# Emails

DocNumber: C05739739
MetadataSubject: NATO
MetadataTo: H
MetadataFrom: Verveer, Melanne S
MetadataDateSent: 2012-09-18T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH2/DOC_0C05739739/C05739739.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: NATO
ExtractedFrom: Verveer, Melanne S <VerveerMS@state.gov>
ExtractedDateSent: Tuesday, September 18, 2012 8:35 PM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739739
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN FULL
ExtractedBodyText:
  I'm heading back from meetings on women, peace and security at NATO. The chief implementer of WPS at DOD also
  traveled with me. It was extremely productive. SG Rasmussen chaired a meeting on 1325 today of all the NATO member
  and partner ambassadors incl DaIcier. The new NATO special rep for 1325 -- the position sponsored by Norway and
  approved at the Chicago summit — gave her inaugural address, and my DOD colleague and I discussed the US efforts
  both generally and in Afghanistan. We were followed by extensive remarks from the NATO ambassadors, all of whom
  touched on the importance of women's role in security and NATO's mission, as well as applauded US leadership. Many
  mentioned you in their interventions! The ambs from Serbia, Azerbaijan and Georgia pointed to their own national
  action plans (their existence was a surprise to us), as well as the new structures they have put in place to implement
  them. The ambassador from Azerbaijan even said that he is hopeful women will contribute to ending their regional
  conflict (I will tell Morningstar). The new special rep - a seasoned diplomat who knows her way around NATO --- wanted
  me to ten you how much you have inspired her -- something I hear everywhere!
  I'm confident our NATO visit also served to reinforce the importance of the NAP and the US role with our own people
  both at NATO and DOD.
  I was sorry to miss the discussion with ASSK but there are more events with her tomw. We are working hard on getting
  the engagement of Burmese women into the formal peace structures being put in place to end the ethnic conflicts.
  I also met with Vivian Redding at the EU who, despite her efforts, is unlikely to get a quota for women on public boards
  of directors adopted. She too expressed her admiration of you and your leadership.
  In addition to everything that's been said about Chris Stevens, he really understood the important role the women in
  Libya were playing in peace and security. Whenever I met with Libyan women at meetings in the region, they went out
  of their way to tell me how much he supported them and how much affection they had for him. Such an awful loss.
  You've been magnificent throughout all this, despite how wrenching it's been.
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739739
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045409

RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739739
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  FULL
  From: Verveer, Melanne S <VerveerMS@state.gov>
  Sent: Tuesday, September 18, 2012 8:35 PM
  To:
  Subject: NATO
  I'm heading back from meetings on women, peace and security at NATO. The chief implementer of WPS at DOD also
  traveled with me. It was extremely productive. SG Rasmussen chaired a meeting on 1325 today of all the NATO member
  and partner ambassadors incl DaIcier. The new NATO special rep for 1325 -- the position sponsored by Norway and
  approved at the Chicago summit — gave her inaugural address, and my DOD colleague and I discussed the US efforts
  both generally and in Afghanistan. We were followed by extensive remarks from the NATO ambassadors, all of whom
  touched on the importance of women's role in security and NATO's mission, as well as applauded US leadership. Many
  mentioned you in their interventions! The ambs from Serbia, Azerbaijan and Georgia pointed to their own national
  action plans (their existence was a surprise to us), as well as the new structures they have put in place to implement
  them. The ambassador from Azerbaijan even said that he is hopeful women will contribute to ending their regional
  conflict (I will tell Morningstar). The new special rep - a seasoned diplomat who knows her way around NATO --- wanted
  me to ten you how much you have inspired her -- something I hear everywhere!
  I'm confident our NATO visit also served to reinforce the importance of the NAP and the US role with our own people
  both at NATO and DOD.
  I was sorry to miss the discussion with ASSK but there are more events with her tomw. We are working hard on getting
  the engagement of Burmese women into the formal peace structures being put in place to end the ethnic conflicts.
  I also met with Vivian Redding at the EU who, despite her efforts, is unlikely to get a quota for women on public boards
  of directors adopted. She too expressed her admiration of you and your leadership.
  In addition to everything that's been said about Chris Stevens, he really understood the important role the women in
  Libya were playing in peace and security. Whenever I met with Libyan women at meetings in the region, they went out
  of their way to tell me how much he supported them and how much affection they had for him. Such an awful loss.
  You've been magnificent throughout all this, despite how wrenching it's been.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739739
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045409



DocNumber: C05739740
MetadataSubject: FW:
MetadataFrom: H
MetadataDateSent: 2012-10-17T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH3/DOC_0C05739740/C05739740.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedTo: B6
ExtractedFrom: H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>
ExtractedCc: Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.gov>
ExtractedDateSent: Wednesday, October 17, 2012 5.48 PM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739740
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
ExtractedBodyText: Pis print.
RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739740
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN PART B5,B3 CIA
  PERS/ORG,B6
  From: H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>
  Sent: Wednesday, October 17, 2012 5.48 PM
  To: B6
  Subject:
  Pis print.
  Original Message
  From: Sullivan, Jacob J [mailto:Sullivanil@state.gov]
  Sent: Thursday, September 27, 2012 12:27 PM
  To: H
  Cc: Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.gov>
  Subject: Fw:
  Original Message
  From:
  Sent: Saturday. September 15. 2012 11:08 AM
  To
  B3 CIA PERS/ORG
  B6
  Sullivan. Jacob J:
  Cc:
  Subject:
  Per the discussion at Deputies, here are the revised TPs for HPSCI. Let me know what you think.
  B5
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739740
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045727



DocNumber: C05739741
MetadataSubject: FW:
MetadataFrom: H
MetadataDateSent: 2012-10-17T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH3/DOC_0C05739741/C05739741.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedCc: Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.gov>
ExtractedDateSent: Thursday, September 27, 2012 12:27 PM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739741
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
ExtractedBodyText:
  Pis print.
  H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>
  Wednesday. October 17 2012 5.48 PM
  B6
  Fw:
  ---

RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739741
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN PART B5,B3 CIA
  PERS/ORG,B6
  From:
  Sent
  To:
  Subject:
  Pis print.
  H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>
  Wednesday. October 17 2012 5.48 PM
  B6
  Fw:
  --- Original Message -----
  From: Sullivan, Jacob Jimaitto:Suilivanii@state.govi
  Sent: Thursday, September 27, 2012 12:27 PM
  To: H
  Cc: Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.gov>
  Subject: Fw:
  ---- Original Message ---
  From
  Sent- Saturday Senterniser 15 2012 11-08 AM
  To:
  B3 CIA PERS/ORG
  B6
  Sullivan, Jacob i;
  Cc:
  Subject:
  Per the discussion at Deputies, here are the revised TPs for HPSCI. Let me know what you think.
  B5
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739741
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045728



DocNumber: C05739742
MetadataSubject: BENGHAZI UPDATE (1200 LOCAL)
MetadataTo: H
MetadataFrom: Mills, Cheryl D
MetadataDateSent: 2011-08-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH1/DOC_0C05739742/C05739742.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: Fw: Benghazi update (1200 local)
ExtractedFrom: Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.gov>
ExtractedCc: S_SpecialAssistarits
ExtractedDateSent: Monday, August 22, 2011 7:10 AM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739742
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN FULL
RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739742
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  FULL
  From: Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.gov>
  Sent: Monday, August 22, 2011 7:10 AM
  To:
  Subject: Fw: Benghazi update (1200 local)
  From: Abbaszadeh, Myna
  Sent: Monday, August 22, 2011 06:54 AM
  To: Sullivan, Jacob); Wells, Alice G; Abedln, Hume; Hanley, Monica R; Mills, Cheryl D
  Cc: S_SpecialAssistarits
  Subject: FVV: Benghazi update (1200 local)
  Update from Rep. Stevens in Benghazi, based on largely on info from acting PM Ali Tarhouni and acting FM
  Salah Bishari:
  • TNC caretaker cabinet/members were up until 4am following events in Tripoli and discussing plans for
  the coming days. Tarhouni said the TNC has been in constant communication with its people in Tripoli,
  including both fighters and those entrusted with implementing the stabilization plans. Rebels in Tripoli,
  in coordination with the TNC, have begun to set up checkpoints inside the city and guard public
  buildings.
  • TNC chairman Abd al Jalil and PM Jibril made statements to the media last night, urging people to
  refrain from revenge attacks and destruction of public buildings.
  • There has so far been "no bloodbath" or serious looting.
  • The capture of Sail al-Islam al-Qadhafi and Mohamed al-Qadhafi is significant The TNC, including
  Abd al-Jalil himself, intervened with rebels surrounding Mohamed's house to ensure that they did not
  harm him. They understood that it would be harmful to the revolution and the TNC if he were
  killed. These events were captured live by Al Jazeera in interviews with Mohamed. Both brothers are
  in rebel custody (at this time, it is unclear to us exactly who is holding them, however).
  • Per Tarhouni, the next steps are: 1) find Muammar Qadhafi; 2) issue a statement announcing the end of
  the Qadhafi regime and the start of the interim period under the INC (TNC staff have begun drafting
  this statement already); 3) insure the delivery of essential services and commodities (esp addressing the
  acute shortages of fuel, children's milk, and medication for blood pressure and diabetes); and 4) move
  the TNC to Tripoli.
  • Regarding the move to Tripoli, Tarhouni said security arrangements would need to be made before they
  could send the TNC.' leadership to the capital. We have heard from another contact that some TNC
  members are already making plans to fly to Misurata and the Western Mountains, possibly as early as
  today, and from there drive to Tripoli.
  • Request for assistance: Tarhouni, who also holds US citizenship, said the items listed above (gas, diesel,
  baby milk, and medicine) are urgently needed in Tripoli and recommended that the USG ship those
  items directly to Zawiya's Port and publicize such assistance as soon as feasible (in coordination with
  the INC). He said this would bring tlie US even more goodwill than it has already earned bore
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739742
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045094



DocNumber: C05739744
MetadataSubject: H: NEW INTEL, LIBYAN PM'S PLANS. SID
MetadataTo: sullivanjj@state.gov
MetadataFrom: H
MetadataDateSent: 2012-10-17T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH3/DOC_0C05739744/C05739744.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: Fw: H: New intel, Libyan PM's plans. Sid
ExtractedTo: 'suilivanii@stategov‘
ExtractedFrom: H <hrod17@clintonernail.corn>
ExtractedDateSent: Wednesday, October 17, 2012 905 PM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739744
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
ExtractedBodyText:
  Fyi.
  B6

RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739744
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  PART B6
  From: H <hrod17@clintonernail.corn>
  Sent: Wednesday, October 17, 2012 905 PM
  To: 'suilivanii@stategov‘
  Subject: Fw: H: New intel, Libyan PM's plans. Sid
  Attachments: hrc memo_rievv_libyan_pm_plans 101612.clooc
  Fyi.
  B6
  From: Sidney Blumenthal [mailto
  Sent: Tuesday, October 16, 2012 09:47 AM
  To: H
  Subject: H: New intel, Libyan PM's plans. Sid
  CONFIDENTIAL
  October 16, 2012
  For: Hillary
  From: Sid
  Re: Plans of new Libyan PM
  SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the
  highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.
  1.On October 15, 2012, new Libya Prime Minister All Zidan discussed the future structure of
  his cabinet and administration with senior advisors to interim President Yussef el Magariaf.
  According to a sensitive source, Zidan stated that he intends to draw on all sectors of the Libyan
  political world to form his cabinet. He also advised that while be must proceed with caution he will
  have at least one and possibly as many as three members of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and its
  Justice and Construction Party (JCP) included M the cabinet. Zidari believes that he can find
  members of the JCP and other Islamist groups who support his plan for establishing a moderate
  Islamic state, while maintaining good working relations with the United States and Western Europe.
  Zidan also plans to reach out to the supporters of Islamist General Abdel Hakim Alamin Belhaj, who
  he believes can be used as a balance against al Qafda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Ansar al
  Sharia as they attempt to undermine the new administration,
  2. In the opinion of this individual Zidan is committed to Magariafs policy of seeking
  constructive relationships with international oil companies. In this regard, Zidan is looking for an
  individual to serve as Minister of Oil who has the appropriate experience and reputation in the
  International Oil industry, while maintaining Islamic credentials that will allow the Minister to work
  with the JCP and conservative independent members of the General National Congress (GNC). Zidan
  believes this will be among his greatest challenges. At the same time, this individual notes that Zidan
  has complained that he and Magariaf are under pressure from the Mohammed Morsi and the Muslim
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No F-2015-04841
  Doc No C05739744 STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  Date 05/13/2015 SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045729

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739744
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  Brotherhood Government of Egypt to use Egyptian oil service firms to replace Western firms in
  supporting the Libyan oil industry. Zidan is skeptical about this idea, fearing that Libya could become
  too dependent on Egypt for technical expertise. He believes that Western firms provide the
  opportunity to maintain independence and balance in the oil sector.
  3.(Source Comment: In the opinion of this source, Zidan, who served at the Libyan Mission to
  India for two years before defecting to the West in 1980, joining Magariaf and his anti- Qadd.afi
  National Front for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL), plans to work with all of the parties and groups in
  the GNC. At the same time his history gives the Prime Minister a relationship with the President and
  a degree of credibility that will be helpful as he forms his cabinet. According to this source, Zidan
  wants to move quickly to name a cabinet. His position is also strengthened by the fact that he worked
  on behalf of the National Transitional Council (NTC) during the 2011Civil War, organizing
  international support for the rebels. According to this sensitive source, Ziclan's immediate concerns
  include organizing the investigation of the September ii attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi,
  and the resulting assassination of Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other Americans. Zidan
  is already under pressure from the U.S. Government to move the investigation along as quickly as
  possible.)
  4. In the opinion of this individual Zidan realizes that the attack on the U.S. consulate is now
  an international symbol of the security issues at play in Libya, and that the use of pro-government
  militias to provide security is not a long term solution to the problem. Zidan believes that the idea
  that the government must ask for support from the powerful militias from Misrata and Zintan
  undermines his efforts to bring order and centralized authority to the country. Zidan believes that he
  can address this problem in part by developing a working majority in the GNC drawing on moderates
  and independents, who will support his efforts to establish a modern Islamic regime that can work
  with the West, particularly International Oil Companies. That said, he cautions his advisors that he
  does not anticipate real success in this regard until the latter part of 2013.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739744
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045730

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739744
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  CONFIDENTIAL
  October 16, 2012
  For: Hillary
  From: Sid
  Re: Plans of new Libyan PM
  SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as
  the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.
  On October 15, 2012, new Libya Prime Minister Ali Zidan discussed the future
  structure of his cabinet and administration with senior advisors to interim President Yussef el
  Ma,gariaf According to a sensitive source, Zidan stated that he intends to draw on all sectors of
  the Libyan political world to form his cabinet. He also advised that while he must proceed with
  caution he will have at least one and possibly as many as three members of the Muslim
  Brotherhood (MB) and its Justice and Construction Party (JCP) included in the cabinet. Zidan
  believes that he can find members of the JCP and other Islamist groups who support his plan for
  establishing a moderate Islamic state, while maintaining good working relations with the United
  States and Western Europe. Zidan also plans to reach out to the supporters of Islamist General
  Abdel Hakim Alainin Belhaj, who he believes can be used as a balance against al Oarda in the
  Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Ansar al Sharia as they attempt to undermine the new
  administration.
  2. In the opinion of this individual Zidan is committed to Magariars policy of seeking
  constructive relationships with international oil companies. In this regard, Zidan is looking for
  an individual to serve as Minister of Oil who has the appropriate experience and reputation in the
  International Oil industry, while maintaining Islamic credentials that will allow the Minister to
  work with the JCP and conservative independent members of the General National Congress
  (GNC). Zidan believes this will be among his greatest challenges. At the same time, this
  individual notes that Zidan has complained that he and Magariaf are under pressure from the
  Mohammed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood Government of Egypt to use Egyptian oil
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739744
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045731



DocNumber: C05739745
MetadataSubject: BENGHAZI UPDATE (1200 LOCAL)
MetadataTo: abedinh@state.gov
MetadataFrom: H
MetadataDateSent: 2011-08-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH1/DOC_0C05739745/C05739745.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: Fw: Benghazi update (1200 local)
ExtractedTo: 'abedinh@state.gov'; 'sullivanj@state.goV
ExtractedFrom: H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>
ExtractedCc: S_SpecialAssistants
ExtractedDateSent: Monday, August 22, 2011 07:06 AM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739745
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN FULL
ExtractedBodyText: Can we arrange shipments of what's requested?
RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739745
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  FULL
  From: H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>
  Sent Monday, August 22, 2011 7:11 AM
  To: 'abedinh@state.gov'; 'sullivanj@state.goV
  Subject Re: Benghazi update (1200 local)
  Can we arrange shipments of what's requested?
  From: Abedin, Huma [mailto:AbedinH©state.gov]
  Sent: Monday, August 22, 2011 07:06 AM
  To: H
  Subject: Fw: Benghazi update (1200 local)
  From: Abbaszadeh, Nima
  Sent: Monday, August 22, 2011 06:54 AM
  To: Sullivan, Jacob 3; Wells, Alice G; Abedin, Huma; Hanley, Monica R; Mills, Cheryl D
  Cc: S_SpecialAssistants
  Subject: FW: Benghazi update (1200 local)
  Update from Rep. Stevens in Benghazi, based on largely on info from acting PM Ali Tarhouni and acting FM
  Salah Bishari:
  • TNC caretaker cabinet/members were up until 4am following events in Tripoli and discussing plans for
  the coming days. Tarhouni said the TNC has been in constant communication with its people in Tripoli,
  including both fighters and those entrusted with implementing the stabilization plans. Rebels in Tripoli,
  in coordination with the TNC, have begun to set up checkpoints inside the city and guard public
  buildings.
  • TNC chairman Abd al Jalil and PM Jibril made statements to the media last nigh urging people to
  refrain from revenge attacks and destruction of public buildings.
  • There has so far been "no bloodbath" or serious looting.
  • The capture of Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi and Mohamed al-Qadhafi is significant. The TNC, including
  Abd al-Jalil himself, intervened with rebels surrounding Mohamed's house to ensure that they did not
  harm him. They understood that it would be harmful to the revolution and the TNC if he were
  killed. These events were captured live by Al Jazeera in interviews with Mohamed. Both brothers are
  in rebel custody (at this time, it is unclear to us exactly who is holding them, however).
  • Per Tarhouni, the next steps are: 1) find Muammar Qadhafi; 2) issue a statement announcing the end of
  the Qadhafi regime and the start of the interim period under the mic (TNC staff have begun drafting
  this statement already); 3) insure the delivery of essential services and commodities (esp addressing the
  acute shortages of fuel, children's milk, and medication for blood pressure and diabetes); and 4) move
  the TNC to Tripoli.
  • Regarding the move to Tripoli, Tarhouni said security arrangements would need to be made before they
  could send the TNC leadership to the capital. We have heard from another contact that some TNC
  members are already making plans to fly to Misurata and the Western Mountains, possibly as early as
  today, and from there drive to Tripoli.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739745
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045095

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739745
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  in Request for assistance: Tarhciuni, who also holds US citizenship, said the ileitis listed .above (gas,. diesel,
  baby milk, and medicine) are urgently needed,in.Tripoli and recommended that the:psq ship those
  items directly to .4awiya's Port and publicize such assistance as sc.5on as feaSitik (in coordination With
  the TNC). He said this would bring the US even more-goodwill than it has already earned here.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739745
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045096



DocNumber: C05739747
MetadataSubject: ANDREW SULLIVAN WITH THE HILLARY LOVE
MetadataFrom: H
MetadataDateSent: 2012-09-19T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH2/DOC_0C05739747/C05739747.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedCc: Cheryl Mills Maggie Williams
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739747
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
ExtractedBodyText:
  Pis print.
  H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>
  Wednesday. September 19 2012 4:26 PM
  Fw: Fwd: Andrew Sullivan with the Hillary love

RawText:
  B6
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739747
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  PART B6
  From:
  Sent:
  To:
  Subject:
  Pis print.
  H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>
  Wednesday. September 19 2012 4:26 PM
  Fw: Fwd: Andrew Sullivan with the Hillary love
  Original Message
  From: Cheryl Mills [mailto
  Sent: Sunday, September 16, 2012 02:28 PM
  To: H
  Subject: Fwd: Andrew Sullivan with the Hillary love
  see op ed
  Forwarded message
  From: Roy Spence
  Date: Sun, Sep 16, 2012 at 1:54 PM
  Subject: RE: Andrew Sullivan with the Hillary love
  To: Jim Kennedy Judy Trabulsi
  Cc: Cheryl Mills Maggie Williams
  This is simply painfully honest on her part and a moment in time where Higher Purpose shines a bright light on Higher
  Ground...Higher Ground is where all great solutions and triumphs are found and scaled...HRC-once again is taking people
  there-whether they ever thought they ever want to go there or not...
  From: Jim Kennedy [mailto:
  Sent: Sunday, September 16, 2012 12:37 PM
  To: Judy Trabulsi
  Cc: Cheryl Mills; Roy Spence; Maggie Williams
  Subject: Re: andrew sullivan with the hillary love
  This op-ed in the Boston Herald is amazing - all the more so because it comes from a former critic of hers:
  An apology to Hillary
  Drying tears again, resilient Clinton proves true leader
  By Margery Eagan I Sunday, September 16, 2012 I http://www.bostonherald.com I Columnists
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739747
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045410

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739747
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  At Andrews Air Force Base on Friday, a military band played "Nearer, My God, to Thee." Marines in dress uniforms
  carried to four black hearses the flag-draped caskets of the Americans, including Winchester native Glen Doherty, killed
  at our consulate in Libya. President Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton led the solemn ceremony, Clinton
  speaking before him.
  "If the last few days teach us anything, let it be this: that this work and the men and women who risk their lives to do it
  are at the heart of what makes America great and good," said Clinton, her voice at times uneven with emotion for the
  dead men she had employed.
  Then she said: "So we will wipe away our tears, stiffen our spines, and face the future undaunted."
  It was a perfect line for America and for Americans who try to keep peace in a smoldering Middle East. It was a line, too,
  that captured — unwittingly or not — how Clinton has lived her life. How many times since this woman took center
  stage in this country nearly 20 years ago has she, privately and publicly, wiped away her tears, stiffened her spine, and
  faced the future undaunted.
  Clinton appeared to be crying again as she listened to Obama, seeming stricken himself. And when Obama finished and
  walked back behind the podium, Clinton reached for his hand like an older sister or even a mother, and held it for a
  second or two. It was a moment the history books will remember.
  There was the first black president on the verge of re-election, or not. There was the woman expected to be the first
  female president, until he showed up out of nowhere. There was the rivalry and tortured history, Bill Clinton ever the
  third actor in the shadows. But all of it was put aside for something bigger than politics or egos: their country. We don't
  see enough of that anymore.
  When her husband was president, I made a career out of trashing Hillary Clinton's hairdos, pantsuits, her attempted
  health care coup, her right-wing conspiracy theories, her staying with that slippery serial philanderer. Four years ago in
  the presidential primary I rooted for Obama over her.
  Yet when she finally conceded a totally unexpected defeat, a different Hillary Clinton began to emerge. She surprised us
  by accepting a consolation prize, secretary of state. She then went on to perform it so ably that nearly two-thirds of
  Americans, an almost unprecedented percentage, approve of her and her rehabilitated — or so we hope — spouse.
  More than once since 2008 I've wondered: Would she have done a better job than Obama? I don't know. But I do know I
  sold this woman short.
  In awful moments in history, some leaders rise to the occasion, and some don't. Think Ronald Reagan's reassurance
  after the Challenger disaster. Or George Bush on the rubble of Ground Zero after 9/11, telling the world we'd never
  forget. Friday, by comparison, was a tiny moment. Still, Hillary Clinton rose to meet it.
  On Sat, Sep 15, 2012 at 11:10 PM, Judy Trabulsi ftirote: B6
  I like "her trademark combination of resolve, empathy, and hyper competence".
  Sent from my iPhone
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739747
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045411

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739747
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  On Sep 15, 2012, at 9:19 PM, "Cheryl Mills" < wrote:
  > The link
  Forwarded message
  > From: Forman, James
  > Date: Sat, Sep 15, 2012 at 3:25 PM
  > Subject: andrew sullivan with the hillary love
  > To: David Domenici Cheryl Mills B6
  > Nice.
  > http://andrewsullivan.thedailybeast.com/2012/09/heyond-the-campaign-th
  > e-country.html
  This e-mail is intended only for the named person or entity to which it is addressed and contains valuable business
  information that is proprietary, privileged, confidential and/or otherwise protected from disclosure. If you received this
  email in error, any review, use, dissemination, distribution or copying of this email is strictly prohibited. Please notify us
  immediately of the error via email to disclaimerinquiries@gsdm.com and please delete the email from your system,
  retaining no copies in any media. We appreciate your cooperation.
  gsdm.legal.disclaimer.03242011
  UNCLASSIFIED
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  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739747
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045412



DocNumber: C05739748
MetadataSubject: BENGHAZI UPDATE (1200 LOCAL)
MetadataTo: H
MetadataFrom: Sullivan, Jacob J
MetadataDateSent: 2011-08-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH1/DOC_0C05739748/C05739748.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: Re: Benghazi update (1200 local)
ExtractedTo: H; Abedin, Huma
ExtractedFrom: Sullivan, Jacob J <SullivanJJ@state.gov>
ExtractedCc: S_SpecialAssistants
ExtractedDateSent: Monday, August 22, 2011 7:17 AM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739748
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN FULL
ExtractedBodyText: Already working on it with Eric S., Jeremy B., and NSS.
RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739748
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  FULL
  From: Sullivan, Jacob J <SullivanJJ@state.gov>
  Sent: Monday, August 22, 2011 7:17 AM
  To: H; Abedin, Huma
  Subject: Re: Benghazi update (1200 local)
  Already working on it with Eric S., Jeremy B., and NSS.
  From: H [mallto:HDR22@clintonemall.com)
  Sent: Monday, August 22, 2011 07:10 AM
  To: Abedin, Hume; Sullivan, Jacob
  Subject: Re: Benghazi update (1200 local)
  Can we arrange shipments of what's requested?
  From: AbedIn, Huma [mailto:AbeclinH@state.gov]
  Sent: Monday, August 22, 2011 07:06 AM
  To: H
  Subject: Fw: Benghazi update (1200 local)
  From: Abbaszadeh, Nima
  Sent: Monday, August 22, 2011 06:54 AM
  To: Sullivan, Jacob J; Wells, Alice G; Abedin, Huma; Hanley, Monica R; Mills, Cheryl D
  Cc: S_SpecialAssistants
  Subject: FW: Benghazi update (1200 local)
  Update from Rep. Stevens in Benghazi, based on largely on info from acting PM Ali Tarhouni and acting FM
  Salah Bishari:
  • TNC caretaker cabinet/members were up until 4am following events in Tripoli and discussing plans for
  the coming days. Tarhouni said the TNC has been in constant communication with its people in Tripoli,
  including both fighters and those entrusted with implementing the stabilization plans. Rebels in Tripoli,
  in coordination with the TNC, have begun to set up checkpoints inside the city and guard public
  buildings.
  • INC chairman Abd al Jalil and PM Jibril made statements to the media last night, urging people to
  refrain from revenge attacks and destruction of public buildings.
  • There has so far been "no bloodbath" or serious looting.
  • The capture of Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi and Mohamed al-Qadhafi is significant. The TNC, including
  Abd al-Jalil himself, intervened with rebels surrounding Mohamed's house to ensure that they did not
  harm him. They understood that it would be harmful to the revolution and the TNC if he were
  killed. These events were captured live by Al Jazeera in interviews with Mohamed. Both brothers are
  in rebel custody (at this time, it is unclear to us exactly who is holding Clem, however).
  • Per Tarhouni, the next steps are: 1) find Muammar Qadhafi; 2) issue a statement announcing the end of
  the Qadhafi regime and the start of the interim period under the TNC (TNC staff have begun drafting
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739748
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045097

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739748
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  this statement already); 3) insure the delivery of essential services and commodities (esp. addressing the
  acute shortages of fuel, children's milk, and medication for blood pressure and diabetes); and 4) move
  the INC to Tripoli.
  • Regarding the move to Tripoli, Tarhouni said security arrangements would need to be made before they
  could send the INC leadership to the capital. We have heard from another contact that some TNC
  members are already making plans to fly to Misurata and the Western Mountains, possibly as early as
  today, and from there drive to Tripoli.
  • Request for assistance: Tarhouni, who also holds US citizenship, said the items listed above (gas, diesel,
  baby milk, and medicine) are urgently needed in Tripoli and recommended that the IJSG ship those
  items directly to Zawiya's Port and publicize such assistance as soon as feasible (in coordination with
  the TNC). He said this would bring the US even more goodwill than it has already earned here.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739748
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045098



DocNumber: C05739750
MetadataTo: Russorv@state.gov
MetadataFrom: H
MetadataDateSent: 2012-10-17T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH3/DOC_0C05739750/C05739750.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739750
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
MetadataSubject:
  [SALON] THE DEATH OF AMBASSADOR CHRIS STEVENS, THE NEED FOR "EXPEDITIONARY DIPLOMACY," AND THE REAL LESSONS FOR U.S. DIPLOMACY

ExtractedBodyText:
  H <hrod17@clintonernail.com5
  Wednesday, October 17, 2012 9:14 PM
  'RLissorv@state.gov'
  Fw: Fwd: [Salon] The Death of Ambassador Chris Stevens, the Need for "Expeditionary
  Diplomacy, " and the Real Lessons for U.S. Diplomacy
  Pls print.

RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739750
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  PART B6
  From:
  Sent:
  To:
  Subject:
  H <hrod17@clintonernail.com5
  Wednesday, October 17, 2012 9:14 PM
  'RLissorv@state.gov'
  Fw: Fwd: [Salon] The Death of Ambassador Chris Stevens, the Need for "Expeditionary
  Diplomacy, " and the Real Lessons for U.S. Diplomacy
  Pls print.
  From:
  Sent: Monday, October 15, 2012 10:27 AM
  To: H
  Subject: Fwd: [Salon] The Death of Ambassador Chris Stevens, the Need for "Expeditionary Diplomacy, "arid the Real
  Lessons for U.S. Diplomacy
  Helpful article. Sid
  Sent from my Verizon Wireless 4G LTE DROID
  B6
  Original Message
  Subject: [Salon] The Death of Ambassador Chris Stevens, the Need for &quot;Expeditionary Diplomacy,
  &quot; and the Real Lessons for U.S. Diplomacy
  From: Chas Freeman &It; &gt;
  To: &quot;[Salonj&quot; &It;salonr&committeefortherepublic.org&gt;
  The Death of Ambassador Chris Stevens, the Need
  for "Expeditionary Diplomacy," and the Real
  Lessons for U.S. Diplomacy
  By Anthony H. Cordesinan
  Oct 11,2012
  littp://csis.orpublication/death-ambassador-chris-stevens-need-expe.ditionary-diplomacy-and-real-lessons-us.,
  cliplomac?utm source-The+Death+of-f-Ambassador-i-Chris+Stevens+and-i-Real+Lessons+tbr÷U.S.+Diplornacy
  &utrn campaign—The+Death+offAmbassador÷Chris+Stevens+and+Real+Lessons-E-for+U .5 .+Diplomacy&utin
  . medium=einail
  It is almost inevitable in an election year that Republicans use every possible opportunity to attack the Obama
  Administration. Part of these attacks have been effort to embarrass the President by turning the killing of
  Ambassador Stevens into a "gotcha" contest where. the President is somehow blamed for largely local security
  decisions and "intelligence failures," The Administration, in turn, has fumbled the situation by going into a state
  of confused denial -- focusing on the uncertain chronology of events that led to Ambassador Chris Stevens'
  death.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739750
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045732

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739750
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  The Republicans seem to be "winning" in political terms, largely because so few Americans in think tanks and
  the media realize that virtually all intelligence and security post-mortems on such events uncover the same
  problems. Once the event is over and clear patterns emerge, there are always warning indicators that could have
  been heeded in retrospect. If one ignores that vast amount of "noise" from other conflicting indicators, and
  looks back with 20-20 hindsight, every such event is always an "intelligence" failure.
  Moreover, competent security officers always are asking for more support and coverage in any area where risks
  exist. There is never enough security even in the best funded times, and these are not the best funded times.
  Almost every aspect of U.S. diplomacy has been subject to budget cuts at a time of upheaval in the Arab world
  and global economic crisis.
  A recent article by Dana Milbank in the Washington Post notes that the same Republican dominated House that
  now critiques events in Libya cut State Department operations by $300 million in 2009 and eliminated funds for
  some 30 more security positions along with it. The House cut security funding by $128 million in FY2011 and
  $331 million in FY2012, although the Senate restored $88 million. Under at least one of Congressman Ryan's
  proposals to amend the budget, State Department funding would be cut by an additional 20% million in 2014 –
  which means another $400 million cut in security.
  It is no tribute to the Obama Administration that it did far too little to push back against these cuts, and even
  less to articulate the need to fund stronger U.S. "expeditionary diplomacy" efforts. Indeed, at a time when far
  too many countries are in crisis and the U.S. faces increased challenges to its regional goals, more funds,
  stronger country teams, increased humanitarian aid, beefed-up military assistance, and on-the-scene diplomacy
  is needed to support U.S. interests.
  In fairness to Secretary Clinton and the large number of dedicated diplomatic professionals, State has tried to
  deal with these challenges by refocusing its diminishing resources, strengthening its ability to provide on-the-
  scene aid, and creating civil efforts that can deal with crises like Syria and the need to provide stronger U.S. aid
  and advisory teams if dictators like Assad fall.
  So far, both the Republican "gotcha" efforts and the Administration's failure to make the case for strong
  "expeditionary diplomacy" have totally failed to serve the U.S. national interest, and have been the worst
  possible memorial to Ambassador Chris Stevens, a man who clearly knew that America's success required risk
  taking and action in the field.
  It is time we come to grips with the world we actually live in. We can't deal with the political upheavals in a
  single Arab country, the impact of Transition in Afghanistan, the internal struggle for the future of Islam,
  energy and trade security, the various national crises in Latin America and Africa, or the competition for the
  future of Asia by speeches in the U.S., quick visits by senior U.S. officials, outside radio and TV programs, and
  empty rhetoric about taking stronger stands or exporting U.S. values.
  We need strong country teams, and teams that are active and take risks. We need men and women on the scene
  who accept the realities on the ground in the countries they operate in. We need strong country teams that can
  work with the full range of factions, provide help in forming political parties and changing governance, provide
  carefully selected aid and advisory efforts to catalyze reform, and provide military and security advisors that
  can help countries move towards stability without excessive repression and threatening their neighbors.
  We need to protect our embassies, consulates, and military advisory groups, but we cannot afford to turn them
  in to fortresses that lock our diplomats, aid teams, and military on the scene away from events and the people
  they are trying to influence. If there are any real lessons from Libya —or Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen,
  Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and all the other nations on the long list of cases where
  American diplomats, advisors and security teams died to serve their country —it is that projecting any form of
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739750
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045733

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739750
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  smart power is done on the ground, is done by moving throughout the country, is done by taking risks, and will
  inevitably incur casualties.
  Some will be ambassadors, some will be aid team personnel or experts in public diplomacy, and some will be
  CIA or men and women in uniform. Every one of them will be a tragedy. But we cannot let either false
  economies or extremist and terrorist threats defeat such efforts. The cost of properly funded expeditionary
  diplomacy —people, military and civil aid funds, and fully funded security efforts —is going to be cheaper
  even on a global level than losing contact and U.S. influence in a single country like Egypt, or being unprepared
  to deal with the flow of events in a nation like Syria or Iraq.
  It is also already all too clear that extremist elements throughout the world realize that attacks on U.S. diplomats
  and military advisors or partners are one of the cheapest and most effective ways to gain immediate visibility,
  strike at the heart of U.S. public opinion, drive the U.S. out of a country, or limit its influence. No one needs to
  defeat U.S. military forces — which can only be deployed to a handful of countries at most —if they can expel
  or paralyze American diplomacy, support for U.S. businesses and investment, support for U.S. NG0s, and
  effective U.S. military and security advisory efforts.
  This threat is already all too real in far too many parts of the world, and it has effectively eliminated one of the
  key differences between "hard" and "soft" power. "Soft" power cannot survive where it is not protected by
  "hard" power. Moreover, there are few if any crises cases where advice and aid in politics, governance,
  economics and rule of law can be separated from a matching need for advice and aid in addressing military,
  security, counterterrorism, and national police concerns.
  In short, we do not need "gotcha" post-mortems or half-formed defenses. The tribute we really owe
  Ambassador Chris Stevens is to undertake the following eight steps:
  • Understand that diplomacy will often be a form of asymmetric warfare in crisis countries, particularly
  those with crumbling regimes or new unstable governments. Accept the fact there can be no success
  without taking increased risk and suffering casualties.
  • Set realistic and achievable goals country-by-country and give the ambassador and country team as
  much discretion as possible. Don't set impossible goals for instant democracy, human rights, rule of law
  or stability. Accept the need for evolutionary action and "doing it their way." Don't try one size fits all
  ideological solutions or efforts from Washington.
  • Stop focusing on narrow budget cuts and examine the costs and benefits of effective, well-funded
  country team efforts. If properly funded diplomacy and country team efforts only win support for the
  U.S. in one crisis country over the next decade, or avoid even one armed intervention, they will still
  more than pay for their costs in terms of the U.S. budget, and the overall effort will be immensely more
  valuable in terms of gains (and tax revenues) in U.S. trade and investment.
  • Reexamine how to create all of the elements of "expeditionary diplomacy" efforts, including strong
  country teams, and the ability to suddenly boost teams in countries in crises, with the full range of tools
  an ambassador needs. This includes adequate staff, operating and security funds, and flexible aid funds
  that can be applied quickly to deal with changing needs and circumstances.
  • Fully fund security but find the best ways to change existing procedures to emphasize mobility and
  move to high-risk areas. Refocus intelligence to help reduce risks, and restructure protection efforts to
  provide specially trained and equipped U.S. and foreign national security. Stop doing pointless security
  post-mortem blame games and focus on the future.
  • Reward and encourage necessary risk taking. Make it clear that this is a key part of a successful career
  path, that it will be fully supported by State and other agencies deploying U.S. personnel, and reorient
  security efforts in country to protect such efforts in the best ways possible rather than creating rules that
  either make effective action impossible or force diplomats and advisors to violate such rules without
  protection. Anyone who works with U.S. diplomats, aid workers, and military advisory teams overseas
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739750
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045734

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739750
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  knows that we have strong cadres ready and willing to take such risks. The challenge is to properly
  support them in county and reward them for their service.
  • Reexamine the insurance coverage, benefits, and salaries of such risk takers. Don't sustain the present
  situation in Afghanistan and earlier in Iraq where contractors get massive wage increases and diplomats
  and aid workers lack the full equivalent of combat pay and protection for them and their families if they
  are killed or disabled. Ensure adequate lasting medical care for lasting injuries.
  Finally, see if there is some way the U.S. Congress can address these issues realistically in a way that actually
  focuses on U.S. national interests even in a time of petty partisan feeding frenzies. These efforts not only need
  the next Administration to fully fund and support them at a time of growing budget pressures, they need
  bipartisan support in both Houses of Congress.
  There will be a need for outside review, for new reporting requirement and for hearings. But, they need to look
  forward. U.S. efforts must serve national interests rather than personal or partisan advantage, accept the
  complexity and time needed to deal with country-by-country efforts, and focus on pragmatic ways of dealing
  with the future rather than dissecting the past.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739750
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045735



DocNumber: C05739752
MetadataSubject: TICK TOCK ON LIBYA
MetadataTo: H
MetadataFrom: Mills, Cheryl D
MetadataDateSent: 2011-08-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH1/DOC_0C05739752/C05739752.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: FW: tick tock on libya
ExtractedFrom: Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.gov>
ExtractedDateSent: Monday, August 22, 201112:37 PM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739752
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
ExtractedBodyText: Here is Draft
RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739752
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  PART B5,B6
  • 1111111111111111111111■
  111.
  From: Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.gov>
  Sent: Monday, August 22, 201112:37 PM
  To:
  Subject: FW: tick tock on libya
  Here is Draft
  From: Jake Sullivan
  Sant: Sunday, August 21, 2011 7:40 PM
  To: Mills, Cheryl D; Nuiand, Victoria J
  Subject: tidc todc on libya
  this is basically off the top of my head, with a few consultations of my notes. but it shows S'
  leadership/ownership/stewardship of this country's libya policy from start to finish, let me know what you
  think. toria, who else might be able to add to this?
  Secretary Clinton's leadership on Libya
  HRC has been a critical voice on Libya in administration deliberations, at NATO, and in contact group
  meetings — as well as the public face of the U.S. effort in Libya. She was instrumental in securing the
  authorization, building the coalition, and tightening the noose around Qadhafi and his regime.
  February 25 — HRC announces the suspension of operations of the Libyan embassy in Washington.
  February 26 — HRC directs efforts to evacuate all U.S. embassy personnel from Tripoli and orders the closing of
  the embassy.
  February 26 HRC made a series of calls to her counterparts to help secure passage of UNSC 1970, which
  imposes sanctions on Gaddafi and his family and refers Qadhafi and his cronies to the ICC
  February 28 — HRC travels to Geneva, Switzerland for consultations with European partners on Libya. She
  gives a major address in which she says: "Colonel Qadhafi and those around him must be held accountable for
  these acts, which violate international legal obligations and common decency. Through their actions, they have
  lost the legitimacy to govern. And the people of Libya have made themselves clear: It is time for Qadhafi to go
  — now, without further violence or delay." She also works to secure the suspension of Libya from membership
  in the Human Rights Council.
  Early March — HRC appoints Special Envoy Chris Stevens to be the U.S. representative to Benghazi
  March 14 — HRC travels to Paris for the G8 foreign minister's meeting. She meets with TNC representative
  Jibril and consults with her colleagues on further UN Security Council action. She notes that a no-fly zone will
  not be adequate.
  March 14-16 — HRC participates in a series of high-level video- and teleconferences
  She is a leading voice for strong UNSC action and a NA TO civilian
  protection mission.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739752
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045099
  B6
  B5

  UNCLASSIFIED STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  U.S. Department of State SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739752
  Date: 05/13/2015
  March 17— HRC secures Russian abstention and Portuguese and African support for UNSC 1973, ensuring that
  it passes. 1973 authorizes a no-fly zone over Libya and "all necessary measures" - code for military action - to
  protect civilians against Gaddafts army.
  March 24 — HRC engages with allies and secures the transition of command and control of the civilian
  protection mission to NATO. She announces the transition in a statement.
  March 18-30— HRC engages with UAE, Qatar, and Jordan to seek their participation in coalition
  operations. Over the course of several days, all three devote aircraft to the mission.
  March 19 — HRC travels to Paris to meet with European and Arab leaders to prepare for military action to
  protect civilians. That night, the first U.S. air strikes halt the advance of Gaddafi's forces on Benghazi and
  target Libya's air defenses.
  March 29 — HRC travels to London for a conference on Libya, where she is a driving force behind the creation
  of a Contact Group comprising 20-plus countries to coordinate efforts to protect civilians and plan for a post-
  Qadhafi Libya. She is instrumental in setting up a rotating chair system to ensure regional buy-in.
  April 14— HRC travels to Berlin for NATO meetings. She is the driving force behind NATO adopting a
  communique that calls for Qadhafi's departure as a political objective, and lays out three clear military
  objectives: end of attacks and threat of attacks on civilians; the removal of Qadhafi forces from cities they
  forcibly entered; and the unfettered provision of humanitarian access.
  May 5 — HRC travels to Rome for a Contact Group meeting. The Contact Group establishes a coordination
  system and a temporary financial mechanism to funnel money to the TNC.
  June 8 — HRC travels to Abu Dhabi for another Contact Group meeting and holds a series of intense discussions
  with rebel leaders.
  June 12 — HRC travels to Addis for consultations and a speech before the African Union, pressing the case for a
  democratic transition in Libya.
  July 15 — HRC travels to Istanbul and announces that the U.S. recognizes the TNC as the legitimate government
  of Libya. She also secures recognition from the other members of the Contact Group.
  Late June — HRC meets with House Democrats and Senate Republicans to persuade them not to de-fund the
  Libya operation.
  July 16 — HRC sends Feltman, Cretz, and Chollet to Tunis to meet with Qadhafi envoys "to deliver a clear and
  firm message that the only way to move forward, is for Qadhafi to step down".
  Early August — HRC works to construct a $1.5 billion assets package to be approved by the Security Council
  and sent to the TNC. That package is working through its last hurdles.
  Early August -- After military chief Abdel Fattah Younes is killed, S sends a personal message to TNC head
  Jalil to press for a responsible investigation and a careful and inclusive approach to creating a new executive
  council
  Early August -- HRC secures written pledges from the TNC to an inclusive, pluralistic democratic
  transition. She continues to consult with European and Arab colleagues on the evolving situation.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State:
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739752
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045100



DocNumber: C05739753
MetadataSubject: MINI FOR TODAY-THURSDAY, SEPT 20, 2012
MetadataTo: H
MetadataFrom: Coleman, Claire L
MetadataDateSent: 2012-09-20T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH2/DOC_0C05739753/C05739753.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedFrom: Coleman, Claire L <ColemanCL@state.gov>
ExtractedCc: Huma Abedin; Abedin, Hurna;
ExtractedDateSent: Thursday, September 20, 2012 7:32 AM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739753
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
ExtractedBodyText:
  Hanley, Monica R; Valmoro, B6
  8:25 am DEPAIRT Private Residence ''En route State Department
  8-35 am ARRIVE State Department
  8:35 am PRESIDENTIAL DAILY BRIEFING
  8.40 am Secretary's Office
  8:45 am DAILY SENIOR STAFF MEETING
  9:15 am Secretary's Conference Room
  915 am WEEKLY MEETING Iv/REGIONAL BUREAU SECRETARIES
  4:45 am Deputy Secretary's Conference Room
  9:55 am REMARKS AT DEPUTY SECRETARY NIDE.S' GLOBAL
  10:10 am INFRASTRUCTURE CONFERENCE
  George C. Marshall Center, Staff Caroline, OPEN PRESS
  10:20 am PRE-BRIEF w/STAFF
  10:30 am Secretary's Outer Office
  10:30 am ONE-ON-ONE BILATERAL w/iNDONESIAN FM MARTY
  1045 am NATALEGAWA, Secretary's Outer Office
  CLOSED MESS (official photo in Secretary's anteroom preceding bilateral)
  10:45 am U.S.-INDONESIA JOINT COMMISSION PLENARY SESSION
  11A5 am Benjamin Franklin Room, 8`k Floor
  Staff Monica, OPEN PRESS (for opening statements only)
  11-50 am WORKING LUNCH wriNDONESIAN FM MARTY NATALEGAWA
  12.50 pm James Monroe Room, 8°` Floor
  Staff. Monica, CLOSED PRESS
  12:50 pm ME-BRIEF w/ STAFF
  1:00 pm Secretary's Anteroom
  1.00 pm JOINT PRESS AVAILABILITY w/INDOINESIAN FM MARTY NATALEGAWA
  1:15 pm Treaty Room,rFloor
  1.30 pra(OSCHEDULING w/HUMA AND LONA (1)
  2:00 pm Secretary's Office
  2:00 pm VIDEOS (S)
  2:15 pm George Marshall Room, Staff: Case
  2:15 pm PHONE CALL w/DEPUTY SECRETARY BILL BURNS
  230pin Secretary's Outer Office
  2.35 pm DEPART State Department *En route U.S. Capitol
  2:50 pin ARRIVE U.S. Capitol
  3:00 pm BRIEFING FOR MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE
  3:50 pm U.S. Capitol, CVC Auditorium, Staff Monica and Philippe, CLOSED PRESS
  3:50 pm DEPART CVC. Auditorium *En route SVC 217
  [walk time: 10 minutes:1
  4:00 pm ARRIVE SVC 217
  4:00 pm BRIEFING FOR MEMBERS OF THE SENATE
  5:00 pm US. Capitol, SVC 217
  Staff Monica and Philippe, CLOSED PRESS
  U.S. Department of State*?
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739753
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045413
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739753
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  5:05 pm DEPART U.S. Capitol ''En mute State Department
  5.20 pm ARRIVE State Department
  5:25 pm OFFICE TIME
  6:00 pm Secretary's Office
  6:00 pm DEPART State Department *En rontelPrivate Residence
  6:10 pm ARRIVE Private Residence
  MC RON Washington, DC
  WIC RON Chappagas, NY
  Weather.
  Washington, DC: Sonny, 73060.
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739753
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045414

RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739753
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  PART B6
  From: Coleman, Claire L <ColemanCL@state.gov>
  Sent: Thursday, September 20, 2012 7:32 AM
  To:
  Cc: Huma Abedin; Abedin, Hurna;
  Lana J; Coleman, Claire I
  Subject Mini for today-Thursday, Sept 20, 2012
  Hanley, Monica R; Valmoro, B6
  8:25 am DEPAIRT Private Residence ''En route State Department
  8-35 am ARRIVE State Department
  8:35 am PRESIDENTIAL DAILY BRIEFING
  8.40 am Secretary's Office
  8:45 am DAILY SENIOR STAFF MEETING
  9:15 am Secretary's Conference Room
  915 am WEEKLY MEETING Iv/REGIONAL BUREAU SECRETARIES
  4:45 am Deputy Secretary's Conference Room
  9:55 am REMARKS AT DEPUTY SECRETARY NIDE.S' GLOBAL
  10:10 am INFRASTRUCTURE CONFERENCE
  George C. Marshall Center, Staff Caroline, OPEN PRESS
  10:20 am PRE-BRIEF w/STAFF
  10:30 am Secretary's Outer Office
  10:30 am ONE-ON-ONE BILATERAL w/iNDONESIAN FM MARTY
  1045 am NATALEGAWA, Secretary's Outer Office
  CLOSED MESS (official photo in Secretary's anteroom preceding bilateral)
  10:45 am U.S.-INDONESIA JOINT COMMISSION PLENARY SESSION
  11A5 am Benjamin Franklin Room, 8`k Floor
  Staff Monica, OPEN PRESS (for opening statements only)
  11-50 am WORKING LUNCH wriNDONESIAN FM MARTY NATALEGAWA
  12.50 pm James Monroe Room, 8°` Floor
  Staff. Monica, CLOSED PRESS
  12:50 pm ME-BRIEF w/ STAFF
  1:00 pm Secretary's Anteroom
  1.00 pm JOINT PRESS AVAILABILITY w/INDOINESIAN FM MARTY NATALEGAWA
  1:15 pm Treaty Room,rFloor
  1.30 pra(OSCHEDULING w/HUMA AND LONA (1)
  2:00 pm Secretary's Office
  2:00 pm VIDEOS (S)
  2:15 pm George Marshall Room, Staff: Case
  2:15 pm PHONE CALL w/DEPUTY SECRETARY BILL BURNS
  230pin Secretary's Outer Office
  2.35 pm DEPART State Department *En route U.S. Capitol
  2:50 pin ARRIVE U.S. Capitol
  3:00 pm BRIEFING FOR MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE
  3:50 pm U.S. Capitol, CVC Auditorium, Staff Monica and Philippe, CLOSED PRESS
  3:50 pm DEPART CVC. Auditorium *En route SVC 217
  [walk time: 10 minutes:1
  4:00 pm ARRIVE SVC 217
  4:00 pm BRIEFING FOR MEMBERS OF THE SENATE
  5:00 pm US. Capitol, SVC 217
  Staff Monica and Philippe, CLOSED PRESS
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State*?
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739753
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045413

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739753
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  5:05 pm DEPART U.S. Capitol ''En mute State Department
  5.20 pm ARRIVE State Department
  5:25 pm OFFICE TIME
  6:00 pm Secretary's Office
  6:00 pm DEPART State Department *En rontelPrivate Residence
  6:10 pm ARRIVE Private Residence
  MC RON Washington, DC
  WIC RON Chappagas, NY
  Weather.
  Washington, DC: Sonny, 73060.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739753
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045414



DocNumber: C05739754
MetadataSubject: RICE ON "THIS WEEK"
MetadataTo: Russorv@state.gov
MetadataFrom: H
MetadataDateSent: 2012-10-17T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH3/DOC_0C05739754/C05739754.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: Rice on "This Week"
ExtractedTo: •Russorv@stategov'
ExtractedFrom: H <hrodl7@ci into nemailcom >
ExtractedDateSent: Sunday, September 16, 2012 1221 PM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739754
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN FULL
ExtractedBodyText: Pis print.
RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739754
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  FULL
  From: H <hrodl7@ci into nemailcom >
  Sent Wednesday, October 17, 2012 9:22 PM
  To: •Russorv@stategov'
  Subject Fw: Rice on "This Week"
  Pis print.
  From: Sullivan, Jacob J [mailto:SullivanWstate.govj
  Sent: Sunday, September 16, 2012 1221 PM
  To: H
  Subject: Rice on "This Week"
  Here is Susan on this week. She wasn't asked about whether we had any Intel. But she did make clear our
  view that this started spontaneously and then evolved. The only troubling sentence relates to the
  investigation, specifically: "And we'll see when the investigation unfolds whether what was — what
  transpired in Benghazi might have unfolded differently in different circumstances." But she got pushed
  there.
  Waiting on other transcripts.
  For more on what happened and why, lees bring in the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Dr. Susan
  Rice. Dr. Rice, thank you for joining us.
  RICE: Good to be with you, Jake.
  TAPPER: So, first of all, what is the latest you can tell us on who these attackers were at the embassy or at
  the consulate in Benghazi? We're hearing that the Libyans have arrested people. They're saying that some
  people involved were from outside the country, that there might have even been Al Qaida ties. What's the
  latest information?
  RICE: Well, Jake, first of all, ifs important to know that there's an FBI investigation that has begun and
  will take some time to be completed. That will tell us with certainty what transpired.
  But our current best assessment, based on the information that we have at present, is that, in fact, what
  this began as, it was a spontaneous -- not a premeditated — response to what had transpired in Cairo.In
  Cairo, as you know, a few hours earlier, there was a violent protest that was undertaken in reaction to this
  very offensive video that was disseminated.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739754
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045736

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739754
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  We believe that folks in Benghazi, a small number of people came to the embassy to -- or to the consulate,
  rather, to replicate the sort of challenge that was posed in Cairo. And then as that unfolded, it seems to
  have been hijacked, let us say, by some individual clusters of extremists who came with heavier weapons,
  weapons that as you know in -- in the wake of the revolution in Libya are -- are quite common and
  accessible. And it then evolved from there.
  We'll wait to see exactly what the investigation finally confirms, but that's the best information we have at
  present.
  TAPPER: Why was there such a security breakdown? Why was there not better security at the compound
  in Benghazi? Why were there not U.S. Marines at the embassy in Tripoli?
  RICE: Well, first of all, we had a substantial security presence with our personnel...
  TAPPER: Not substantial enough, though, right?
  RICE: ... with our personnel and the consulate in Benghazi. Tragically, two of the four Americans who
  were killed were there providing security. That was their function. And indeed, there were many other
  colleagues who were doing the same with them.
  It obviously didn't prove sufficient to the -- the nature of the attack and sufficient in that -- in that
  moment. And that's why, obviously, we have reinforced our remaining presence in Tripoli and why the
  president has very -- been very clear that in Libya and throughout the region we are going to call on the
  governments, first of all, to assume their responsibilities to protect our facilities and our personnel, and
  we're reinforcing our facilities and our -- our embassies where possible...
  TAPPER: But why...
  RICE: ... and where needed.
  TAPPER: Why would we not have Marines at the embassy in Tripoli to begin with? It would seem like this
  -- this is obviously an unstable country. This is a region where U.S. interests have been attacked in
  previous months. Why were there not Marines there to begin with?
  RICE: First of all, there are Marines in some places around the world. There are not Marines in every
  facility. That depends on the circumstances. That depends on the requirements. Our presence in Tripoli,
  as in Benghazi, is relatively new, as you will recall. We've been back post-revolution only for a matter of
  months.
  But I've visited there myself, both to Tripoli and Benghazi. I was very grateful to have a strong security
  presence with me as part of our -- our embassy detachment there. So we certainly are aware that Libya is a
  place where there have been increasingly some violent incidents. The security personnel that the State
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739754
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045737

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739754
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  Department thought were required were in place. And we'll see when the investigation unfolds whether
  what was -- what transpired in Benghazi might have unfolded differently in different circumstances.
  But the president has been very clear. The protection of American personnel and facilities is and will
  remain our top ptiority. That's why we've reinforced our presence in Tripoli and elsewhere.
  TAPPER: Look at this map, if you would. There have been protests around the world over the last several
  days. And President Obama pledged to repair America's relationships with the Muslim world. Why does
  the U.S. seem so impotent? And why is the U.S. even less popular today in some of these Muslim and Arab
  countries than it was four years ago?
  RICE: Jake, we're not impotent. We're not even less popular, to challenge that assessment. I don't know
  on what basis you make that judgment. But let me -- let me point...
  TAPPER: It just seems that the U.S. government is powerless as this — as this maelstrom erupts.
  RICE: It's actually the opposite. First of all, let's be clear about what transpired here. What happened this
  week in Cairo, in Benghazi, in many other parts of the region...
  TAPPER: Tunisia, Khartoum...
  RICE: ... was a result -- a direct result of a heinous and offensive video that was widely disseminated, that
  the U.S. government had nothing to do with, which we have made clear is reprehensible and disgusting.
  We have also been very clear in saying that there is no excuse for violence, there is -- that we have
  condemned it in the strongest possible terms.
  But let's look at what's happened. It's quite the opposite of being impotent. We have worked with the
  governments in Egypt. President Obama picked up the phone and talked to President Morsi in Egypt. And
  as soon as he did that, the security provided to our personnel in our embassies dramatically increased.
  President Morsi...
  TAPPER: It took two days for President Morsi to say anything about this.
  RICE: President Mani has been out repeatedly and said that he condemns this violence. He's called off —
  and his people have called off any further demonstrations and have made very clear that this has to stop,
  (CROSSTALK)
  RICE: Now, and -- and same, frankly, in Tunisia, in Yemen, and, of course, in Libya, where the
  government has -- has gone out of its way to try to step up security and express deepest remorse for what
  has happened. We are quite popular in Libya, as you might expect, having been a major partner in their
  revolution. What transpired outside of our consulate in Benghazi was not an expression of deep-seated
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739754
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045738

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739754
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  anti-Americanism on the part of the Libyan people. Quite the contrary. The counter-demonstrations, the
  outpouring of sympathy and support for Ambassador Stevens and for the United States, the government
  of Libya and -- and the people on the street saying how pained they are by this, is much more a reflection
  of the sentiment towards the United States than a small handful of heavily armed mobsters.
  TAPPER: That certainly, according to polling, is the case in Libya. Not the case in Egypt. And since you
  brought up President Morsi, let me try to get some clarification on something. President Obama was asked
  about the relationship with Egypt on Wednesday, and this is what he said.
  (BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
  OBAMA: I don't think that we would consider them an ally, but we don't consider them an enemy. They
  are a new government that is trying to find its way.
  (END VIDEO CLIP)
  TAPPER: The United States has sent billions of dollars of U.S. taxpayer money to Egypt over the last few
  decades. And by definition, as you know, according to the State Department, Egypt is a major non-NATO
  ally of the United States. Why would President Obama say Egypt is not an ally?
  RICE: Well, first of all, the president has been very clear and -- and everybody understands that Egypt is a
  very critical partner of the United States, has long been so. That relationship remains the same, and the
  president wasn't signaling any change in -- in the nature...
  TAPPER: Was he trying to nudge Morsi?
  RICE: The president wasn't signaling any change in the nature of our relationship. Obviously, the
  president had a conversation with President Morsi and a very productive one, in which he underscored
  that it's, of course, the responsibility of the Egyptian government as host to protect diplomatic personnel
  and facilities, including our own, and we saw that President Morsi, immediately after that, took dramatic
  steps to improve the security of our facilities in Cairo and elsewhere, and then went out and repeatedly
  made a number of very important and powerful statements condemning the violence and conveying the
  message that, however hateful such a video may be, there is absolutely no justification for violence against
  the United States or other Western partners.
  So what we've seen is that the president has been incredibly calm, incredibly steady, and incredibly
  measured in his approach to this set of developments. And his interventions, his leadership has ensured
  that in Egypt, in Yemen, in Tunisia, in Libya, and many other parts of the world, that leaders have come
  out and made very plain that there's no excuse for this violence. We heard Prime Minister Erdogan of
  Turkey say the same, we heard the Grand Mufti in Saudi Arabia say the same, that there's no excuse for
  violence, that violence is to be condemned, and that governments have a responsibility to protect United
  States personnel and facilities and those of all foreign diplomats.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739754
  Date: 05/13/2015
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  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045739

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739754
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  TAPPER: I know you have to go, but very quickly, was the president in that interview trying to nudge
  President Morsi, "Get your act together'?
  RICE: No. I think that the president communicated directly with — with President Morsi and had the
  opportunity to -- to understand our expectation that Egypt will do what it can to protect our facilities. So
  that -- that was conveyed very directly, and the results were immediate and quite satisfactory.
  TAPPER: Dr. Rice, thank you so much for coming here today and answering our questions.
  RICE: Good to be with you.
  END
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739754
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045740



DocNumber: C05739755
MetadataSubject: TICK TOCK ON LIBYA
MetadataTo: Flores, Oscar
MetadataFrom: H
MetadataDateSent: 2011-09-03T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH1/DOC_0C05739755/C05739755.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: Fw: tick tock on libya
ExtractedTo: Oscar Flores
ExtractedFrom: H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>
ExtractedDateSent: Saturday, September 3, 2011 10:28 PM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739755
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
ExtractedBodyText: Pis print for me.
RawText:
  B6
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739755
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  PART B5,B6
  From: H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>
  Sent: Saturday, September 3, 2011 10:28 PM
  To: Oscar Flores
  Subject: Fw: tick tock on libya
  Pis print for me.
  From: Mills, Cheryl D [mailto:MillsCD@state.gov]
  Sent: Monday, August 22, 2011 12:37 PM
  To: H
  Subject: FIN: tick tock on libya
  Here is Draft
  From: Jake Sullivan
  Sent: Sunday, August 21, 2011 7:40 PM
  To: Mills, Cheryl D; Nuland, Victoria
  Subject: tick tock on libya
  this is basically off the top of my head, with a few consultations of my notes. but it shows S'
  leadership/ownership/stewardship of this country's libya policy from start to finish. let me know what you
  think. toria, who else might be able to add to this?
  Secretary Clinton's leadership on Libya
  HRC has been a critical voice on Libya in administration deliberations, at NATO, and in contact group
  meetings — as well as the public face of the U.S. effort in Libya. She was instrumental in securing the
  authorization, building the coalition, and tightening the noose around Qadhafi and his regime.
  February 25 — HRC announces the suspension of operations of the Libyan embassy in Washington.
  February 26 — HRC directs efforts to evacuate all U.S. embassy personnel from Tripoli and orders the closing of
  the embassy.
  February 26 HRC made a series of calls to her counterparts to help secure passage of UNSC 1970, which
  imposes sanctions on Gaddafi and his family and refers Qadhafi and his cronies to the ICC
  February 28 — HRC travels to Geneva, Switzerland for consultations with European partners on Libya. She
  gives a major address in which she says: "Colonel Qadhafi and those around him must be held accountable for
  these acts, which violate international legal obligations and common decency. Through their actions, they have
  lost the legitimacy to govern. And the people of Libya have made themselves clear: It is time for Qadhafi to go
  — now, without further violence or delay." She also works to secure the suspension of Libya from membership
  in the Human Rights Council.
  Early March -- IIRC appoints Special Envoy Chris Stevens to be the U.S. representatiye to Benghazi
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739755
  Date: 05/13/2015
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  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB00451 01

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739755
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  March 14 - HRC travels to Paris for the G8 foreign minister's meeting. She meets with TNC representative
  Jibril and consults with her colleagues on further UN Security Council action. She notes that a no-fly zone will
  not be adequate.
  March 14-16 - HRC participates in a series of high-level video- and teleconferences with
  She is a leading voice for strong UNSC action and a NATO civilian B5
  protection mission.
  March 17- HRC secures Russian abstention and Portuguese and African support for UNSC 1973, ensuring that
  it passes. 1973 authorizes a no-fly zone over Libya and "all necessary measures" - code for military action - to
  protect civilians against Gaddafi's army.
  March 24 - HRC engages with allies and secures the transition of command and control of the civilian
  protection mission to NATO. She announces the transition in a statement.
  March 18-30- HRC engages with UAE, Qatar, and Jordan to seek their participation in coalition
  operations. Over the course of several days, all three devote aircraft to the mission.
  March 19 - HRC travels to Paris to meet with European and Arab leaders to prepare for military action to
  protect civilians. That night, the first U.S. air strikes halt the advance of Gaddafi's forces on Benghazi and
  target Libya's air defenses.
  March 29 - HRC travels to London for a conference on Libya, where she is a driving force behind the creation
  of a Contact Group comprising 20-plus countries to coordinate efforts to protect civilians and plan for a post-
  Qadhafi Libya. She is instrumental in setting up a rotating chair system to ensure regional buy-in.
  April 14 - HRC travels to Berlin for NATO meetings. She is the driving force behind NATO adopting a
  communiqué that calls for Qadhafi's departure as a political objective, and lays out three clear military
  objectives: end of attacks and threat of attacks on civilians; the removal of Qadhafi forces from cities they
  forcibly entered; and the unfettered provision of humanitarian access.
  May 5 - HRC travels to Rome for a Contact Group meeting. The Contact Group establishes a coordination
  system and a temporary financial mechanism to funnel money to the TNC.
  June 8 - HRC travels to Abu Dhabi for another Contact Group meeting and holds a series of intense discussions
  with rebel leaders.
  June 12 - HRC travels to Addis for consultations and a speech before the African Union, pressing the case for a
  democratic transition in Libya.
  July 15 - HRC travels to Istanbul and announces that the U.S. recognizes the TNC as the legitimate government
  of Libya. She also secures recognition from the other members of the Contact Group.
  Late June - HRC meets with House Democrats and Senate Republicans to persuade them not to de-fund the
  Libya operation.
  July 16 - HRC sends Feltrnan, Cretz, and Chollet to Tunis to meet with Qadhafi envoys "to deliver a clear and
  firm message that the only way to move forward, is for Qadhafi to step down".
  Early August - HRC works to construct a $1.5 billion assets package to be approved by the Security Council
  and sent to the TNC. That package is working through its last hurdles.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739755
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045102

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739755
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  Early August -- After military chief Abdel Fattah Younes is killed, S sends a personal message to TNC head
  Jalil to press for a responsible investigation and a careful and inclusive approach to creating a new executive
  council.
  Early August -- I-IRC secures written pledges from the TNC to an inclusive, pluralistic democratic
  transition. She continues to consult with European and Arab colleagues on the evolving situation.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739755
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045103



DocNumber: C05739756
MetadataSubject: WSJ - MISCUES BEFORE LIBYA ASSAULT
MetadataTo: H
MetadataFrom: Mills, Cheryl D
MetadataDateSent: 2012-09-20T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH2/DOC_0C05739756/C05739756.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: Fvv: WSJ - Miscues Before Libya Assault
ExtractedFrom: Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.gov>
ExtractedDateSent: Thursday, September 20, 2012 11:10 PM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739756
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739756
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  PART B6
  From: Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.gov>
  Sent: Thursday, September 20, 2012 11:10 PM
  To:
  Subject: Fvv: WSJ - Miscues Before Libya Assault
  From: Nuland, Victoria J
  Sent: Thursday, September 20, 2012 10:42 PM
  To Sullivan, Jacob JI; Reines, Philippe I; Mills, Cheryl D; Nides, Thomas R; Sherman, Wendy R; Kennedy, Patrick F;
  Boswell, Eric 3
  Subject: Fvv: WSJ - Miscues Before Libya Assault
  This is a real hit piece - they intentionally twisted and misused info shared to help them understand how we work, while
  using Libyan sourcing as gospel. Totally unprofessional and egregiously inflammatory.
  From: PA Clips [mailto:paclips@state.gov]
  Sent: Thursday, September 20, 2012 10:19 PM
  To PA-Monitoring-Group-DL
  Subject: WSJ - Miscues Before Libya Assault
  Miscues Before Libya Assault
  Wall Street Journal
  Updated September 20, 2012, 9:15 p.m. EDT
  By MARGARET COKER in Benghazi, Libya and ADAM ENTOUS, JAY SOLOMON and SIOBHAN GORMAN in Washington
  Limited Security in Benghazi, Secrecy Over Safe House, Contributed to Tragedy
  The U.S. Consulate in Benghazi under attack on Sept. 11. The deadly assault raised questions about security lapses and
  misjudgments by U.S. officials.
  The deadly assault on a U.S. diplomatic mission in Libya on Sept. 11 was preceded by a succession of security lapses and
  misjudgments, compounded by fog-of-battle decisions, that raise questions about whether the scope of the tragedy
  could have been contained.
  U.S, officials issued alerts and ordered security precautions in neighboring Egypt ahead of protests and violence on Sept.
  11, but largely overlooked the possibility of trouble at other diplomatic postings in the region.
  The State Department chose to maintain only limited security in Benghazi, Libya, despite months of sporadic attacks
  there on U.S. and other Western missions. And while the U.S. said it would ask Libya to boost security there, it did so just
  once, for a one week period in June, according to Libyan officials.
  The U.S. didn't seriously consider sending in the military during the attack. It summoned rapid-response teams of
  Marines only after the U.S. ambassador was dead. State Department officials said they doubted the Pentagon could
  have mobilized a rescue force quickly enough to make a difference during the fighting. The Pentagon waited for
  guidance from State, which is responsible for diplomatic security, a senior military official said,
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739756
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045415

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739756
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  Adding a new dimension to the chain of events, the siege also engulfed what officials now describe as a secret safe
  house used by American officials and security personnel involved in sensitive government programs after last year's
  Libyan revolution.
  Even when that building, also known as the "annex," came under attack, U.S. officials were reluctant to divulge its
  existence, and the secrecy complicated the Libyan response and the eventual American evacuation, according to Libyan
  security officials.
  The Obama administration has defended levels of security in place. Though intelligence officials are investigating
  indications al Qaeda's North African affiliate had connections with militants who mounted the attack, U.S. officials say
  the evidence still indicates it was a spontaneous response to protests in Cairo against an anti-Islamic video. But a
  detailed review based on interviews with more than a dozen U.S. and Libyan officials shows months of ominous signals
  suggesting the need for better security, along with missed chances for delivering it.
  President Barack Obama, in his re-election campaign, gets high marks from voters on national security, but has drawn
  Republican criticism over his handling of the anti-American protests.
  After a classified briefing to lawmakers by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton Thursday, Sen. Susan Collins (R., Maine)
  called the security "woefully inadequate, given the security-threat environment." The State Department has convened
  an Accountability Review Board to investigate the attack, something it is required to do after such an incident.
  U.S. officials still are struggling to piece together details of the attack. For more than a week after U.S. Ambassador
  Christopher Stevens was killed, the State Department couldn't say why he was in Benghazi. On Thursday, officials said
  they believed he was there to attend the launch of a joint U.S.-Libyan cultural and educational program.
  Mr. Stevens and Sean Smith, an information officer, were killed at the consulate, in the first wave of the attack. Former
  Navy SEALs Glen Doherty and Tyrone Woods died later, at the sensitive safe house or annex a kilometer away. It remains
  unclear to U.S. and Libyan officials whether the militants knew of that facility or just followed a U.S. convoy to it after
  the consulate attack.
  The apparent lapses extended to firefighting equipment. Rescue attempts at the main building were thwarted in part by
  the absence of smoke-protection masks and fire extinguishers, said Libyan guards. Senior State Department officials said
  these wouldn't have provided sufficient protection against the diesel-fueled inferno.
  State Department officials said security for the consulate was frequently reviewed and was deemed sufficient to counter
  what U.S. officials considered to be the most likely threat at the time: a limited hit-and-run attack with rocket-propelled
  grenades or improvised explosive devices, or IEDs.
  There was a string of attacks in Benghazi in the months before Sept. 11, including a June 6 IED explosion outside.the
  consulate compound. "These types of incidents were the ones that were our principal concerns," a senior State
  Department official said. Based on the outcome of the June 6 attack, in which a perimeter wall was damaged but no
  Americans hurt, a second State Department official added: "Our security plan worked."
  Current and former officials said the security choices in Benghazi reflected efforts by Mr. Stevens to maintain a low-
  profile security posture and show faith in Libya's new leaders, despite questions about their ability to rein in heavily
  armed bands of militants. Officials say Mr. Stevens personally advised against having Marines posted at the embassy in
  Tripoli, apparently to avoid a militarized U.S. presence.
  The security plan for the consulate also reflected confidence Mr. Stevens felt in a city where he worked for months with
  rebels battling Moammar Gadhafi's rule. State Department officials said he didn't consult with Washington before
  traveling to Benghazi, located in an area that has become notorious for its volatile mix of Islamist militancy and heavy
  weaponry.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739756
  Date: 05/13/2015
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  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045416

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739756
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  "This is what happens when you're relying on a government that's not in control of the whole country," said Randa
  Fahmy Hudome, a former U.S. official. Benghazi "was awash with weapons in the hands of various brigades who were all
  in combat with one another. It wasn't a secret."
  A State Department official said Washington doesn't control the travels of ambassadors within countries where they are
  posted. But some current and former U.S. officials say it was a mistake for the administration to put so much faith in the
  Libyans to provide adequate security so soon after the revolution, and questioned why more robust contingency plans
  weren't in place.
  One senior State Department official described the Benghazi consulate as a "temporary office" that security officers
  treated as a "subsidiary" of the embassy in Tripoli, where more strenuous procedures and precautions were in place. "So
  Tripoli had the plan and the idea was that these people would just fall back on Tripoli, which they did in this situation, so
  it worked," the official said.
  Alarm bells about security in Benghazi started sounding this spring.
  On April 10, someone threw an explosive device at a convoy carrying United Nations envoy Ian Martin. On May 22, a
  rocket-propelled grenade hit offices of the International Committee of the Red Cross.
  After the June 6 IED attack on the U.S. consulate, the U.S. asked Libya to step up security around American installations,
  said a State Department spokesman. Libyan officials say the request was only for one week. A State Department official
  said the temporary security buildup was needed to repair damage to the wall.
  The Libyan who received the request said the added security was two extra cars of men plus some heavy machine guns.
  After the repairs, Libyan security returned to normal levels: a four-man team of armed guards protecting the perimeter
  and four unarmed Libyan guards inside to screen visitors.
  Tensions remained high, however. On June 11, a rocket-propelled grenade hit a convoy in Benghazi carrying Britain's
  ambassador to Libya, injuring two bodyguards. Britain closed its consulate in Benghazi.
  The U.S. deemed the security level sufficient and decided to stay, "given the very important mission that we have in
  eastern Libya to support U.S. national security interests," said a senior State Department official. He said "robust"
  security improvements had been made to the compound since the Americans moved into it in May 2011, including
  cement barriers and barbed wire.
  As the attacks mounted in Benghazi, intelligence agencies warned of the growing security risks, but didn't have specific
  intelligence about particular threats or planned attacks. On Aug. 27, the State Department issued a travel warning for
  Libya, citing a threat of assassinations and car bombings in both Benghazi and Tripoli. The warning said the embassy's
  ability to intervene was limited because armed groups behind the attacks were "neither sanctioned nor controlled by
  the Libyan government."
  In the days before Sept. 11, intelligence agencies issued their annual warning of heightened security risks around the
  anniversary of the 2001 attacks. Many counterterrorism officials saw a lessened risk this year than last year, which was
  the 10th anniversary and the first one after the killing of Osama bin Laden.
  In Libya, embassy personnel conducted a security review right before the anniversary. It determined there was no
  reason to think an attack was planned or the consulate in Benghazi was "insufficiently postured," said a senior
  administration official.
  Across the border in Egypt, red flags appeared on Sept. 8, after a radical Egyptian cleric aired on television portions of an
  anti-Islam video believed made in the U.S. Officials at the U.S. embassy in Cairo that night sent the first of several
  messages alerting Washington and other embassies in the region to the video and seeking guidance about responding
  and the potential for a backlash.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739756
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045417

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739756
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  The embassy in Cairo knew the film was beginning to get attention because it was monitoring social media, according to
  State Department officials. "That was well ahead of any intelligence that they got from Washington," one official said.
  On Monday, Sept. 10, intelligence agencies sent a warning directly to the U.S. embassy in Cairo saying the protests could
  turn violent. Diplomatic security officers in Cairo sent most embassy personnel home.
  Intelligence analysts at the time had no reason to believe the unrest would spill over to neighboring Libya or beyond,
  officials said. State Department officials likewise found no reason to put other embassies in the region on heightened
  alert and decided not to call in Marine teams to help in Cairo.
  "We have to put this in context: We've had protest after protest in Cairo. We know where the military is. We know
  where to find them when we need them," a senior State Department official said.
  Ethan Chorin, an American development economist working with U.S. and Libyan officials on a hospital in Benghazi, said
  he spoke by phone to Mr. Stevens about an hour before the assault, and the ambassador told him there was "no
  indication of trouble" following the protests in Egypt. Mr. Chorin said a subsequent conversation he had with the
  ambassador's security officer was cut short by what the officer said was a serious problem. Several minutes later, he
  could, hear explosions from his hotel room across town as the assault began.
  During a final call by Mr. Chorin to a security officer at the consulate, the attack began, and his call was cut off.
  The attack on the consulate compound started shortly after 9:30 p.m. Benghazi time, which was 3:30 p.m. Eastern time,
  according to Libyan security guards.
  Besides the four armed Libyans outside, five armed State Department diplomatic security officers were at the consulate.
  Diplomatic security agent David Ubben was inside the main building with Mr. Stevens and Mr. Smith, the information-
  management officer, when the attack,ers set it on fire around 15 minutes after the shooting started.
  The three took refuge in a safe room, but found themselves overcome by smoke and agreed they would make a break
  for it through a window, according to a State Department official familiar with Mr. Ubben's role.
  Mr. Ubben, a 30-year-old Iraq war veteran, managed to escape, but lost contact with Messrs. Stevens and Smith in the
  dense smoke, the official said.
  In Washington, officials said, National Security Adviser Tom Donilon informed Mr. Obama of the attack in progress
  ahead of a 5 p.m. Eastern time Oval Office meeting with Defense Secretary Leon Panetta and Gen. Martin Dempsey,
  chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. By then, the main villa in the consulate compound was on fire.
  There was no serious consideration at that hour of intervening with military force, officials said. Doing so without Libya's
  permission could represent a violation of sovereignty and inflame the situation, they said. Instead, the State Department
  reached out to the Libyan government to get reinforcements to the scene.
  The Libyans sent about two dozen security men, according to members of the reinforcement team, who arrived at the
  consulate 30 minutes after the fighting had started.
  In addition to the shooting, thick black smoke and flames hindered a proper search inside the consulate, an effort
  further hampered by the absence of fire extinguishers and masks.
  Mr. Ubben and the other security agents made several trips into the building to try to find the diplomats but could
  spend only brief periods inside, and suffered varying degrees of lung damage, said the official familiar with Mr. Ubben's
  role.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739756
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045418

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739756
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  On one trip in, they found Mr. Smith's body and pulled it out. There was no sign of the ambassador.
  The American security personnel evacuated the consulate and made their way to the secret site called the annex.
  A plane with an American security team from Tripoli arrived in Benghazi about 1:30 a.m., according to the Libyan
  account. The team found its way to the annex using global positioning devices. Libyans who accompanied the Americans
  to the scene weren't told of the annex's location because of its connection to sensitive programs, and the Americans
  didn't give them the GPS coordinates or address. Libyans at an emergency operation center in Benghazi were also kept
  in the dark to the exact location.
  As the U.S. and Libyan reinforcement team arrived from the airport, fighting broke out at the annex.
  That assault, using rocket-propelled grenades and mortars, was described in U.S. and Libyan accounts as more
  sophisticated than the earlier attack on the consulate, and it appeared to involve militants with possible links to al
  Qaecla.
  The Libyans led a convoy of roughly 30 Americans from the safe house to the airport, where a plane had been waiting.
  But they quickly realized the plane was too small to evacuate everyone at once.
  "We were surprised at the numbers of Americans who were at the airport," said Libyan Deputy Prime Minister Mustafa
  Abushagour. "We figured three or four people. No one told us the numbers ahead of time."
  The deputy prime minister said that he learned about the extent of U.S. intelligence operations only after the incident.
  We have no problem with intelligence sharing or gathering, but our sovereignty is also key," said Mr. Abushagour.
  The first to be flown to Tripoli were American diplomats and civilians. The U.S. security team waited for a second flight.
  During the wait, Libyan troops went, without any Americans, to the Benghazi Medical Center to retrieve the
  ambassador's body. Around 8 a.m., according to Libyan officials, the security detail flew back to Tripoli, carrying the
  body.
  Some officials say the U.S. could have sent military forces to Benghazi from U.S. Naval Air Station Sigonella, which is
  some 450 miles away in Sicily, or mobilized a Marine team in Rota, Spain. Some officials said the U.S. could also have
  sent aircraft to the scene in a "show of force" to scare off the attackers.
  State Department officials dismissed the suggestions as unrealistic. "They would not have gotten there in two hours,
  four hours or six hours. They don't have troops sitting in a room next to an airplane with a pilot just sitting in the next
  room drinking coffee," one senior State Department official said.
  Some defense officials agreed with that assessment, given limited communications to Americans on the ground during
  the assault. "It was the fog of war," one said.
  At the annex, Mr. Ubben suffered head and leg injuries from a mortar explosion. He was released this week from
  intensive care but remains at Walter Reed National Military Medical Center, in Bethesda, Md., the State Department
  official familiar with his role said.
  Mr. Ubben, a Marylander, is married and has a stepdaughter and an infant son. He is conscious and able to
  communicate, according to his father, Rex Ubben.
  "He's in good spirits," the senior Mr. Ubben said. "They're pretty confident that he'll be able to walk again."
  —Julian E. Barnes and Michael M. Phillips contributed
  to this article.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739756
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045419

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739756
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  Harry Edwards • Press Officer • Press Desk • U.S. Department of State
  2201 C St, NW RFT1 2109, Washington, DC 20520 I IN:BB: edwardshoOstate gov B6
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739756
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045420



DocNumber: C05739757
MetadataSubject: LIBYANS MARCH AGAINST ISLAMIST MILITIAS IN BENGHAZI
MetadataTo: H
MetadataFrom: Mills, Cheryl D
MetadataDateSent: 2012-09-21T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH2/DOC_0C05739757/C05739757.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: FW: Libyans march against Islamist rnhtias in Benghazi
ExtractedFrom: Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.gov>
ExtractedDateSent: Friday, September 21, 2012 4:05 PM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739757
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN FULL
RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739757
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  FULL
  From: Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.gov>
  Sent: Friday, September 21, 2012 4:05 PM
  To:
  Subject: FW: Libyans march against Islamist rnhtias in Benghazi
  From: Toiv, Nora F
  Sent: Friday„ September 21, 2012 3:48 PM
  To: Mills, Cheryl D
  Subject: Libyans march against Islamist militias in Benghazi
  Libyans march against Islamist militias in Benghazi
  By Peter Graff and Suleiman Al-Khalidi
  BENGHAZI, Libya Fri Sep 21, 2012 2:23prn EDT
  (Reuters) - Thousands of Libyans marched in Benghazi on Friday in support of democracy and against the
  Islamist militias that Washington blames for an attack on the U.S. consulate last week that killed four
  Americans including the ambassador.
  The "Rescue Benghazi day" demonstration called for the government to disband armed groups that have refused
  to give up their weapons since the NATO-backed revolution that toppled Muammar Gaddafi last year,
  Marchers headed for a main square where a much smaller counter demonstration of hundreds of supporters of
  hardline Islamist group Ansar al-Sharia were waiting.
  "It's obvious that this protest is against the militias. All of them should join the army or security forces as
  individuals, not as groups," medical student Ahmed Sanallah, 27, said. "Without that there will be no prosperity
  and no success for the new Libya."
  The late afternoon demonstration had a cheerful atmosphere as families marched with small children on their
  shoulders.
  Fighter jets and helicopters roared overhead in a show of official support for the demonstration, which has been
  enthusiastically promoted by the city's authorities.
  "Those military battalions that want to impose their ideology on the people of Libya will be confronted," Saleh
  Gaouda, a member of new ruling national congress, said.
  "This city wants to go back to stability and participate in building the state"
  In a sign of the cheerful atmosphere, one ear had a giant cardboard model of Benghazi's landmark lighthouse
  strapped to the roof As the sun set and the crowd began to disperse, someone shot fireworks into the air.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739757
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045421

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739757
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  "DEFEND BENGHAZI"
  Although the main demands of the marchers did not mention the attack on the U.S. consulate, it seems to have
  provided a strong impetus for the authorities to rally support behind the country's weak government.
  U.S. ambassador Christopher Stevens was well liked in Libya, and many people who were angered by an anti-
  Islamic film made in the United States consider the attack on the embassy to have been excessive. Some
  placards in English, intended for international news cameras, read: "We demand justice for Stevens" and "Libya
  lost a friend".
  "1 am out today to defend Benghazi. Killing the ambassador is a completely separate thing," 26-year-old Arnjad
  Mohammed Hassan, a network engineer, said "I don't give a damn about the killing of the ambassador because
  the Americans offended the Prophet. I am just here for Benghazi."
  Benghazi, 1,000 km (600 miles) from Tripoli across largely empty desert, is controlled by various armed
  groups, including some comprised of Islamists who openly proclaim their hostility to democratic government
  and the West.
  Some of these have been identified by local people as being among those who were at the consulate protest last
  week. U.S. officials have described the violence as a "terrorist attack".
  One group linked to the attack is Ansar al-Shatia, which has denied involvement in the violence.
  Abu Al-Qaa, a demonstrator at the Ansar al-Sharia counter demonstration, said Stevens "was preparing for he
  entry of American troops into Libya".
  "The will of the Prophet was to expel infidels from Muslim lands so that Muslims prevail. Terrorizing your
  enemy is one of Islam's tenets." ,
  He said he had fought against American troops in Iraq where he was arrested and sent back to Gaddafi's Libya
  and jailed for three years.
  One banner at that demonstration read: "Day to rescue Benghazi or day to rescue America?"
  In southern Libya, at least six people were killed and 12 injured in clashes between security forces and a local
  group, a security official and a resident said on Friday.
  Security forces were sent to the town of Brak, 700 km (400 miles) south of Tripoli, on Wednesday to stop a
  group broadcasting songs about Craddafi on the radio, the official said The security forces, made up of former
  rebel fighters, came under attack upon arrival.
  (Additional reporting by Omar Al-Mostnary and Ali Shuaib; Editing by Giles Elgood)
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739757
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045422



DocNumber: C05739758
MetadataSubject: FW:
MetadataTo: H
MetadataFrom: Mills, Cheryl D
MetadataDateSent: 2012-10-18T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH3/DOC_0C05739758/C05739758.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedCc: S_SpecialAssistants
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739758
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
ExtractedBodyText:
  Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.gov>
  Thursday, October 18, 2012 8:06 AM
  FW:
  B7(A)
  B7(C)
  Remind me to discuss.

RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739758
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN PART
  B7(C),B7(A)
  From:
  Sent:
  To:
  Subject:
  Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.gov>
  Thursday, October 18, 2012 8:06 AM
  FW:
  B7(A)
  B7(C)
  Remind me to discuss.
  From: Randolph, Lawrence M
  Sent: Thursday, October 18, 2012 7:47 AM
  To: Sullivan, Jacob J; Mills, Cheryl D; Macmanus, Joseph E (S)
  Cc: S_SpecialAssistants
  Subject: FW:
  From: Slack, Anne
  Sent: Thursday, October 18, 2012 7:40 AM
  To Hayes, Molly E; Kelley, Henry; Worman, Patrick F; S_SpecialAssistants
  Cc: Siberell, Justin H; Rochman, Daniel A; Norman, Marc E; Witkowsky, Anne A; Thompson, Mark I; SeIlitto, Michael P;
  Sidereas, Evyenla
  Subject RE:
  Colleagues,
  Readout
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739758
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045741

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739758
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  Best, Anne
  Anne Slack
  Tunisia Desk
  Office of Maghreb Affairs
  U.S. Department of State
  Tel.: 202-647-4676
  B7(A)
  B7(C)
  From: Slack, Anne
  Sent: Wednesday, October 17, 2012 7:55 AM
  To: Slack, Anne; Hayes, Molly E; Kelley, Henry; Worman, Patrick F; S_SpecialAssistants
  Cc: Sibereli, Justin H; Rachman, Daniel A; Norman, Marc E; Witkowsky, Anne A; Thompson,
  Sidereas, Evyria
  Subject: RE:
  Mark I; Se!lido, Michael P;
  Colleagues,
  Regards, Anne
  From: Slack, Anne
  Sent: Wednesday, October 17, 2012 7:47 AM
  To: Hayes, Molly E; Kelley, Henry; Worman, Patrick F; S_SpecialAssistants
  Cc: Siberell, Justin H; Rochman, Daniel A; Norman, Marc E; Witkowsky, Anne A; Thompson, Mark I; Sellitto, Michael P;
  Sidereas, Evyenia
  Subject: RE:
  Colleagues,
  They will provide an update
  on Thursday before opening of business Washington time. We will keep you apprised.
  Best, Anne
  Anne Slack
  Tunisia Desk
  Office of Maghreb Affairs
  U.S. Department of State
  Tel.: 202-647-4676
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739758
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045742



DocNumber: C05739759
MetadataSubject: ROGERS
MetadataTo: H
MetadataFrom: Sullivan, Jacob J
MetadataDateSent: 2011-09-10T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH1/DOC_0C05739759/C05739759.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: Rogers
ExtractedFrom: Sullivan, Jacob J <Sullivann@state.gov>
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739759
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN FULL
ExtractedBodyText:
  Apparently wants to see you to tallk Libya/weapons.
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739759
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045104

RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739759
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  FULL
  From: Sullivan, Jacob J <Sullivann@state.gov>
  Sent Saturday, September 10, 2011 10:23 AM
  To:
  Subject: Rogers
  Apparently wants to see you to tallk Libya/weapons.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739759
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045104



DocNumber: C05739760
MetadataSubject: ANYTHING TO REPORT?
MetadataTo: H
MetadataFrom: Sullivan, Jacob J
MetadataDateSent: 2012-09-21T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH2/DOC_0C05739760/C05739760.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: RE: Anything to report?
ExtractedDateSent: Friday, September 21, 2012 6:37 PM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739760
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN FULL
ExtractedBodyText:
  Sorry — I've been flat out. (And I've agreed to have dinner with Anne-Marie at 7!)
  1. Well get you a new CGI draft tomorrow morning for you to noodle on. Feel free to'call when you've looked at it
  and we can talk about other directions if it doesn't feel right.
  2, Tom met with Barak today; I will get readout from Sam V tomorrow afternoon. Wendy is going to write points
  for you.
  3. Yousef called to say now that Jeff is gone ABZ has no one to talk to on a regular basis and asked if he could talk
  to Bill Burns.
  4. Ben Rhodes sent me the draft UNGA speech which I will forward to you shortly.
  5. Bill/Wendy are currently in a SVTC on some information that they may want to report to you on — but unclear
  whether there is anything to it.
  6. We've nailed down a $15 mm non-lethal support and $15 mm humanitarian support announcement for next
  Friday's Friends of Syria meeting.
  7. Hold on Rick Olson was lifted by Paul.
  8. Protestors stormed Ansar al Shade's headquarters in Benghazi, and a huge number marched against militias.
  9. 1 saw Dennis Ross today for one of our S/P sessions. I can fill you in on the latest on his effort. Also, he will send
  you some stuff in advance of your relevant meetings (he was just in Israel).
  That's the key stuff for now. More medium-range stuff to discuss in NY.
  From H [mallto:HDR22@dintonernall.comj
  Sent: Friday, September 21, 2012 6:08 PM
  To: Sullivan, Jacob
  Subject: Anything to report?
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739760
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045423

RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739760
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  FULL
  From Sullivan, Jacob J <Sollivanil@state.gov>
  Sent: Friday, September 21, 2012 6:37 PM
  To:
  Subject: RE: Anything to report?
  Sorry — I've been flat out. (And I've agreed to have dinner with Anne-Marie at 7!)
  1. Well get you a new CGI draft tomorrow morning for you to noodle on. Feel free to'call when you've looked at it
  and we can talk about other directions if it doesn't feel right.
  2, Tom met with Barak today; I will get readout from Sam V tomorrow afternoon. Wendy is going to write points
  for you.
  3. Yousef called to say now that Jeff is gone ABZ has no one to talk to on a regular basis and asked if he could talk
  to Bill Burns.
  4. Ben Rhodes sent me the draft UNGA speech which I will forward to you shortly.
  5. Bill/Wendy are currently in a SVTC on some information that they may want to report to you on — but unclear
  whether there is anything to it.
  6. We've nailed down a $15 mm non-lethal support and $15 mm humanitarian support announcement for next
  Friday's Friends of Syria meeting.
  7. Hold on Rick Olson was lifted by Paul.
  8. Protestors stormed Ansar al Shade's headquarters in Benghazi, and a huge number marched against militias.
  9. 1 saw Dennis Ross today for one of our S/P sessions. I can fill you in on the latest on his effort. Also, he will send
  you some stuff in advance of your relevant meetings (he was just in Israel).
  That's the key stuff for now. More medium-range stuff to discuss in NY.
  From H [mallto:HDR22@dintonernall.comj
  Sent: Friday, September 21, 2012 6:08 PM
  To: Sullivan, Jacob
  Subject: Anything to report?
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739760
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045423



DocNumber: C05739762
MetadataSubject: UPDATE: LIBYAN ISLAMIST SAYS HE WAS AT U.S. CONSULATE DURING ATTACK (REUTERS)
MetadataTo: H
MetadataFrom: Mills, Cheryl D
MetadataDateSent: 2012-10-18T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH3/DOC_0C05739762/C05739762.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: UPDATE: Libyan Islamist says he was at U.S. consulate during attack (Reuters)
ExtractedFrom: Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.gov>
ExtractedDateSent: Thursday, October 18, 2012 5:53 PM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739762
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN FULL
RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739762
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  FULL
  From: Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.gov>
  Sent: Thursday, October 18, 2012 5:53 PM
  To:
  Subject FW: UPDATE: Libyan Islamist says he was at U.S. consulate during attack (Reuters)
  From: OpsNewsTicker©state.gov [mailto:OpsNewsTicker@state.gov]
  Sent: Thursday, October 18, 2012 5:50 PM
  To NEWS-Libya; NEWS-Mahogany
  Subject: UPDATE: Libyan Islamist says he was at U.S. consulate during attack (Reuters)
  BENGHAZI (Reuters) - A Libyan militia commander who U.S officials say is under investigation in connection
  with the attacks on the American consulate in Benghazi which led to the death of the ambassador said he was
  present during the incident but was not one of the ringleaders.
  Some American newspapers have quoted unnamed Libyan officials as pointing to Ahmed Abu Khattala as
  the leader of the attacks on Sept, 11. The newspapers also reported that the officials said Abu Khattala's
  whereabouts were unknown.
  U.S. government sources told Reuters that Abu Khattala is being investigated as a suspect in the Benghazi
  consulate attacks though U.S. investigators are not clear at this point if he played a role in leading or organising
  the attacks.
  In an interview, Abu Khattala told Reuters he had only heard he was a suspect through news media and was
  surprised that officials had told journalists he was at large.
  "These reports say that no one knows where I am and that I am hiding," he said. "But here I am in the open,
  sitting in a hotel with you I'm even going to pick up my sister's kids from school soon."
  Sitting with a friend in the restaurant of a Benghazi hotel, the 41-year-old, sporting a red felt hat and a full
  salt-and-pepper beard, laughed gently.
  "There were many people there from Ansar al-Shariah, from other brigades and from the general public," the
  official, who refused to be named, said, referring to the hardline Islamist militia group which has been blamed
  for the attack.
  "Just because someone is there doesn't mean they were behind it."
  Abu Khattala denied being a leader of Ansar al-Shariah, but said he was friendly with the group and knew its
  membership well.
  A U.S. official said there may be more than person taking a lead role in the group.
  "Ansar al-Shariah is a factionalised militant group without one home address," the official told Reuters.
  "There may be several military commanders playing a role in its activities."
  Abu Khattala said that on the night of Sept 11, he received a phone call telling him that an attack on the U.S.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739762
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045743

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739762
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  consulate was in progress and that he then went to the scene.
  "I arrived at the street parallel to the consulate and waited for other brigade leaders to show me the way to
  the buildings," he said. "I arrived at the scene just like the others did -- to see what was happening."
  He said that after he arrived at the consulate, he began to help direct traffic with other militia leaders.
  "People were crashing into each other because of the chaos and there was sporadic shooting," he said.
  Abu Khattala said he called the commanders of Benghazi's security forces -- the February 17 brigade and the
  Supreme Security Committee -- and told them to remove their cars and people from the consulate to avoid
  clashes.
  "Soon after I made my calls, one of the guards told me that four men were detained in a building inside the
  compound who had been shooting at the demonstrators," he said.
  "By the time I arrived at the building the men had already escaped. At that point I left the scene and didn't
  return."
  Little is known about Abu Khattala, who hails from Benghazi.
  Abu Khattala, who is unmarried, said he went to public schools in Libya but did not attend university or
  community college. He said he was imprisoned for a total of 10 years for "knowing suspected personalities". He
  refused to elaborate.
  "I've also never left the country," he said when asked if he received any education or training abroad.
  Abu Khattala said he formed the Obeidah al-Jarrah brigade at the beginning of the armed revolt which
  toppled Muammar Gaddafi last year.
  The shadowy armed militia was blamed in the killing last July of military chief Abdelfattah Younes, a
  former Gaddafi loyalist who had defected to the rebels.
  Younes was involved in the 1969 coup that brought Gaddafi to power. He was interior minister before he
  defected and took a senior position in the rebellion in February.
  Some rebels, especially hard-line conservative Islamist fighters who were persecuted under Gaddafi, were
  never happy to serve under a man who had been so close to Gaddafi.
  Abu Khattala was questioned by Libyan authorities but released because no evidence directly linked him to
  the killing. He said he later broke up his militia group.
  "After the revolution Obeidah al-Jarrah was disbanded because we were a fighting group and the war was
  over in Benghazi," he said.
  But many members of Obeidah al-Jarrah are known to have joined other brigades, including Ansar al-
  Shariah in Benghazi.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739762
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045744

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739762
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  Newsrickors sled senior Doper:moot dhotis to imsking nolo. This item *pears as it did if, its original publication and dOSSnot contain anolyats or commentsty
  by Dp:v
  aiolent sources.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739762
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045745



DocNumber: C05739763
MetadataSubject: LIBYA
MetadataTo: millscd@state.gov
MetadataFrom: H
MetadataDateSent: 2012-10-19T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH3/DOC_0C05739763/C05739763.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedTo: Millscd@state.gov
ExtractedFrom: H <hrod17©clintonemaiLcom>
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739763
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN FULL
ExtractedBodyText:
  I just heard an npr report about the CIA station chief in Tripoli sending a cable on 9/12 saying there was no demo etc. Do
  you know about this?
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739763
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045746

RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739763
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  FULL
  From: H <hrod17©clintonemaiLcom>
  Sent Friday, October 19, 2012 6:58 AM
  To: Millscd@state.gov
  Subject Libya
  I just heard an npr report about the CIA station chief in Tripoli sending a cable on 9/12 saying there was no demo etc. Do
  you know about this?
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739763
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045746



DocNumber: C05739764
MetadataSubject: PROTESTERS STORM MAIN ISLAMIST MILITIA HQ IN LIBYA'S BENGHAZI (REUTERS)
MetadataTo: H
MetadataFrom: Mills, Cheryl D
MetadataDateSent: 2012-09-21T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH2/DOC_0C05739764/C05739764.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: Fw. Protesters storm main Islamist militia HQ in Libya's Benghazi (Reuters)
ExtractedFrom: Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.goy>
ExtractedDateSent: Friday, September 21, 2012 7:28 PM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739764
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN FULL
RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739764
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE
  IN FULL
  From: Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.goy>
  Sent: Friday, September 21, 2012 7:28 PM
  To:
  Subject: Fw. Protesters storm main Islamist militia HQ in Libya's Benghazi (Reuters)
  From: OpsNewslicker@stategov Ernailto:OosNewsTicker@state.govj
  Sent: Friday, September 21, 2012 05:33 PM
  To: NEWS-Mahogany
  Subject: Protesters storm main Islamist militia HQ in Libya's Benghazi (Reuters)
  BENGHAZI (Reuters) - Hundreds of pro-government protesters stormed the headquarters of the main Islamist
  militia group in Libyais eastern city of Benghazi on Friday, Reuters witnesses said.
  Chanting "Libya, Libya", the demonstrators pulled down flags of the Ansar Al-Sharia militia and torched a
  vehicle inside the base. There was no sign of resistance from the militia.
  Earlier, protesters entered a separate compound belonging to the militia.
  News Tickers alert senior Department officials to bteaking news This item appears salt did in its original publication and does not contain analysis or commentary
  by Department sources.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739764
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045424



DocNumber: C05739765
MetadataSubject: LIBYA
MetadataTo: H
MetadataFrom: Mills, Cheryl D
MetadataDateSent: 2012-10-19T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH3/DOC_0C05739765/C05739765.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: Re: Libya
ExtractedFrom: Mills, Cheryl 0 <MillsCDOstate.gov>
ExtractedDateSent: Friday, October 19, 2012 06:57 AM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739765
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN FULL
ExtractedBodyText:
  Have not seen - will see if we can get
  ----

RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739765
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  FULL
  From: Mills, Cheryl 0 <MillsCDOstate.gov>
  Sent Friday, October 19, 2012 7:25 AM
  To:
  Subject: Re: Libya
  Have not seen - will see if we can get
  ---- Original Message ----
  From H imailto:HDR22@clintoriemail.comj
  Sent: Friday, October 19, 2012 06:57 AM
  To: Mills, Cheryl D
  Subject: Libya
  I just heard an npr report about the CIA station chief in Tripoli sending a cable on 9/12 saying there was no demo etc. Do
  you know about this?
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739765
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045747



DocNumber: C05739766
MetadataSubject: LIBYA
MetadataTo: H
MetadataFrom: PIR
MetadataDateSent: 2012-09-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH2/DOC_0C05739766/C05739766.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: Libya
ExtractedFrom: PIR
ExtractedCc: COM; Jake Sullivan
ExtractedDateSent: Saturday, September 22, 2012 7:45 AM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739766
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
ExtractedBodyText:
  Associated Press
  Published September 21, 2012
  BENGHAZI, lli3YA — Hundreds of protesters angry over last week's killing of the U.S. ambassador to Libya stormed the
  compound of the Islamic extremist militia suspected in the attack, evicting militiamen and setting fire to their building
  Friday.
  In an unprecedented show of public anger at Libya's rampant militias, the crowd overwhelmed the compound of the
  Ansar Al-Sharlah Brigade in the center of the eastern city of Benghazi.
  Ansar Al-Shariah fighters initially fired in the air to disperse the crowd, but eventually abandoned the site with their
  weapons and vehicles after it was overrun by waves of protesters shouting "No to militias."
  "I don't want to see armed men wearing Afghani-style clothes stopping me in the street to give me orders, I only want to
  see people in uniform," said Omar Mohammed, a university student who took part in the takeover of the site, which
  protesters said was done in support of the army and police.
  No deaths were reported in the incident, which came after tens of thousands marched in Benghazi against armed
  militias. One vehicle was also burned at the compound.
  For many Libyans, the Sept. 11 attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi was the last straw in one of the biggest
  problems Libya has faced since the ouster and death of longtime dictator Moamrnar Qaddafi around a year ago -- the
  multiple mini-armies that with their arsenals of machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades are stronger than the
  regular armed forces and police.
  The militias, a legacy of the rag-tag popular forces that fought Qaddafi's regime, tout themselves as protectors of Libya's
  revolution, providing security where police cannot. But many say they act like gangs, detaining and intimidating rivals
  and carrying out killings.
  Militias made up of Islamic radicals like Ansar Al-Shariah are notorious for attacks on Muslims who don't abide by their
  hardline ideology. Officials and witnesses say fighters from Ansar Al-Shariati led the attack on the U.S. consulate, which
  killed Amb. Chris Stevens and three other Americans.
  After taking over the Ansar compound, protesters then drove to attack the Benghazi headquarters of another Islamist
  militia, Rafallah Sahati. The militiamen opened fire on the protesters, who were largely unarmed. At least 20 were
  wounded, and there were unconfirmed witness reports of three protesters killed.
  Earlier in the day, some 30,000 people filled a broad boulevard as they marched along a lake in central Benghazi on
  Friday to the gates of the headquarters of Ansar Al-Shariah.
  "No, no, to militias," the crowd chanted, filling a broad boulevard. They carried banners and signs demanding that
  militias disband and that the government build up police to take their place in keeping security. "Benghazi is in a trap,"
  signs read. "Where is the army, where is the police?"
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739766
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045425
  B6
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739766
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  Other signs mourned the killing of Stevens, reading, "The ambassador was Libya's friend" and "Libya lost a friend."
  Military helicopters and fighter jets flew overhead, and police mingled in the crowd, buoyed by the support of the
  protesters.
  The march was the biggest seen in Benghazi, Libya's second largest city and home to 1 million people, since the fall of
  Qaddafi in August 2011. The public backlash comes in part in frustration with the interim government, which has been
  unable to rein in the armed factions. Many say that officials' attempts to co-opt fighters by paying them have only fueled
  the growth of militias without bringing them under state control or integrating them into the regular forces.
  Residents of another main eastern city, Darna, have also begun to stand up against Ansar Al-Shariah and other militias.
  The anti-militia fervor in Darna is notable because the city, in the mountains along the Mediterranean coast north of
  Benghazi, has long had a reputation as a stronghold for Islamic extremists. During the Qaddafi era, it was the hotbed of a
  deadly Islamist insurgency against his regime.
  A significant number of the Libyan jihadists who travelled to Afghanistan and Iraq during recent wars came from Darna.
  During the revolt against him last year, Qaddafi's regime warned that Darna would declare itself an Islamic Emirate and
  ally itself with Al Qaeda.
  But now, the residents are lashing out against Ansar Al-Shariah, the main Islamic extremist group in the city.
  "The killing of the ambassador blew up the situation. It was disastrous," said Ayoub al-Shedwi, a young bearded Muslim
  preacher in Darna who says he has received multiple death threats because has spoken out against militias on a radio
  show he hosts. "We felt that the revolution is going in vain."
  Leaders of tribes, which are the strongest social force in eastern Libya, have come forward to demand that the militias
  disband.
  Tribal leaders in Benghazi and Darna announced this week that members of their tribes who are militiamen will no
  longer have their protection in the face of anti-militia protests. That means the tribe will not avenge them if they are
  killed.
  Activists and residents have held a sit-in for the past eight days outside Darna's Sahaba Mosque, calling on tribes to put
  an end to the "state of terrorism" created by the militias.
  Militiamen have been blamed for a range of violence in Darna. On the same day Stevens killed in Benghazi, a number of
  elderly Catholic nuns and a priest who have lived in Darna for decades providing free medical services, were attacked,
  reportedly beaten or stabbed. There have been 32 killings over the past few months, including the city security chief and
  assassinations of former officers from Qaddafi's military.
  Darna's residents are conservative, but they largely don't fit the city's reputation as extremists.
  Women wear headscarves, but not the more conservative black garb and veil that covers the entire body and face. In
  the ancient city's narrow alleys, shops display sleeveless women dresses and the young men racing by in cars blare
  Western songs.
  And many are impatient with Ansar Al-Sharjah's talk of imposing its strict version of Islamic law. The group's name
  means "Supporters of Shariah Law."
  "We are not infidels for God sake, We have no bars, no discos, we are not practicing vice in the street," said Wassam ben
  Madin, a leading activist in the city who lost his right eye in clashes with security forces on the first day of the uprising
  against Qaddafi. "This is not the time for talk about Sharjah. Have a state first then talk to me about Sharjah."
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739766
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045426
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739766
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  "If they are the 'supporters of Sharjah' then who are we?" he said. "We don't want the flag of Al Qaeda raised over
  heads," he added, referring to Ansar Al-Shariah's black banner.
  One elder resident at the Sahaba Mosque sit-in, Ramadan Yousset said, "We will talk to them peacefully. We will tell
  them you are from us and you fought for us" during the civil war against Qaddafi. But 'if you say no (to integrating into
  the) police and army, we will storm your place. It's over."
  Officials in the interim government and security forces say they are not strong enough to crack down on the militias. The
  armed factions have refused government calls for them to join the regular army and police.
  So the government has created a "High Security Committee" aimed at grouping the armed factions as a first step to
  integration, Authorities pay fighters a salary of as much as 1,000 dinars, around $900, to join -- compared to the average
  police monthly salary of around $200.
  However, the militias that join still do not abide by government authority, and critics say the lure of salaries has only
  prompted more militias to form.
  Officials and former rebel commanders estimate the number of rebels that actually fought in the 8-month civil war
  against Gadhafi at around 30,000. But those now listed on the High Security Committee payroll have reached several
  hundred thousand.
  "All these militia and entities are fake ones but it is mushrooming," said Khaled Hadar, a Benghazi-based lawyer. 'The
  government is only making temporarily solutions, but you are creating a disaster."
  ###
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739766
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045427

RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739766
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  PART B6
  From: PIR
  Sent: Saturday, September 22, 2012 7:45 AM
  To:
  Cc: COM; Jake Sullivan
  Subject: Libya
  Associated Press
  Published September 21, 2012
  BENGHAZI, lli3YA — Hundreds of protesters angry over last week's killing of the U.S. ambassador to Libya stormed the
  compound of the Islamic extremist militia suspected in the attack, evicting militiamen and setting fire to their building
  Friday.
  In an unprecedented show of public anger at Libya's rampant militias, the crowd overwhelmed the compound of the
  Ansar Al-Sharlah Brigade in the center of the eastern city of Benghazi.
  Ansar Al-Shariah fighters initially fired in the air to disperse the crowd, but eventually abandoned the site with their
  weapons and vehicles after it was overrun by waves of protesters shouting "No to militias."
  "I don't want to see armed men wearing Afghani-style clothes stopping me in the street to give me orders, I only want to
  see people in uniform," said Omar Mohammed, a university student who took part in the takeover of the site, which
  protesters said was done in support of the army and police.
  No deaths were reported in the incident, which came after tens of thousands marched in Benghazi against armed
  militias. One vehicle was also burned at the compound.
  For many Libyans, the Sept. 11 attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi was the last straw in one of the biggest
  problems Libya has faced since the ouster and death of longtime dictator Moamrnar Qaddafi around a year ago -- the
  multiple mini-armies that with their arsenals of machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades are stronger than the
  regular armed forces and police.
  The militias, a legacy of the rag-tag popular forces that fought Qaddafi's regime, tout themselves as protectors of Libya's
  revolution, providing security where police cannot. But many say they act like gangs, detaining and intimidating rivals
  and carrying out killings.
  Militias made up of Islamic radicals like Ansar Al-Shariah are notorious for attacks on Muslims who don't abide by their
  hardline ideology. Officials and witnesses say fighters from Ansar Al-Shariati led the attack on the U.S. consulate, which
  killed Amb. Chris Stevens and three other Americans.
  After taking over the Ansar compound, protesters then drove to attack the Benghazi headquarters of another Islamist
  militia, Rafallah Sahati. The militiamen opened fire on the protesters, who were largely unarmed. At least 20 were
  wounded, and there were unconfirmed witness reports of three protesters killed.
  Earlier in the day, some 30,000 people filled a broad boulevard as they marched along a lake in central Benghazi on
  Friday to the gates of the headquarters of Ansar Al-Shariah.
  "No, no, to militias," the crowd chanted, filling a broad boulevard. They carried banners and signs demanding that
  militias disband and that the government build up police to take their place in keeping security. "Benghazi is in a trap,"
  signs read. "Where is the army, where is the police?"
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739766
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045425
  B6

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739766
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  Other signs mourned the killing of Stevens, reading, "The ambassador was Libya's friend" and "Libya lost a friend."
  Military helicopters and fighter jets flew overhead, and police mingled in the crowd, buoyed by the support of the
  protesters.
  The march was the biggest seen in Benghazi, Libya's second largest city and home to 1 million people, since the fall of
  Qaddafi in August 2011. The public backlash comes in part in frustration with the interim government, which has been
  unable to rein in the armed factions. Many say that officials' attempts to co-opt fighters by paying them have only fueled
  the growth of militias without bringing them under state control or integrating them into the regular forces.
  Residents of another main eastern city, Darna, have also begun to stand up against Ansar Al-Shariah and other militias.
  The anti-militia fervor in Darna is notable because the city, in the mountains along the Mediterranean coast north of
  Benghazi, has long had a reputation as a stronghold for Islamic extremists. During the Qaddafi era, it was the hotbed of a
  deadly Islamist insurgency against his regime.
  A significant number of the Libyan jihadists who travelled to Afghanistan and Iraq during recent wars came from Darna.
  During the revolt against him last year, Qaddafi's regime warned that Darna would declare itself an Islamic Emirate and
  ally itself with Al Qaeda.
  But now, the residents are lashing out against Ansar Al-Shariah, the main Islamic extremist group in the city.
  "The killing of the ambassador blew up the situation. It was disastrous," said Ayoub al-Shedwi, a young bearded Muslim
  preacher in Darna who says he has received multiple death threats because has spoken out against militias on a radio
  show he hosts. "We felt that the revolution is going in vain."
  Leaders of tribes, which are the strongest social force in eastern Libya, have come forward to demand that the militias
  disband.
  Tribal leaders in Benghazi and Darna announced this week that members of their tribes who are militiamen will no
  longer have their protection in the face of anti-militia protests. That means the tribe will not avenge them if they are
  killed.
  Activists and residents have held a sit-in for the past eight days outside Darna's Sahaba Mosque, calling on tribes to put
  an end to the "state of terrorism" created by the militias.
  Militiamen have been blamed for a range of violence in Darna. On the same day Stevens killed in Benghazi, a number of
  elderly Catholic nuns and a priest who have lived in Darna for decades providing free medical services, were attacked,
  reportedly beaten or stabbed. There have been 32 killings over the past few months, including the city security chief and
  assassinations of former officers from Qaddafi's military.
  Darna's residents are conservative, but they largely don't fit the city's reputation as extremists.
  Women wear headscarves, but not the more conservative black garb and veil that covers the entire body and face. In
  the ancient city's narrow alleys, shops display sleeveless women dresses and the young men racing by in cars blare
  Western songs.
  And many are impatient with Ansar Al-Sharjah's talk of imposing its strict version of Islamic law. The group's name
  means "Supporters of Shariah Law."
  "We are not infidels for God sake, We have no bars, no discos, we are not practicing vice in the street," said Wassam ben
  Madin, a leading activist in the city who lost his right eye in clashes with security forces on the first day of the uprising
  against Qaddafi. "This is not the time for talk about Sharjah. Have a state first then talk to me about Sharjah."
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739766
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045426

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739766
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  "If they are the 'supporters of Sharjah' then who are we?" he said. "We don't want the flag of Al Qaeda raised over
  heads," he added, referring to Ansar Al-Shariah's black banner.
  One elder resident at the Sahaba Mosque sit-in, Ramadan Yousset said, "We will talk to them peacefully. We will tell
  them you are from us and you fought for us" during the civil war against Qaddafi. But 'if you say no (to integrating into
  the) police and army, we will storm your place. It's over."
  Officials in the interim government and security forces say they are not strong enough to crack down on the militias. The
  armed factions have refused government calls for them to join the regular army and police.
  So the government has created a "High Security Committee" aimed at grouping the armed factions as a first step to
  integration, Authorities pay fighters a salary of as much as 1,000 dinars, around $900, to join -- compared to the average
  police monthly salary of around $200.
  However, the militias that join still do not abide by government authority, and critics say the lure of salaries has only
  prompted more militias to form.
  Officials and former rebel commanders estimate the number of rebels that actually fought in the 8-month civil war
  against Gadhafi at around 30,000. But those now listed on the High Security Committee payroll have reached several
  hundred thousand.
  "All these militia and entities are fake ones but it is mushrooming," said Khaled Hadar, a Benghazi-based lawyer. 'The
  government is only making temporarily solutions, but you are creating a disaster."
  ###
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739766
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045427



DocNumber: C05739767
MetadataSubject: CGI DRAFT V3 092212.DOCX
MetadataTo: H
MetadataFrom: Sullivan, Jacob J
MetadataDateSent: 2012-09-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH2/DOC_0C05739767/C05739767.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: cgi draft v3 092212.docx
ExtractedFrom: Sullivan, Jacob J <SullivanJJ@state.gov>
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739767
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
ExtractedBodyText:
  B5
  Megan is working on a development speech but please read the below if you can this afternoon.
  Let me know your thoughts.
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045428
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  ED
  B5
  UNCLASSIF
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045429
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  B5
  UNCLASSIF
  U.S. Departm
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  ED
  ent of State
  STATE-5CB0045430
  B5
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045431
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  B5
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767 STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  Date: 05/13/2015 SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045432
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  B5
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045433
  B5
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045434
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  202-431-6498 ° B5
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045435
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  202-431-6498 B5
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045436
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  B5
  202431 -6498
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045437
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  202-431-6498 B5
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045438
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  202431-6498
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045439
  B5
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  202-431-6498 B5
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045440
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  202-431-6498 B5
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045441
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  202-431-6498 B5
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045442

RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN PART
  B5
  From: Sullivan, Jacob J <SullivanJJ@state.gov>
  Sent Saturday, September 22, 2012 405 PM
  To:
  Subject: cgi draft v3 092212.docx
  Attachments: egi draft v3 092212.doex
  B5
  Megan is working on a development speech but please read the below if you can this afternoon.
  Let me know your thoughts.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045428

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  ED
  B5
  UNCLASSIF
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045429

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  B5
  UNCLASSIF
  U.S. Departm
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  ED
  ent of State
  STATE-5CB0045430

  B5
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045431

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  B5
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767 STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  Date: 05/13/2015 SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045432

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  B5
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045433

  B5
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045434

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  202-431-6498 ° B5
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045435

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  202-431-6498 B5
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045436

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  B5
  202431 -6498
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045437

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  202-431-6498 B5
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045438

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  202431-6498
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045439
  B5

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  202-431-6498 B5
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045440

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  202-431-6498 B5
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045441

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  202-431-6498 B5
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739767
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045442



DocNumber: C05739768
MetadataSubject: H: LATEST INTEL: LIBYAN LEADERSHIP PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS. SID
MetadataTo: H
MetadataFrom: Blumenthal, Sidney
MetadataDateSent: 2012-10-25T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH3/DOC_0C05739768/C05739768.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: H: Latest intel: Libyan leadership private discussions. Sid
ExtractedFrom: Sidney Blumenthal
ExtractedDateSent: Thursday, October 25, 2012 9:57 AM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739768
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
ExtractedBodyText:
  October 25, 2012
  For: Hillary

RawText:
  B6
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739768
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  PART B6
  From: Sidney Blumenthal
  Sent: Thursday, October 25, 2012 9:57 AM
  To:
  Subject: H: Latest intel: Libyan leadership private discussions. Sid
  Attachments: rim memo Libyan Leadership Private Discussions 102512,docx
  CONFIDENTIAL
  October 25, 2012
  For: Hillary
  From: Sid
  Re: Latest Libyan Leadership Private Discussions Sz Plans
  SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the
  highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.
  1.During mid-October 2012 Libyan President Yussef el Magariaf stated in private that he and
  Prime Minister Ali Zidan have ordered National Libyan Army (NLA) Chief of Staff General Youssef al
  Mangoush to establish a more coordinated operational relationship with Misrata and Zintan militias
  in order to support expanded army operations throughout the country. According to a sensitive
  source, prior to the death of the United States Ambassador on September ii, 2012 Mangoush resisted
  greater reliance on these specific large militias, believing that such a move undercuts the
  government's efforts to disarm and demobilize all of the militias left over from the 2011 civil war. At
  this point, however, Mangoush agreed with Magariaf that the situation in the country is becoming
  increasingly dangerous and unmanageable. Accordingly, the Chief of Staff stated that he will work
  with Ousama al Jouwali, the leader of the Zintan forces to step up operations against the other
  militias, (supported by the Misrata troops), that also come from the mountainous region of Western
  Libya. At the same time he will instruct NLA troops under ground force commander General Khalifa
  Belgasirn Haftar to pursue operations against tribal forces fighting on behalf of the Qaddafi family in
  Southern and Southeastern Libya.
  2. (Source Comment: In the opinion of this individual, Magariaf and Zidan agree that Libya's
  future depends on the success of their efforts in this militia demobilization operation over the next six
  months. While they believe that the involvement of Ansar al Sharia forces, with the assistance of al
  Qai'da in the Islamic Magreb (AQIM), in the assassination of the U.S. Ambassador has focused the
  world business and diplomatic community on the reality of the security issues surrounding the
  militias, the President and Prime Minister also fear that the situation is far worse than Western
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739768
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045748

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739768
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  sources realize. Mangoush informs them that AQIM and radical Salafist groups are increasing their
  efforts to take advantage of the frustrations of the various militias with the government, using the
  attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi as an inspiration for their activities. Just as Ansar al Sharia
  began as a militia supporting the federalist claims of Eastern tribal leaders, and was then infiltrated
  by AQIM radicals, Mangoush believes many of the other regional and ethnic militias around the
  country could follow the same path, if his troops do not succeed in the disarmament program. He
  also agrees with Zidan that they must move quickly since Libya's tradition of avoiding the Sunni-Shia
  conflict that dominates most of Middle East is beginning to erode during this period of chaos.)
  3. A particularly sensitive source noted that NLA operations have already begun against Ansar
  al Sharia forces south of Benghazi, after members of that militia/terrorist group killed four national
  policemen during a grenade attack at a roadblock in the Sousa Mountains. Under orders from Haftar
  Libyan troops surrounded more than 100 Ansar al Sharia fighters in the region of the town of Sousa.
  According to this sensitive source, the NLA suffered relatively heavy casualties in the fighting, but
  believe they captured a number of AQIM operatives and one of Ansar al Sharia's senior commanders,
  Sufian bin Qamu, who they believe ordered the attack on the police. Mangoush also reported to Zidan
  that Qamu had been previously captured by United States forces and imprisoned at the Guantanamo
  Bay facility.
  4. At the same time the Libyan army and forces from the Misrata militia entered the town of
  Bani Walid approximately 100 miles south of Tripoli, in an area still loyal to the Qaddafi family,
  engaging in close fighting with pro-Qaddafi forces. During the fighting Haftar dispatched troops with
  heavier arms to support the Misrata forces. According to this source, the NLA downplayed the level of
  the fighting, in an effort to reassure the supporters of the Government. That said the NLA/Misrata
  force had captured the city center and the airport after suffering significant casualties. The
  Government forces entered the city after shelling opposition positions around the city hospital, using
  heavy mortars and motorized guns.
  5. (Source Comment: In the opinion of this knowledgeable individual, while Magariaf and
  Zidan remain optimistic about the future of Libya, they believe that the security situation will remain
  tenuous throughout 2013. Magariaf also sees the national election scheduled for mid-2013 as a
  potentially complicating factor. According to this source, Mangoush and Haftar focused on Bani
  Walid under pressure from the Misrata commanders. These militia leaders were, according to a
  knowledgeable source, angered over the death of one of their senior officials, Omran Shahan, at the
  hands of pro-Qaddafi forces in Bani Walid. The Misrata commanders report that Shaban was one of
  the organizers of the Misrata militia unit that captured and executed Qaddafi in 2011 outside of the
  town of Sirte. The Misrata leaders, supported by the General National Council (GNC), demanded the
  surrender of the men who arrested and killed Shahan. As the fighting expanded through late
  September and early October, Magariaf and his advisors came to see Bani Walid as an important
  symbol of their commitment to disarm the militias and anti-government groups, and increased their
  involvement accordingly.)
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739768
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045749

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739768
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  CONFIDENTIAL
  October 25, 2012
  For: Hillary
  From: Sid
  Re: Latest Libyan Leadership Private Discussions & Plans
  SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as
  the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.
  I. During mid-October 2012 Libyan President Yussef el Magariaf stated in private that
  he and Prime Minister Ali Zidan have ordered National Libyan Army (NLA) Chief of Staff
  General Youssef al Mangoush to establish a more coordinated operational relationship with
  Misrata and Zintan militias in order to support expanded army operations throughout the country
  According to a sensitive source, prior to the death of the United States Ambassador on
  September 11, 2012 Mangoush resisted greater reliance on these specific large militias, believing
  that such a move undercuts the government's efforts to disarm and demobilize all of the militias
  left over from the 2011 civil war. At this point, however, Mangoush agreed with Magariaf that
  the situation in the county is becoming increasingly dangerous and unmanageable.
  Accordingly, the Chief of Staff stated that he will work with Ousama al Jouwali, the leader of the
  Zintan forces to step up operations against the other militias, (supported by the Misrata troops),
  that also come from the mountainous region of Western Libya. At the same time he will instruct
  NLA troops under ground force commander General Khalifa Belgasim Haftar to pursue
  operations against tribal forces fighting on behalf of the Qaddafi family in Southern and
  Southeastern Libya.
  2. (Source Comment In the opinion of this individual, Magariaf and Ziclan agree that
  Libya's future depends on the success of their efforts in this militia demobilization operation
  over the next six months. While they believe that the involvement of Ansar al Sharia forces,
  with the assistance of al Qai'cla in the Islamic Magrel• (AQIM), in the assassination of the U.S
  Ambassador has focused the world business and diplomatic community on the reality of the
  security issues surrounding the militias, the President and Prime Minister also fear that the
  situation is far worse than Western sources realize Mangoush informs them that AQIM and
  radical Salafist groups are increasing their efforts to take advantage of the frustrations of the
  various militias with the government, using the attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi as an
  inspiration for their activities Just as Ansar al Sharia began as a militia supporting the federalist
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739768
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045750

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739768 .
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  claims of Eastern tribal leaders, and was then infiltrated by AQIM radicals, Mangoush believes
  many of the other regional and ethnic militias around the country could follow the same path, if
  his troops do not succeed in the disarmament program. He also agrees with Zidan that they must
  move quickly since Libya's tradition of avoiding the Sunni-Shia conflict that dominates most of
  Middle East is beginning to erode during this period of chaos.)
  3. A particularly sensitive source noted that NLA operations have already begun against
  Ansar al Sharia forces south of Benghazi, after members of that militia/terrorist group killed four
  national policemen during a grenade attack at a roadblock in the Sousa Mountains. Under orders
  from flaftar Libyan troops surrounded more than 100 Ansar al Sharia fighters in the region of the
  town of Sousa. According to this sensitive source, the NLA suffered relatively heavy casualties
  in the fighting, but believe they captured a number of AQIM operatives and one of Ansar al
  Sharia's senior commanders, Sufian bin Qamu, who they believe ordered the attack on the
  police. Mangoush also reported to Zidan that Qamu had been previously captured by United
  States forces and imprisoned at the Guantanamo Bay facility.
  4. At the same time the Libyan army and forces from the Misrata militia entered the
  town of Bani Walid approximately 100 miles south of Tripoli, in an area still loyal to the Qaddafi
  family, engaging in close fighting with pro-Qaddafi forces. During the fighting Haftar
  dispatched troops with heavier arms to support the Misrata forces. According to this source, the
  NLA downplayed the level of the fighting, in an effort to reassure the supporters of the
  Government. That said the NLAJMisrata force had captured the city center and the airport after
  suffering significant casualties. The Government forces entered the city after shelling opposition
  positions around the city hospital, using heavy mortars and motorized guns
  5. (Source Comment: In the opinion of this knowledgeable individual, while Magariaf
  and Zidan remain optimistic about the future of Libya, they believe that the security situation
  will remain tenuous throughout 2013. Magariaf also sees the national election scheduled for
  mid-2013 as a potentially complicating factor. According to this source, Mangoush and Haftar
  focused on Bani Walid under pressure from the Misrata commanders. These militia leaders
  were, according to a knowledgeable source, angered over the death of one of their senior
  officials, Omran Shaban, at the hands of pro-Qaddafi forces in Bani Walk]. The Misrata
  commanders report that Shaban was one of the organizers of the Misrata militia unit that
  captured and executed Qaddafi in 2011 outside of the town of Sirte. The Misrata leaders,
  supported by the General National Council (GNC), demanded the surrender of the men who
  arrested and killed Shaban. As the fighting expanded through late September and early October,
  Magariaf and his advisors came to see Bani Walid as an important symbol of their commitment
  to disarm the militias and anti-government groups, and increased their involvement accordingly.)
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739768
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045751



DocNumber: C05739769
MetadataSubject: H: LATEST INTEL: LIBYAN LEADERSHIP PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS. SID
MetadataTo: Russorv@state.gov
MetadataFrom: H
MetadataDateSent: 2012-10-25T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH3/DOC_0C05739769/C05739769.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: H: Latest intel: Libyan leadership private discussions. Sid
ExtractedTo: 'Russorv@state.gov'
ExtractedFrom: H <hrod17@clintonemail.corn>
ExtractedDateSent: Thursday, October 25, 2012 09:57 AM Eastern Standard Time
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739769
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
ExtractedBodyText: Pis print.
RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739769
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  PART B6
  From: H <hrod17@clintonemail.corn>
  Sent Thursday, October 25, 2012 10:18 AM
  To: 'Russorv@state.gov'
  Subject Fw; H; Latest intel: Libyan leadership private discussions. Sid
  Attachments: hrc memo Libyan Leadership Private Discussions 102512.doo(
  Pis print.
  From: Sidney Blumenthal [mato
  Sent: Thursday, October 25, 2012 09:57 AM Eastern Standard Time
  To: H
  Subject: H: Latest intel: Libyan leadership private discussions. Sid
  CONFIDENTIAL
  October 25, 2012
  For: Hillary
  From: Ski
  Re: Latest Libyan Leadership Private Discussions & Plans
  SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the
  highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.
  1. During mid-October 2012 Libyan President Yussef el Magariaf stated in private that he and
  Prime Minister Ali Zidan have ordered National Libyan Aimy (NLA) Chief of Staff General Youssef al
  Mangoush to establish a more coordinated operational relationship with Misrata and Zintan militias
  in order to support expanded army operations throughout the country. According to a sensitive
  source, prior to the death of the United States Ambassador on September 11, 2012 Mangoush resisted
  greater reliance on these specific large militias believing that such a move undercuts the
  government's efforts to disarm and demobilize all of the militias left over from the 2011civil war. At
  this point, however, Mangoush agreed with Magariaf that the situation in the country is becoming
  increasingly dangerous and unmanageable. Accordingly, the Chief of Staff stated that he will work
  with Ousama al Jouwali, the leader of the Zintan forces to step up operations against the other
  militias, (supported by the Misrata troops), that also come from the mountainous region of Western
  Libya. At the same time he will instruct NLA troops under ground force commander General IChalifa
  Belqasirn Haftar to pursue operations against tribal forces fighting on behalf of the Qaddafi family in
  Southern and Southeastern Libya
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No F-2015-04841
  Doc No C05739769
  Date 05/13/2015
  B6
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045752

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739769
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  2. (Source Comment: In the opinion of this individual, Magariaf and Zidan agree that Libya's
  future depends on the success of their efforts in this militia demobilization operation over the next six
  months. While they believe that the involvement of Ansar al Sharia forces, with the assistance of al
  Qai'da in the Islamic Magreb (AQIM), in the assassination of the U.S. Ambassador has focused the
  world business and diplomatic community on the reality of the security issues surrounding the
  militias, the President and Prime Minister also fear that the situation is far worse than Western
  sources realize. Mangoush informs them that AQIM and radical Sala.fist groups are increasing their
  efforts to take advantage of the frustrations of the various militias with the government, using the
  attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi as an inspiration for their activities. Just as Ansar at Sharia
  began as a militia supporting the federalist claims of Eastern tribal leaders, and was then infiltrated
  by AQIM radicals, Mangoush believes many of the other regional and ethnic militias around the
  country could follow the same path, if his troops do not succeed in the disarmament program. He
  also agrees with Zidan that they must move quickly since Libya's tradition of avoiding the Sunni-Shia
  conflict that dominates most of Middle East is beginning to erode during this period of chaos.)
  3. A particularly sensitive source noted that NLA operations have already begun against Ansar
  at Sharia forces south of Benghazi, after members of that militia/terrorist group killed four national
  policemen during a grenade attack at a roadblock in the Sousa Mountains. Under orders from Haftar
  Libyan troops surrounded more than 100 Ansar al Sharia fighters in the region of the town of Sousa.
  According to this sensitive source, the NLA. suffered relatively heavy casualties in the fighting, but
  believe they captured a number of AQIM operatives and one of Ansar at Shaaia's senior commanders,
  Sufian bin Qamu, who they believe ordered the attack on the police. Mangoush also reported to Zidan
  that Qamu had been previously captured by United States forces and imprisoned at the Guantanamo
  Bay facility.
  4. At the same time the Libyan army and forces from the Misrata militia entered the town of
  Bani Walid approximately mot miles south of Tripoli, in an area still loyal to the Qaddafi family,
  engaging in close fighting with pro-Qadclafi forces. During the fighting Haftar dispatched troops with
  heavier arms to support the Misrata forces. According to this source, the NTLA downplayed the level of
  the fighting, in an effort to reassure the supporters of the Government. That said the NLA/Misrata
  force had captured the city center and the airport after suffering significant casualties. The
  Government forces entered the city after shelling opposition positions around the city hospital, using
  heavy mortars and motorized guns.
  5. (Source Comment: In the opinion of this knowledgeable individual, while Magariaf and
  Zidan remain optimistic about the future of Libya, they believe that the security situation will remain
  tenuous throughout 2013. Magariaf also sees the national election scheduled for mid-2013 as a
  potentially complicating factor. According to this source, Mangoush and Haftar focused on Rani
  Walid under pressure from the Misrata commanders. These militia leaders were, according to a
  knowledgeable source, angered over the death of one of their senior officials, Omran Shaban, at the
  hands of pro-Qaddafi forces in Bani Walid. The Misrata commanders report that Shaban was one of
  the organizers of the Misrata militia unit that captured and executed Qadclafi in 2011 outside of the
  town of Sirte. The Misrata leaders, supported by the General National Council (GNC), demanded the
  surrender of the men who arrested and killed Shaban. As the fighting expanded through late
  September and early October, Magariaf and his advisors came to see Bani Walid as an important
  symbol of their commitment to disarm the militias and anti-government groups, and increased their
  involvement accordingly.)
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739769
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045753

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739769
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  CONFIDENTIAL
  October 25, 2012
  For: Hilary
  From: Sid
  Re: Latest Libyan Leadership Private Discussions & Plans
  SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as
  the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.
  1. During mid-October 2012 Libyan President Yussef el Magariaf stated in private that
  he and Prime Minister Ali Zidan have ordered National Libyan Army (NLA) Chief of Staff
  General Youssef al Mangoush to establish a more coordinated operational relationship with
  Misrata and Zintan militias in order to support expanded army operations throughout the country.
  According to a sensitive source, prior to the death of the United States Ambassador on
  September 11, 2012 Mangoush resisted greater reliance on these specific large militias, believing
  that such a move undercuts the government's efforts to disarm and demobilize all of the militias
  left over from the 2011 civil war. At this point, however, Mangoush agreed with Magariaf that
  the situation in the country is becoming increasingly dangerous and unmanageable.
  Accordingly, the Chief of Staff stated that he will work with Ousama al Jouwali, the leader of the
  Zintan forces to step up operations against the other militias, (supported by the Misrata troops),
  that also come from the mountainous region of Western Libya. At the same time he will instruct
  NLA troops under ground force commander General Khalifa Belciasim Haftar to pursue
  operations against tribal forces fighting on behalf of the Qaddafi family in Southern and
  Southeastern Libya.
  2. (Source Comment: In the opinion of this individual, Magariaf and Zidan agree that
  Libya's future depends on the success of their efforts in this militia demobilization operation
  over the next six months. While they believe that the involvement of Ansar al Sharia forces,
  with the assistance of al Qai'da in the Islamic Magreb (AQ1M), in the assassination of the U.S.
  Ambassador has focused the world business and diplomatic community on the reality of the
  security issues surrounding the militias, the President and Prime Minister also fear that the
  situation is far worse than Western sources realize Mangoush informs them that AQIIvf and
  radical Salafist groups are increasing their efforts to take advantage of the frustrations of the
  various militias with the government, using the attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi as an
  inspiration for their activities. Just as Ansar al Sharia began as a militia supporting the federalist
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739769
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045754

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739769
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  claims of Eastern tribal leaders, and was then infiltrated by AQIM radicals, Mangoush believes
  many of the other regional and ethnic militias around the country could follow the same path, if
  his troops do not succeed in the disarmament program, He also agrees with Zidan that they must
  move quickly since Libya's tradition of avoiding the Sunni-Shia conflict that dominates most of
  Middle East is beginning to erode during this period of chaos.)
  3. A particularly sensitive source noted that NLA operations have already begun against
  Amu al Sharia forces south of Benghazi, after members of that militia/terrorist group killed four
  national policemen during a grenade attack at a roadblock in the Sousa Mountains. Under orders
  from Haftar Libyan troops surrounded more than 100 Ansar al Sharia fighters in the region of the
  town of Sousa According to this sensitive source, the NLA suffered relatively heavy casualties
  in the fighting, but believe they captured a number of AQIM operatives and one of Ansar al
  Sharia's senior commanders, Saran bin Qamu, who they believe ordered the attack on the
  police. Mangoush also reported to Zidan that Qamu had been previously captured by United
  States forces and imprisoned at the Guantanamo Bay facility.
  4. At the same time the Libyan army and forces from the Misrata militia entered the
  town of Bani Walid approximately 100 miles south of Tripoli, in an area still loyal to the Qaddafi
  family, engaging in close fighting with pro-Qaddafi forces. During the fighting Haftar
  dispatched troops with heavier arms to support the Misrata forces. According to this source, the
  NLA downplayed the level of the fighting, in an effort to reassure the supporters of the
  Government That said the NLA/Misrata force had captured the city center and the airport after
  suffering significant casualties. The Government forces entered the city after shelling opposition
  positions around the city hospital, using heavy mortars and motorized guns.
  S. (Source Comment: In the opinion of this knowledgeable individual, while Magariaf
  and Zidan remain optimistic about the future of Libya, they believe that the security situation
  will remain tenuous throughout 2013. Magariaf also sees the national election scheduled for
  mid-2013 as a potentially complicating factor. According to this source, Mangoush and Haftar
  focused on Bani Walid under pressure from the Misrata commanders. These militia leaders
  were, according to a knowledgeable source, angered over the death of one of their senior
  officials, Omran Shaban, at the hands of pro-Qaddafi forces in Bard Walid The Misrata
  commanders report that Shahan was one of the organizers of the Misrata militia unit that
  captured and executed Qaddafi in 2011 outside of the town of Sine. The Misrata leaders,
  supported by the General National Council (GNC), demanded the surrender of the men who
  arrested and killed Shahan As the fighting expanded through late September and early October,
  Magariaf and his advisors came to see Bani Walid as an important symbol of their commitment
  to disarm the militias and anti-government groups, and increased their involvement accordingly.)
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739769
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045755



DocNumber: C05739771
MetadataSubject: H: LATEST INTEL: LIBYAN LEADERSHIP PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS. SID
MetadataTo: sullivanjj@state.gov
MetadataFrom: H
MetadataDateSent: 2012-10-25T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH3/DOC_0C05739771/C05739771.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: H: Latest Intel: Ubyan leadership private discussions. Sid
ExtractedTo: 'suilivanij@state.gok,
ExtractedFrom: H <hrod17@dintonemaii.com>
ExtractedDateSent: Thursday, October 25, 2012 09:57 AM Eastern Standard lime
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739771
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
ExtractedBodyText: Fyi and send around as you choose.
RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739771
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  PART B6
  From: H <hrod17@dintonemaii.com>
  Sent Thursday, October 25, 2012 1018 AM
  To: 'suilivanij@state.gok,
  Subject Fitv: H: Latest intel: Libyan leadership private discussions Sid
  Attachments: hrc memo Libyan Leadership Private Discussions 102512.docx
  Fyi and send around as you choose.
  From: Sidney Blumenthal [malt)
  Sent: Thursday, October 25, 2012 09:57 AM Eastern Standard lime
  To: H
  Subject: H: Latest Intel: Ubyan leadership private discussions. Sid
  CONFIDENTIAL
  October 25, 2012
  For: Hillary
  From: Sid
  Re: Latest Libyan Leadership Private Discussions & Plans
  SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the
  highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.
  1. During mid-October 2012 Libyan President Yussef el Magariaf stated in private that he and
  Piime Minister Ali Zidan have ordered National Libyan Army (NIA) Chief of Staff General Youssef al
  Mangoush to establish a more coordinated operational relationship with Misrata and Zintan militias
  in order to support expanded army operations throughout the country. According to a sensitive
  source, prior to the death of the United States Ambassador on September 11, 2012 Mangoush resisted
  greater reliance on these specific large militias, believing that such a move undercuts the
  government's efforts to disarm and demobilize all of the militias left over from the 2011 civil war. At
  this point, however, Mangoush agreed with Magariaf that the situation in the country is becoming
  increasingly dangerous and unmanageable. Accordingly, the Chief of Staff stated that he will work
  with Ousama al Jouwali, the leader of the Zintan forces to step up operations against the other
  militias, (supported by the Misrata troops), that also come from the mountainous region of Western
  Libya. At the same time he will instruct NLA troops under ground force commander General Khalifa
  Belgasina Haftar to pursue operations against tribal forces fighting on behalf of the Qaddafi family in
  Southern and Southeastern Libya.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No F-2015-04841
  Doc No C05739771
  Date 05/13/2015
  B6
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045756

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739771
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  2- (Source Comment: In the opinion of this individual, Magariaf and Zidan agree that Libya's
  future depends on the success of their efforts in this militia demobilization operation over the next six
  months. While they believe that the involvement of Ansar al Sharia forces, with the assistance of al
  Qafda in the Islamic Magreb (AQIM), in the assassination of the U.S. Ambassador has focused the
  world business and diplomatic community on the reality of the security issues surrounding the
  militias, the President and Prime Minister also fear that the situation is far worse than Western
  sources realize. Mangoush informs them that AQIM and radical Salafist groups are increasing their
  efforts to take advantage of the frustrations of the various militias with the government, using the
  attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi as an inspiration for their activities. Just as Amax al Sharia
  began as a militia supporting the federalist claims of Eastern tribal leaders, and was then infiltrated
  by NEVI radicals, Mangoush believes many of the other regional and ethnic militias around the
  country could follow the same path, if his troops do not succeed in the disarmament program. Be
  also agrees with Zidan that they must move quickly since Libya's tradition of avoiding the Sunni-Shia
  conflict that dominates most of Middle East is beginning to erode during this period of chaos.)
  3. A particularly sensitive source noted that NLA operations have already begun against Ansar
  al Sharia forces south of Benghazi, after members of that militia/terrorist group killed four national
  policemen during a grenade attack at a roadblock in the Sousa Mountains. Under orders from Haftar
  Libyan troops surrounded more than 100 Ansar al Sharia fighters in the region of the town of Sousa.
  According to this sensitive source, the NIA suffered relatively heavy casualties in the fighting, but
  believe they captured a number of AQIM operatives and one of Ansar al Sharia's senior commanders,
  Sufian bin Qamu, who they believe ordered the attack on the police. Mangoush also reported to Zidan
  that Qamu had been previously captured by United States forces and imprisoned at the Guantanamo
  Bay facility.
  4. At the same time the Libyan army and forces from the Misrata militia entered the town of
  Bani Walid approximately 100 miles south of Tripoli, in an area still loyal to the Qaddafi family,
  engaging in close fighting with pro-Qaddafi forces. During the fighting Haftar dispatched troops with
  heavier arms to support the Misrata forces. According to this source, the NLA downplayed the level of
  the fighting, in an effort to reassure the supporters of the Government. That said the NLA/Misrata
  force had captured the city center and the airport after suffering significant casualties. The
  Government forces entered the city after shelling opposition positions around the city hospital, using
  heavy mortars and motorized guns.
  5. (Source Comment: In the opinion of this knowledgeable individual, while Magariaf and
  Zidan remain optimistic about the future of Libya, they believe that the security situation will remain
  tenuous throughout 2013. Magariaf also sees the national election scheduled for mid-2013 as a
  potentially complicating factor. According to this source, Mangoush and Haftar focused on Bani
  Walid under pressure from the Misrata commanders. These militia leaders were, according to a
  knowledgeable source, angered over the death of one of their senior officials, Omran Shaban, at the
  hands of pro-Qaddafi forces in Bani Walid. The Misrata commanders report that Shahan was one of
  the organizers of the Misrata militia unit that captured and executed Qaddafi in 2011 outside of the
  town of Sirte. The Misrata leaders, supported by the General National Council (GNC), demanded the
  surrender of the men who arrested and killed Shahan. As the fighting expanded through late
  September and early October, Magariaf and his advisors came to see Bani Walid as an important
  symbol of their commitment to disarm the militias and anti-government groups, and increased their
  involvement accordingly.)
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739771
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045757

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739771
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  CONFIDENTIAL
  October 25, 2012
  For: Hillary
  From: Sid
  Re. Latest Libyan Leadership Private Discussions & Plans
  SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as
  the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.
  L During mid-October 2012 Libyan President Yussef el Magariaf stated in private that
  he and Prime Minister Ali Zidan have ordered National Libyan Army (NLA) Chief of Staff
  General Youssef al Mangoush to establish a more coordinated operational relationship with
  Misrata and Zintan militias in order to support expanded army operations throughout the country.
  According to a sensitive source, prior to the death of the United States Ambassador on
  September 11, 2012 Mangoush resisted greater reliance on these specific large militias, believing
  that such a move undercuts the government's efforts to disarm and demobilize all of the militias
  left over from the 2011 civil war. At this point, however, Mangoush agreed with Magariaf that
  the situation in the country is becoming increasingly dangerous and unmanageable.
  Accordingly, the Chief of Staff stated that he will work with Ousama al Jouvvali, the leader of the
  Zintan forces to step up operations against the other militias, (supported by the Misrata troops),
  that also come from the mountainous region of Western Libya. At the same time he will instruct
  NLA troops under ground force commander General Khali& Belgasim Haftar to pursue
  operations against tribal forces fighting on behalf of the Qaddafi family in Southern and
  Southeastern Libya.
  2 (Source Comment. In the opinion of this individual, Magariaf and Zidan agree that
  Libya's future depends on the success of their efforts in this militia demobilization operation
  over the next six months. While they believe that the involvement of Ansar al Sharia forces,
  with the assistance of al Qai'da in the Islamic Magreb (AQUA), in the assassination of the U
  Ambassador has focused the world business and diplomatic community on the reality of the
  SeCtifity issues surrounding the militias, the President and Prime Minister also fear that the
  situation is far worse than Western sources realize. Mangoush informs them that AQIM and
  radical Salafist groups are increasing their efforts to take advantage of the frustrations of the
  various militias with the government, using the attack on the U S Consulate in Benghazi as an
  inspiration for their activities. Just as Ansar al Sharia began as a militia supporting the federalist
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739771
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045758

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739771
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  claims of Eastern tribal leaders, and was then infiltrated by AQIM radicals, Mangoush believes
  many of the other regional and ethnic militias around the country could follow the same path, if
  his troops do not succeed in the disarmament program. He also agrees with Zidan that they must
  move quickly since Libya's tradition of avoiding the Sunni-Shia conflict that dominates most of
  Middle East is beginning to erode during this period of chaos.)
  3. A particularly sensitive source noted that l's1LA operations have already begun against
  Ansar al Sharia forces south of Benghazi, after members of that militia/terrorist group killed four
  national policemen during a grenade attack at a roadblock in the Sousa Mountains. Under orders
  from Haftar Libyan troops Surrounded more than 100 Ansar al Sharia fighters in the region of the
  town of Sousa According to this sensitive source, the NLA suffered relatively heavy casualties
  in the fighting, but believe they captured a number of AQ1M operatives and one of Ansar al
  Sharia's senior commanders, Sufian bin Qamu, who they believe ordered the attack on the
  police. Mangoush also reported to Zidan that Qamu had been previously captured by United
  States forces and imprisoned at the Guantanamo Bay facility.
  4. At the same time the Libyan army and forces from the Msrata militia entered the
  town of Bani Walid approximately 100 miles south of Tripoli, in an area still loyal to the Qaddafi
  family, engaging in close fighting with pro-Qaddaft forces. During the fighting Haftar
  dispatched troops with heavier arms to support the Misrata forces. According to this source, the
  NLA downplayed the level of the fighting, in an effort to reassure the supporters of the
  Government. That said the NLAIMisrata force had captured the city center and the airport after
  suffering significant casualties. The Government forces entered the city after shelling opposition
  positions around the city hospital, using heavy mortars and motorized guns.
  5. (Source Comment: In the opinion of this knowledgeable individual, while Magariaf
  and Zidan remain optimistic about the future of Libya, they believe that the security situation
  will remain tenuous throughout 2013 Magaiiaf also sees the national election scheduled for
  mid-2013 as a potentially complicating factor. According to this source, Mangoush and Haftar
  focused on Bani Walid under pressure from the Misrata commanders. These militia leaders
  were, according to a knowledgeable source, angered over the death of one of their senior
  officials, Omran Shahan, at the hands of pro-Qaddafi forces in Bani Walid. The Misrata
  commanders report that Shahan was one of the organizers of the Misrata militia unit that
  captured and executed Qaddafi in 2011 outside of the town of Sirte, The Misrata leaders,
  supported by the General National Council (GNC), demanded the surrender of the men who
  arrested and killed Shahan, As the fighting expanded through late September and early October,
  Magariaf and his advisors came to see Bani Walid as an important symbol of their commitment
  to disarm the militias and anti-government groups, and increased their involvement accordingly.)
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739771
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045759



DocNumber: C05739772
MetadataSubject: H: LATEST INTEL: LIBYAN LEADERSHIP PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS. SID
MetadataTo: H
MetadataFrom: Sullivan, Jacob J
MetadataDateSent: 2012-10-25T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH3/DOC_0C05739772/C05739772.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: Fw: H: Latest intel: Libyan leadership private discussions. Sid
ExtractedFrom: Sullivan, Jacob J <SullivanJJ@state.gov>
ExtractedDateSent: Thursday, October 25, 2012 10:18 AM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739772
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
ExtractedBodyText: Roger, will do.
RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739772
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  PART B6
  From: Sullivan, Jacob J <SullivanJJ@state.gov>
  Sent Thursday, October 25, 2012 11:18 AM
  To:
  Subject Re: H: Latest intel: Libyan leadership private discussions. Sid
  Roger, will do.
  From: H [mailto:HDR22@clintonemail.com]
  Sent: Thursday, October 25, 2012 10:18 AM
  To: Sullivan, Jacob J
  Subject: Fw: H: Latest intel: Libyan leadership private discussions. Sid
  Fyi and send around as you choose.
  From: Sidney Blumenthal [mailto B6
  Sent: Thursday, October 25, 2012 1J9:5/ Am Eastern standard Time
  To: H
  Subject: H: Latest intel: Libyan leadership private discussions. Sid
  CONFIDENTIAL
  October 25, 2012
  For: Hillary
  From: Sid
  Re: Latest Libyan Leadership Private Discussions & Plans
  SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the
  highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.
  1. During mid-October 2012 Libyan President Yu.ssef el Magariaf stated in private that he and
  Prime Minister Ali Zidan have ordered National Libyan Army (NLA) Chief of Staff General Youssef al
  Mangoush to establish a more coordinated operational relationship with Misrata and Zintan militias
  in order to support expanded army operations throughout the country. According to a sensitive
  source, prior to the death of the United States Ambassador on September 11, 2012 Mangoush resisted
  greater reliance on these specific large militias, believing that such a move undercuts the
  government's efforts to disarm and demobilize all of the militias left over from the 2011 civil war. At
  this point, however, Mangoush agreed with Magariaf that the situation in the country is becoming
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739772
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045760

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739772
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  increasingly dangerous and unmanageable. Accordingly, the Chief of Staff stated that he will work
  with Ousama al Jouwali, the leader of the Zintan forces to step up operations against the other
  militias, (supported by the Misrata troops), that also come from the mountainous region of Western
  Libya. At the same time he will instruct NLA troops under ground force commander General Khalifa
  Belqasim Haftar to pursue operations against tribal forces fighting on behalf of the Qaddafi family in
  Southern and Southeastern Libya.
  2. (Source Comment: In the opinion of this individual, Magariaf and Zidan agree that Libya's
  future depends on the success of their efforts in this militia demobilization operation over the next six
  months. While they believe that the involvement of Ansar al Sharia forces, with the assistance of al
  Qati.cla in the Islamic Magreb (AQIM), in the assassination of the U.S, Ambassador has focused the
  world business and diplomatic community on the reality of the security issues surrounding the
  militias, the President and Prime Minister also fear that the situation is far worse than Western
  sources realize. Mangoush informs them that AQIM and radical Salafist groups are increasing their
  efforts to take advantage of the frustrations of the various militias with the government, using the
  attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi as an inspiration for their activities. Just as Amax al Sharia
  began as a militia supporting the federalist claims of Eastern tribal leaders, and was then infiltrated
  by AQIM radicals, Mangoush believes many of the other regional and ethnic militias around the
  country could follow the same path, if his troops do not succeed in the disarmament program. He
  also agrees with Zidan that they must move quickly since Libya's tradition of avoiding the Sunni-Shia
  conflict that dominates most of Middle East is beginning to erode during this period of chaos.)
  3. A particularly sensitive source noted that NLA operations have already begun against Ansar
  al Sharia forces south of Benghazi, after members of that militia/terrorist group killed four national
  policemen during a grenade attack at a roadblock in the Sousa Mountains. Under orders from Haftar
  Libyan troops surrounded more than 100 Ansar al Sharia fighters in the region of the town of Sousa.
  According to this sensitive source, the NLA suffered relatively heavy casualties in the fighting, but
  believe they captured a number of AQIM operatives and one of Ansar al Sharia's senior commanders,
  Sufian bin Qamu, who they believe ordered the attack on the police. Mangoush also reported to Zidan
  that Qamu had been previously captured by United States forces and imprisoned at the Guantanamo
  Bay facility.
  4. At the same time the Libyan army and forces from the Misrata militia entered the town of
  Rani Walid approximately 100 miles south of Tripoli, in an area still loyal to the Qaddafi family,
  engaging in close fighting with pro-Qaddafi forces. During the fighting Haftar dispatched troops with
  heavier arms to support the Misrata forces. According to this source, the NLA downplayed the level of
  the fighting, in an effort to reassure the supporters of the Government. That said the NLA/Misrata
  force had captured the city center and the airport after suffering significant casualties. The
  Government forces entered the city after shelling opposition positions around the city hospital, using
  heavy mortars and motorized guns.
  5. (Source Comment: In the opinion of this knowledgeable individual, while Magariaf and
  Zidan remain optimistic about the future of Libya, they believe that the security situation will remain
  tenuous throughout 2013. Magariaf also sees the national election scheduled for mid-2013 as a
  potentially complicating factor. According to this source, Mangoush and Haftar focused on Bani
  Walid under pressure from the Misrata commanders. These militia leaders were, according to a
  knowledgeable source, angered over the death of one of their senior officials, Oman Shahan, at the
  hands of pro-Qaddafi forces in Bani Walid. The Misrata commanders report that Shaban was one of
  the organizers of the Misrata militia unit that captured and executed Qaddafi in 2011 outside of the
  town of Sirte, The Misrata leaders, supported by the General National Council (CNC), demanded the
  surrender of the men who arrested and killed Shahan. As the fighting expanded through late
  September and early October, Magariaf and his advisors came to see Bani Walid as an important
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739772
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045761

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739772
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  symbol of their commitment to disarm the militias and anti-government groups, and increased their
  involvement accordingly.)
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739772
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045762



DocNumber: C05739774
MetadataSubject: WSJ EDITORIAL - THE OTHER EMBASSY ATTACK
MetadataTo: H
MetadataFrom: Mills, Cheryl D
MetadataDateSent: 2012-10-27T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH3/DOC_0C05739774/C05739774.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: Fw: WSJ Editorial - The Other Embassy Attack
ExtractedFrom: Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.gov>
ExtractedDateSent: Saturday, October 27, 2012 6:45 AM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739774
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739774
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  PART B6
  From: Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.gov>
  Sent: Saturday, October 27, 2012 6:45 AM
  To:
  Subject: Fw: WSJ Editorial - The Other Embassy Attack
  From: PA Clips [mallto:paclips@state.gov]
  Sent: Friday, October 26, 2012 09:04 PM
  To PA-Monitoring-Group-DL; NEA-Press-DL; DS PA Media; Shore, Rhonda H; Atchison, Mark C; Moe, Grace T;
  Coordination; Mills, Cheryl D; Tow, Nora F; SARB
  Subject: WSJ Editorial - The Other Embassy Attack
  The Other Embassy Attack
  Wall Street Journal Review & Outlook
  Friday, October 26, 2012, 6:43 p.m. EDT
  Tehran tries to turn Yemen into another Lebanon.
  Government emails from Libya released this week show Foggy Bottom's finest knew within hours that an Islamist terror
  group was behind the September 11 attacks that killed four Americans. Maybe this truth drip will force President Obama
  to explain why his Administration so strenuously downplayed a terrorist connection and insisted an anti-Islamic video
  was to blame. But amid media and Congressional efforts to uncover the truth about Benghazi, it's worth paying
  attention to another attack on a U.S. diplomatic mission last month.
  On September 13, several hundred people, mostly young men, stormed the Embassy in Yemen's capital of Sanaa. The
  American staff had been evacuated, but the compound was overrun. In the melee four Yemenis died. At the time the
  event was lumped in with other anti-American protests in Tunisia, Pakistan and Egypt that week.
  Yet it has since become clear that the Yemen assault was also well coordinated, likely by one or more militias. More
  alarming is an Iranian connection that signals that Tehran is expanding its long and quiet war on America to a new front.
  The U.S. isn't ruling out the possible complicity of a Yemeni army faction loyal to ousted President Ali Abdullah Saleh. He
  stepped down from power in February as part of a U.S.-backed political transition. Since his departure, the military has
  been divided amid jockeying for control in this tribal society. The Salehs deny the accusation.
  During months of anti-government protests in 2011, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) also gained control of
  territory in central Yemen. The group has several times tried to strike the U.S. mainland, and it may have been behind
  the assassination this month of a Yemeni security officer employed at the U.S. Embassy.
  However, the leading culprit is a Shiite rebel force backed by Tehran. Taking their name from a deceased commander,
  the Houthi militia have since the mid-1990s fought against the Sunni-dominated government in Sanaa. According to
  Western officials in Yemen, Iran has provided assistance for a Houthi resurgence in the past year Their fighters have
  gone to Iran and Lebanon for training, and money and arms have flowed from both into Yemen, officials say. The
  Houthis run a satellite TV channel, al-Maseera, from Beirut.
  In July the Yemeni government said it had uncovered an Iranian spy ring in Sanaa. That got the attention of the Saudis,
  who are anxious about Iranian efforts to stir up their co-religionist Shiites in Bahrain, Yemen and most of all in the
  Kingdom itself.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739774
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045763

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739774
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  Tehran's strategy in Yemen calls to mind Lebanon in the 1980s, when Iran built up Hezbollah into what has become the
  leading political power in Lebanon. The Iran-backed terrorists burst onto the scene by bombing the U.S. embassy and
  Marine barracks in Beirut. If the Houthis were in the lead last month, the command and control chain runs straight to
  Tehran.
  The interim Yemeni government is also grappling with a separatist armed uprising in the south. One of the leaders of the
  fractured rebel force lives in Beirut and has tried to build a pro-Iran movement in the south, according to a Western
  diplomat in Sanaa.
  The Houthis and the southerners are separate groups with somewhat different agendas. But Iran may be facilitating a
  partnership, as well as reaching out to al Qaeda. They have one goal in common: To bring down the pro-American
  government in Sanaa. "Despite the fact that they're on opposite ends of the religious spectrum, al Qaeda and Iran will
  cooperate," a Western diplomat says. "You see indications that Iran is helping al Qaeda by trying to forge relations
  between AQAP, Houthis and southern rebels."
  The U.S. supports a "national dialogue" to stabilize Yemen, while waging a drone campaign against the AQAP. Both are
  commendable goals. Yet Tehran has emerged as a new threat to Yemen's future and is fighting the U.S. through terror
  proxies. Congress can seek more clarity about Iran's designs with an inquiry into the Sanaa attacks.
  Harry Edwards • Press Officer • Press Desk • U.S. Department of State
  2201 C St, NW Rm 2109, Washington, DC 20520 I iff:139: I edwardshg@state.gov B6
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739774
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045764



DocNumber: C05739775
MetadataSubject: CGI DRAFT V3 092212.DOCX
MetadataTo: Flores, Oscar
MetadataFrom: H
MetadataDateSent: 2012-09-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH2/DOC_0C05739775/C05739775.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: cgi draft v3 092212.docx
ExtractedTo: Oscar Flores
ExtractedFrom: H <brod17@clintonernail.com>
ExtractedDateSent: Saturday, September 22, 2012 407 PM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739775
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
ExtractedBodyText: Ns print.
RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739775
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN PART
  B5
  From: H <brod17@clintonernail.com>
  Sent: Saturday, September 22, 2012 407 PM
  To: Oscar Flores
  Subject Fw: cgi draft v3 092212.docx
  Attachments: cgi draft v3 092212.docx
  Ns print.
  From: Sullivan, Jacob] [mailto:Sullivan33@state.govi
  Sent: Saturday, September 22, 2012 04:05 PM
  To: H
  Subject: cgi draft v3 092212.docx
  Megan is working on a development speech but please read the below if you can this afternoon. B5
  et me know your thoughts.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739775
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045443

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
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  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
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  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739775
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  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
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  Doc No. C05739775
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  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
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  Doc No. C05739775
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  Doc No. C05739775
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  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
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  202-431-6498 B5
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  Doc No. C05739775
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  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
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  Doc No. C05739775
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  202-431-6498
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  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739775
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  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045455
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  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739775
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
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  Doc No. C05739775 STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
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  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739775
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  202-431-6498 B5
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  Doc No. C05739775
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
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DocNumber: C05739777
MetadataTo: H
MetadataFrom: Huma, Abedin
MetadataDateSent: 2012-10-29T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH3/DOC_0C05739777/C05739777.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedFrom: Huma Abedin <Hurna@clintonemail.com>
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739777
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
ExtractedBodyText:
  we are preparing for sandy here. parts of the city are crazy already. there is a crane on top of a high building on 57th
  street that they think is about to fall which is pretty crazy everything is shut down but its been a good conference call
  day!
  i talked to chris this morning and she is gathering things for you based on all the the things we discussed there is a
  possibility of 3 nice gowns and a lot of blouses and jackets i think we should find a day in ny sometime soon so you can
  try things on.
  Had long visit with my friend who was in benghazi will download in person but think very important for you to call B6
  he injured DS officer he is now well enough to talk he doesnt want a visit but a check in call and asking him if
  he needs anything would be good monica will remind you of this
  Also heard from both the bush and reagan libraries over the last few days neither wants to host the osc.ar exhibit after it
  leaves little rock so i think we will focus on making that exhibit amazing and i will explain situation to odlr.
  more later
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739777
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045765

RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739777
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN PART
  B6
  From: Huma Abedin <Hurna@clintonemail.com>
  Sent Monday, October 29, 2012 335 PM
  To:
  we are preparing for sandy here. parts of the city are crazy already. there is a crane on top of a high building on 57th
  street that they think is about to fall which is pretty crazy everything is shut down but its been a good conference call
  day!
  i talked to chris this morning and she is gathering things for you based on all the the things we discussed there is a
  possibility of 3 nice gowns and a lot of blouses and jackets i think we should find a day in ny sometime soon so you can
  try things on.
  Had long visit with my friend who was in benghazi will download in person but think very important for you to call B6
  he injured DS officer he is now well enough to talk he doesnt want a visit but a check in call and asking him if
  he needs anything would be good monica will remind you of this
  Also heard from both the bush and reagan libraries over the last few days neither wants to host the osc.ar exhibit after it
  leaves little rock so i think we will focus on making that exhibit amazing and i will explain situation to odlr.
  more later
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739777
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045765



DocNumber: C05739778
MetadataSubject: NOT A DRY EYE IN NEA
MetadataTo: hanleymr@state.gov
MetadataFrom: H
MetadataDateSent: 2012-09-23T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH2/DOC_0C05739778/C05739778.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: Fw: Not a dry eye in NEA
ExtractedTo: 'hanleymr@state.gov.
ExtractedFrom: H <hrod17©clintonemail.com>
ExtractedCc: S_SpecialAssistants
ExtractedDateSent: Sunday, September 23, 2012 10:29 PM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739778
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN FULL
ExtractedBodyText: Pls print.
RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739778
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  FULL
  From: H <hrod17©clintonemail.com>
  Sent: Sunday, September 23, 2012 10:29 PM
  To: 'hanleymr@state.gov.
  Subject: Fw: Not a dry eye in NEA
  Pls print.
  From: Mills, Cheryl D [mailto:MillsCD@state.gov]
  Sent: Wednesday, September 12, 2012 08:35 PM
  To: H
  Subject: Fw: Not a dry eye in NEA
  From: Randolph, Lawrence M
  Sent: Wednesday, September 12, 2012 04:33 PM
  To: Mills, Cheryl D
  Subject: RE: Not a dry eye in NEA
  Including mine. Her remarks were really moving. Chris was an amazing Man. Such a huge loss. You know, I was in Libya
  before coming here and in my almost ten years, i have never worked with such a calm, cool headed, funny
  diplomat. Made it all seem really easy- even in one of the hardest places to work in the world.
  From: Mills, Cheryl D
  Sent: Wednesday, September 12, 2012 10:56 AM
  To: Randolph, Lawrence M
  Subject: Re: Not a dry eye in NEA
  Thx
  From: Randolph, Lawrence M
  Sent: Wednesday, September 12, 2012 10:09 AM
  To: Mills, Cheryl D; Sullivan, Jacob I
  Cc: S_SpecialAssistants
  Subject: FW: Not a dry eye in NEA
  This is from the spokesperson in NEA. It's true.
  From: Snipe, Aaron D
  Sent: Wednesday, September 12, 2012 10:07 AM
  To: Randolph, Lawrence M
  Subject: Not a dry eye in NEA
  Please tell the Secretary how much her words meant to us down here. The statement was amazing and the delivery was
  so heartfelt and genuine.
  We're really blown away.
  Please thank her for us.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739778
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045458

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739778
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  Aaron D. Snipe
  Spokesperson I Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs I U.S. Department of State
  2201 C Street NW I Room 6250 I Washington, DC, 20520
  Office: +1 202-647-9533 I Email: snlpead@state.gov
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739778
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045459



DocNumber: C05739779
MetadataSubject: DIPLOMATS STILL IN BENGHAZI SAY THEY HAD LONG QUESTIONED U.S. RELIANCE ON LOCAL MILITIA (MCCLATCHY)
MetadataTo: H
MetadataFrom: Mills, Cheryl D
MetadataDateSent: 2012-11-11T05:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH3/DOC_0C05739779/C05739779.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: Fw: Diplomats still in Benghazi say they had long questioned US. reliance on local
ExtractedFrom: Mills, Cheryl D <MilisCD@state.gov>.
ExtractedCc: O'Connell, Andrew M; Johnson, Brock A; Boswell, Eric J
ExtractedDateSent: Sunday, November 11, 2012 09:38 AM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739779
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
ExtractedBodyText: militia (McClatchy)
RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739779
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  PART B6
  From: Mills, Cheryl D <MilisCD@state.gov>.
  Sent Sunday, November 11, 2012 10:16 AM
  To:
  Subject: Fw: Diplomats still in Benghazi say they had long questioned US. reliance on local
  militia (McClatchy)
  From: Kennedy, Patrick F
  Sent: Sunday, November 11, 2012 09:38 AM
  To: Mills, Cheryl D
  Cc: O'Connell, Andrew M; Johnson, Brock A; Boswell, Eric J
  Subject: RE: Diplomats still in Benghazi say they had long questioned U.S. reliance on local militia (McClatchy)
  Cheryl
  Before the attack, Egypt, Turkey, Sudan, Italy, Tunisia, France and the UN had rep there
  France and the UN pulled out after 9/11
  But the question being posed has a false premise, i.e. that the US depended on foreign militia while the others
  depended on their own resources
  The US had tertiary dependence on the militia, as our primary and secondary reliance was on first the OS personnel arid
  the second on the QRF
  The others did not have an internal second
  Regards
  pat
  From: Mills, Cheryl D
  Sent: Sunday, November 11, 2012 7:19 AM
  To: Johnson, Brock A
  Cc: O'Connell, Andrew M; Kennedy, Patrick F
  Subject: Re: Diplomats still In Benghazi say they had long questioned U.S. reliance on local militia (McClatchy)
  Do we know who still has a dip presence there today?
  From: Mills, Cheryl D
  Sent: Saturday, November 10, 2012 03:35 PM
  To: Johnson, Brock A
  Subject: Re: Diplomats still in Benghazi say they had long questioned U.S, reliance on local militia (McClatchy)
  Thank you
  From: Johnson, Brock A
  Sent: Saturday, November 10, 2012 0112 PM
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739779
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045766

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739779
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  To: Mills, Cheryl D
  Subject: Fw: Diplomats still in Benghazi say they had long questioned U.S. reliance on local militia (McClatchy)
  From: Brock Johnson [mailto:
  Sent: Saturday, November 10, 2012 01:10 PM
  To: Johnson, Brock A
  Subject: Diplomats still in Benghazi say they had long questioned U.S. reliance on local militia (McClatchy)
  Diplomats still in Benghazi say they had long questioned U.S.
  reliance on local militia
  By Nancy A. Youssef
  McClatchy Newspapers
  On the day of the attack, U.S. officials had spotted a police officer taking photos of the compound from a villa
  under construction across the streets. This was the view the officer would have had of the compound.
  - Nancy A. Youssef /MCT
  Even before the deadly Sept. 11 attack on the U.S. consulate that killed Ambassador Christopher Stevens and
  three other Americans, diplomats from other nations and Libyan security officials had questioned the wisdom of
  a U.S. decision to rely primarily on members of a local militia to protect its compound here.
  Diplomats here told McClatchy that while it's customary to depend on local forces to protect diplomatic
  missions, only the United States of the 10 or so foreign missions here allowed the local militia to be the first line
  of defense. The others said they instead depended on military forces from their own country to provide security.
  "A few months ago, there was a small attack here and the Libyans fled," said a diplomat from a European
  nation who asked that he not be further identified so that he could speak candidly about his assessment of
  security here. "After that, I decided to only use special forces" from his own country.
  "We never considered using the brigades," he said, referring to the 17th of February Brigade, the local militia
  that was considered the primary security force for the U.S. mission. "We assumed the United States had a
  special relationship with the brigades."
  Said another diplomat who requested anonymity for the same reasons: "I would never depend on the brigades."
  The diplomat said he believed U.S. officials were unaware of the extremist links of those who were guarding
  them. "The mistake of the Americans was not following the trail of Islamic radicals,' he said.
  For some, the cost of supplying security made operating in Benghazi prohibitive. The British, for example,
  brought in their own troops and also hired Libyans to provide security, according to Khalid al Hadar, who owns
  the compound that the British used as their offices here. But after a June attack on the British ambassador's
  convoy, the British withdrew from Benghazi. A British official told McClatchy that the realization that security
  would require a larger — and more expensive — British force in Benghazi helped fuel that decision.
  Hadar said the British still check in periodically on their compound, where a shot-up bulletproof windshield
  from the June ambush still sits in what was the consulate's carport.
  Who was responsible for determining how the United States protected its consulate here remains unclear two
  months after Stevens' death. According to the State Department, the ambassador, in consultation with deputies
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739779 STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  Date: 05/13/2015 SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045767
  B6

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739779
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  and security advisers, makes all security decisions, though they can be overruled from Washington. At a hearing
  of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee last month, Eric Allan Nordstrom, who served as
  the chief security officer at the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli from September 2011 until July, testified that he had
  requested additional security.
  Charlene Lamb, the deputy assistant secretary for diplomatic security, defended the security procedures that had
  been taken in Benghazi, telling the hearing that there were five American security guards — the number
  recommended by Nordstrom — along with Libyans in Benghazi when the attack took place.
  "We had the correct number of assets in Benghazi at the time of 9/11 ," she said.
  It is unknown what Stevens' own position on security in Benghazi was. A Western diplomat here said the trip
  was Stevens' first extensive visit to Benghazi since he'd assumed the ambassador's post in May. The diplomat
  said that when he heard the attack begin about 9:30 p.m., he assumed "that Chris was long gone."
  The diplomat expressed surprise that Stevens hadn't been evacuated at the first sign of trouble. "We used to
  take training from the Americans" on diplomatic security, he said.
  How the U.S. vetted its local security force in Benghazi may be among the questions to come up Thursday
  when the Senate Intelligence Committee holds a closed hearing on the attack. Witnesses expected to appear
  include Director of National Intelligence James Clapper and Matt Olsen, director of the National
  Counterterrorism Center. David Petraeus, who resigned Friday as director of the CIA after acknowledging an
  extramarital affair, had been scheduled to appear but will be replaced by Acting CIA Director Michael Morrell,
  according to Sen. Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif., the committee's chairwoman.
  On Wednesday, during a ceremony honoring Stevens, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that the
  administration has, in the wake of the 9/11 attack, dispatched a joint State and Defense Department task force
  "to review high-threat posts to determine whether there are other improvements we need in light of the evolving
  security challenges we now face."
  Diplomats here, however, say they believe one such improvement had become obvious in the months after a
  NATO air campaign helped topple the government of longtime Libyan leader Moanunar Gadhafi: Don't expect
  local forces to protect you when they can't even protect themselves against local extremists and terrorists
  groups in a city now defined by reprisal attacks. In the past week alone, two police stations here were bombed
  and a police colonel's patrol car was destroyed in front of his house; extremist groups seeking to wrest control
  of the city are the suspected culprits.
  According to two guards who were at the compound that night, a four-member team from the 17th of February
  Brigade's VIP protection unit was assigned to provide security inside the compound and serve as a quick-
  reaction force. The 17th of February guards lived in a house closest to the front gate. According to the guards,
  they tried to fend off the attack of as many 100 men that night, shooting repeatedly at them.
  But 17th of February brigade leaders say they never considered themselves responsible for consulate security,
  and Najib Muftah, 25, a co-founder of the brigade's VIP unit, denied that his group was in charge. "How could
  four people secure a consulate?" he said.
  Consulate security that night was a hodge-podge of local groups, in addition to a handful of Americans,
  including Stevens' bodyguard. Outside, members of Libya's newly formed police force stood guard, sitting in
  their parked vehicles. In addition, as many as five unarmed Libyans who worked for the Blue Mountain Group,
  a Wales-based contractor, were stationed around the perimeter to watch for suspicious activity and search
  visitors to the compound.
  But as a rowdy caravan of attackers came barreling down the road leading to the consulate, the police officers
  parked on the other side of the street from the consulate fled, according to a 31-year-old private security guard
  who was there that night. The security guard asked not to be named for fearing he would be targeted for
  working with Americans.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739779
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045768

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739779
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  Earlier in the day, somewhere between 4 a.m. and 6 a.m., a member of the Blue Mountain Group reported that
  he had seen one of the police officers photographing the inside of the compound from the upper floor of a villa
  under construction across the street, according to the security guard, whose story confirms previous accounts.
  But while reporters going through the consulate location in recent days discovered memos that suggested the
  consulate had complained to Libyan authorities about the incident, Interior Ministry officials in Benghazi said
  they were never contacted by U.S. officials.
  Salah Daghman, the newly named deputy minister of interior for Benghazi, said that in any case it would be
  unlikely that members of his police force would have challenged the Islamist group suspected of leading the
  Sept. 11 attack. He described his men as "afraid of Ansar al Shariah."
  "Everyone has a gun, he said. "Benghazi is not secure."
  Members of the 17th of February Brigade first formed a "VIP protection" unit shortly after the anti-Gadhafi
  uprising began in Febraury 2011. A group of about 50, they were trained by Qataris to protect the cavalcade of
  politicians and diplomats who came to Benghazi, which was then the capital of rebel-controlled eastern Libya.
  "If anything happened to the envoys that came to support the Libyan people, people would have believed
  Gadhafi claims that we are all al Qaida," Muftah said. Among the foreign visitors the brigade's VIP unit
  protected was French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who made a stunning visit here after Gadhafi's government
  collapsed.
  Stevens, who had been a special representative to the rebel government during the civil war, used the protection
  unit as well, but not so much for security but as guides in the city, Muftah said. After the war, the brigade
  continued to provide escorts as the U.S. formalized its presence here; most likely, Muftah said, because it was
  the strongest force in Benghazi.
  In addition, the brigade had a base less than a mile from the consulate that could provide additional forces if
  needed, as it did Sept. 11. "And we had good relations with the United States," Muftah said.
  Once the rebel government moved to Tripoli and nations began to reopen embassies there, the United States
  kept working with the brigade, as many of its troops were incorporated into the newly formed Libyan army.
  Once Benghazi had a trained and running police force, the Americans asked for police forces to be stationed
  outside the consulate, said Fawzi Waniss, the head of the Benghazi Supreme Security Committee, the group
  with responsibility for melding Libya's many armed organizations into a unified force.
  As the security situation deteriorated, several Libyan officials and the Blue Mountain guards said they urged the
  United States to buttress security at the consulate, even as Stevens was wildly popular among residents here.
  The Libyans, they said, could not secure themselves from a mounting extremist threat.
  "I told them, you should have your own security," Waniss said. "Don't depend on the Libyans."
  But others have suggested that the U.S. officials may have felt such a step was unnecessary because the CIA
  had established offices about a mile away and had promised to send security officers to the consulate, if needed.
  All of the diplomats interviewed for this story said they were unaware of the CIA station's existence.
  That in fact happened on the night of Sept. 11, according to a CIA timeline, which said security officers from
  the CIA station, which U.S. officials refer to as an annex, were dispatched 25 minutes after the first reports of
  trouble. It took another 25 minutes for the force to reach the consulate, however, because of resistance from
  militants.
  One diplomat here said that while he appreciated the effort of the CIA guards to render assistance, 25 minutes in
  such a situation "is too late."
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739779
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045769



DocNumber: C05739780
MetadataSubject: HOW ARE THE HEARINGS GOING?
MetadataTo: H
MetadataFrom: Mills, Cheryl D
MetadataDateSent: 2012-11-13T05:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH3/DOC_0C05739780/C05739780.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: RE: How are the hearings going?
ExtractedTo: H; Reines, Philippe t
ExtractedFrom: Mills, Cheryl ID <MillsCD@state.gov›
ExtractedDateSent: Tuesday, November 13, 2012 3:02 PM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739780
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN FULL
ExtractedBodyText:
  Just starting had to have a little come to with some of our colleagues but folks now on board.
  FIR is up there with them

RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739780
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  FULL
  From: Mills, Cheryl ID <MillsCD@state.gov›
  Sent: Tuesday, November 13, 2012 3:02 PM
  To: H; Reines, Philippe t
  Subject: RE: How are the hearings going?
  Just starting had to have a little come to with some of our colleagues but folks now on board.
  FIR is up there with them
  From: H [mailto:HDR22@clintonemail.corn]
  Sent: Tuesday, November 13, 2012 3:01 PM
  To: Mills, Cheryl D; Reines, Philippe I
  Subject: How are the hearings going?
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739780
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045770



DocNumber: C05739781
MetadataSubject: S TODAY
MetadataTo: hanleymr@state.gov
MetadataFrom: H
MetadataDateSent: 2012-09-23T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH2/DOC_0C05739781/C05739781.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: Fw: S today
ExtractedTo: 'hanleyrnr@state.gov'
ExtractedFrom: H <hrod17@ciintonernailcom>
ExtractedDateSent: Sunday, September 23, 2012 10:29 PM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739781
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
ExtractedBodyText:
  Pis print.
  ----

RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739781
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  PART B6
  From: H <hrod17@ciintonernailcom>
  Sent: Sunday, September 23, 2012 10:29 PM
  To: 'hanleyrnr@state.gov'
  Subject: Fw: S today
  Pis print.
  ---- Original Message ----
  From: Sullivan, Jacob [mailto:Suilivanii@state,govj
  Sent: Wednesday, September 12, 2012 10:25 PM
  To: H
  Subject: Fw: S today
  This is nice.
  Original Message ---
  From: Sherwood-Randall, Liz [mailto:1
  Sent: Wednesday, September 12, 2012 1008 PM
  To Sullivan, Jacob
  Subject: S today
  Jake I was so moved by Hillary's powerful presence today on the screen as I watched along with millions in America
  and around the world. She was emphathetic and unflinching and inspiring; she was wise and steady and strong. My 80
  year old mother called from LA to say "She was like our rock of Gibraltar". What greater compliment for the Secretary of
  State on such an awful day? l salute her as well as you and your colleagues who crafted her remarks under tremendous
  time and factual constraints. it really showed everyone the stuff of which she's made. With admiration and affection --
  Liz
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739781
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045460
  B6



DocNumber: C05739783
MetadataSubject: QUICK READOUT FROM JEFF FELTMAN IN TRIPOL
MetadataTo: H
MetadataFrom: Sullivan, Jacob J
MetadataDateSent: 2011-09-14T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH1/DOC_0C05739783/C05739783.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739783
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
ExtractedBodyText:
  Sullivan, Jacob J <SullivanJJ©stategove
  Wednesday, September 14, 2011 10:26 AM
  FW: Quick readout from Jeff Feltman in Neal '
  RELEASE IN PART B5,B3
  INA,B6
  FYI — worth a scan.

RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739783
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  From:
  Sent:
  To:
  Subject:
  Sullivan, Jacob J <SullivanJJ©stategove
  Wednesday, September 14, 2011 10:26 AM
  FW: Quick readout from Jeff Feltman in Neal '
  RELEASE IN PART B5,B3
  INA,B6
  FYI — worth a scan.
  From: Dibble, Elizabeth L
  Sent: Wednesday. September 14 2011 10:08 AM
  To Sullivan, Jacob J; Gordon, Philip H; Carson,
  Johnnie; Ryo, Rexon Y; Pelofelty, Eric), Welk, Aim G; Zeya, tiers 5; Grantham, Chris W; Shannon, Thomas A (P);
  Nuland, Victoria 3; Ward, Kenneth D; Kennedy, Patrick F; Austin-Ferguson, Kathleen T; Lohman, Lee; Crete, Gene A; Carl
  Stephanie S. Naranjo, Brian R; Pittman, H Dean; Pascual, Carlos; Cekuta, Robert F;
  Wand, Mark (DCHA/AA); Romanowski, Aline (ME/AA); Gray, Gordon
  Cc Fell/Ilan, Jeffrey D; Djerassl, Alexander M; Maxwell, Raymond 0; Roebuck, William V; Sidereas, Eugenia M; Abdalla,
  Alyce N; Polaschlk, Joan A
  Subject: Quick readout from Jeff Feitman in Tried
  Jeff asked me to pass along the following readout. Please excuse the free-form list of subjects but I wanted to get this
  out quickly to as wide an audience as possible. Please feel free to share with others I've missed.
  1. State of Embassy Tripoli facility: While admitting he is no engineer, Jeff agrees with the initial OBO assessment
  that the facility is not salvageable — the condition is "shocking and photos doesn't do it justice.' Floors have
  collapsed, the ballistic glass and metal support beams have melted, and it has been totally trashed. Jeff asked
  for their help on Embassy security; they took this on board but noted that they are still in the process of trying to
  secure the country.
  2. Abdel JAI and Mahmoud fibril both to NY next week: Both will travel to NY next week for the high level
  meeting on the 20th. Jain will then return to Libya, and Jibril will remain in NY to deliver the Libyan address to
  UNGA on the 24th. The plan is to have the new cabinet in place by the 2e,with Jibril the likely PM. Jeff pressed
  them on including a woman on their UN delegation. He also made all of the points about the need for the INC
  to take the lead in NY in outlining what they are seeking from the int'l community but they didn't share their
  ideas about what they will say.
  Action needed: Jalil needs a visa,
  understand MAG is working this now but we will need to facilitate issuance (likely by Embassy Tunis).
  1 Saadi Qadhafl and Niger: Jibril has sent a letter to Niamey and is sending the Deputy FM there to talk about
  Saadi. The Libyan request to Niger will be two-fold: 1. Detain him properly (they understand he is free to roam
  about 2. Be prepared to return him to Libya to stand trial.
  4. Weapons issues: They will ask OPCW to come back and they want them to say yes but the Libyans are picking
  up noises from OPCW that they can't accept a request from the INC now because the INC is not a UN
  member. (comment: I know the credentials issue is being worked this week in NY but Ken Ward please convey
  to OPCW that they need to take the Libyans up on their request asap.)
  S. OUP mandate: they think NATO should stay beyond an additional 30 days (I told Jeff I thought we were now
  looking at 90 in any case).
  6. Pan Am 103: Jeff raised the issue with Jaill and the Justice Minister, which they took on board; Justice Minister
  said "this was a crime against humanity so Libya has to cooperate."
  7. Treatment of Libyans of color and African migrants: Jeff raised and they responded with the right things.
  8. Oil fund paper: Passed to INC.
  9. "Boots on the ground": they asked about the comments they had seen and expressed their concern over
  them. Jeff explained that these were people to help provide security for our people and facility and why they
  were necessary.
  B6
  B3 INA
  B5
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739783
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045105



DocNumber: C05739784
MetadataSubject: SECRETARY IN TRIPOLI
MetadataTo: H
MetadataFrom: Mills, Cheryl D
MetadataDateSent: 2011-10-21T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH1/DOC_0C05739784/C05739784.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: Fw: Secretary in Tripoli
ExtractedFrom: Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.gov›
ExtractedDateSent: Friday, October 21, 2011 5:17 AM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739784
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739784
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  PART B6
  From: Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.gov›
  Sent: Friday, October 21, 2011 5:17 AM
  To:
  Subject: Fw: Secretary in Tripoli
  From: Cretz, Gene A
  Sent: Friday, October 21, 2011 04:50 AM
  To: Mills, Cheryl D
  Subject: Secretary In Tripoli
  T hanks for the kind words. I think the Secretary's visit here was picture perfect given the chaos we labor under in
  Libya.The Secretary was great and her efforts will I think help us move forward on our project to help the war-wounded.
  On a lighter note, I will never be lonely here after the Secretary was kind enough to give my personal contact
  information to all 120,000 students at the university during her stirring dialogue with them. It has been quite a week ;I
  don't think I can take any more excitement. All the best, Gene.
  From: Mills, Cheryl D
  Sent: Sunday, October 16, 2011 2:36 PM
  To: Cretz, Gene A
  Subject RE: contact
  Thanks so much Gene - you have been a terrific partner in a hard circumstance.
  I think we will move forward with seeking to have Chris become charge in January and then
  nominate him subsequently so he can begin serving.
  B6
  cdm
  From: Cretz, Gene A
  Sent: Friday, October 14, 2011 1:36 PM
  To Mills, Cheryl D
  Subject: contact
  Hi Cheryl: hope this finds you well. I know that Jeff has been in touch with you regarding the switch between myself
  and Chris Stevens. I just wanted you to know that I am prepared to do whatever you and the Secretary think is best. I
  met with Pat Kennedy and Bill Burns before I left and told them
  please rest assured that I consider myself extremely fortunate to B6
  have had the opportunity to work closely with/for the Secretary during the past 8 months. I consider the Secretary's
  visit to Tripoli this coming week to be the high point of my 30 year career. Warm regards, Gene.
  PERSONAL
  This email is UNCLASSIFIED.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739784
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045106



DocNumber: C05739785
MetadataSubject: H: MORSI'S PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS TODAY. SID
MetadataTo: hanleymr@state.gov
MetadataFrom: H
MetadataDateSent: 2012-09-23T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH2/DOC_0C05739785/C05739785.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: Fw: H: Morsi's private conversations today. Sid
ExtractedTo: "hanIeymr@state.gov'
ExtractedFrom: H 1
ExtractedDateSent: Sunday, September 23, 2012 10:35 PM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739785
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
ExtractedBodyText: Pis print.
RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739785
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  PART B6
  From: H 1
  .1rod17©clintonemail.com>
  Sent: Sunday, September 23, 2012 10:35 PM
  To: "hanIeymr@state.gov'
  Subject: Fw: H: Morsi's private conversations today. Sid
  Attachments: hrc memo morsi's private conversations 091412.docx
  Pis print.
  From: Sidney Blumenthal fmailto:
  Sent: Friday, September 14, 2012 06:31 PM
  To: H
  Subject: H: Morsi's private conversations today. Sid
  CONFIDENTIAL
  September 14, 2012
  For: Hillary
  From: Sid
  Re: Morsi's private conversations & coordination with Magariaf
  SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the
  highest levels of European governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.
  1. Late in the day on September 14, 2012, Egyptian President Moharriad. Morsi told senior
  European diplomats that he is increasingly concerned the current anti-U.S. and anti-Western violence
  spreading through Cairo and into the rest of Egypt may be part of an effort by his Salafist political
  rivals to destabilize his government, which many of them believe is too moderate in its positions
  regarding Islam, Israel, and the non-Muslim world. According to this source, Morsi, who is in
  Brussels for meetings with the European Union (EU), was particularly concerned over a message from
  Army commander General Abdel Fatah al-Sissi, that Islamist guerrillas, believed to be drawn
  primarily from the Sawarki Bedouin tribe, had launched an attack on a base of the International
  Peacekeeping Force (IPF) in the Sinai. The General reported that the 1500 United Nations troops at
  the base, including some U.S. forces, were under heavy attack and casualty figures were not yet
  known. Morsi stated that this fight was an example of radical anti-government forces and Salafist
  Islamist dissidents taking advantage of the current situation to carry out attacks that demonstrate his
  government is unable to protect Western personnel and facilities in Egypt. Morsi stated that the
  success or failure of his regime is directly tied to his ability to establish a moderate Islamic state that
  can work with western business interests.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739785
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045461
  B6

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739785
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  2. (Source Comment: In the opinion of this individual, the current wave of violence is related
  to an ongoing struggle between Salafist and Sufi Muslims throughout Egypt. What makes it more
  frustrating for Morsi is that much of the violence appears to be inspired by members of the Salafist al
  Nour Party, the coalition partner of Morsi's Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) in the new Egyptian
  Parliament. According to this individual, Morsi delayed condemning the initial attacks on the U.S.
  Embassy out of concern that his opponents would use such a statement to move against his
  government. Late on the evening of September 13, 2012, Mohammed Badie, the Supreme Guide of
  the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (MB), sent a message to Morsi warning that he and the Supreme
  Guidance Council were concerned that the situation around the U.S. Embassy was getting out of
  control and that, difficult as it might seem, he had to take tough measures against the demonstrators,
  and protect the interests of the U.S. and other Western Governments. In a telephone discussion with
  Saadi al-Katany, the MB/Freedom and Justice Party (MB/FJP) Speaker of the lower house of
  parliament, Morsi admitted that he had felt constrained from acting, given his past history of poor
  personal relations with the leaders of al Nour. Al-Katany urged him to gain control of the situation.)
  3. On September 14, Morsi also stated to an EU official that he had received extremely forceful
  messages from both the U.S. State Department and the Office of the U.S. President, leaving no doubt
  in his mind that the U.S. —Egyptian relations and more than $ibillion in U.S. aid were at stake in this
  matter. Morsi added that since much of this aid goes to the Egyptian Army, he and al-Katany agreed
  that actions that put it in jeopardy would also damage the new Egyptian administration's current
  good relationship with the Army. Accordingly, Morsi instructed the military and security forces to use
  all necessary force short of lethal measures to protect U.S. and Western facilities. In a private
  conversation, Morsi stated that he felt he is losing control of the political situation and fears that if the
  current fighting results in deaths, either of demonstrators, U.S. diplomats, Egyptian security
  personnel, or UN peacekeepers, the situation may spin out of control and his government could fall.
  Al-Katany agreed, but said that taking no action would guarantee disaster. They agreed that when the
  situation calms down they will have to deal with the al Nour party, which they fear will, in the future,
  take advantage of circumstances to try to destabilize Morsi's administration. With this in mind, Morsi
  ordered al-Sissi to direct the commanders of Military Intelligence (MI -Mukhabarat el-Khabeya) to
  step up operations collecting information on the activities of the al Nour leadership, focusing on any
  contacts with potentially violent Salafist dissidents.
  4.(Source Comment: A separate sensitive source also noted that General al-Sissi is warning
  Morsi about press reports that the person who made the controversial internet film at the heart of this
  situation is an Egyptian Coptic Christian. The General cautioned that as this report gains wider
  circulation, the government and the Army must prepare for violent attacks by Islamists against that
  community, which makes up ten (10) percent of the Egyptian population.)
  5. A separate sensitive source noted that for his part, al-Sissi is prepared to to have his troops
  take harsh measures against any demonstrators who attack Western personnel and facilities. The
  General is also concerned that the al Nour leaders are even more dangerous than Morsi realizes, and
  he has ordered the MI to increase technical and physical surveillance of these individuals. In
  addition, he stated in private that Morsi and al-Katany spoke with Libyan President Mohammed
  Yussef el Magariaf, and they had all agreed that military and security officials in Egypt and Libya will
  cooperate in an effort to track links between the violence in Cairo and Benghazi. Al-Sissi has ordered
  Special Forces units to step up patrols in the Egypt-Libya border region, while the MI will monitor
  communications between dissidents; primarily Salafists, in both countries. According to this source
  the General is convinced that these dissidents are seizing the opportunity presented by the current
  unrest to move against the governments of Morsi and al-Magariaf. He also received permission from
  Morsi to step up cooperation with his counterparts in the U.S. and Western Europe to deal with this
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739785
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045462

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739785
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  situation and al-Sissi believes al-Magariaf has given similar instructions to Libyan military and
  security officials.
  6. (Source Comment: According to a separate sensitive source, al-Sissi believes that, given his
  new orders from Morsi, the Army can, for the most part, protect Western facilities and personnel in
  Egypt. But the General is concerned that the security services can never completely eliminate the
  threat from small well organized bands looking to carry out terrorist attacks. Following discussion
  with Libyan security officials he believes they have the same concerns.)
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739785
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045463



DocNumber: C05739786
MetadataTo: Sullivan, Jacob J
MetadataFrom: Mills, Cheryl D
MetadataDateSent: 2012-11-14T05:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH3/DOC_0C05739786/C05739786.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: HomelandSecurity, Intelligence: Dear Colleague: COSIGN: Letter Opposing Ambassador Susan Rice for
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739786
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN FULL
MetadataSubject:
  HOMELANDSECURITY, INTELLIGENCE: DEAR COLLEAGUE: COSIGN: LETTER OPPOSING AMBASSADOR SUSAN RICE FOR SECRETARY OF STATE

ExtractedBodyText:
  Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@stategov>
  Wednesday, November 14, 2012 9:17 AM
  Sullivan, Jacob J; Reines, Philippe I; Verma, Richard R
  FW: HomelandSecurity, Intelligence: Dear Colleague COSIGN: Letter Opposing
  Ambassador Susan Rice for Secretary of State

RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739786
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  FULL
  From:
  Sent:
  To:
  Subject
  Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@stategov>
  Wednesday, November 14, 2012 9:17 AM
  Sullivan, Jacob J; Reines, Philippe I; Verma, Richard R
  FW: HomelandSecurity, Intelligence: Dear Colleague COSIGN: Letter Opposing
  Ambassador Susan Rice for Secretary of State
  From: e-Dear Colleague
  Sent: Wednesday, November 14, 2012 00:56 AM
  To: E-DEARCOLL ISSUES G-Z 000001s2,house.gov <E-DEARCOLL ISSUES G-2 000001s2.house.gov>
  Subject: HomelandSecurity, Intelligence: Dear Colleague: COSIGN: Letter Opposing Ambassador Susan Rice for
  Secretary of State
  COSIGN. Letter Opposing Ambassador Susan Rice
  for Secretary of State
  From: The Honorable Jeff Duncan
  Sent By: Rebecca.G.UlrichAmail.house.gov
  Date: 11/14/2012
  November 14, 2012
  Dear Colleague,
  1 would like to bring to your attention the letter below regarding reports that President Obama may be
  considering Ambassador Susan Rice to succeed Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State. lam very concerned
  about this possibility, and! intend to send the following letter to the president in opposition to any efforts to
  nominate Ambassador Rice for the position of Secretary of State. The deadline to sign is Friday, November
  I eat noon.
  November 16, 2012
  President Bank Obama
  The White House
  1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
  Washington, DC 20500
  Dear Mr. President
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739786 STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  Date: 05/13/2015 SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045771

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739786
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  We, the undersigned, are deeply troubled by reports that you may be considering Ambassador Susan
  Rice to succeed Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State. Though Ambassador Rice has been our Representative to
  the U.N., we believe her misleading statements over the days and weeks following the attack on our embassy in
  Libya that led to the deaths of Ambassador Stevens and three other Americans caused irreparable damage to her
  credibility both at home and around the world.
  In her interviews over that time, Ambassador Rice propagated a falsehood that the attacks were
  "spontaneous," the outcome of a protest "spun out of control," and the result of a YouTube video. Only on
  September 19— eight days after the attack — did the American people learn from National Counterterrorism
  Director Matthew Olsen that the intelligence services considered the attack an act of terrorism and that al Qaeda
  may have played a role.
  Ambassador Rice is widely viewed as having either willfully or incompetently misled the American
  public in the Benghazi matter. Her actions plausibly give U.S. allies (and rivals) abroad reason to question U.S.
  commitment and credibility when needed. Thus, we believe that making her the face of U.S. foreign policy in
  your second term would greatly undermine your desire to improve U.S. relations with the world and continue
  your trust with the American people.
  As you know, there have been repeated Congressional requests for information on the events of
  September 11, 2012. Over the past month, our Senate colleagues have sent 13 separate letters to senior
  Administration officials, including to you. Many Members of the House of Representatives have also sent
  letters requesting answers. Our questions remain unanswered, and your Administration continues to deny
  Congress access to critical information necessary for effective oversight.
  Recent reports of discrepancies between the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence
  Agency's public timelines of the events on September 11 only exacerbate the problem, and we believe these
  inconsistencies deserve closer examination.
  In light of this troubling situation and the continued unanswered questions, we strongly oppose any
  efforts to nominate Ambassador Susan Rice for the position of Secretary of State.
  Sincerely,
  Members of Congress
  CC: All U.S. Senators
  Yours in Liberty,
  Jeff Duncan (SC-03)
  Member of Congress
  Visit the e-Dear Colleague Service to manage your subscription to the available Issue and Party list(s).
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739786 STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  Date: 05/13/2015 SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045772



DocNumber: C05739787
MetadataSubject: DAVID PETRAEUS WILL TESTIFY ON BENGHAZI (POLITICO)
MetadataTo: H
MetadataFrom: Mills, Cheryl D
MetadataDateSent: 2012-11-14T05:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH3/DOC_0C05739787/C05739787.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: FW: David Petraeus will testify on Benghazi (Politico)
ExtractedFrom: Mills. Cheryl 0 <ivtillsCD@stategov›
ExtractedCc: Sullivan, Jacobi; Reines, Philippe
ExtractedDateSent: Wednesday, November 14, 2012 10:43 AM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739787
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN FULL
ExtractedBodyText: FYi
RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739787
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  FULL
  From: Mills. Cheryl 0 <ivtillsCD@stategov›
  Sent: Wednesday, November 14, 2012 10:43 AM
  To:
  Cc: Sullivan, Jacobi; Reines, Philippe
  Subject: FW: David Petraeus will testify on Benghazi (Politico)
  FYi
  From: Johnson, Brock A
  Sent: Wednesday, November 14, 2012 10:11 AM
  To: Coordination
  Cc: Reines, Philippe I; Klevorick, Caitlin B; Kennedy, Patrick F; Mills, Cheryl D
  Subject David Petraeus will testify on Benghazi (Politico)
  David Petraeus will testify on Benghazi
  By KATIE auseK 111/14/12 9:32 AM EST Updated: 11/14112 9:54 AM EST
  Gen. David Petraeus wil! testify before the Senate Intelligence Committee. Senate intelligence Committee Chairwoman i3rianne Feinstein told POLMCO
  Wednesday morning But the exact schedule has not been set for his testimony.
  Petraeus has Indicated his willingness Ito testify" He is eager to come before the committee so we will work out the details,' Feinstein said.
  Earlier Wednesday, Fox New reported that the former director of the CIA who resigned last week over an extramarital affair, will still testify voluntarily on Friday
  before congressional intelligence committees regarding the Sept 11 attack on the U.S. diplomatic facility in Benghazi, Libya
  Petraeus was initially slated to offer testimony on Benghazi at closed hearings before the Senate Intelligence Committee On Thursday.
  Feinstein, the chairwoman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said on CNN's "The Situation Room" on Tuesday that she believed Petraeus would eventually
  appear before the committee because he is a "responsible person."
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739787
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045773



DocNumber: C05739788
MetadataSubject: FW:
MetadataTo: hanleymr@state.gov
MetadataFrom: H
MetadataDateSent: 2012-09-23T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH2/DOC_0C05739788/C05739788.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: Fw:
ExtractedTo: 'hanleymr@state.gov'
ExtractedFrom: H <hrod17@clintoriemail.com>
ExtractedDateSent: Sunday, September 23, 2012 10:36 PM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739788
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
ExtractedBodyText:
  Pls print.
  ----

RawText:
  B6
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739788
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  PART B6
  From: H <hrod17@clintoriemail.com>
  Sent: Sunday, September 23, 2012 10:36 PM
  To: 'hanleymr@state.gov'
  Subject: Fw:
  Pls print.
  ---- Original Message
  From: Mills, Cheryl 0 finallto:MillsCD@state,govi
  Sent: Friday, September 14, 2012 07:36 PM
  To: H
  Subject: FW:
  ----Original Message--
  From: Brett McGurk [mato
  Sent: Friday, September 14, 2012 5:50 PM
  To: Mills, Cheryl D
  Subject: Re:
  Cheryl, I can't imagine what this week has been like for you but wanted to write after attending the Andrews ceremony
  today. I was with some NEA hands who knew Chris well and they all noted the Secretary's visit to their offices earlier in
  the week and how pitch-perfect this has been handled. The remarks today were beautiful and moving. I did not have a
  personal connection to the four lost this week but the President and Secretary seemed to be speaking as well to those I
  did know and still mourn. So I wanted to write to say thank you. This is among the most challenging and uncertain
  periods in our history — and our nation is more fortunate than it knows to have such a steady team at the helm,
  Brett
  Sent via BlackBerry by AT&T
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739788
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045464



DocNumber: C05739789
MetadataSubject: H: LATEST INTEL LIBYAN CONFLICTS, LEADERS & MILITIAS. SID
MetadataTo: H
MetadataDateSent: 2012-01-05T05:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH1/DOC_0C05739789/C05739789.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739789
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
ExtractedBodyText:
  B6
  Thursday, January 5, 2012 12:26 PM
  H: latest int& libyan conflicts, leaders & rniittias, Sid
  hrc_merno_libyan_leaders_kmilitias_010512.docx
  January 5, 2012
  For: HRC

RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739789
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  PART B6
  From:
  Sent
  To:
  Subject:
  Attachments:
  B6
  Thursday, January 5, 2012 12:26 PM
  H: latest int& libyan conflicts, leaders & rniittias, Sid
  hrc_merno_libyan_leaders_kmilitias_010512.docx
  CONFIDENTIAL
  January 5, 2012
  For: HRC
  From: Sid
  Re: Libyan leadership and militias
  SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the
  highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.
  1.During the last week of December 2011, and the first week of 2012, Libya's Prime Minister
  Abdurrahina el-Keib and President Mustafa Abdul Jai engaged in a series of emergency planning
  meetings attempting to deal with specific issues threatening the stability of the new National
  Transitional Council (NTC) Government According to extremely sensitive sources speaking in strict
  confidence, paramount among these issues are the questions of disarming and rewarding the regional
  militias who bore the majority of the fighting against the regime of Muammar al Qaddafi, as well as
  the related issue of finding ministers and senior administrators for the new government who are
  acceptable to these revolutionary forces. These individuals noted that on four occasions, beginning on
  December 23, 2011, groups or angry militiamen came to el-Keib's office and demanded better
  treatment, a clear message of support for the role of Islamic law, and the removal of former Qaddafi
  advisors from the new government
  2. (Source Comment: In the opinion of a very sensitive source, el-Keib is genuinely concerned
  that this situation could spiral out of control and threatens the regime. He also suspects that much of
  the unrest is being stirred by General Abdel Hakim Mamin Belhaj and his conservative Islamist
  supporters. By staying out of the new government, Belhaj has established a position from which he
  can criticize their actions and appointments without concern or control, That said, el — Keib has been
  told by his contacts in the Moslem Brotherhood (MB) that even Belhaj has been surprised that the
  unrest in the militias has begun to manifest itself in fighting between groups that previously shared
  the same goals and operated under Belhaj's loose command, This is particularly true in the case of
  the increasingly violent conflicts between the Misrata and Zintan regional militias.)
  3. In an effort to address these problems el-Keib is making changes in his new administration,
  removing Minister of Economics Taher Sherkaz, who, as a former economic advisor to Qaddafi, was a
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739789
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045107

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739789
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  told by his contacts in the Moslem Brotherhood (MB) that even Belhaj has been surprised that the
  unrest in the militias has begun to manifest itself in fighting between groups that previously shared
  the same goals and operated under Belhaj's loose command. This is particularly true in the case of
  the increasingly violent conflicts between the Misrata and Zintan regional militias.)
  3. In an effort to address these problems el-Keib is making changes in his new administration,
  removing Minister of Economics Taher Sherkaz, who, as a former economic advisor to Qaddafi, was a
  particular target of the militiamen. In the opinion of well informed individuals, el-Keib's closest and
  most influential advisors are experts with economic backgrounds and experience dealing with
  Western firms and governments. The most influential of this group are Minister of Oil Abdulrahman
  Ben Yaw, Minister of Finance Hassan Ziglam, National Oil Company chief Nuni Berrusien, and Ngeb
  Obeda from the Libyan Stock Exchange.
  4- (Source Comment: In the opinion of a very sensitive source, el-Keib and Jalil are also very
  concerned over growing criticism that these technocrats are puppets of various Western governments
  and firms. Belhaj and the militiamen appear intent on limiting the influence of these Western
  entities, using them as a weapon to weaken the el-Keib regime. This trend is also affecting national
  security, where, despite el-Keib's efforts to maintain a balance between the Islamists, regional
  commanders, and the national army, a potentially dangerous conflict has arisen over the position of
  Chief of Staff of the National Army. El-Kieb, according to this individual, believes that he must settle
  this matter in short order to avoid provoking security concerns among foreign allies and businesses
  'contacts.)
  5. According to a knowledgeable individual, in late December 2011e1-Kieb resisted efforts by
  General Khalifa Belqasim Haftar to establish himself as the Chief of Staff of the National Army.
  Haftar, who lived in the United States for many years and is believed by Belhaj and others to have a
  relationship with the U.S. Government, is using his popularity among the officer corps of the regular
  NTC army to support his claim to be Chief of Staff. This produced heated protests from militia
  leaders and in late December 20 ael-Keib named deputy Minister of Defense Colonel Yussef
  Mangoush„ to be Chief of Staff. In the opinion of one source, this is a problematic choice, since el-
  Keib is replacing the supposedly pro-American Haftar with al-Mangoush who commanded one of
  Qaddafi's elite Special Forces units, even after the revolution began. This individual believes that el-
  Keib's decision was driven by personal animosity toward Haftar, and the influence of Minister of
  Defense Osama al-Juwali. The situation is far from resolved, as Haftar and his supporters,
  particularly in the Benghazi garrison, continue to claim that the General is the true Chief of Staff. El-
  Keib and al-Juwali are working to reconcile all of the elements in this conflict as quickly as possible,
  before the supporters of the two claimants begin fighting. In the meantime, el-Keib has stated in
  private that he fully expects Belhaj to attack al-Mangoush, but the Prime Minister believes that the
  Colonel is the only officer strong enough to disarm the militias and avoid a civil war.
  6. At the same time, a very sensitive source added that el-Keib and Jail are attempting to
  reconcile the fighting between Misrata and Zintan forces in Tripoli by naming Misrata leader Fawzi
  Abd Ali as Minister of the Interior and al-Juwali, who was commander of the Zintan militia, as
  Minister of Defense. To date, according to this individual, this effort has met with limited success, as
  the fighting has continued and the militias are refusing to disarm until their demands regarding living
  standards are met.
  7. (Source Comment: One very sensitive source noted, that el-Keib is aware of the fact that he
  is running out of time to stabilize the situation in Libya. He believes that if he does not disarm the
  militias and meet their demands in the next six months there is a good chance of increased fighting
  among rival groups that could lead to civil war. In any event, he realizes that the ongoing instability
  will cause Western governments, firms, and banks, to hesitate before committing themselves to long
  term relationships with Libya. El-Keib believes that Belhaj and his advisors have made the same
  judgment, and are waiting to fill any vacuum created by this violence, by establishing a conservative
  Islamic Republic.)
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739789
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045108

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739789
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  CONFIDENTIAL
  January 5, 2012
  For: HR,C
  From: Sid
  Re: Libyan leadership and militias
  SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as
  the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.
  1. During the last week of December 2011, and the first week of 2012, Libya's Prime
  Minister Abdurrahim el-Keib and President Mustafa, Abdul Jafil engaged in a series of
  emergency planning meetings attempting to deal with specific issues threatening the stability of
  the new National Transitional Council (NTC) Government. According to extremely sensitive
  sources speaking in strict confidence, paramount among these issues are the questions of
  disarming and rewarding the regional militias who bore the majority of the fighting against the
  regime of Muammar al Qaddafi, as well as the related issue of finding ministers and senior
  administrators for the new government who are acceptable to these revolutionary forces. These
  individuals noted that on four occasions, beginning on December 23, 2011, groups or angry
  militiamen came to el-ICeib's office and demanded better treatment, a clear message of support
  for the role of Islamic law, and the removal of former Qaddafi advisors from the new
  government.
  2. (Source Comment: In the opinion of a vet}, sensitive source, el-Keib is genuinely
  concerned that this situation could spiral out of control and threatens the regime. He also
  suspects that much of the unrest is being stirred by General Abdel Hakim Alamin Bell* and his
  conservative Islamist supporters, By staying out of the new government, Belhaj has established
  a position from which he can criticize their actions and appointments without concern or control.
  That said, el — Keit) has been told by his contacts in the Moslem Brotherhood (MB) that even
  Belhaj has been surprised that the unrest in the militias has begun to manifest itself in fighting
  between groups that previously shared the same goals and operated under Belhaj's loose
  command. This is particularly true in the case of the increasingly violent conflicts between the
  Misrata and Zintan regional militias.)
  3. In an effort to address these problems el-Keib is making changes in his new
  administration, removing Minister of Economics Taher Sherkaz, who, as a former economic
  advisor to Qaddafi, was a particular target of the militiamen In the opinion of well informed
  individuals, el-Keib's closest and most influential advisors are experts with economic
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739789
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045109

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739789
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  backgrounds and experience dealing with Western firms and governments. The most influential
  of this group are Minister of Oil Abdulrahman Ben Yezza, Minister of Finance Hassan Ziglarn,
  National Oil Company chief Nur Berrusien, and Ngeb Obeda from the Libyan Stock Exchange.
  4. (Source Comment. In the opinion of a very sensitive source, el-Keib and Jail are
  also very concerned over growing criticism that these technocrats are puppets of various Western
  governments and firms. Belhaj and the militiamen appear intent on limiting the influence of
  these Western entities, using them as a weapon to weaken the el-Keib regime. This trend is also
  affecting national security, where, despite el-Keib's efforts to maintain a balance between the
  Islamists, regional commanders, and the national army, a potentially dangerous conflict has
  arisen over the position of Chief of Staff of the National Army, El-Kieb, according to this
  individual, believes that he must settle this matter in short order to avoid provoking sec.urity
  concerns among foreign allies and businesses contacts )
  5. According to a knowledgeable individual, in late December 2011el-Kieb resisted
  efforts by General Khalifa Belqasim Haftar to establish himself as the Chief of Staff of the
  National Army. Haftar, who lived in the United States for many years and is believed by Belhaj
  and others to have a relationship with the U.S. Government, is using his popularity among the
  officer corps of the regular NTC army to support his claim to be Chief of Staff. This produced
  heated protests from militia leaders and in late December 2011el-Keib named deputy Minister of
  Defense Colonel Yussef al-Mangoush, to be Chief of Staff. In the opinion of one source, this is
  a problematic choice, since el-Keib is replacing the supposedly pro-American Haftar with al-
  Mangoush who commanded one of Qadclafi's elite Special Forces units, even after the revolution
  began. This individual believes that el-Keib's decision was driven by personal animosity toward
  Haftar, and the influence of Minister of Defense Osaina al-Juwali. The situation is far from
  resolved, as Haftar and his supporters, particularly in the Benghazi garrison, continue to claim
  that the General is the true Chief of Staff El-Keib and al-Juwali are working to reconcile all of
  the elements in this conflict as quickly as possible, before the supporters of the two claimants
  begin fighting. In the meantime, el-Keib has stated in private that he fully expects Belhaj to
  attack al-Marigotish, but the Prime Minister believes that the Colonel is the only officer strong
  enough to disarm the militias and avoid a civil war.
  6. At the same time, a very sensitive source added that el-Keib and hill are attempting to
  reconcile the fighting between Misrata and Zintan forces in Tripoli by naming Misrata leader
  Fawzi Abd Ali as Minister of the Interior and al-Juwali, who was commander of the Zintan
  militia, as Minister of Defense. To date, according to this individual, this effort has met with
  limited success, as the fighting has continued and the militias are refusing to disarm until their
  demands regarding living standards are met.
  7. (Source Comment: One very sensitive source noted, that el-Keib is aware of the fact
  that be is running out of time to stabilize the situation in Libya He believes that if he does not
  disarm the militias and meet their demands in the next six months there is a good chance of
  increased fighting among rival groups that could lead to civil war. In any event, he realizes that
  the ongoing instability will cause Western governments, firms, and banks, to hesitate before
  committing themselves to long tern relationships with Libya. El-Keib believes that Belhaj and
  his advisors have made the same judgment, and are waiting to fill any vacuum created by this
  violence, by establishing a conservative Islamic Republic.)
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739789
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045110



DocNumber: C05739790
MetadataSubject: THANKS
MetadataTo: hanleymr@state.gov
MetadataFrom: H
MetadataDateSent: 2012-09-23T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH2/DOC_0C05739790/C05739790.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739790
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN FULL
ExtractedBodyText:
  Pis print.
  H <hrod17@clintonemail.com›
  Sunday, September 23, 2012 10.36 PM
  'hanieymr@state.gov`
  Fw: Thanks

RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739790
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  FULL
  From:
  Sent:
  To:
  Subject:
  Pis print.
  H <hrod17@clintonemail.com›
  Sunday, September 23, 2012 10.36 PM
  'hanieymr@state.gov`
  Fw: Thanks
  From: Burns, William 3 [mailto:BurnsWi@state.gov]
  Sent Friday, September 14, 2012 06:37 PM
  To: H
  Subject: Thanks
  Your remarks this afternoon at Andrews were wonderful Thanks for doing so much for our institution on such a sad
  day.
  Just sent you a hi side note on visits to Jordan and Iraq, and look forward to catching up. Enjoy the weekend in the
  meantime.
  Bill
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739790
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045465



DocNumber: C05739791
MetadataSubject: THANKS
MetadataTo: hanleymr@state.gov
MetadataFrom: H
MetadataDateSent: 2012-09-23T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH2/DOC_0C05739791/C05739791.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: FW: thanks
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739791
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN FULL
ExtractedBodyText:
  Pis print.
  H <hrod17@ciintonernail.com>
  Sunday, September 23, 2012 10:36 PM
  'hanleymr@state.gov.
  Fw: thanks
  ...

RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739791
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  FULL
  From:
  Sent:
  To:
  Subject
  Pis print.
  H <hrod17@ciintonernail.com>
  Sunday, September 23, 2012 10:36 PM
  'hanleymr@state.gov.
  Fw: thanks
  ...
  From: Mills, Cheryl D [mailto:MillsCDOstate.govj
  Sent: Friday, September 14, 2012 07:31 PM
  To: H
  Subject: FW: thanks
  From: Barton, Rick (CSO)
  Sent: Friday, September 14, 2012 6:15 PM
  To: Mills, Cheryl D
  Subject: thanks
  Cheryl, Please extend our thanks to the Secretary for today's moving event. As always, her remarks (the President's and
  the chaplain's) were just right. I will also send a note to Pat and Capricia to thank them for a well led day that helped
  build solidarity, despite the sorrow.
  Thanks also for Cindy and Yael they are a pleasure to work with every day.
  We are making real progress.
  Best, Rick
  Rick Barton
  Ambassador
  Assistant Secretary
  Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations
  202.663.0807
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739791
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045466



DocNumber: C05739792
MetadataSubject: DAVID PETRAEUS WILL TESTIFY ON BENGHAZI (POLITICO)
MetadataTo: Mills, Cheryl D
MetadataFrom: Reines, Philippe I
MetadataDateSent: 2012-11-14T05:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH3/DOC_0C05739792/C05739792.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: Re: David Petraeus will testify on Benghazi (Politico)
ExtractedTo: Mills, Cheryl D; H
ExtractedFrom: Reines, Philippe I <reinesp@state.gov>
ExtractedCc: Sullivan, Jacob
ExtractedDateSent: Wednesday, November 14, 2012 10:45 AM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739792
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN FULL
ExtractedBodyText:
  To be clear, this is not on Thursday. It's at some later time apart from the already schedule HPSCI & SSCI briefings

RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739792
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  FULL
  From: Reines, Philippe I <reinesp@state.gov>
  Sent: Wednesday, November 14, 2012 10:45 AM
  To: Mills, Cheryl D; H
  Cc: Sullivan, Jacob
  Subject: Re: David Petraeus will testify on Benghazi (Politico)
  To be clear, this is not on Thursday. It's at some later time apart from the already schedule HPSCI & SSCI briefings
  From: Mills, Cheryl D
  Sent: Wednesday, November 14, 2012 10:42 AM
  To: H <HDR22@dintonemail.com>
  Cc: Sullivan, Jacob J; Reines, Philippe I
  Subject: FW: David Petraeus will testify on Benghazi (Politico)
  FYI
  From: Johnson, Brock A
  Sent: Wednesday, November 14, 2012 10:11 AM
  To: Coordination
  Cc: Reines, Philippe I; Klevorick, Caitlin B; Kennedy, Patrick F; Mills, Cheryl D
  Subject: David Petraeus will testify on Benghazi (Politico)
  David Petraeus will testify on Benghazi
  By KATIE GLUECK I 11/14/12 9:32 AM EST Updated: 11/14/12 9:54 AM EST
  Gen. David Petraeus will testify before the Senate Intelligence Committee, Senate Intelligence Committee Chairwoman Dianne Feinstein told POLITICO
  Wednesday morning. But the exact schedule has not been set for his testimony.
  "Mr. Petraeus has indicated his willingness [to testify]. He is eager to come before the committee so we will work out the details," Feinstein said.
  Earlier Wednesday, Fox New reported that the former director of the CIA who resigned last week over an extramarital affair, will still testify voluntarily on Friday
  before congressional intelligence committees regarding the Sept, 11 attack on the U.S. diplomatic facility in Benghazi, Libya.
  Petraeus was initially slated to offer testimony on Benghazi at closed hearings before the Senate Intelligence Committee on Thursday.
  Feinstein, the chairwoman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said on CNN's "The Situation Room" on Tuesday that she believed Petraeus would eventually
  appear before the committee because he is a ''responsible person."
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739792
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045774



DocNumber: C05739793
MetadataSubject: REMARKS
MetadataTo: hanleymr@state.gov
MetadataFrom: H
MetadataDateSent: 2012-09-23T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH2/DOC_0C05739793/C05739793.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: Fw: Remarks
ExtractedTo: 'hanleymrgastategov'
ExtractedFrom: H < hrod17@clintonemaii.com>
ExtractedDateSent: Sunday, September 23, 2012 10:37 PM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739793
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/14/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
ExtractedBodyText: Pis print.
RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739793
  Date: 05/14/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN PART B3 CIA
  PERS/ORG,B6
  From: H < hrod17@clintonemaii.com>
  Sent: Sunday, September 23, 2012 10:37 PM
  To: 'hanleymrgastategov'
  Subject: Fw: Remarks
  Pis print.
  From: Mills, Cheryl D [mailba:MillsCD©state.govi
  Sent: Friday, September 14, 2012 07:47 PM
  To: H
  Subject: Remarks
  B3 CIA PERS/ORG
  B6
  From:
  Sent: Friday, September 14, 2012 7:17 PM
  To: Mills, Cheryl D
  Subject: Remarks
  Good evening.
  First, amazing service today. Many thanks to you and everyone at your Department -- beginning with the Secretary for
  working so incredibly hard to make such a difficult ceremony so dignified for everyone involved. The Director and I are
  truly grateful.
  Second, we are now in the process of sending you the classified cables the Secretary and/or you requested. We are
  sending them to your Ops Center. Thanks.
  Cheers, RS
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739793
  Date: 05/14/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045467



DocNumber: C05739794
MetadataSubject: H: LATEST INTEL LIBYAN CONFLICTS, LEADERS & MILITIAS. SID
MetadataTo: sullivanjj@state.gov
MetadataFrom: H
MetadataDateSent: 2012-01-05T05:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH1/DOC_0C05739794/C05739794.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: H: latest intel libyari conflicts, leaders & militias. Sid
ExtractedTo: 'sulliyanfOstate.gott
ExtractedFrom: H <hroc117@clintonemail.com>
ExtractedDateSent: nursciay, January ub, 2012 1Z:Zfa PM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739794
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
ExtractedBodyText: Worrying. Pls distribute and request feedback from Jeff, Cretz, et al.
RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739794
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  PART B6
  From: H <hroc117@clintonemail.com>
  Sent Thursday, January 5, 2012 5:16 PM
  To: 'sulliyanfOstate.gott
  Subject Fw: H: latest Intel libyan conflicts, leaders & militias. Sid
  Attachments: hrc_memo_libyanJeaders__&_militias_010511doa
  Worrying. Pls distribute and request feedback from Jeff, Cretz, et al.
  From:
  Sent: nursciay, January ub, 2012 1Z:Zfa PM
  To: H
  Subject: H: latest intel libyari conflicts, leaders & militias. Sid
  B6
  CONFIDENTIAL
  January, 2012
  For: HRC
  From: Sid
  Re: Libyan leadership and militias
  SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the
  highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.
  1. During the last week of December 2011, and the first week of 2012, Libya's Prime Minister
  Abdurrahim el-Keib and President Mustafa Abdul Jail engaged in a series of emergency planning
  meetings attempting to deal with specific issues threatening the stability of the new National
  Transitional Council (NTC) Government. According to extremely sensitive sources speaking in strict
  confidence, paramount among these issues are the questions of disarming and rewarding the regional
  militias who bore the majority of the fighting against the regime of Muaimnar al Qaddafi, as well as
  the related issue of finding ministers and senior administrators for the new government who are
  acceptable to these revolutionary forces. These individuals noted that on four occasions, beginning on
  December 23, 2011, groups or angry militiamen came to el-Keib's office and demanded better
  treatment, a clear message of support for the role of Islamic law, and the removal of former Qaddafi
  advisors from the new government.
  2. (Source Comment: In the opinion of a very sensitive source, el-Keib is genuinely concerned
  that this situation could spiral out of control and threatens the regime. He also suspects that much of
  the unrest is being stirred by General Abdel Hakim Alamin Belhaj and his conservative Islamist
  supporters. By staying out of the new government, Belhaj has established a position from which he
  can criticize their actions and appointments without concern or control,. That said, el — Keib has been
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No F-2015-04841
  Doc No C05739794 STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  Date 05/13/2015 SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045111

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739794
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  told by his contacts in the Moslem Brotherhood (MB) that even Belhaj has been surprised that the
  unrest in the militias has begun to manifest itself in fighting between groups that previously shared
  the same goals and operated under Belhars loose command. This is particularly true in the case of
  the increasingly violent conflicts between the Misrata and Zintan regional militias.)
  3. In an effort to address these problems el-Keib is making changes in his new administration,
  removing Minister of Economics Taher Sherkaz, who, as a former economic advisor to Qaddafi, was a
  particular target of the militiamen. In the opinion of well informed individuals, el-Keib's closest and
  most influential advisors are experts with economic backgrounds and experience dealing with
  Western firms and governments. The most influential of this group are Minister of Oil Abdulrahman
  Ben Yezza, Minister of Finance Hassan Ziglam, National Oil Company chief Nuni Berrusien, and Nge,b
  Obeda from the Libyan Stock Exchange.
  4. (Source Comment: In the opinion of a very sensitive source, el-Keib and Jail are also very
  concerned over growing criticism that these technocrats are puppets of various Western governments
  and firms. Belhaj and the militiamen appear intent on limiting the influence of these Western
  entities, using them as a weapon to weaken the el-Keib regime. This trend is also affecting national
  security, where, despite el-Keib's efforts to maintain a balance between the Islamists, regional
  commanders, and the national army, a potentially dangerous conflict has arisen over the position of
  Chief of Staff of the National Army. El-Kieb, according to this individual, believes that he must settle
  this matter in short order to avoid provoking security concerns among foreign allies and businesses
  contacts.)
  5. According to a knowledgeable individual, in late December 2011e1-Kieb resisted efforts by
  General Khalifa Belqasim Haftar to establish himself as the Chief of Staff of the National Army.
  Haftar, who lived in the United States for many years and is believed by Belhaj and others to have a
  relationship with the U.S. Government, is using his popularity among the officer corps of the regular
  NTC army to support his claim to be Chief of Staff. This produced heated protests from militia
  leaders and in late December 20liel-Keib named deputy Minister of Defense Colonel Yussef al-
  Mangoush, to be Chief of Staff. In the opinion of one source, this is a problematic choice, since el-
  Keit) is replacing the supposedly pro-American Haftar with al-Mangoush who commanded one of
  Qaddafi's elite Special Forces units, even after the revolution began. This individual believes that el-
  Keib's decision was driven by personal animosity toward Haftar, and the influence of Minister of
  Defense Osama al-Juwali. The situation is far from resolved, as Haftar and his supporters,
  particularly in the Benghazi garrison, continue to claim that the General is the true Chief of Staff. El-
  Keib and al-Juwali are working to reconcile all of the elements in this conflict as quickly as possible,
  before the supporters of the two claimants begin fighting. In the meantime, el-Keib has stated in
  private that he fully expects Belhaj to attack al-Mangoush, but the Prime Minister believes that the
  Colonel is the only officer strong enough to disarm the militias and avoid a civil war.
  6. At the same time, a very sensitive source added that el-Keib and Jalil are attempting to
  reconcile the fighting between Misrata and Zintan forces in Tripoli by naming Misrata leader Fawzi
  Abd All as Minister of the Interior and al-Juwali, who was commander of the Zintan militia, as
  Minister of Defense. To date, according to this individual, this effort has met with limited success, as
  the fighting has continued and the militias are refusing to disarm until their demands regarding living
  standards are met.
  7, (Source Comment: One very sensitive source noted, that el-Keib is aware of the fact that he
  is running out of time to stabilize the situation in Libya. He believes that if he does not disarm the
  militias and meet their demands in the next six months there is a good chance of increased fighting
  among rival groups that could lead to civil war. In any event, he realizes that the ongoing instability
  will cause Western governments, firms, and banks, to hesitate before committing themselves to long
  term relationships with Libya. El-Keil3 believes that Belhaj and his advisors have made the same
  judgment, and are waiting to fill any vacuum created by this violence, by establishing a conservative
  Islamic Republic.)
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739794
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045112

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739794
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  CONFIDENTIAL
  January 5, 2012
  For. HRC
  From: Sid
  Re: Libyan leadership and militias
  SOURCE. Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as
  the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services,
  1. During the last week of December 2011, and the first week of 2012, Libya's Prime
  Minister Abdurrahim el-Keib and President Mustafa Abdul Jalil engaged in a series of
  emergency planning meetings attempting to deal with specific issues threatening the stability of
  the new National Transitional Council (NTC) Government. According to extremely sensitive
  sources speaking in strict confidence, paramount among these issues are the questions of
  disarming and rewarding the regional militias who bore the majority of the fighting against the
  regime of Muammar al Qadclafi, as well as the related issue of finding ministers and senior
  administrators for the new government who are acceptable to these revolutionary forces. These
  individuals noted that on four occasions, beginning on December 23, 2011, groups or angry
  militiamen came to el-ICeib's office and demanded better treatment, a clear message of support
  for the role of Islamic law, and the removal of former Qaddafi advisors from the new
  government.
  2, (Source Comment: In the opinion of a very sensitive source, el-Keib is genuinely
  concerned that this situation could spiral out of control and threatens the regime. He also
  suspects that much of the unrest is being stirred by General Abdel Hakim Alamin Belhaj and his
  conservatiti'e Islamist supporters. By staying out of the new government, Belhaj has established
  a position from which he can criticize their actions and appointments without concern or control.
  That said, el — Keib has been told by his contacts in the Moslem Brotherhood (MB) that even
  Belhaj has been surprised that the unrest in the militias has begun to manifest itself in fighting
  between groups that previously shared the same goals and operated under Belhaj s loose
  command. This is particularly true in the case of the increasingly violent conflicts between the
  Misr= and Zintan regional militias.)
  3, In an effort to address these problems el-Keib is making changes in his new
  administration, removing Minister of Economics Taher Sherkaz, who, as a former economic
  advisor to Qaddafi, was a particular target of the militiamen_ In the opinion of well informed
  el-Keib's closest and most influential advisors are experts with economic
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739794
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045113

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739794
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  backgrounds and experience dealing with Western firms and governments. The most influential
  of this group are Minister of Oil Abdulrahman Ben Yezza, Minister of Finance Hassan Ziglam,
  National Oil Company chief Nuni Berrusien, and Ngeb Obeda from the Libyan Stock Exchange.
  4. (Source Comment: In the opinion of a very sensitive source, el-Keib and Jra.Ill are
  also very concerned over growing criticism that these technocrats are puppets of various Western
  governments and firms. Belhaj and the militiamen appear intent on limiting the influence of
  these Western entities, using them as a weapon to weaken the el-Keib regime. This trend is also
  affecting national security, where, despite el-Keib's efforts to maintain a balance between the
  Islamists, regional commanders, and the national army, a potentially dangerous conflict has
  arisen over the position of Chief of Staff of the National Army. El-Kieb, according to this
  individual, believes that he must settle this matter in short order to avoid provoking security
  concerns among foreign allies and businesses contacts.)
  S. According to a knowledgeable individual, in late December 2011el-Kieb resisted
  efforts by General Khalifa Belqasim Haftar to establish himself as the Chief of Staff of the
  National Army. Haftar, who lived in the United States for many years and is believed by Belhaj
  and others to have a relationship with the U.S. Government, is using his popularity among the
  officer corps of the regular Nrc army to support his claim to be Chief of Staff. This produced
  heated protests from militia leaders and in late December 2011el-Keib named deputy Minister of
  Defense Colonel Yussef al-Mangoush, to be Chief of Staff. In the opinion of one source, this is
  a problematic choice, since el-Keib is replacing the supposedly pro-American Haftar with al-
  Mangoush who commanded one of Qaddafrs elite Special Forces units, even after the revolution
  began. This individual believes that el-Keib's decision was driven by personal animosity toward
  Haftar, and the influence of Minister of Defense Osama al-Juwali. The situation is far from
  resolved, as Haftar and his supporters, particularly in the Benghazi garrison, continue to claim
  that the General is the true Chief of Staff, El-Keib and al-Juwali are working to reconcile all of
  the elements in this conflict as quickly as possible, before the supporters of the two claimants
  begin fighting. In the meantime, el-Keib has stated in private that he fully expects Belhaj to
  attack al-Mangoush, but the Prime Minister believes that the Colonel is the only officer strong
  enough to disarm the militias and avoid a civil war.
  6. At the same time, a very sensitive source added that el-Keib and Jalil are attempting to
  reconcile the fighting between Misrata and Zintan forces in Tripoli by naming Misrata leader
  Fawzi Abd Ali as Minister of the Interior and al-Juwali, who was commander of the Zintan
  militia, as Minister of Defense. To date, according to this individual, this effort has met with
  limited success, as the fighting has continued and the militias are refusing to disarm until their
  demands regarding living standards are met
  7. (Source Comment: One very sensitive source noted, that el-Keib is aware of the fact
  that he is running out of time to stabilize the situation in Libya. He believes that if he does not
  disarm the militias and meet their demands in the next six months there is a good chance of
  increased fighting among rival groups that could lead to civil war. In any event, he realizes that
  the ongoing instability will cause Western governments, firms, and banks, to hesitate before
  committing themselves to long term relationships with Libya. El-Keib believes that Belhaj and
  his advisors have made the same judgment, and are waiting to fill any vacuum created by this
  violence, by establishing a conservative Islamic Republic.)
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739794
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045114



DocNumber: C05739795
MetadataSubject: POLITICO BREAKING NEWS
MetadataTo: H
MetadataFrom: Mills, Cheryl D
MetadataDateSent: 2012-11-14T05:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH3/DOC_0C05739795/C05739795.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: FW: POLITICO Breaking News
ExtractedFrom: Mills, Cheryl 0 <MillsC0@state.gov›
ExtractedDateSent: Wednesday, November 14, 2012 8:07 PM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739795
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN FULL
RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739795
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  FULL
  From: Mills, Cheryl 0 <MillsC0@state.gov›
  Sent: Wednesday, November 14, 2012 8:07 PM
  To:
  Subject Fw: POLMCO Breaking News
  From: Johnson, Brock A
  Sent: Wednesday, November 14, 2012 08:04 PM
  To Mills, Cheryl D; Reines, Philippe I; Klevorick, Caitlin B
  Subject: FW: POLITICO Breaking News
  -
  From: Blumenfeld, Joshua R
  Sent: Wednesday, November 14, 2012 8:03 PM
  To: Coordination
  Subject: Fw: POLITICO Breaking News
  .. _ . .
  From POLITICO Breaking News Driailto:breakingnews@politico.corn]
  Sent: Wednesday, November 14, 2012 08:01 PM
  To: Blumenfeld, Joshua R
  Subject: POLITICO Breaking News
  POLITICO Breaking News
  Gen. David Petraeus will testify Friday before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence about the
  Sept. 11 attack in Benghazi, Libya, the committee has announced The 7:30 a.m. meeting is closed to the
  public. Petraeus was the director of the CIA when the fatal attacks occurred.
  For more information... http://www.politico.com
  To unsubscribes
  http :h dyn politico .com/unsubscri be.cfm?em ail—BIumerifelcUR@S tate .Go v&uuid=6B8BA9DA-D396-139B-
  444B88 E9D5D51C68&a lertID=1
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739795
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045775



DocNumber: C05739796
MetadataSubject: H: LATEST INTEL LIBYAN CONFLICTS, LEADERS & MILITIAS. SID
MetadataFrom: H
MetadataDateSent: 2012-01-05T05:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH1/DOC_0C05739796/C05739796.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739796
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
ExtractedBodyText:
  H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>
  Thursday January 5 2012 5:22 PM
  B6
  Re: H: latest intel libyan conflicts, leaders & militias. Sid
  Thanks, as always, and Happy New Year!
  _

RawText:
  B6
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739796
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  PART B6
  From:
  Sent:
  To:
  Subject:
  H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>
  Thursday January 5 2012 5:22 PM
  B6
  Re: H: latest intel libyan conflicts, leaders & militias. Sid
  Thanks, as always, and Happy New Year!
  _
  From:
  Sent: Thursday, January 05, 2012 12:26 PM
  To: H
  Subject: H: latest Intel libyan conflicts, leaders & militias. Sid
  CONFIDENTIAL
  January 5, 2012
  For: HRC
  From: Sid
  Re: Libyan leadership and militias
  SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the
  highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.
  1. During the last week of December 2011, and the first week of 2012, Libya's Prime Minister
  Abdurrahim el-Keib and President Mustafa Abdul Jalil engaged in a series of emergency planning
  meetings attempting to deal with specific issues threatening the stability of the new National
  Transitional Council (NTC) Government. According to extremely sensitive sources speaking in strict
  confidence, paramount among these issues are the questions of disarming and rewarding the regional
  militias who bore the majority of the fighting against the regime of Muammar al Qaddafi, as well as
  the related issue of finding ministers and senior administrators for the new government who are
  acceptable to these revolutionary forces. These individuals noted that on four occasions, beginning on
  December 23, 2011, groups or angry militiamen came to el-Keib's office and demanded better
  treatment, a clear message of support for the role of Islamic law, and the removal of former Qaddafi
  advisors from the new government.
  2. (Source Comment: In the opinion of a very sensitive source, el-Keib is genuinely concerned
  that this situation could spiral out of control and threatens the regime. He also suspects that much of
  the unrest is being stirred by General Abdel Hakim Alamin Belhaj and his conservative Islamist
  supporters. By staying out of the new government, Belhaj has established a position from which he
  can criticize their actions and appointments without concern or control. That said, el — Keib has been
  told by his contacts in the Moslem Brotherhood (MB) that even Belhaj has been surprised that the
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739796 STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  Date: 05/13/2015 SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045115

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739796
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  unrest in the militias has begun to manifest itself in fighting between groups that previously shared
  the same goals and operated under Belhaj's loose command. This is particularly true in the case of
  the increasingly violent conflicts between the Misrata and Zintan regional militias.)
  3. In an effort to address these problems el-Keib is making changes in his new administration,
  removing Minister of Economics Taher Sherkaz, who, as a former economic advisor to Qaddafi, was a
  particular target of the militiamen. In the opinion of well informed individuals, el-Keib's closest and
  most influential advisors are experts with economic backgrounds and experience dealing with
  Western firms and governments. The most influential of this group are Minister of Oil Abdulrahman
  Ben Yezza, Minister of Finance Hassan Ziglam, National Oil Company chief Nuni Berrusien, and Ngeb
  Obeda from the Libyan Stock Exchange.
  4. (Source Comment: In the opinion of a very sensitive source, el-Keib and Jalil are also very
  concerned over growing criticism that these technocrats are puppets of various Western governments
  and firms. Belhaj and the militiamen appear intent on limiting the influence of these Western
  entities, using them as a weapon to weaken the el-Keib regime. This trend is also affecting national
  security, where, despite el-Keib's efforts to maintain a balance between the Islamists, regional
  commanders, and the national army, a potentially dangerous conflict has arisen over the position of
  Chief of Staff of the National Army. El-Kieb, according to this individual, believes that he must settle
  this matter in short order to avoid provoking security concerns among foreign allies and businesses
  contacts.)
  5. According to a knowledgeable individual, in late December 2011e1-Kieb resisted efforts by
  General Khalifa Belqasim Haftar to establish himself as the Chief of Staff of the National Army.
  Haftar, who lived in the United States for many years and is believed by Belhaj and others to have a
  relationship with the U.S. Government, is using his popularity among the officer corps of the regular
  NTC army to support his claim to be Chief of Staff. This produced heated protests from militia
  leaders and in late December 2011e1-Keib named deputy Minister of Defense Colonel Yussef al-
  Mangoush, to be Chief of Staff. In the opinion of one source, this is a problematic choice, since el-
  Keib is replacing the supposedly pro-American Haftar with al-Mangoush who commanded one of
  Qaddafi's elite Special Forces units, even after the revolution began. This individual believes that el-
  Keib's decision was driven by personal animosity toward Haftar, and the influence of Minister of
  Defense Osama al-Juwali. The situation is far from resolved, as Haftar and his supporters,
  particularly in the Benghazi garrison, continue to claim that the General is the true Chief of Staff. El-
  Keib and al-Juwali are working to reconcile all of the elements in this conflict as quickly as possible,
  before the supporters of the two claimants begin fighting. In the meantime, el-Keib has stated in
  private that he fully expects Belhaj to attack al-Mangoush, but the Prime Minister believes that the
  Colonel is the only officer strong enough to disarm the militias and avoid a civil war.
  6. At the same time, a very sensitive source added that el-Keib and Jalil are attempting to
  reconcile the fighting between Misrata and Zintan forces in Tripoli by naming Misrata leader Fawzi
  Abd Ali as Minister of the Interior and al-Juwali, who was commander of the Zintan militia, as
  Minister of Defense. To date, according to this individual, this effort has met with limited success, as
  the fighting has continued and the militias are refusing to disarm until their demands regarding living
  standards are met.
  7. (Source Comment: One very sensitive source noted, that el-Keib is aware of the fact that he
  is running out of time to stabilize the situation in Libya. He believes that if he does not disarm the
  militias and meet their demands in the next six months there is a good chance of increased fighting
  among rival groups that could lead to civil war. In any event, he realizes that the ongoing instability
  will cause Western governments, firms, and banks, to hesitate before committing themselves to long
  term relationships with Libya. El-Keib believes that Belhaj and his advisors have made the same
  judgment, and are waiting to fill any vacuum created by this violence, by establishing a conservative
  Islamic Republic.)
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739796
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045116



DocNumber: C05739797
MetadataSubject: POLITICO BREAKING NEWS
MetadataTo: millscd@state.gov
MetadataFrom: H
MetadataDateSent: 2012-11-14T05:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH3/DOC_0C05739797/C05739797.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: FW: POLITICO Breaking News
ExtractedTo: 'aliilscd@state.gov'
ExtractedFrom: H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>
ExtractedDateSent: Wednesday, November 14, 2012 0806 PM Eastern Standard Time
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739797
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN FULL
ExtractedBodyText:
  When will he do Senate/Feinstein?
  From Mills, Cheryl D [mailto:MillsCa©state.govj
  Sent: Wednesday, November 14, 2012 0806 PM Eastern Standard Time
  To: H
  Subject Fw: POLITICO Breaking News

RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739797
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  FULL
  From: H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>
  Sent Wednesday, November 14, 2012 8:40 PM
  To: 'aliilscd@state.gov'
  Subject Re: POLITICO Breaking News
  When will he do Senate/Feinstein?
  From Mills, Cheryl D [mailto:MillsCa©state.govj
  Sent: Wednesday, November 14, 2012 0806 PM Eastern Standard Time
  To: H
  Subject Fw: POLITICO Breaking News
  From: Johnson, Brock A
  Sent: Wednesday, November 14, 2012 08:04 PM
  To Mills, Cheryl a; Reines, Philippe I; Klevorick, Catthr B
  Subject: FW: POLITICO Breaking News
  From Blumenfeld, Joshua R
  Sent: Wednesday, November 14, 2012 8:03 PM
  To: Coordination
  Subject: Fw: POLITICO Breaking News
  From: POLITICO Breaking News [mailto:breakingnevvs@politico.com]
  Sent: Wednesday, November 14, 2012 08:01 PM
  To: Blumenfeld, Joshua R
  Subject: POLITICO Breaking News
  POLITICO Breaking News
  Gen David Petraeus will testify Friday before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence about the
  Sept. 11 attack in Benghazi, Libya, the committee has announced. The 7:30 am meeting is closed to the
  public. Petraeus was the director of the CIA when the fatal attacks occurred
  For more information http-//www politico corn
  To unsubscribe,
  http://dyn.politico.corn/unsubscribe.cfm?ernail=BlumenfeldiR@State.Gov&uuid=6B8BA9DA-D396-139B-
  444B8BE9D5D5 I C68&al ertID=1
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739797
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045776



DocNumber: C05739798
MetadataSubject: LIBYANS MARCH AGAINST ISLAMIST MILITIAS IN BENGHAZI
MetadataTo: hanleymr@state.gov
MetadataFrom: H
MetadataDateSent: 2012-09-23T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH2/DOC_0C05739798/C05739798.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: Fw: Libyans march against Islamist militias in Benghazi
ExtractedTo: 'hanleyrnr@state.gov'
ExtractedFrom: H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>
ExtractedCc: Hanley, Monica R; Abedin, Hume
ExtractedDateSent: Sunday, September 23, 2012 10:57 PM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739798
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
ExtractedBodyText:
  Pis print.
  From Mills, Cheryl D [mailto:MillsCD@state.gov]
  Sent: Friday, September 21, 2012 0404 PM
  To: H
  Subject: FW: Libyans march against Islamist militias in Benghazi

RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739798
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN PART
  B5
  From: H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>
  Sent: Sunday, September 23, 2012 10:57 PM
  To: 'hanleyrnr@state.gov'
  Subject: Fw: Libyans march against Islamist militias in Benghazi
  Pis print.
  From Mills, Cheryl D [mailto:MillsCD@state.gov]
  Sent: Friday, September 21, 2012 0404 PM
  To: H
  Subject: FW: Libyans march against Islamist militias in Benghazi
  From: Toiv, Nora F
  Sent Friday, September 21, 2012 3:48 PM
  To: Mills, Cheryl D
  Subject: Libyans march against Islamist militias in Benghazi
  Libyans march against Islamist militias in Benghazi
  By Peter Graff and Suleiman Al-Khalidi
  BENGHAZI, Libya l Fri Sep 21, 2012 2:23pm EDT
  (Reuters) - Thousands of Libyans marched in Benghazi on Friday in support of democracy and against the
  Islamist militias that Washington blames for an attack on the U.S. consulate last week that killed four
  Americans including the ambassador.
  The "Rescue Benghazi day" demonstration called for the government to disband armed groups that have refused
  to give up their weapons since the NATO-backed revolution that toppled Muammar Gaddafi last year
  Marchers headed for a main square where a much smaller counter demonstration of hundreds of supporters of
  hardline Islamist group Ansar al-Sharia were waiting.
  "Ifs obvious that this protest is against the militias. All of them should join the army or security forces as
  individuals, not as groups," medical student Ahmed Sanallah, 27, said. "Without that there will be no prosperity
  and no success for the new Libya."
  The late afternoon demonstration had a cheerful atmosphere as families marched with small children on their
  shoulders.
  Fighter jets and helicopters roared overhead in a show of official support for the demonstration, which has been
  enthusiastically promoted by the city's authorities.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739798
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045468

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739798
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  "Those military battalions that want to impose their ideology on the people of Libya will be confronted," Saleh
  Gaouda, a member of new ruling national congress, said.
  "This city wants to go back to stability and participate in building the state."
  In a sign of the cheerful atmosphere, one car had a giant cardboard model of Benghazi's landmark lighthouse
  strapped to the roof. As the sun set and the crowd began to disperse, someone shot fireworks into the air.
  "DEFEND BENGHAZI"
  Although the main demands of the marchers did not mention the attack on the U.S. consulate, it seems to have
  provided a strong impetus for the authorities to rally support behind the country's weak government.
  U.S. ambassador Christopher Stevens was well liked in Libya, and many people who were angered by an anti-
  Islamic film made in the United States consider the attack on the embassy to have been excessive. Some
  placards in English, intended for international news cameras, read: "We demand justice for Stevens" and "Libya
  lost a friend".
  "I am out today to defend Benghazi. Killing the ambassador is a completely separate thing," 26-year-old Amjad
  Mohammed Hassan, a network engineer, said. "I don't give a damn about the killing of the ambassador because
  the Americans offended the Prophet. I am just here for Benghazi."
  Benghazi, 1,000 km (600 miles) from Tripoli across largely empty desert, is controlled by various armed
  groups, including some comprised of Islamists who openly proclaim their hostility to democratic government
  and the West.
  Some of these have been identified by local people as being among those who were at the consulate protest last
  week. U.S. officials have described the violence as a "terrorist attack".
  One group linked to the attack is Ansar al-Sharia, which has denied involvement in the violence.
  Abu Al-Qaa, a demonstrator at the Ansar al-Sharia counter demonstration, said Stevens "was preparing for the
  entry of American troops into Libya".
  "The will of the Prophet was to expel infidels from Muslim lands so that Muslims prevail. Terrorizing your
  enemy is one of Islam's tenets."
  He said he had fought against American troops in Iraq where he was arrested and sent back to Gaddafi's Libya
  and jailed for three years.
  One banner at that demonstration read: "Day to rescue Benghazi or day to rescue America?"
  In southern Libya, at least six people were killed and 12 injured in clashes between security forces and a local
  group, a security official and a resident said on Friday.
  Security forces were sent to the town of Brak, 700 km (400 miles) south of Tripoli, on Wednesday to stop a
  group broadcasting songs about Gaddafi on the radio, the official said. The security forces, made up of former
  rebel fighters, came under attack upon arrival.
  (Additional reporting by Omar Al-Mosmary and Ali Shuaib; Editing by Giles Elgood)
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739798
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045469

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739798
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  From: Sullivan, Jacob J <SullivanJJ©state.gov>
  Sent: Monday, September 24, 2012 843 AM
  To:
  Cc: Hanley, Monica R; Abedin, Hume
  Subject: Edits
  B5
  Hopefully Mon or Huma can work these in teleprompter.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739798
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045470

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739798
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  B5
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739798
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045471



DocNumber: C05739799
MetadataSubject: MARK - QUICK REUTERS QUERY
MetadataTo: H
MetadataFrom: Mills, Cheryl D
MetadataDateSent: 2012-11-15T05:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH3/DOC_0C05739799/C05739799.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: FW: Mark - quick Reuters query
ExtractedFrom: Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.gov>
ExtractedCc: Sullivan, Jacob J; Valmoro, Lona J; Abedin, Huma
ExtractedDateSent: Thursday, November 15, 2012 1:08 PM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739799
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739799
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN PART B6
  From: Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.gov>
  Sent: Thursday, November 15, 2012 1:08 PM
  To:
  Cc: Sullivan, Jacob J; Valmoro, Lona J; Abedin, Huma
  Subject: FW: Mark - quick Reuters query
  From: Klevorick, Caitlin B
  Sent: Thursday, November 15, 2012 12:16 PM
  To Mills, Cheryl D; Toner, Mark C; Lieberman, Dean; Reines, Philippe I; Adams, David S
  Cc Nuland, Victoria 3; Hammer, Michael A; PA Libya
  Subject RE: Mark - quick Reuters query
  Here's what fox has up now:
  Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will testify before Congress on the September 11 terror attacks on the US
  consulate in Benghazi, Libya, Fox News has learned. The testimony will be open and will happen in December.
  At a hearing on Capitol Hill today, Foreign Affairs Committee Chairwoman Beam. Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) told
  the committee that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton would be testifying before them in early December.
  "I would like to note that I have spoken to Secretary Clinton's Counselor and Chief of Staff, Cheryl Mills, and
  the Secretary has committed to testifying before our Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on
  the Accountability Review Board's report, which is expected to be concluded by early to mid-December," she
  said.
  Read more: http://nation.foxnews.comfbenghazi-gate/20 12/1 1 /1 5/secretary-state-hillary-clinton-testify-
  congress-berighazi-terror-attacks-december#ixzz2CJC112Z1
  From: Mills, Cheryl D
  Sent: Thursday November 15 2012 10:58 AM
  To: Toner, Mark C; Lieberman, Dean; Reines, Philippe I; Adams, David S
  Cc Nuland, Victoria 3; Hammer, Michael A; PA Libya
  Subject: RE: Mark - quick Reuters query
  Yes
  I spoke with Rep Ros-Lehtinen yesterday.
  Advised that S is committed to speaking to her committees of jurisdiction once the arb is completed.
  And the target date for completion of the Arb was in December.
  Tell me what you need so I can help you with any points.
  cdm
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739799
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045777

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739799
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  From: Toner, Mark C
  Sent: Thursday, November 15, 2012 10:40 AM
  To Lieberman, Dean; Reines, Philippe I; Mills, Cheryl 0; Adams, David
  Cc: Nuland, Victoria 3; Hammer, Michael A; PA Libya
  Subject: RE: Mark - quick Reuters query
  + Dave
  From: Lieberman, Dean
  Sent: Thursday, November 15, 2012 10:37 AM
  To Toner, Mark C; Reines, Philippe I; Mills, Cheryl
  Cc: Nuland, Victoria), Hammer, Michael A; PA Libya
  Subject RE Mark quick Reuters query
  At the HFAC public hearing, Ros-Lehtinen just said in her opening statement: "Secretary Clinton is committed to testifying
  before our committee and SFRC on the ARS report which is expected to be completed by early to mid December,"
  From: Toner, Mark C
  Sent: Thursday, November 15, 2012 10:29 AM
  To Reines, Philippe I; Mills, Cheryl
  Cc: Nuland, Victoria 3; Hammer, Michael A; PA Libya
  Subject FW: Mark - quick Reuters query
  Hi all - Do we know where this is coming from?
  From:
  Sent: Thursday, November 15, 2012 10:28 AM
  To: Toner, Mark C
  Subject: Mark - quick Reuters query
  We see FOX reporting: Urgent: Hillary Clinton totestify before Congress on Benghazi in early DEC.
  Can you confirm this? Any details.
  Thanks and regards,
  Paul Eckert
  Reuters Asia Correspondent
  1333 H Street NW
  Washington, DC 20005
  Tel 202 789-8578
  Cell
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739799
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045778
  B6
  B6



DocNumber: C05739800
MetadataSubject: H: LATEST INTEL LIBYAN CONFLICTS, LEADERS & MILITIAS. SID
MetadataTo: H
MetadataDateSent: 2012-01-05T05:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH1/DOC_0C05739800/C05739800.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: Re: H: latest Intel libyan conflicts, leaders & militias. Sid
ExtractedFrom: B6
ExtractedDateSent: Thursday, January 5, 2012 5:29 PM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739800
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
ExtractedBodyText:
  Happy new year! Talk when you get a chance_
  --

RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739800
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  PART B6
  From: B6
  Sent: Thursday, January 5, 2012 5:29 PM
  To:
  Subject: Re: H: latest Intel libyan conflicts, leaders & militias. Sid
  Happy new year! Talk when you get a chance_
  --Original Message—
  From- H <HDR22aclintonernail.com>
  To:
  Sent: Thu, Jan 5, 2012 5:22 pm
  Subject: Re: H: latest intel libyan conflicts, leaders & militias. Sid
  Thanks, as always, and Happy New Year
  From:
  Sent: Thursday, January 05, 2012 12:26 PM
  To: H
  Subject H: latest intel libyan conflicts, leaders 8, militias. Sid
  CONFIDENTIAL
  January 5, 2012
  For: HRC
  From: Ski
  Re: Libyan leadership and militias
  SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the
  highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.
  1. During the last week of December 2011 and the first week of 2012, Libya's Prime Minister
  Abdurrahim el-Keib and President Mustafa Abdul Ja.lil engaged in a series of emergency planning
  meetings attempting to deal with specific issues threatening the stability of the new National
  Transitional Council (NTC) Government. According to extremely sensitive sources speaking in strict
  confidence, paramount among these issues are the questions of disarming and rewarding the regional
  militias who bore the majority of the fighting against the regime of Muammar al Qaddafi, as well as
  the related issue of finding ministers and senior administrators for the new government who are
  acceptable to these revolutionary forces. These individuals noted that on four occasions, beginning on
  December 23, 2011, groups or angry militiamen came to el-Keib's office and demanded better
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739800
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045117
  B6
  B6

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739800
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  treatment, a clear message of support for the role of Islamic law, and the removal of former Qaddafl
  advisors from the new government.
  2. (Source Comment: In the opinion of a very sensitive source, el-Keib is genuinely concerned
  that this situation could spiral out of control and threatens the regime. He also suspects that much of
  the unrest is being stirred by General Abdel Hakim Alamin Belhaj and his conservative Islamist
  supporters. By staying out of the new government, Belhaj has established a position from which he
  can criticize their actions and appointments without concern or control. That said, el — Keib has been
  told by his contacts in the Moslem Brotherhood (MB) that even Belhaj has been surprised that the
  unrest in the militias has begun to manifest itself in fighting between groups that previously shared
  the same goals and operated under Belhaj's loose command. This is particularly true in the case of
  the increasingly violent conflicts between the Misrata and Zintan regional militias.)
  3. In an effort to address these problems el-Keib is making changes in his new administration,
  removing Minister of Economics Taher Sherkaz, who, as a former economic advisor to Qaddafi, was a
  particular target of the militiamen. In the opinion of well informed individuals, el-Keib's closest and
  most influential advisors are experts with economic backgrounds and experience dealing with
  Western firms and governments. The most influential of this group are Minister of Oil Abdulrahman
  Ben Yezza, Minister of Finance Hassan Ziglarn, National Oil Company chief Nuni Berrusien, and Ngeb
  Obeda from the Libyan Stock Exchange.
  4. (Source Comment: In the opinion of a very sensitive source, el-Keib and JAE are also very
  concerned over growing criticism that these technocrats are puppets of various Western governments
  and firms. Belhaj and the militiamen appear intent on limiting the influence of these Western
  entities, using them as a weapon to weaken the el-Keib regime. This trend is also affecting national
  security, where, despite el-Keib's efforts to maintain a balance between the Islamists, regional
  commanders, and the national army, a potentially dangerous conflict has arisen over the position of
  Chief of Staff of the National Army. El-Kieb, according to this individual, believes that he must settle
  this matter in short order to avoid provoking security concerns among foreign allies and businesses
  contacts.)
  5. According to a knowledgeable individual, in late December 2011e1-Kieb resisted efforts by
  General Khalith Belqasim Haftar to establish himself as the Chief of Staff of the National Army.
  Haftar, who lived in the United States for many years and is believed by Belhaj and others to have a
  relationship with the U.S. Government, is using his popularity among the officer corps of the regular
  mrcarmy to support his claim to be Chief of Staff. This produced heated protests from militia
  leaders and in late December 2011e1-Keib named deputy Minister of Defense Colonel Yussef al-
  Mangoush, to be Chief of Staff. In the opinion of one source, this is a problematic choice, since el-
  Keib is replacing the supposedly pro-American Haftar with al-Mangoush who commanded one of
  Qaddafi's elite Special Forces units, even after the revolution began. This individual believes that el-
  Keib's decision was driven by personal animosity toward Haftar, and the influence of Minister of
  Defense Osama al-Juwali. The situation is far from resolved, as Haftar and his supporters,
  particularly in the Benghazi garrison, continue to claim that the General is the true Chief of Staff. El-
  Keib and al-Juwali are working to reconcile all of the elements in this conflict as quickly as possible,
  before the supporters of the two claimants begin fighting. In the meantime, el-Keib has stated in
  private that he fully expects Belhaj to attack al-Mangoush, but the Prime Minister believes that the
  Colonel is the only officer strong enough to disarm the militias and avoid a civil war.
  6. At the same time, a very sensitive source added that el-Keib and Jain are attempting to
  reconcile the fighting between Misrata and Zintan forces in Tripoli by naming Misrata leader Favvzi
  Abd Ali as Minister of the Interior and al-Juwali, who was commander of the Zintan militia, as
  Minister of Defense. To date, according to this individual, this effort has met with limited success, as
  the fighting has continued and the militias are refusing to disarm until their demands regarding living
  standards are met.
  7. (Source Comment: One very sensitive source noted, that el-Keib is aware of the fact that he
  is running out of time to stabilize the situation in Libya. He believes that if he does not disarm the
  militias and meet their demands in the next six months there is a good chance of increased fighting
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739800
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045118

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739800
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  among rival groups that could lead to civil war. In any event, he realizes that the ongoing instability
  will cause Western governments, firms, and banks, to hesitate before committing themselves to long
  term relationships with Libya. El-Keib believes that Belhaj and his advisors have made the same
  judgment, and are waiting to fill any vacuum created by this violence, by establishing a conservative
  Islamic Republic.)
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739800
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045119



DocNumber: C05739801
MetadataSubject: EDITS
MetadataTo: Sullivan, Jacob J
MetadataFrom: Hanley, Monica R
MetadataDateSent: 2012-09-24T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH2/DOC_0C05739801/C05739801.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: Edits
ExtractedTo: Sullivan, Jacob J; H
ExtractedFrom: Hanley, Monica R <HanleyMR@state.gov>
ExtractedCc: Abedin, Huma
ExtractedDateSent: Monday, September 24, 2012 8:47 AM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739801
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
ExtractedBodyText: Got it
RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739801
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN PART
  B5
  From: Hanley, Monica R <HanleyMR@state.gov>
  Sent: Monday, September 24, 2012 8:47 AM
  To: Sullivan, Jacob J; H
  Cc: Abedin, Huma
  Subject Re: Edits
  Got it
  Original Message
  From: Sullivan, Jacob
  Sent: Monday, September 24, 2012 08:42 AM
  To: 'hdr22@clintonemail.com' chdr22@clintonemail.com>
  Cc: Hanley, Monica R; Abedin, Huma
  Subject: Edits
  Hopefully Mon or Huma can work these in teleprompter.
  B5
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739801
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045472

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739801
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  B5
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739801
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045473



DocNumber: C05739802
MetadataSubject: AN OP-ED YOU SHOULD READ; PRAISES STATE FOR WHAT STEVENS DID RIGHT
MetadataTo: H
MetadataFrom: Slaughter, Anne-Marie
MetadataDateSent: 2012-11-15T05:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH3/DOC_0C05739802/C05739802.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739802
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
ExtractedBodyText:
  Anne-Marie Slaughter B6
  Thursday, November 15, 2012 1:58 PM
  Cheryl Mills; Jacob J Sullivan (SullivanJJ@state.gov); Abedin, Huma
  an op-ed you should read: praises State for what Stevens did right
  had lunch Admiral Mullen, who is teaching here this year; in his view Sarah gets it exactly right.
  latimes.com
  Op-Ed
  The world after Petraeus
  Obama should seize this chance to adjust his foreign policy.
  By Sarah Chayes
  November 15, 2012
  The scandal enveloping members of America's adulated top brass is the deepest crisis to hit the military in
  decades. It is a crisis President Obama did not need — shaming the country and increasing his burden during a
  major transition on his national security team. And yet, crisis can be a great corrective. Obama should use this
  one to reverse one of the most dysfunctional elements of U.S. foreign policy over the last decade: an infatuation
  with military solutions to problems that are fundamentally political.
  The resignation of former Central Intelligence Agency Director David H. Petraeus after an extramarital affair
  came to light, together with expected high-level personnel changes at the State Department and other agencies,
  creates a singular opportunity to embark on the complex process of rebalancing U.S. foreign policy in favor of
  non-military approaches.
  When he first came to office, Obama seemed suspicious of Petraeus, who made his reputation under President
  George W. Bush as the general who transformed the military's approach to the Iraq war. The suspicion was
  reflected in the fraught National Security Council debate over Afghanistan strategy in 2009. Yet since then,
  Obama, like so many others, seems to have been seduced by Petraeus. Not by the man but by what the man
  could offer him.
  Petraeuss unique political genius over the last decade has been to provide each of two contrasting presidents a
  military solution to his key national security problems that was tailored to his character. For Bush, obsessed
  with Iraq and with leaving a mark on the Middle East, Petraeus helped design a grandiose, troop-heavy
  approach.
  With the change of administrations, Petraeus soon saw that Obama and his team were different — concerned
  about the costs of the inherited wars and about the risks of a runaway military. So while Petraeus continued to
  pay lip-service to counterinsurgency doctrine, he veered away from it in practice. His focus as commander of
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739802 STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  Date: 05/13/2015 SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045779
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739802
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  the troops in Afghanistan — and even more so at the CIA — was on a type of warfare better suited to this
  president: targeted, technologically advanced, secretive killing over which the president could exert control.
  But such an approach, though cheaper in resources and American lives, is still flawed. It is still a military
  answer to problems that are deeply political in nature and rooted in a complex mix of history, regional and
  cultural particularism, and the effects of a protracted abuse of power by elites. By shifting to drones and special
  ops as the instruments of choice to combat militant extremism, the U.S. government remains consumed by the
  same old questions: How many men and women in uniform, equipped with what kind of hardware, need to
  employ which tactics to defeat the enemy?
  What atrophied during the years that two U.S. administrations dwelt obsessively on these questions were all the
  other tools of U.S. foreign policy, including information-gathering and analysis, diplomacy and economic and
  legal leverage.
  Perhaps the gravest consequence has been the knowledge deficit. Both wars were hampered by a devastating
  lack of situational understanding. In Afghanistan, where I lived and worked for more than eight years, I was
  stunned by how long it took U.S. officials to realize that tribes were key to Afghan social structure. U.S.
  officials resisted meeting with ordinary Afghans, dealing instead with members of a self-serving and unpopular
  government. So, for more than a decade, the U.S. government was operating almost blind.
  The first way Obama can constructively harness Petraeus downfall is to reorient the CIA toward its core
  function: intelligence-gathering. Of late, a body-count culture has prevailed at the CIA, exemplified by the
  secretive drone campaign. If 60 intelligence professionals are assigned to planning and monitoring each drone
  in the air, as has been reported, that's 60 who are not on the ground in country, interacting with locals, gaining
  an intuitive feel for the dynamics. Obama should resist the temptation to put another target-focused operator at
  the helm of the CIA.
  Another main civilian component of U.S. power is its diplomacy. Obama should also use this moment of
  transition to think through what kind of State Department he really needs. The instruments of U.S. foreign
  policy are multiple, varied and subtle in their application. To avail itself of them, the government needs smart,
  adaptable, dynamic risk-takers, who think strategically and operate with autonomy. Such people must be
  attracted to government service and provided responsibilities commensurate with their talents.
  But the other national security topic of the moment threatens to push Obama in the wrong direction. The death
  of Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens in Benghazi, Libya, has been politicized in deeply counterproductive
  ways. Members of Congress should bear that in mind as they continue examining the details of the attack.
  Stevens was exactly the type of diplomat the U.S. government needs: someone with long experience in the
  region to which he was posted, an ambassador who engaged with people, gained insight into the environment
  and helped influence it. That kind of diplomacy is essential, but it carries risks. If it becomes politically
  untenable in Washington for an ambassador to die in the line of duty, then talented diplomats will be hobbled.
  And faced with a choked career path, the best will look elsewhere for rewarding work. Obama should appoint a
  secretary of State determined to counteract the tendency to retrench.
  Perhaps the most important foreign policy challenge Obama faces in his second term is how to expand,
  restructure and reinforce the range of civilian instruments of U.S. power. That is a generational task, but one the
  current crisis has provided an unparalleled opportunity to tackle.
  Sarah Chayes, former special assistant to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs. of Staff is a resident associate at the
  Carnegie Endowment and a contributing writer to Opinion.
  UNCLASSIFar
  EtiVright 2012, Los Angeles Times
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739802 STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  Date: 05/13/2015 SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045780
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739802
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  Sarah Chaves
  Senior Associate
  Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
  1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW
  Washington, DC 20036
  (1.202) 939.2265
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739802
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045781

RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739802
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  PART B6
  From:
  Sent:
  To:
  Cc:
  Subject:
  Anne-Marie Slaughter B6
  Thursday, November 15, 2012 1:58 PM
  Cheryl Mills; Jacob J Sullivan (SullivanJJ@state.gov); Abedin, Huma
  an op-ed you should read: praises State for what Stevens did right
  had lunch Admiral Mullen, who is teaching here this year; in his view Sarah gets it exactly right.
  latimes.com
  Op-Ed
  The world after Petraeus
  Obama should seize this chance to adjust his foreign policy.
  By Sarah Chayes
  November 15, 2012
  The scandal enveloping members of America's adulated top brass is the deepest crisis to hit the military in
  decades. It is a crisis President Obama did not need — shaming the country and increasing his burden during a
  major transition on his national security team. And yet, crisis can be a great corrective. Obama should use this
  one to reverse one of the most dysfunctional elements of U.S. foreign policy over the last decade: an infatuation
  with military solutions to problems that are fundamentally political.
  The resignation of former Central Intelligence Agency Director David H. Petraeus after an extramarital affair
  came to light, together with expected high-level personnel changes at the State Department and other agencies,
  creates a singular opportunity to embark on the complex process of rebalancing U.S. foreign policy in favor of
  non-military approaches.
  When he first came to office, Obama seemed suspicious of Petraeus, who made his reputation under President
  George W. Bush as the general who transformed the military's approach to the Iraq war. The suspicion was
  reflected in the fraught National Security Council debate over Afghanistan strategy in 2009. Yet since then,
  Obama, like so many others, seems to have been seduced by Petraeus. Not by the man but by what the man
  could offer him.
  Petraeuss unique political genius over the last decade has been to provide each of two contrasting presidents a
  military solution to his key national security problems that was tailored to his character. For Bush, obsessed
  with Iraq and with leaving a mark on the Middle East, Petraeus helped design a grandiose, troop-heavy
  approach.
  With the change of administrations, Petraeus soon saw that Obama and his team were different — concerned
  about the costs of the inherited wars and about the risks of a runaway military. So while Petraeus continued to
  pay lip-service to counterinsurgency doctrine, he veered away from it in practice. His focus as commander of
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739802 STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  Date: 05/13/2015 SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045779

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739802
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  the troops in Afghanistan — and even more so at the CIA — was on a type of warfare better suited to this
  president: targeted, technologically advanced, secretive killing over which the president could exert control.
  But such an approach, though cheaper in resources and American lives, is still flawed. It is still a military
  answer to problems that are deeply political in nature and rooted in a complex mix of history, regional and
  cultural particularism, and the effects of a protracted abuse of power by elites. By shifting to drones and special
  ops as the instruments of choice to combat militant extremism, the U.S. government remains consumed by the
  same old questions: How many men and women in uniform, equipped with what kind of hardware, need to
  employ which tactics to defeat the enemy?
  What atrophied during the years that two U.S. administrations dwelt obsessively on these questions were all the
  other tools of U.S. foreign policy, including information-gathering and analysis, diplomacy and economic and
  legal leverage.
  Perhaps the gravest consequence has been the knowledge deficit. Both wars were hampered by a devastating
  lack of situational understanding. In Afghanistan, where I lived and worked for more than eight years, I was
  stunned by how long it took U.S. officials to realize that tribes were key to Afghan social structure. U.S.
  officials resisted meeting with ordinary Afghans, dealing instead with members of a self-serving and unpopular
  government. So, for more than a decade, the U.S. government was operating almost blind.
  The first way Obama can constructively harness Petraeus downfall is to reorient the CIA toward its core
  function: intelligence-gathering. Of late, a body-count culture has prevailed at the CIA, exemplified by the
  secretive drone campaign. If 60 intelligence professionals are assigned to planning and monitoring each drone
  in the air, as has been reported, that's 60 who are not on the ground in country, interacting with locals, gaining
  an intuitive feel for the dynamics. Obama should resist the temptation to put another target-focused operator at
  the helm of the CIA.
  Another main civilian component of U.S. power is its diplomacy. Obama should also use this moment of
  transition to think through what kind of State Department he really needs. The instruments of U.S. foreign
  policy are multiple, varied and subtle in their application. To avail itself of them, the government needs smart,
  adaptable, dynamic risk-takers, who think strategically and operate with autonomy. Such people must be
  attracted to government service and provided responsibilities commensurate with their talents.
  But the other national security topic of the moment threatens to push Obama in the wrong direction. The death
  of Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens in Benghazi, Libya, has been politicized in deeply counterproductive
  ways. Members of Congress should bear that in mind as they continue examining the details of the attack.
  Stevens was exactly the type of diplomat the U.S. government needs: someone with long experience in the
  region to which he was posted, an ambassador who engaged with people, gained insight into the environment
  and helped influence it. That kind of diplomacy is essential, but it carries risks. If it becomes politically
  untenable in Washington for an ambassador to die in the line of duty, then talented diplomats will be hobbled.
  And faced with a choked career path, the best will look elsewhere for rewarding work. Obama should appoint a
  secretary of State determined to counteract the tendency to retrench.
  Perhaps the most important foreign policy challenge Obama faces in his second term is how to expand,
  restructure and reinforce the range of civilian instruments of U.S. power. That is a generational task, but one the
  current crisis has provided an unparalleled opportunity to tackle.
  Sarah Chayes, former special assistant to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs. of Staff is a resident associate at the
  Carnegie Endowment and a contributing writer to Opinion.
  UNCLASSIFar
  EtiVright 2012, Los Angeles Times
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739802 STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  Date: 05/13/2015 SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045780

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739802
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  Sarah Chaves
  Senior Associate
  Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
  1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW
  Washington, DC 20036
  (1.202) 939.2265
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739802
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045781



DocNumber: C05739803
MetadataSubject: H: LATEST INTEL LIBYAN CONFLICTS, LEADERS & MILITIAS. SID
MetadataTo: H
MetadataFrom: Sullivan, Jacob J
MetadataDateSent: 2012-01-05T05:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH1/DOC_0C05739803/C05739803.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: RE: H: latest inter Mayan conflicts, leaders & militias. Sid
ExtractedFrom: Sullivan, Jacobi <Sullivanii@state.gov>
ExtractedDateSent: Thursday, January 5, 2012 7:22 PM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739803
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
ExtractedBodyText: Will do.
RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739803
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  PART B6
  From: Sullivan, Jacobi <Sullivanii@state.gov>
  Sent: Thursday, January 5, 2012 7:22 PM
  To:
  Subject: RE: H: latest inter Mayan conflicts, leaders & militias. Sid
  Will do.
  From: H [mailto:HDR22@clintonemail.comi
  Sent Thursday, January 05, 2012 5:16 PM
  To: Sullivan„ Jacob
  Subject Fw: H: latest Intel libyan conflicts, leaders & militias. Sid
  Worrying. Pis distribute and request feedback from Jeff, Cretz, et al.
  From:
  Sent: Thursday, January 05, 2012 12:26 PM
  To: H
  Subject: H: latest Intel libyan conflicts, leaders & militias. Sid
  CONFI DENTIAL
  January 5, 2012
  For: HRC
  From: Sid
  Re: Libyan leadership and militias
  SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the
  highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.
  1. During the last week of December 2011, and the first week of 2012, Libya's Prime Minister
  Abdurrahim el-Keib and President Mustafa Abdul Jalil engaged in a series of emergency planning
  meetings attempting to deal with specific issues threatening the stability of the new National
  Transitional Council (NTC) Government. According to extremely sensitive sources speaking in strict
  confidence, paramount among these issues are the questions of disarming and rewarding the regional
  militias who bore the majority of the fighting against the regime of ivluammar al Qaddafi, as well as
  the related issue of finding ministers and senior administrators for the new government who are
  acceptable to these revolutionary forces. These individuals noted that on four occasions, beginning on
  December 23, 2011, groups or angry militiamen came to el-KeilD's office and demanded better
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739803
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045120
  B6

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739803
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  treatment, a clear message of support for the role of Islamic law, and the removal of former Qaddafi
  advisors from the new government.
  2, (Source Comment: In the opinion of a very sensitive source, el-Keib is genuinely concerned
  that this situation could spiral out of control and threatens the regime. He also suspects that much of
  the unrest is being stirred by General Abdel Hakim Alamin Belhaj and his conservative Islamist
  supporters. By staying out of the new government, Belhaj has established a position from which he
  can criticize their actions and appointments without concern or control. That said, el — Keib has been
  told by his contacts in the Moslem Brotherhood (MB) that even Belhaj has been surprised that the
  unrest in the militias has begun to manifest itself in fighting between groups that previously shared
  the same goals and operated under Belhaj's loose command. This is particularly true in the case of
  the increasingly violent conflicts between the Misrata and Zintan regional militias.)
  3. In an effort to address these problems el-Keib is making changes in his new administration,
  removing Minister of Economics Taher Sherkaz, who, as a former economic advisor to Qaddafi, was a
  particular target of the militiamen. In the opinion of well informed individuals, el-Keib's closest and
  most influential advisors are experts with economic backgrounds and experience dealing with
  Western firms and governments. The most influential of this group are Minister of Oil Abdulrahman
  Ben Yezza, Minister of Finance Hassan Ziglam, National Oil Company chief Mari Berrusien, and Ngeb
  Obecia from the Libyan Stock Exchange.
  4. (Source Comment: In the opinion of a very sensitive source, el-Keib and Jai are also very
  concerned over growing criticism that these technocrats are puppets of various Western governments
  and firms. Belhaj and the militiamen appear intent on limiting the influence of these Western
  entities, using them as a weapon to weaken the el-Keib regime. This trend is also affecting national
  security, where, despite el-Keib's efforts to maintain a balance between the Islamists, regional
  commanders, and the national army, a potentially dangerous conflict has arisen over the position of
  Chief of Staff of the National Army. El-Kieb, according to this individual, believes that he must settle
  this matter in short order to avoid provoking security concerns among foreign allies and businesses
  contacts.)
  5. According to a knowledgeable individual, in late December 2011e1-Kieb resisted efforts by
  General Khalifa Belqasim Haftar to establish himself as the Chief of Staff of the National
  Army. Haftar, who lived in the United States for many years and is believed by Belhaj and others to
  have a relationship with the U.S. Government, is using his popularity among the officer corps of the
  regular NTC army to support his claim to be Chief of Staff. This produced heated protests from
  militia leaders and in late December 2011e1-Keib named deputy Minister of Defense Colonel Yussef al-
  Mangoush, to be Chief of Staff. In the opinion of one source, this is a problematic choice, since el-
  !Leib is replacing the supposedly pro-American Haftar with al-Mangoush who commanded one of
  Qaddafi's elite Special Forces units, even after the revolution began. This individual believes that el-
  Keib's decision was driven by personal animosity toward Haftar, and the influence of Minister of
  Defense Osama al-Juwali. The situation is far from resolved, as Haftar and his supporters,
  particularly in the Benghazi garrison, continue to claim that the General is the true Chief of Staff. El-
  Keib and al-Juwali are working to reconcile all of the elements in this conflict as quickly as possible,
  before the supporters of the two claimants begin fighting. In the meantime, el- Keib has stated in
  private that he fully expects Belhaj to attack al-Mangoush, but the Prime Minister believes that the
  Colonel is the only officer strong enough to disarm the militias and avoid a civil war.
  6. At the same time, a very sensitive source added that el-Keib and Jalil are attempting to
  reconcile the fighting between Misrata and Zintan forces in Tripoli by naming Misrata leader Fawzi
  Abd Ali as Minister of the Interior and al-Juwali, who was commander of the Zintan militia, as
  Minister of Defense. To date, according to this individual, this effort has met with limited success, as
  the fighting has continued and the militias are refusing to disarm until their demands regarding living
  standards are met.
  7. (Source Comment: One very sensitive source noted, that el-Keib is aware of the fact that he
  is running out of time to stabilize the situation in Libya. He believes that if he does not disarm the
  militias and meet their demands in the next six months there is a good chance of increased fighting
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739803
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045121

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739803
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  among rival groups that could lead to civil war. In any event, he realizes that the ongoing instability
  will cause Western governments, firms, and banks, to hesitate before committing themselves to long
  term relationships with Libya. El-Keib believes that Belhaj and his advisors have made the same
  judgment, and are waiting to fill any vacuum created by this violence, by establishing a conservative
  Islamic Republic.)
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739803
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045122



