# Emails

DocNumber: C05739849
MetadataSubject: THANK YOU SO MUCH
MetadataTo: Burnswj@state.gov
MetadataFrom: H
MetadataDateSent: 2012-12-20T05:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH3/DOC_0C05739849/C05739849.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedTo: 'Burnswj@state.gov'; `NidesTh@stategoy'
ExtractedFrom: H <hrod17@clintonemailcom>
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739849
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN FULL
ExtractedBodyText:
  Dear Bill and Tom,
  I'm sorry that I cannot be on the Hill today as we had long planned, but very grateful that you both will be. The
  Department and I appreciate your leadership everyday.
  So, I'll be nursing my cracked head and cheering you on as you "remain calm and carry on"!
  Happy Holidays--H
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739849
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045832

RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739849
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  FULL
  From: H <hrod17@clintonemailcom>
  Sent Thursday, December 20, 2012 7:38 AM
  To: 'Burnswj@state.gov'; `NidesTh@stategoy'
  Cc `rnillscd©stategov`
  Subject Thank you so much
  Dear Bill and Tom,
  I'm sorry that I cannot be on the Hill today as we had long planned, but very grateful that you both will be. The
  Department and I appreciate your leadership everyday.
  So, I'll be nursing my cracked head and cheering you on as you "remain calm and carry on"!
  Happy Holidays--H
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739849
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045832



DocNumber: C05739850
MetadataSubject: THANK YOU SO MUCH
MetadataTo: H
MetadataFrom: Mills, Cheryl D
MetadataDateSent: 2012-12-20T05:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH3/DOC_0C05739850/C05739850.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: Thank you so much
ExtractedCc: Mills, Cheryl
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739850
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN FULL
ExtractedBodyText:
  So nice
  Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.gov>
  Thursday, December 20, 2012 7:40 AM
  RE: Thank you so much

RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739850
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  FULL
  From:
  Sent:
  To:
  Subject
  So nice
  Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.gov>
  Thursday, December 20, 2012 7:40 AM
  RE: Thank you so much
  Original Message-----
  From H [mailto:HDR22@clintonemail.corn]
  Sent: Thursday, December 20, 2012 7:38 AM
  To Burns, William .1; Nides, Thomas R
  Cc: Mills, Cheryl
  Subject: Thank you so much
  Dear Bill and Torn,
  I'm sorry that I cannot be on the Hill today as we had long planned, but very grateful that you both will be. The
  Department and I appreciate your leadership everyday.
  So, VII be nursing my cracked head and cheering you on as you "remain calm and carry on"!
  Happy Holidays---H
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739850
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045833



DocNumber: C05739851
MetadataSubject: THANK YOU SO MUCH
MetadataTo: H
MetadataFrom: Burns, William J
MetadataDateSent: 2012-12-20T05:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH3/DOC_0C05739851/C05739851.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: Re: Thank you so much
ExtractedFrom: Bums, William J <BurnsWi@state.gov>
ExtractedCc: Mills, Cheryl D
ExtractedDateSent: Thursday, December 20, 2012 7:44 AM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739851
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN FULL
ExtractedBodyText:
  Many thanks. Will do my best. Get well soon, and have a wonderful holiday. I'm very lucky to serve in your State
  Department.

RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739851
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  FULL
  From: Bums, William J <BurnsWi@state.gov>
  Sent: Thursday, December 20, 2012 7:44 AM
  To:
  Subject: Re: Thank you so much
  Many thanks. Will do my best. Get well soon, and have a wonderful holiday. I'm very lucky to serve in your State
  Department.
  Original Message ----
  From: H (mailto:HDR22@clintonemail.com]
  Sent: Thursday, December 20, 2012 07:38 AM
  To: Burns, William J; Nides, Thomas R
  Cc: Mills, Cheryl D
  Subject: Thank you so much
  Dear Bill and Tom,
  I'm sorry that I cannot be on the Hill today as we had long planned, but very grateful that you both will be. The
  Department and I appreciate your leadership everyday.
  So, be nursing my cracked head and cheering you on as you "remain calm and carry on"!
  Happy Holidays--H
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739851
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045834



DocNumber: C05739852
MetadataSubject: THANK YOU SO MUCH
MetadataTo: H
MetadataFrom: Nides, Thomas R
MetadataDateSent: 2012-12-20T05:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH3/DOC_0C05739852/C05739852.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: Re: Thank you so much
ExtractedFrom: Nides, Thomas R <NidesTR@state.gov>
ExtractedCc: Mills, Cheryl D
ExtractedDateSent: Thursday, December 20, 2012 07:38 AM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739852
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN FULL
ExtractedBodyText:
  Thanks I wish I could tell u I am looking forward to this but it would be a lie! Get better...
  ----

RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739852
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  FULL
  From: Nides, Thomas R <NidesTR@state.gov>
  Sent Thursday, December 20, 2012 7:47 AM
  To:
  Subject: Re: Thank you so much
  Thanks I wish I could tell u I am looking forward to this but it would be a lie! Get better...
  ---- Original Message -----
  From: H trnailta:NDR22@clintonemail.comj
  Sent: Thursday, December 20, 2012 07:38 AM
  To: Burns, William .1; Nides, Thomas R
  Cc: Mills, Cheryl D
  Subject: Thank you so much
  Dear Bill and Tom,
  I'm sorry that I cannot be on the Hill today as we had long planned, but very grateful that you both will be. The
  Department and I appreciate your leadership everyday.
  So, I'll be nursing my cracked head and cheering you on as you "remain calm and carry on"!
  Happy Ho lidays—H
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739852
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045835



DocNumber: C05739853
MetadataSubject: THANK YOU SO MUCH
MetadataTo: NidesTR@state.gov
MetadataFrom: H
MetadataDateSent: 2012-12-20T05:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH3/DOC_0C05739853/C05739853.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: Re: Thank you so much
ExtractedTo: 'NidesTR@state.gov'
ExtractedFrom: H ‹hrod17@clintonemailcom>
ExtractedCc: Mills, Cheryl D
ExtractedDateSent: Thursday, December 20, 2012 07:47 AM Eastern Standard Time
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739853
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN FULL
ExtractedBodyText:
  Well, what doesn't kill you, makes you stronger gas I have rationalized for years), so just survive and you'll have
  triumphed!
  ----

RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739853
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  FULL
  From: H ‹hrod17@clintonemailcom>
  Sent Thursday, December 20, 2012 7:52 AM
  To: 'NidesTR@state.gov'
  Subject Re: Thank you so much
  Well, what doesn't kill you, makes you stronger gas I have rationalized for years), so just survive and you'll have
  triumphed!
  ---- Original Message --
  From: Nides, Thomas R [mailto:NidesTR@state.gov]
  Sent: Thursday, December 20, 2012 07:47 AM Eastern Standard Time
  To: H
  Subject: Re: Thank you so much
  Thanks I wish I could tell u I am looking forward to this but it would be a lie! Get better...
  Original Message ---
  From: H (mailto:HDR22@clintonemaitcom)
  Sent: Thursday, December 20, 2012 07:38 AM
  To: Burns, William 1; Nides, Thomas R
  Cc: Mills, Cheryl D
  Subject: Thank you so much
  Dear Bill and Tom,
  I'm sorry that I cannot be on the Hill today as we had long planned, but very grateful that you both will be. The
  Department and I appreciate your leadership everyday.
  So, I'll be nursing my (*racked head and cheering you on as you "remain calm and carry on"!
  Happy Hoiiclays—H
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739853
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045836



DocNumber: C05739855
MetadataSubject: FOX FROM CAITLIN
MetadataTo: H
MetadataFrom: Mills, Cheryl D
MetadataDateSent: 2012-12-20T05:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH3/DOC_0C05739855/C05739855.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: PIN: FOX from Caitlin
ExtractedFrom: Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.gov>
ExtractedCc: Abedin, Hurna
ExtractedDateSent: Thursday, December 20, 2012 7:57 AM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739855
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN FULL
ExtractedBodyText:
  FYSA
  Prom: Laszczych, Joanne
  Sent: Thursday, December 20, 2012 7:57 AM
  To: Mills, Cheryl D
  Subject: FOX from Caitlin
  VAN SUSTEREN: Senator, there is a report from the State Department that Secretary of State Hillary
  Clinton will testify on Benghazi before the middle of January. There has been some criticism of whether or
  not she has a concussion. I believe she has a concussion. What do you think?
  MCCAIN: I know that in my view, Secretary Clinton, when she said she assumed full responsibility, she
  certainly has a lot of responsibility for what happened in Benghazi. That's -- that report made that very
  clear. But I must say, I have never seen Secretary Clinton back down from a fight. And I have
  never seen her back down. And / believe that she is now not physically well enough to testify
  and she will testify the middle of January.
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739855
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045837

RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739855
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  FULL
  From: Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.gov>
  Sent Thursday, December 20, 2012 800 AM
  To:
  Cc: Abedin, Hurna
  Subject: PIN: FOX from Caitlin
  FYSA
  Prom: Laszczych, Joanne
  Sent: Thursday, December 20, 2012 7:57 AM
  To: Mills, Cheryl D
  Subject: FOX from Caitlin
  VAN SUSTEREN: Senator, there is a report from the State Department that Secretary of State Hillary
  Clinton will testify on Benghazi before the middle of January. There has been some criticism of whether or
  not she has a concussion. I believe she has a concussion. What do you think?
  MCCAIN: I know that in my view, Secretary Clinton, when she said she assumed full responsibility, she
  certainly has a lot of responsibility for what happened in Benghazi. That's -- that report made that very
  clear. But I must say, I have never seen Secretary Clinton back down from a fight. And I have
  never seen her back down. And / believe that she is now not physically well enough to testify
  and she will testify the middle of January.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739855
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045837



DocNumber: C05739856
MetadataSubject: FOX FROM CAITLIN
MetadataTo: millscd@state.gov
MetadataFrom: H
MetadataDateSent: 2012-12-20T05:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH3/DOC_0C05739856/C05739856.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: FW: FOX from Caitlin
ExtractedTo: 'millscd@state.gov'
ExtractedFrom: H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>
ExtractedCc: Abedin, Huma <AbedinH©state.gov>
ExtractedDateSent: Thursday, December 20, 2012 8:03 AM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739856
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN FULL
ExtractedBodyText:
  Huma called him and Graham. Also, someone should call Greta VS to thank her for "knowing the truth."

RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739856
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  FULL
  From: H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>
  Sent: Thursday, December 20, 2012 8:03 AM
  To: 'millscd@state.gov'
  Subject Re: FOX from Caitlin
  Huma called him and Graham. Also, someone should call Greta VS to thank her for "knowing the truth."
  From: Mills, Cheryl D [mailto:MillsCD@state.gov]
  Sent; Thursday, December 20, 2012 07:59 AM Eastern Standard Time
  To: H
  Cc: Abedin, Huma <AbedinH©state.gov>
  Subject: FW: FOX from Caitlin
  FYSA
  From: Laszczych, Joanne
  Sent: Thursday, December 20, 2012 7:57 AM
  To: Mills, Cheryl D
  Subject: FOX from Caitlin
  VAN SUSTEREN: Senator, there is a report from the State Department that Secretary of State Hillary
  Clinton will testify on Benghazi before the middle of January. There has been some criticism of whether or
  not she has a concussion. I believe she has a concussion. What do you think?
  MCCAIN: I know that in my view, Secretary Clinton, when she said she assumed full responsibility, she
  certainly has a lot of responsibility for what happened in Benghazi. That's -- that report made that very
  clear. But I must say, I have never seen Secretary Clinton ,back down from a fight. And I
  have
  never seen her back down. And I believe that she is now not physically well enough to testify
  and She will testify the middle of January.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739856
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045838



DocNumber: C05739857
MetadataSubject: H: V GOOD INTEL INTERNAL LIBYA. SID
MetadataTo: H
MetadataFrom: Sullivan, Jacob J
MetadataDateSent: 2012-01-23T05:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH1/DOC_0C05739857/C05739857.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: H: V good Intel internal Libya. Sid
ExtractedFrom: Sullivan, Jacob J <Sullivann@state.gov>
ExtractedDateSent: Monday, January 23, 2012 723 PM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739857
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
ExtractedBodyText: Will do, as with the other.
RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739857
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  PART B6
  From: Sullivan, Jacob J <Sullivann@state.gov>
  Sent: Monday, January 23, 2012 723 PM
  To:
  Subject RE H: V good intel internal Libya. Sid
  Will do, as with the other.
  From: H [mallto:HDR220clintonemail.com]
  Sent: Monday, January 23, 2012 1:41PM
  To: Sullivan, Jacob 3
  Subject Fw: H: V good Intel internal Libya. Sid
  Fyi, as usual distribute as you determine.
  B6
  _
  Sent: Monday, January 23, 2012 12:11 PM
  To: H
  Subject: H: V good Intel internal Libya. Sid
  CONFIDENTIAL
  January 23, 2012
  For: HRC
  From. Sid
  Re: Libya internal strife
  SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of
  European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.
  1. On the evening of January 22, 2012, according to an official with access to the leadership of the National
  Transitional Government (NTC), Libyan President Mustafa Abdul Jalil spoke at length with Prime Minister Abdurrahim el-
  Keib, stating in a heated exchange that el-Keib's government must take the steps necessary to address the complaints of
  the demobilized fighters from the 2011revolution. Jalil pointed out that the new government has been discussing this
  situation since it was formed in October 2011, and matters have now reached a crisis point with a group of more than
  2,000 disgruntled veterans, supported by students, attacking the NTC offices in Benghazi on January 21, destroying
  computer equipment and NTC files. These demonstrators, some of whom threw Molotov cocktails at the NTC
  headquarters building, continue to demand better medical care, jobs, payment for their time in the revolutionary army, and
  a commitment to transparency on the part of the el-Keib regime; particularly the appointment of cabinet members arid
  senior officials.
  2. According to this source, when el-Keib replied, pointing out that demonstrators were camped outside of his
  office in Tripoli. He added that the government had to proceed in a measured and professional manner, Jalil stated in
  angry tones, that NTC Staffers were beaten and could have been killed during the January 21 incident, pointing out that
  this is how the rebellion against Muammar al Qaddafi began in February 2011. Jalil also warned that Islamist leader
  General Abdel Hakim Alamin Belhaj and his supporters, particularly militia commanders from Zintan, Misrata, and other
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739857
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045137

  UNCLASSIFIED STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  U.S. Department of State SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739857
  Date: 05/13/2015
  western regions, are anxiously waiting for the NTC government to collapse. Their goal, in the opinion of this individual, is
  to eventually move in and establish a strict Islamic state. Jalil, added that his contacts in the Egyptian Muslim
  Brotherhood had been in touch during the preceding week, warning that the threat from Belhaj is very real. El-Keib stated
  that he must press Minister of Defense Osama al-Juwali and Interior Minister Fawzi Abd Ali to be more efficient in
  administering their positions. According to this individual, el-Keib fears that al-Juwali, who was a western commander
  during the revolution, may be maintaining a secret relationship with Belhaj and his allies. In response, Jai warned el-Keib
  to avoid trying to use the regular military forces posted around Benghazi under General Khalifa Beloasim Hefter in an
  effort to restrain the former militia troops as such a step could lead to civil war.
  3.(Source Comment: In the opinion of an extremely well placed individual, el-Keib is, in fact, increasingly
  frustrated by the inefficiency in his regime and the inability of hie ministers and administrators to arrange contracts with
  foreign firms. He complains that his principal advisors, Minister of Oil Abdulrahman Ben Yezza and Minister of Finance
  Hassan Zigiam, have been too timid in resolving the questions associated with contracts involving foreign firms, both old
  and new. At present it appearsthat whenever one official raises a question regarding an agreement the entire matter is
  put on hold and delayed. In the opinion of this source, el-Kelb knows that without these agreements he cannot meet the
  demands of the veterans and the students. El-Keib stated in confidence, that he may have made a serious mistake in
  removing the former oil/finance minister All Tatham' from the government. El-Kelb also noted that Jalil is shaken by the
  January 21 attack on NTC headquarters end is searching for ways to appease the demonstrators. Most recently he
  asked Abdel - Haltdh Ghoza, his principal deputy and NiC spokesman to step down. Ghoza, who comes from the
  Benghazi area, was particularly unpopular with the western troops.)
  4. Following the discussion with Jalil, el-Kieb ordered Ziglarn and Ngeb Obedoi, the head of the Stock Exchange,
  to move with all possible speed to address the issue of the foreign contracts and arrange for new vendors to provide the
  services demanded by the veterans and students. In this discussion he pointed out that if they cannot deal with this
  situation they will not have to worry about the national elections in 2012, Libya will be an Islamic Republic, with BeMO as
  the ruler. El-Kalb pointed out that foreign governments and large oil firms must be aware of this threat and that this will
  frighten them into meeting the conditions for foreign contracts set out by the NTC.
  5. (Source Comment: According to an extremely sensitive source, el-Keib spoke secretly with Hefter, stating that
  he, and those troops loyal to him, should be prepared to move to protect the government in the event of increased
  violence. This effort could include moving against Belhaj and attacking militia forces before they can unite and
  organize. El-Keib emphasized that this is for planning purposes only, and no action should be taken until el-Kelb gives
  the order. He emphasized that he will do everything possible to avoid civil war, but he is now concerned that Jai will be
  unable to deal with the level of hostility against the NTC, and cannot be counted on to take strong positions against Belhaj
  and his supporters. In the opinion of this individual, el-Keib cannot back away from his commitment to technicians in
  senior positions, but he will press them as hard as he can to have the government respond to the needs of the veterans
  and students. El-Keib believes it is not too late to address these problems, but they must move quickly.)
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739857
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045138

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739857
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  From: H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>
  Sent: Monday, January 23, 2012 9:17 PM
  To: 'Russorv@state.gov'
  Subject Fw. H: V good intel internal Libya. Sid
  Attachments: hrc memo libya internal strife 012312.doa
  Pis print.
  From
  Sent: Monday, January 23, 2012 12:11 PM
  To: H
  Subject: H: V good intel internal Libya. Sid
  CONFIDENTIAL
  January 23, 2012
  For: HRC
  From: Sid
  Re: Libya internal strife
  SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of
  European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.
  1. On the evening of January 22, 2012, according to an official with access to the leadership of the National
  Transitional Government (NTC), Libyan President Mustafa Abdul Jalil spoke at length with Prime Minister Abdurrahim el-
  Keib, stating in a heated exchange that el-Keib's government must take the steps necessary to address the complaints of
  the demobilized fighters from the 2011 revolution. Jail! pointed out that the new government has been discussing this
  situation since it was formed in October 2011, and matters have now reached a crisis point, with a group of more than
  2,000 disgruntled veterans, supported by students, attacking the NTC offices in Benghazi on January 21, destroying
  computer equipment and NTC files. These demonstrators, some of whom threw Molotov cocktails at the NTC
  headquarters building, continue to demand better medical care, jobs, payment for their time in the revolutionary army, and
  a commitment to transparency on the part of the el-Keib regime; particularly the appointment of cabinet members and
  senior officials.
  2. According to this source, when el-Keib replied, pointing out that demonstrators were camped outside of his
  office in Tripoli. He added that the government had to proceed in a measured and professional manner, Jalil stated in
  angry tones, that NTC staffers were beaten and could have been killed during the January 21 incident, pointing out that
  this is how the rebellion against Muammar al Qaddafi began in February 2011. Jalil also warned that Islamist leader
  General Abdel Hakim Alamin Belhaj and his supporters, particularly militia commanders from Zintan, Misrata, and other
  western regions, are anxiously waiting for the NTC government to collapse. Their goal, in the opinion of this individual, is
  to eventually move in and establish a strict Islamic state. Jalil, added that his contacts in the Egyptian Muslim
  Brotherhood had been in touch during the preceding week, warning that the threat from Belhaj is very real. El-Keib stated
  that he must press Minister of Defense Osama al-Juwali and Interior Minister Fawzi Abd All to be more efficient in
  administering their positions. According to this individual, el-Keib fears that al-Juwali, who was a western commander
  during the revolution, may be maintaining a secret relationship with Belhaj and his allies. In response, Jalil warned el-Keib
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739857
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045139
  B6

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739857
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  to avoid trying to use the regular military forces posted around Benghazi under General Khalifa Belqasim Hefter in an
  effort to restrain the former militia troops as such a step could lead to civil war.
  3.(Source Comment: In the opinion of an extremely well placed individual, el-Keib is, in fact, increasingly
  frustrated by the inefficiency in his regime and the inability of his ministers and administrators to arrange contracts with
  foreign firms. He complains that his principal advisors, Minister of Oil Abdulrahman Ben Yezza and Minister of Finance
  Hassan Ziglam, have been too timid in resolving the questions associated with contracts involving foreign firms, both old
  and new. At present it appears that whenever one official raises a question regarding an agreement the entire matter Is
  put on hold and delayed. In the opinion of this source, el-Keib knows that without these agreements he cannot meet the
  demands of the veterans and the students. El-Keib stated in confidence, that he may have made a serious mistake in
  removing the former oil/finance minister Ali Tarhouni from the government. El-Keib also noted that AM is shaken by the
  January 21 attack on NTC headquarters and is searching for ways to appease the demonstrators. Most recently he
  asked Abdel— Hafidh Ghoza, his principal deputy and NTC spokesman to step down. Ghoza, who comes from the
  Benghazi area, was particularly unpopular with the western troops.)
  4. Following the discussion with Jatil, el-Meb ordered Ziglarn and Ngeb Obeda, the head of the Stock Exchange,
  to move with all possible speed to address the issue of the foreign contracts and arrange for new vendors to provide the
  services demanded by the veterans and students. In this discussion he pointed out that if they cannot deal with this
  situation they will not have to worry about the national elections in 2012, Libya will be an Islamic Republic, with Belhaj as
  the ruler. El-Keib pointed out that foreign governments and large oil firms must be aware of this threat and that this will
  frighten them into meeting the conditions for foreign contracts set out by the NTC.
  5. (Source Comment: According to an extremely sensitive source, el-Keib spoke secretly with Haftar, stating that
  he, and those troops loyal to him, should be prepared to move to protect the government in the event of increased
  violence. This effort could include moving against Belhaj and attacking militia forces before they can unite and organize.
  El-Keib emphasized that this is for planning purposes only, and no action should be taken until el-Keib gives the order.
  He emphasized that he will do everything possible to avoid civil war, but he is now concerned that Jalil will be unable to
  deal with the level of hostility against the NTC, and cannot be counted on to take strong positions against Belhaj and his
  supporters. In the opinion of this individual, el-Keib cannot back away from his commitment to technicians in senior
  positions, but he will press them as hard as he can to have the government respond to the needs of the veterans and
  students. El-Keib believes it is not too late to address these problems, but they must move quickly.)
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739857
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045140

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739857
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  CONFIDENTIAL
  January 23, 2012
  For: HRC
  From: Sid
  Re: Libya internal strife
  SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as
  the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.
  1. On the evening of January 22, 2012, according to an official with access to the
  leadership of the National Transitional Government (NTC), Libyan President Mustafa Abdul
  Jalil spoke at length with Prime Minister Abdurrahim el-Keib, stating in a heated exchange that
  el-Keib's government must take the steps necessary to address the complaints of the demobilized
  fighters from the 2011revolution. Jalil pointed out that the new government has been discussing
  this situation since it was formed in October 2011, and matters have now reached a crisis point,
  with a group of more than 2,000 disgruntled veterans, supported by students, attacking the NTC
  offices in Benghazi on January 21, destroying computer equipment and NTC files. These
  demonstrators, some of whom threw Molotov cocktails at the NTC headquarters building,
  continue to demand better medical care, jobs, payment for their time in the revolutionary army,
  and a commitment to transparency on the part of the el-Keib regime; particularly the
  appointment of cabinet members and senior officials.
  2. According to this source, when el-Keib replied, pointing out that demonstrators were
  camped outside of his office in Tripoli. He added that the government had to proceed in a
  measured and professional manner, Jalil stated in angry tones, that NTC staffers were beaten and
  could have been killed during the January 21 incident, pointing out that this is how the rebellion
  against Muammar al Qaddafi began in February 2011. Jalil also warned that Islamist leader
  General Abdel Hakim Alamin Belhaj and his supporters, particularly militia commanders from
  Zintan, Misrata, and other western regions, are anxiously waiting for the NTC government to
  collapse. Their goal, in the opinion of this individual, is to eventually move in and establish a
  strict Islamic state. Jalil, added that his contacts in the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood had been
  in touch during the preceding week, warning that the threat from Belhaj is very real. El-Keib
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739857
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045141

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739857
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  stated that he must press Minister of Defense ()sauna al-Juwali and Interior Minister Fawzi Abd
  Ali to be more efficient in administering their positions. According to this individual, el-Keib
  fears that al-Juwali, who was a western commander during the revolution, may be maintaining a
  secret relationship with Belhaj and his allies. In response, Jalil warned el-Keib to avoid trying to
  use the regular military forces posted around Benghazi under General Khalifa Belqasim Haftar in
  an effort to restrain the former militia troops as such a step could lead to civil war.
  3.(Source Comment. In the opinion of an extremely well placed individual, el-Keib is,
  in fact, increasingly frustrated by the inefficiency in his regime and the inability of his ministers
  and administrators to arrange contracts with foreign firms. He complains that his principal
  advisors, Minister of Oil Abdulrahman Ben Yezza and Minister of Finance Hassan Ziglam, have
  been too timid in resolving the questions associated with contracts involving foreign firms, both
  old and new. At present it appears that whenever one official raises a question regarding an
  agreement the entire matter is put on hold and delayed. In the opinion of this source, el-Keib
  knows that without these agreements he cannot meet the demands of the veterans and the
  students. El-Keib stated in confidence, that he may have made a serious mistake in removing the
  forrner oil/finance minister Ali Tarhouni from the government. El-Keib also noted that Jalil is
  shaken by the January 21 attack on NTC headquarters and is searching for ways to appease the
  demonstrators. Most recently he asked Abdel Hafidh Ghoza, his principal deputy and NTC
  spokesman to step down. Grhoza, who comes from the Benghazi area, was particularly
  unpopular with the western troops.)
  4. Following the discussion with Jalil, el-Kieb ordered Ziglam and Ngeb Obeda, the head
  of the Stock Exchange, to move with all possible speed to address the issue of the foreign
  contracts and arrange for new vendors to provide the services demanded by the veterans and
  students. In this discussion he pointed out that if they cannot deal with this situation they will
  not have to worry about the national elections in 2012, Libya will be an Islamic Republic, with
  Belhaj as the ruler. El-Keib pointed out that foreign governments and large oil firms must be
  aware of this threat and that this will frighten them into meeting the conditions for foreign
  contracts set out by the NTC
  5 (Source Comment. According to an extremely sensitive source, el-Keib spoke
  secretly with Haflar, stating that he, and those troops loyal to him, should be prepared to move to
  protect the government in the event of increased violence. This effort could include moving
  against Belhaj and attacking militia forces before they can unite and organize. El-Keib
  emphasized that this is for planning purposes only, and no action should be taken until el-Keib
  gives the order. He emphasized that he will do everything possible to avoid civil war, but he is
  now concerned that Jalil will be unable to deal with the level of hostility against the NTC, and
  cannot be counted on to take strong positions against Belhaj and his supporters In the opinion of
  this individual, el-Keib cannot back away from his commitment to technicians in senior
  positions, but he will press them as hard as he can to have the government respond to the needs
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739857
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045142

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739857
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  of the veterans and students. El-Keib believes it is not too late to address these problems, but
  they must move wickly.)
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739857
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045143



DocNumber: C05739858
MetadataSubject: FOX FROM CAITLIN
MetadataTo: millscd@state.gov
MetadataFrom: H
MetadataDateSent: 2012-12-20T05:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH3/DOC_0C05739858/C05739858.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: FW: FOX from Caitlin
ExtractedTo: 'millscd@state.gov.
ExtractedFrom: H <hrod17@dintonemail.com>
ExtractedCc: Abedin, Huma <AbeclInH@state.gov›
ExtractedDateSent: Thursday, December 20, 2012 8:23 AM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739858
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN FULL
ExtractedBodyText: Can you call me?
RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739858
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  FULL
  From: H <hrod17@dintonemail.com>
  Sent: Thursday, December 20, 2012 8:23 AM
  To: 'millscd@state.gov.
  Subject Re: FOX from Caitlin
  Can you call me?
  From: Mills, Cheryl D [mailto:MillsCD@state.govi
  Sent: Thursday, December 20, 2012 07:59 AM Eastern Standard Time
  To: H
  Cc: Abedin, Huma <AbeclInH@state.gov›
  Subject: FW: FOX from Caitlin
  FYSA
  From: Laszczych, Joanne
  Sent: Thursday, December 20, 2012 7:57 AM
  To: Mills, Cheryi D
  Subject: FOX from Caitlin
  VAN SUSTEREN: Senator, there is a report from the State Department that Secretary of State Hillary
  Clinton will testify on Benghazi before the middle of January. There has been some criticism of whether or
  not she has a concussion. I believe she has a concussion. What do you think?
  MCCAIN: I know that in my view, Secretary Clinton, when she said she assumed full responsibility, she
  certainly has a lot of responsibility for what happened in Benghazi. That's -- that report made that very
  clear. But I must say, ,I have never seen Secretary Clinton back down from a fight And I have
  never seen her back down. And I believe that she is now not physically well enough to testify
  and she will testify the middle of 3anuary.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739858
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045839



DocNumber: C05739859
MetadataSubject: LIBYA INFO
MetadataTo: H
MetadataFrom: Sullivan, Jacob J
MetadataDateSent: 2012-01-24T05:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH1/DOC_0C05739859/C05739859.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: FW: Libya info
ExtractedFrom: Sullivan, Jacob J <Sullivanii@state.gov>
ExtractedDateSent: Tue 1/24/2012 2:25 AM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739859
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
ExtractedBodyText: FYI
RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739859
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN PART
  B5
  From: Sullivan, Jacob J <Sullivanii@state.gov>
  Sent Tuesday, January 24, 2012 1:00 PM
  To:
  Subject: FW: Libya info
  FYI
  From: Cretz, Gene A
  Sent Tuesday, January 24, 2012 258 AM
  To: Sullivan, Jacob); Felteriare Jeffrey D
  Subject: RE: Libya info
  B5
  The Benghazi protestors appear to
  be a pastiche of different groups of disaffected people including war-wounded, martyrs' families, transparency and
  accountability demendeurs, and those who believe the east is once again being neglected. So the source of this report
  attributing the whole thing to war-wounded does not jive, although they may have been the ones who carried out
  the violent acts. The Belhaj bogeyman is a bit overplayed-no doubt his military influence has waned but he does remain
  a player —one of many —looking to make political gain in this new environment The proposition that he is just lying in
  waiting to take advantage of the current stability to move in and establish an Islamic state appears a bit
  exaggerated. Minister of Labor Rajbani (who has his own axes to grind) said there is now a group of six ministers (I need
  to clarify whether this is with al-Keeb's knowelcige or not) who are serving as the "cohones" of the cabinet and taking
  decisions the others won't al-Keeb Is proceding cautiously (that is his strength and weakness) and that is the problem-
  this is really the time for a "war-time" cabinet not the cautious approach he appears to be taking does not suit this volatile
  time Let's see what the meeting today between the NTC and the government produces—the benghazi protests, the Bani
  Walid conflict and the various other incidents that have flared up in recent days point to the need for some real drastic
  movement in the DDR process and in the other issues that engender current dissatisfaction among the populace. I can
  really comment on the points regarding foreign contracts except to say it rings true given the current governments
  reluctance to make any significant decisions, especially regarding past or future issues of money. The Hefter piece also
  sounds a bridge too far given al-Keeb's disposition. But I do agree that it is not too late if this government can just
  organize itself and take some fundamental decisions to i mprove liquidity, get the real war-wounded good treatment and
  push the MOD and MOI to speed up the DDR process.
  From: Sullivan, Jacob
  Sent: Tue 1/24/2012 2:25 AM
  To: Crete, Gene A; Feltman, Jeffrey
  Subject: Libya info
  Interested, as always, in your views.
  SOURCE. Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of
  European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.
  1. On the evening of January 22, 2012, according to an official with access to the leadership of the National
  Transitional Government (NTC), Libyan President Mustafa Abdul „late spoke at length with Prime Minister Abdurrahim el-
  Keib, stating in a heated exchange that el-Keib's government must take the steps necessary to address the complaints of
  the demobilized fighters from the 2011revolution. Jalil pointed out that the new government has been discussing this
  situation since it was formed in October 2011, and matters have now reached a crisis point, with a group of more than
  2,000 disgruntled veterans, supported by students, attacking the NTC offices in Benghazi on January 21, destroying
  computer equipment and NTC files. These demonstrators, some of whom threw Molotov cocktails at the NTC
  headquarters building, continue to demand better medical care, jobs, payment for their time in the revolutionary army, and
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739859
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045144

  UNCLASSIFIED STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  U.S. Department of State SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739859
  Date: 05/13/2015
  a commitment to transparency on the part of the el-Keib regime; particularly the appointment of cabinet members and
  senior officials.
  2. According to this source, when el-Keib replied, pointing out that demonstrators were camped outside of his
  office in Tripoli. He added that the government had to proceed in a measured and professional manner, Jalil stated in
  angry tones, that NTC staffers were beaten and could have been killed during the January 21 incident, pointing out that
  this is how the rebellion against Muammar al Qaddafi began in February 2011, Jaill also warned that Islamist leader
  General Abdel Hakim Alamin Belhaj and his supporters, particularly militia commanders from Zintan, Misrata, and other
  western regions, are anxiously waiting for the NTC government to collapse. Their goal, in the opinion of this individual, is
  to eventually move in and establish a strict Islamic state. Jan!, added that his contacts in the Egyptian Muslim
  Brotherhood had been in touch during the preceding week, warning that the threat from Belhaj is very real. El-Keib stated
  that he must press Minister of Defense Osama al-Juwali and Interior Minister Fawzi Abd All to be more efficient in
  administering their positions. According to this individual, el-Keib fears that al-Juwali, who was a western commander
  during the revolution, may be maintaining a secret relationship with Belhaj and his allies. In response, Jalil warned el-Keib
  to avoid trying to use the regular military forces posted around Benghazi under General Khalifs Belqasim Hefter in an
  effort to restrain the former militia troops as such a step could lead to civil war.
  3. (Source Comment In the opinion of an extremely well placed individual, el-Keib is, in fact, increasingly
  frustrated by the inefficiency in his regime and the Inability of his ministers and administrators to arrange contracts with
  foreign firms. He complains that his principal advisors, Minister of Oil Abdulrahman Ben Yezza and Minister of Finance
  Hassan Ziglam, have been too timid in resolving the questions associated with contracts involving foreign firms, both old
  and new. At present it appears that whenever one official raises a question regarding an agreement the entire matter is
  put on hold and delayed. In the opinion of this source, el-Keib knows that without these agreements he cannot meet the
  demands of the veterans and the students. El-Keib stated in confidence, that he may have made a serious mistake in
  removing the former oil/finance minister Ali Tarhouni from the government. El-Keib also noted that JalIl is shaken by the
  January 21 attack on NTC headquarters and is searching for ways to appease the demonstrators. Most recently he
  asked Abdel — Hafidh Ghoza, his principal deputy and NTC spokesman to step down. Ghoza, who comes from the
  Benghazi area, was particularly unpopular with the western troops.)
  4. Following the discussion with Jalil, el-Kieb ordered Ziglam and Ngeb Obeda, the head of the Stock Exchange,
  to move with all possible speed to address the issue of the foreign contracts and arrange for new vendors to provide the
  services demanded by the veterans and students. In this discussion he pointed out that if they cannot deal with this
  situation they will not have to worry about the national elections in 2012, Libya will be an Islamic Republic, with Belhaj as
  the ruler. El-Keib pointed out that foreign governments and large oil firms must be aware of this threat and that this will
  frighten them into meeting the conditions for foreign contracts set out by the NTC.
  5. (Source Comment According to an extremely sensitive source, el-Keib spoke secretly with Haftar, stating that
  he, and those troops loyal to him, should be prepared to move to protect the government in the event of increased
  violence. This effort could include moving against Belhaj and attacking militia forces before they can unite and
  organize. El-Keib emphasized that this is for planning purposes only, and no action should be taken until el-Keib gives
  the order. He emphasized that he will do everything possible to avoid civil war, but he is now concerned that Jalil will be
  unable to deal with the level of hostility against the NTC, and cannot be counted on to take strong positions against Belhaj
  and his supporters. In the opinion of this individual, el-Keib cannot back away from his commitment to technicians in
  senior positions, but he will press them as hard as he can to have the government respond to the needs of the veterans
  and students. El-Keib believes it is not too late to address these problems, but they must move quickly.)
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739859
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045145



DocNumber: C05739860
MetadataSubject: H: SURE YOU'VE SEEN ALL THIS INFO, BUT START ON GRAPH 5. SID
MetadataTo: sullivanjj@state.gov
MetadataFrom: H
MetadataDateSent: 2012-12-20T05:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH3/DOC_0C05739860/C05739860.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: H: Sure you've seen all this info, but start on graph 5. Sid
ExtractedTo: 'sullivanjj@state.gov'
ExtractedFrom: H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>
ExtractedDateSent: Thursday, December 20, 2012 12:40 PM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739860
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
ExtractedBodyText: Fyi.
RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739860
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  PART B6
  From: H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>
  Sent: Thursday, December 20, 2012 12:40 PM
  To: 'sullivanjj@state.gov'
  Subject Fw: H: Sure you've seen all this info, but start on graph 5. Sid
  Fyi.
  From: Sidney Blumenthal [mailto
  Sent: Wednesday, December 19, 2012 09:01 AM Eastern Standard lime
  To: H
  Subject: H: Sure you've seen all this info, but start on graph 5. Sid
  http://www.juancole.com/2012/12/benghazis-criticizes-consular.html
  Benghazi's Deep Throat fingers Islamist Leaders for
  Attacks as State Dept Criticized on Consular Security
  Posted on 12/19/2012 by Juan
  The report saying that security was inadequate at the compound that the US had adopted as its ad hoc
  consulate in Benghazi, Libya, dominates today's headlines. That conclusion is obvious. The
  "consulate" was just a private residence taken over for this purpose by the US in the city. It was not
  constructed to be a US government building in a potentially hostile city.
  I met a person who worked there when I was in Benghazi in June, and she told me that it wasn't even
  clear if the consulate would be retained after the first of this year. It was possibly temporary,
  depending on Congressional funding. (The Tea Party House hasn't been good on meeting requests for
  embassy security funds).
  The more interesting question than why ad hoc arrangements should have been made for a consulate
  during and after the Libyan revolution (the answer to which seems fairly obvious) is, who is
  responsible for the string of assassinations and acts of violence in the city, of which the RPG attack on
  the consulate on September 11 was only one? Benghazi, with a population of over one million in a
  country of 6.5 million, is Libya's second largest city and was the epicenter of the revolution against the
  government of Muammar Qaddafi in 2011.
  On November 22, Benghazi police chief Farej Darssi was assassinated. In October a police colonel
  barely avoided death— his car was wired to explode. A Libyan intelligence officer was killed in
  September. A general was assassinated in August. Some of these figures had worked for Qaddafi but
  had defected to the revolution. Qaddafi's security forces were responsible for the 1996 massacre of
  hardline fundamentalists at Abu Salim prison, and for making others just disappear. Likely the same
  shadowy cells that attacked the US consulate are behind the attacks on Benghazi police and army
  officers.
  There may have been a break in the case. Last Saturday, Benghazi security forces loyal to the elected
  government in Tripoli, captured a man they suspected of being involved with the groups behind the
  violence. And, he appears to have been willing to spill the beans. So let's call him the Libyan Deep
  Throat.
  Deep Throat is so knowledgeable about the conspiracies facing the city and so dangerous to those
  hatching them that the latter immediately attempted to spring him from jail.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739860
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045840
  B6

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739860
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  On Sunday morning, militants attacked the police facility next to the holding cell where the man is
  being detained. A policeman at that station died in a hail of bullets from the attackers, and they called
  for back-up. The police car that sped to the scene was ambushed and three policemen in it were killed.
  Still, the police stood their ground and fought off the assault, and they kept their valuable suspect in
  custody, with all his valuable testimony.
  Shortly after midnight, on Monday morning, small explosives were set off at the Garyounis police
  station in Benghazi, damaging a couple of automobiles but otherwise doing little damage. Then
  explosives were set off at al-Uruba police station, which also took sniper fire, but neither resulted in
  casualties.
  The police became vigilant, and they apprehended a shady-looking man skulking around near the al-
  Hadaeg police station, finding him to have two rocket propelled grenades in his possession, which he
  was apparently intending to fire at the station.
  In other words, the capture of Libyan Deep Throat has set off a gang war on the police, who are being
  informed by bombings and shootings that they must let their infounant go or risk their
  So what is Deep Throat saying? According to local journalist Mohamed Bujenah of the Libyan Herald,
  a senior figure in the Benghazi police told him that the informant had fingered as many as 7
  prominent Muslim fundamentalist leaders in connection with these attacks, of whom the police
  named 6 explicitly:
  1 Sayan Ben Quinu, from the notoriously radical town of Derna, and a former prisoner at
  Guantanamo
  2.Ahmad Bukatela, leader of the Mai& Militia
  3.Muhammad al-Zahawi, head of the Ansar al-Sharia militia
  4.Muhammad al-Gharabi, a leader of the Rafallah al-Sahafi Militia
  5.Ismail Sallabi, another leader of Rafallah al-Sahati
  6.Salim Nabous, head of the Zawiya Martyrs' Brigade
  It is just a newspaper article. We don't kilow if the informant actually named these individuals or if he
  did so to escape torture, in which case we can't trust what he said. But if the allegations are true, there
  is collusion among several hardline militias in the city to create instability in hopes of taking it over.
  The new, elected, prime minister Ali Zeidan, has started asserting himself militarily. He clod the
  country's southern borders against instability in the Sahel. He may well have some risky house
  cleaning to do in Benghazi.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739860
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045841



DocNumber: C05739861
MetadataSubject: H: V GOOD INTEL INTERNAL LIBYA. SID
MetadataTo: Russorv@state.gov
MetadataFrom: H
MetadataDateSent: 2012-01-27T05:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH1/DOC_0C05739861/C05739861.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: H: V good intel internal Libya. Sid
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739861
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
ExtractedBodyText:
  H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>
  Friday, January 27, 2012 7:15 AM
  'Russorv©state.gov'
  Fw: H: V good Intel internal Libya. Sid
  hrc memo libya internal strife 012312.dooc
  Pis print.

RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739861
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  PART B6
  From:
  Sent:
  To:
  Subject
  Attachments:
  H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>
  Friday, January 27, 2012 7:15 AM
  'Russorv©state.gov'
  Fw: H: V good Intel internal Libya. Sid
  hrc memo libya internal strife 012312.dooc
  Pis print.
  From:
  Sent: Monday, January 23, 2012 12:11 PM
  To: H
  Subject: H: V good intel internal Libya. Sid
  CONFIDENTIAL
  January 23, 2012
  For. HRC
  From: Sid
  Re: Libya internal strife
  SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of
  European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.
  1. On the evening of January 22, 2012, according to an official with access to the leadership of the National
  Transitional Government (NTC), Libyan President Mustafa Abdul Jalil spoke at length with Prime Minister Abdurrahim el-
  Keib, stating in a heated exchange that el-Keib's government must take the steps necessary to address the complaints of
  the demobilized fighters from the 2011revolution. Jalil pointed out that the new government has been discussing this
  situation since it was formed in October 2011, and matters have now reached a crisis point, with a group of more than
  2,000 disgruntled veterans, supported by students, attacking the NTC offices in Benghazi on January 21, destroying
  computer equipment and NTC files. These demonstrators, some of whom threw Molotov cocktails at the NTC
  headquarters building, continue to demand better medical care, jobs, payment for their time in the revolutionary army, and
  a commitment to transparency on the part of the el-Keib regime; particularly the appointment of cabinet members and
  senior officials.
  2. According to this source, when el-Keib replied, pointing out that demonstrators were camped outside of his
  office in Tripoli. He added that the government had to proceed in a measured and professional manner, Jalil stated in
  angry tones, that NTC staffers were beaten and could have been killed during the January 21 incident, pointing out that
  this is how the rebellion against Muammar al Qaddafi began in February 2011. Jalil also warned that Islamist leader
  General Abdel Hakim Alamin Belhaj and his supporters, particularly militia commanders from Zintan, Misrata, and other
  western regions, are anxiously waiting for the NTC government to collapse. Their goal, in the opinion of this individual, is
  to eventually move in and establish a strict Islamic state. Jalil, added that his contacts in the Egyptian Muslim
  Brotherhood had been in touch during the preceding week, warning that the threat from Belhaj is very real. El-Keib stated
  that he must press Minister of Defense Osama al-Juwali and Interior Minister Fawzi Abd All to be more efficient in
  administering their positions. According to this individual, el-Keib fears that al-Juwali, who was a western commander
  during the revolution, may be maintaining a secret relationship with Belhaj and his allies. In response, Jalil warned el-Keib
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739861
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045146
  B6

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739861
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  to avoid trying to use the regular military forces posted around Benghazi under General Khalila Belqasim Hefter in an
  effort to restrain the former militia troops as such a step could lead to civil war.
  3.(Source Comment: In the opinion of an extremely well placed individual, el-Keib is, in fact, increasingly
  frustrated by the inefficiency in his regime and the inability of his ministers and administrators to arrange contracts with
  foreign firms. He complains that his principal advisors, Minister of Oil Abdulrahman Ben Yezza and Minister of Finance
  Hassan Ziglam, have been too timid in resolving the questions associated with contracts involving foreign firms, both old
  and new. At present it appears that whenever one official raises a question regarding an agreement the entire matter is
  put on hold and delayed. In the opinion of this source, el-Keib knows that without these agreements he cannot meet the
  demands of the veterans and the students. El-Keib stated in confidence, that he may have made a serious mistake in
  removing the former oil/finance minister Ali Tarhouni from the government. El-Keib also noted that Jalil is shaken by the
  January 21 attack on NTC headquarters and is searching for ways to appease the demonstrators. Most recently he
  asked Abdel Hafidh Ghoza, his principal deputy and NTC spokesman to step down. Ghoza, who comes from the
  Benghazi area, was particularly unpopular with the western troops.)
  4. Following the discussion with Jalil, el-Kieb ordered Ziglarn and Ngeb Obeda, the head of the Stock Exchange,
  to move with all possible speed to address the issue of the foreign contracts and arrange for new vendors to provide the
  services demanded by the veterans and students. In this discussion he pointed out that if they cannot deal with this
  situation they will not have to worry about the national elections in 2012, Libya will be an Islamic Republic, with Bethej as
  the ruler. El-Keib pointed out that foreign governments and large oil firms must be aware of this threat and that this will
  frighten them into meeting the conditions for foreign contracts set out by the NTC.
  5. (Source Comment: According to an extremely sensitive source, el-Keib spoke secretly with Haftar, stating that
  he, and those troops loyal to him, should be prepared to move to protect the government in the event of increased
  violence. This effort could include moving against Belhaj and attacking militia forces before they can unite and organize.
  El-Keib emphasized that this is for planning purposes only, and no action should be taken until el-Keib gives the order.
  He emphasized that he will do everything possible to avoid civil war, but he is now concerned that Jalii will be unable to
  deal with the level of hostility against the NTC, and cannot be counted on to take strong positions against Belhaj and his
  supporters. In the opinion of this individual, el-Keib cannot back away from his commitment to technicians in senior
  positions, but he will press them as hard as he can to have the government respond to the needs of the veterans and
  students. El-Keib believes it is not too late to address these problems, but they must move quickly.)
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739861
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045147

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739861
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  CONFIDENTIAL
  January 23, 2012
  For: EIRC
  From: Sid
  Re Libya internal strife
  SOURCE. Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as
  the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.
  1. On the evening of January 22, 2012, according to an official with access to the
  leadership of the National Transitional Government (NTC), Libyan President Mustafa Abdul
  Jalil spoke at length with Prime Minister Abdurrahim el-Keib, stating in a heated exchange that
  el-Keib's government must take the steps necessary to address the complaints of the demobilized
  fighters from the 2011revolution. Jalil pointed out that the new government has been discussing
  this situation since it was formed in October 2011, and matters have now reached a crisis point,
  with a group of more than 2,000 disgruntled veterans, supported by students, attacking the NTC
  offices in Benghazi on January 21, destroying computer equipment and NTC files. These
  demonstrators, some of whom threw Molotov cocktails at the NTC headquarters building,
  continue to demand better medical care, jobs, payment for their time in the revolutionary army,
  and a commitment to transparency on the part of the el-Keib regime; particularly the
  appointment of cabinet members and senior officials.
  2. According to this source, when el-Keib replied, pointing out that demonstrators were
  camped outside of his office in Tripoli. He added that the government had to proceed in a
  measured and professional manner, Jalil stated in angry tones, that NTC staffers were beaten and
  could have been killed during the January 21 incident, pointing out that this is how the rebellion
  against Muammar al Qaddafi began in February 2011. Jalil also warned that Islamist leader
  General Abdel Hakim Alamin Belhaj and his supporters, particularly militia commanders from
  Zintan, Misrata, and other western regions, are anxiously waiting for the NTC government to
  collapse. Their goal, in the opinion of this individual, is to eventually move in and establish a
  strict Islamic state. Jalil, added that his contacts in the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood had been
  in touch during the preceding week, warning that the threat from Belhaj is very real. El-Keib
  UNCLASSIFIED '
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739861
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045148

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739861
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  stated that he must press Minister of Defense Osama al-Juwali and Interior Minister Fawzi Abd
  Ali to be more efficient in administering their positions. According to this individual, el-Keib
  fears that al-Juwali, who was a western commander during the revolution, may be maintaining a
  secret relationship with Belhaj and his allies In response, Jalil warned el-Keib to avoid trying to
  use the regular military forces posted around Benghazi under General Khalifa Belqasim Haftar in
  an effort to restrain the former militia troops as such a step could lead to civil war.
  3.(Source Comment: In the opinion of an extremely well placed individual, el-Keib is,
  in fact, increasingly frustrated by the inefficiency in his regime and the inability of his ministers
  and administrators to arrange contracts with foreign firms. He complains that his principal
  advisors, Minister of Oil Abdulrahman Ben Yezza and Minister of Finance Hassan Ziglam, have
  been too timid in resolving the questions associated with contracts involving foreign firms, both
  old and new. At present it appears that whenever one official raises a question regarding an
  agreement the entire matter is put on hold and delayed. In the opinion of this source, el-Keib
  knows that without these agreements he cannot meet the demands of the veterans and the
  students. El-Keib stated in confidence, that he may have made a serious mistake in removing the
  former oil/finance minister Ali Tarhouni from the government. El-Keib also noted that Jalil is
  shaken by the January 21 attack on NTC headquarters and is searching for ways to appease the
  demonstrators. Most recently he asked Abdel — Hafidh Ghoza, his principal deputy and NTC
  spokesman to step down. Ghoza, who comes from the Benghazi area, was particularly
  unpopular with the western troops.)
  4. Following the discussion with Jalil, el-Kieb ordered Ziglam and Ngeb Obeda, the head
  of the Stock Exchange, to move with all possible speed to address the issue of the foreign
  contracts and arrange for new vendors to provide the services demanded by the veterans and
  students. In this discussion he pointed out that if they cannot deal with this situation they will
  not have to worry about the national elections in 2012, Libya will be an Islamic Republic, with
  Belhaj as the ruler. El-Keib pointed out that foreign governments and large oil firms must be
  aware of this threat and that this will frighten them into meeting the conditions for foreign
  contracts set out by the NTC.
  5. (Source Comment: According to an extremely sensitive source, el-Keib spoke
  secretly with Haftar, stating that he, and those troops loyal to him, should be prepared to move to
  protect the government in the event of increased violence. This effort could include moving
  against Belhaj and attacking militia forces before they can unite and organize. El-Keib
  emphasized that this is for planning purposes only, and no action should be taken until el-Keib
  gives the order. He emphasized that he will do everything possible to avoid civil war, but he is
  now concerned that Jalil will be unable to deal with the level of hostility against the NTC, and
  cannot be counted on to take strong positions against Belhaj and his supporters. In the opinion of
  this individual, el-Keib cannot back away from his commitment to technicians in senior
  positions, but he will press them as hard as he can to have the government respond to the needs
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739861
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045149

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739861
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  of the veterans and students. El-Keib believes it is not too late to address these problems, but
  they must move quickly.)
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739861
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045150



DocNumber: C05739862
MetadataSubject: H: SURE YOU'VE SEEN ALL THIS INFO, BUT START ON GRAPH 5. SID
MetadataTo: H
MetadataFrom: Sullivan, Jacob J
MetadataDateSent: 2012-12-20T05:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH3/DOC_0C05739862/C05739862.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedDateSent: Thursday, December 20, 2012 12:40 PM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739862
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
ExtractedBodyText:
  Thanks.
  Sullivan, Jacob J <Sullivanii@state.gov>
  Thursday, December 20, 2012 1:25 PM
  RE: H: Sure you've seen all this info, but start on graph 5. Sid
  From H [rnallto:HDR220cliritonernail.com]
  Sent: Thursday, December 20, 2012 12:40 PM
  To Sullivan, Jacob 3
  Subject Fw: H: Sure you've seen all this info, but start on graph 5. Sid
  Fyi.

RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739862
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  PART B6
  From:
  Sent
  To:
  Subject:
  Thanks.
  Sullivan, Jacob J <Sullivanii@state.gov>
  Thursday, December 20, 2012 1:25 PM
  RE: H: Sure you've seen all this info, but start on graph 5. Sid
  From H [rnallto:HDR220cliritonernail.com]
  Sent: Thursday, December 20, 2012 12:40 PM
  To Sullivan, Jacob 3
  Subject Fw: H: Sure you've seen all this info, but start on graph 5. Sid
  Fyi.
  From: Sidney Blumenthal [mailto:, B6
  Sent: Wednesday, December 19, 2012 09:01 AM Eastern Standard Time
  To: H
  Subject: H: Sure you've seen all this info, but start on graph 5. Sid
  http://www.juaricole.corn/2o12/12/benghazis-criticizes-consular.html
  Benghazi's Deep Throat fingers Islamist Leaders for
  Attacks as State Dept Criticized on Consular Security
  Posted on 12/19/2012 by Juan
  The report saying that security was inadequate at the compound that the US had adopted as its ad hoc
  consulate in Benghazi, Libya, dominates today's headlines. That conclusion is obvious. The
  "consulate" was just a private residence taken over for this purpose by the US in the city. It was not
  constructed to be a US government building in a potentially hostile city.
  I met a person who worked there when I was in Benghazi in June, and she told me that it wasn't even
  clear if the consulate would be retained after the first of this year It was possibly temporary,
  depending on Congressional funding. (The Tea Party House hasn't been good on meeting requests for
  embassy security funds).
  The more interesting question than why ad hoc arrangements should have been made for a consulate
  during and after the Libyan revolution (the answer to which seems fairly obvious) is, who is
  responsible for the string of assassinations and acts of violence in the city, of which the RPG attack on
  the consulate on September 11 was only one? Benghazi, with a population of over one million in a
  country of 6.5 million, is Libya's second largest city and was the epicenter of the revolution against the
  government of Muammar Qaddafi in 2011.
  On November 22, Benghazi police chief Farej Darssi was assassinated. In October a police colonel
  barely avoided death— his car was wired to explode. A Libyan intelligence officer was killed in
  September. A general was assassinated in August. Some of these figures had worked for Qaddafi but
  had defected to the revolution. QacIdafi's security forces were responsible for the 1996 massacre of
  hardline fundamentalists at Abu Salim prison, and for making others just disappear. Likely the same
  shadowy cells that attacked the US consulate are behind the attacks on Benghazi police and army
  officers.
  There may have been a break in the case. Last Saturday, Benghazi securiV forces loyal to the elected
  government in Tripoli, captured a man they suspected of being involved with the groups behind the
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No F-2015-04841
  Doc No C05739862 STATE DEPT - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM
  Date 05/13/2015 SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS NO FOIA WAIVER STATE-SCB0045842

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739862
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  violence.And, he appears to have been willing to spill the beans. So let's call him the Libyan Deep
  Throat.
  Deep Throat is so knowledgeable about the conspiracies facing the city and so dangerous to those
  hatching them that the latter immediately attempted to spring him from jail.
  On Sunday morning, militants attacked the police facility next to the holding cell where the man is
  being detained. A policeman at that station died in a hail of bullets from the attackers, and they called
  for back-up. The police ear that sped to the scene was ambushed and three policemen in it were killed.
  Still, the police stood their ground and fought off the assault, and they kept their valuable suspect in
  custody, with all his valuable testimony.
  Shortly after midnight, on Monday morning, small explosives were set off at the Garyounis police
  station in Benghazi, damaging a couple of automobiles but otherwise doing little damage. Then
  explosives were set off at al-Uruba pollee station, which also took sniper fire, but neither resulted in
  casualties.
  The police became vigilant, and they apprehended a shady-looking man skulking around near the al-
  Hadaeg police station, finding him to have two rocket propelled grenades in his possession, which he
  was apparently intending to fire at the station.
  In other words, the capture of Libyan Deep Throat has set off a gang war on the police, who are being
  informed by bombings and shootings that they must let their informant go or risk their
  So what is Deep Throat saying? According to local journalist Mohamed Bujenah of the Libyan Herald,
  a senior figure in the Benghazi police told him that the informant had fingered as many as 7
  prominent Muslim fundamentalist leaders in connection with these attacks, of whom the police
  named 6 explicitly:
  Sufyan Ben Qumu, from the notoriously radical town of Duna, and a former prisoner at
  Guantanamo
  2.Ahmad Bukatela, leader of the Ubaida Militia
  3.Muhammad al-Zahawi, head of the Ansar al-Sharia militia
  4. Muhammad al-Gharabi, a leader of the Rafallah al-Sahati Militia
  5.Ismail Sallabi, another leader of Rafallah al-Sahati
  6.Salim Nabotes, head of the Zawiya Martyrs' Brigade
  It is just a newspaper article. We don't know if the informant actually named these individuals or if he
  did so to escape torture, in which case we can't trust what he said. But if the allegations are true, there
  is collusion among several hardline militias in the city to create instability in hopes of taking it over.
  The new, elected, prime minister All Zeidan, has started asserting himself militarily. He closed the
  country's southern borders against instability in the Sahel. He may well have some risky house
  cleaning to do in Benghazi.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739862
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045843



DocNumber: C05739864
MetadataSubject: H: LIBYA, INTEL, INTERNAL CONFLICT OVER MILITIAS. SID
MetadataTo: Sullivan, Jacob J
MetadataFrom: H
MetadataDateSent: 2012-02-21T05:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH1/DOC_0C05739864/C05739864.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: It Libya, intel, internal conflict over militias, Sid
ExtractedTo: Jacob J Sullivan
ExtractedFrom: H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739864
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
ExtractedBodyText:
  Pis review and forward as appropriate.
  Sent from my iPad
  Begin forwarded message:

RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739864
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  PART B6
  From: H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>
  Sent Tuesday, February 21, 2012 11;14 PM
  To: Jacob J Sullivan
  Subject Fwd: H: Libya, intd, internal conflict over militias. Sid
  Attachments: hrc libya militias 022112.clocx; Arr0000thtrn
  Pis review and forward as appropriate.
  Sent from my iPad
  Begin forwarded message:
  From:
  Date: Fehmary 21, 2012 100457 PM EST
  To H <IDR22@clintonemail.corn>
  Subject: It Libya, intel, internal conflict over militias, Sid
  CONFIDENTIAL
  February 21, 2012
  For: Hillary
  From: Sid
  Re: Libya politics to control militias
  SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as
  well as the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and
  security services.
  B6
  1. On February 19, 2012, Libyan President Mustafa Abdul Jalil and Prime
  Minister Abdurrahim el-Keib instructed Minister of the Interior Minister Favvzi Abd All
  and Minister of Defense Osama al Juwali to move as forcefully as possible to deal with
  armed conflict between the various militias which carried the bulk of fighting during the
  2onrevolution against former dictator Muammar al Qaddafi. According to an
  extremely sensitive source speaking in secret, el-Keib, acting in his role as the head of
  government, told the two ministers that, if they could not stop the fighting and disarm
  the militias he would be forced to find ministers who can cally out his orders. Ali and
  Juwali each stated privately that, while they would follow orders, they have little hope of
  succeeding in this matter until el-Keib and Jail gain credibility as the rulers of the
  country. Ali added that, in his opinion, this situation will persist until a new
  UNCLASSIFIED
  government is chosen during the national elections planned for later in 2012.
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739864 STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  Date: 05/13/2015 SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045151

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739864
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  2. In the opinion of this individual, the Prime Minister is particularly concerned
  by the situation in the Southern portion of the country, where the area defined by the
  towns of Ghat, Sabha, and al Kufra, where fighting between rival tribal and regional
  militias has been exacerbated by the activities of Qaddafi loyalists, and their allies,
  Taureg tribal fighters. This individual added that el-Keib and Jalil agree that the
  uncertain security situation in this area represents a threat to Libya's future stability.
  They agreed that, at present, if faced with a concerted effort by either disaffected
  militiamen or pro-Qaddafi forces government security forces and the new national army
  would be unable to protect either Libyan citizens or Western businessmen and oil
  industry workers in the region.
  3.(Source Comment: In the opinion of this individual, el-Keib believes that any
  attack against oil field workers will frighten large Western firms and seriously damage
  Libya's efforts to recover from the revolution. This individual added that al Juwali is
  particularly upset with his deputy Minister and Chief of Staff of the Army, General
  Yousef Mangoush, who he believes has been unable to work with national army ground
  force commander General Khalifa Belgasim Haftar. A very sensitive source added that
  the Benghazi based units of the army, under Haftar's direct command, are currently
  deploying to the area southeast of al-Kufra, along the Sudanese border.)
  4. In the opinion of a sensitive source, Haftar and al Juwali believe that the
  Sudanese military is providing arms and supplies to the pro-Qaddafi forces, under direct
  orders from Sudanese President Omar al Bashir. El-Keib complained to al-Juwali that
  Haftar's forces passed through al-Kufra region during early and mid-February on their
  way to the Sudanese border, however; they did nothing to disarm the local revolutionary
  militias, or stop the fighting between competing tribal groups. In the opinion of this
  individual, Rafter felt that the threat from the pro-Qaddafi forces was greater than that
  posed by the regional and tribal fighting
  5. At the same time, a source with excellent access to the leadership of the
  National Transitional Council (NTC) stated in secret that fighting continues between
  regional, tribal, and religious rivals throughout the Northern/Mediterranean portions of
  the country. This same source added that the ongoing struggle between the Misrata and
  Zintan militias for control of the area west of Tripoli is particularly violent and
  disruptive for the rest of the country. In the capital itself, fighting continues between
  regional groups, the national army, Islamist militias, and criminal street gangs, all of
  whom are very well armed. This individual reports that during mid -February 2012 el-
  Keib and Jalil agreed to address the problem of disaffected former militiamen and their
  families by providing payments of 2,000 Dinars (approximately $1,500) per month to
  the families of fighters who were wounded or killed in the revolution.
  6. In addition the President and Prime Minister instructed Minister of Finance
  Hassan Ziglam to develop an efficient system to provide assistance funds to unemployed
  former fighters. For his part, Ziglam privately expressed concern that previous efforts in
  this regard have met with a high level of fraud. According to the government's best
  estimates, the revolutionary army included approximately 25,000 combat troops, but it
  is difficult to identify those with legitimate claims, as no accurate service records were
  maintained. That said, he stated in private that the government must be seen to take
  some form of direct action, even if money is paid to fraudulent claimants. The fact is,
  according to Ziglam, the NTC is losing control of the country and must give something
  to the veterans of the revolution to slow this process.
  7.(Source Comment: Speaking in strictest confidence, a knowledgeable
  individual stated that al-Juwali is concerned by the possibility that the country may
  deteriorate into a multi-sided civil war involving the regional militias, Islamist forces
  and the national army. At the same time, he acknowledges that the new army has lost
  control of large portions of the southern part of the country, with tribal fighting spilling
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739864
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045152

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739864
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  over into Mali and Chad. According to this source, al-Juwali is also frustrated by the
  slow pace of military and police training promised to the various Libyan national
  security forces by the governments of France and Turkey. He added that, while Turkey
  has received some of the most seriously wound troops for treatment, the lack of
  adequate medical care for veterans inside of Libya remains a major source of conflict
  between the former rebel troops and the NTC government.)
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739864
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045153

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739864
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  CONFIDENTIAL
  February 21, 2012
  For: Hillary
  From: Sid
  Re: Libya politics to control militias
  SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as
  the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.
  1. On February 19, 2012, Libyan President Mustafa Abdul hill and Prime Minister
  Abdurrahirn el-Keib instructed Minister of the Interior Minister Fawzi Abd All and Minister of
  Defense Osama al kwali to move as forcefully as possible to deal with armed conflict between
  the various militias which carried the bulk of fighting during the 2011revolution against former
  dictator Muammar al Qaddafi. According to an extremely sensitive source speaking in secret, el-
  Keib, acting in his role as the head of government, told the two ministers that, if they could not
  stop the fighting and disarm the militias he would be forced to find ministers who can carry out
  his orders All and Juwali each stated privately that, while they would follow orders, they have
  little hope of succeeding in this matter until el-Keib and Jalil gain credibility as the rulers of the
  country. Ali added that, in his opinion, this situation will persist until a new government is
  chosen during the national elections planned for later in 2012
  2 In the opinion of this individual, the Prime Minister is particularly concerned by the
  situation in the Southern portion of the country, where the area defined by the towns of Ghat,
  Sabha, and al Kufra, where fighting between rival tribal and regional militias has been
  exacerbated by the activities of Qaddafi loyalists, and their allies, Taureg tribal fighters. This
  individual added that el-Keib and Jalil agree that the uncertain security situation in this area
  represents a threat to Libya's future stability. They agreed that, at present, if faced with a
  concerted effort by either disaffected militiamen or pro-Qaddafi forces government security
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739864
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045154

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739864
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  forces and the new national army would be unable to protect either Libyan citizens or Western
  businessmen and oil industry workers in the region.
  3.(Source Comment: In the opinion of this individual, el-Keib believes that any attack
  against oil field workers will frighten large Western firms and seriously damage Libya's efforts
  to recover from the revolution. This individual added that al Juwali is particularly upset with his
  deputy Minister and Chief of Staff of the Army, General Yousef Mangoush, who he believes has
  been unable to work with national army ground force commander General Khalifa, Belgasim
  Halter. A very sensitive source added that the Benghazi based units of the army, under Haftar's
  direct command, are currently deploying to the area southeast of al-Kufra, along the Sudanese
  border.)
  4. In the opinion of a sensitive source, Haftar and al Juwali believe that the Sudanese
  military is providing arms and supplies to the pro-Qacklafl forces, under direct orders from
  Sudanese President Ornar al Bashir. El-Keib complained to al-Juwali that Haftar's forces passed
  through al-Kufra region during early and mid-February on their way to the Sudanese border,
  however; they did nothing to disarm the local revolutionary militias, or stop the fighting between
  competing tribal groups. In the opinion of this individual, Ha.fter felt that the threat from the pro-
  Qaddafi forces was greater than that posed by the regional and tribal fighting.
  5. At the same time a source with excellent access to the leadership of the National
  Transitional Council (NTC) stated in secret that fighting continues between regional, tribal, and
  religious rivals throughout the Northern/Mediterranean portions of the country. This same
  source added that the ongoing struggle between the Misrata and Zintan militias for control of the
  area west of Tripoli is particularly violent and disruptive for the rest of the country. In the
  capital itself, fighting continues between regional groups, the national army, Islamist militias,
  and criminal street gangs, all of whom are very well armed. This individual reports that during
  mid-February 2012 el-Keib and hill agreed to address the problem of disaffected former
  militiamen and their families by providing payments of 2,000 Dinars (approximately $1,500) per
  month to the families of fighters who were wounded or killed in the revolution.
  6. In addition the President and Prime Minister instructed Minister of Finance Hassan
  ZigIarn to develop an efficient system to provide assistance funds to unemployed former fighters
  For his part, Ziglarn privately expressed concern that previous efforts in this regard have met
  with a high level of fraud. According to the government's best estimates, the revolutionary army
  included approximately 25,000 combat troops, but it is difficult to identify those with legitimate
  claims, as no accurate service records were maintained. That said he stated in private that the
  government must be seen to take some form of direct action, even if money is paid to fraudulent
  claimants. The fact is, according to Ziglam, the NTC is losing control of the country and must
  give something to the veterans of the revolution to slow this process.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739864
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045155

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739864
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  7. (Source Comment: Speaking in strictest confidence, a knowledgeable individual stated
  that al-Juwali is concerned by the possibility that the country may deteriorate into a multi-sided
  civil war involving the regional militias, Islamist forces and the national army. At the same time,
  he acknowledges that the new army has lost control of large portions of the southern part of the
  country, with tribal fighting spilling over into Mali and Chad. According to this source, al-
  Juwali is also frustrated by the slow pace of military and police training promised to the various
  Libyan national security forces by the governments of France and Turkey. He added that, while
  Turkey has received some of the most seriously wound troops for treatment, the lack of adequate
  medical care for veterans inside of Libya remains a major source of conflict between the former
  rebel troops and the NTC government.)
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739864
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045156



DocNumber: C05739865
MetadataSubject: H: LIBYA, LATEST BENGHAZI INTEL. SID
MetadataTo: sullivanjj@state.gov
MetadataFrom: H
MetadataDateSent: 2012-12-20T05:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH3/DOC_0C05739865/C05739865.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: H: Libya, latest Benghazi intel. Sid
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739865
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
ExtractedBodyText:
  H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>
  Thursday, December 20 2012 1:52 PM
  'sullivanjj@state.gov'
  Fw: H: Libya, latest Benghazi intel. Sid
  hrc memo libya, benghazi, oil 121012,docx
  More info.

RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739865
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  PART B6
  4111•1111111111
  From:
  Sent:
  To:
  Subject
  Attachments:
  H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>
  Thursday, December 20 2012 1:52 PM
  'sullivanjj@state.gov'
  Fw: H: Libya, latest Benghazi intel. Sid
  hrc memo libya, benghazi, oil 121012,docx
  More info.
  From: Sidney Blumenthal [malt°
  Sent: Monday, December 10, 2012 02:56 PM Eastern Standard Time
  To: H
  Subject: H: Libya, latest Benghazi intel. Sid
  B6
  CONFIDENTIAL
  December 10, 2012
  For: Hillary
  From: Sid
  Re: Libya, Benghazi, Oil
  SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Government, as well as the highest levels
  of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.
  a. During early December 2012 Libyan Prime Minister Ali Zidan and President Mohamed
  Magariaf concluded a series of discreet meetings with selected tribal leaders from Eastern Cyrenaica
  region (Barqa in Arabic), after which they agreed that the problem of the growing Barqa federalist
  movement is gaining strength and will again become a major issue in early 2013. At the same time
  National Libyan Army (NLA) Chief of Staff General Youssef al Mangoush warned Zidan that the
  Eastern tribes have rearmed and reequipped in the past three months and are preparing to reassert
  their desire for a degree of autonomy in early 2013. Mangoush also advised that the situation in the
  region between Benghazi and the Egyptian border may become increasingly complicated as Salafist
  fighters from Egypt continue to arrive in Benghazi. Mangoush reported that his staff officers have
  been advised M secret by aids to Egyptian Army Chief of Staff, General Mohammed al-Sissi, that,
  acting under instructions from Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi, military and security forces are
  taking steps to detain or neutralize extreme Salafist para-military groups and that a number of these
  fighters are fleeing to Libya. According to the Libyan commander, these Salafist fighters are
  comfortable in Benghazi, where many of them served with Libyan revolutionary forces during the
  rebellion against former dictator Muammar al Qaddafi.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739865
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045844

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739865
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  2. In the opinion of this individual, Zidan and Magariaf, after consulting with Minister of Oil
  Abdulbari al-Arusi, decided to move forward with a plan dating back to the administration of former
  Oil Minister Abdulrahman Ben Yezza dividing the National Oil Corporatioes (NOC) production and
  exploration divisions into two separate firms. With this in mind, al-Arusi began discussing the matter
  with concerned parties in late November and early December. Included in these discussions were
  meetings with members of the local federalist council in Benghazi and tribal officials from Barqa. In
  these sessions Al-Arusi described a new structure managing all existing oil-related firms„ while
  building new operations and raising funds from investors outside of the country. This firm will be
  divided into two branches, one in Benghazi and one in Tripoli. Al-Arusi added that the cost of this
  project will range between fifty (50) and sixty (6o) billion dinars.
  3.(Source Comment: According to a separate sensitive source, this concept came as a surprise
  to most of the local officials in Tripoli and Benghazi. This individual added that while the Western
  officials continue to have some questions about the matter, the Benghazi/Barqa leaders were, in al-
  Arusi's opinion, positive, if not enthusiastic about the new initiative. According to al-Arusi, doubts on
  either side relate to the mistrust that remains between the two regions, but he is determined to move
  ahead in this matter and is supported by Zidan and Magariaf. According to this source, the president
  and prime minister are convinced that they must deal with this internal East-West issue before they
  can bring a stable security environment to the country, and disarm the remaining independent
  militias in each part of the country. This individual added that in private discussions al-Arusi stated
  that the tentative name for this new oil entity will be the National Corporation for Oil Refining and
  Petrochemicals Industry, with its headquarters in Tripoli, and substantive offices in Benghazi. Like
  the NOC, the new firm will fall under the Ministry of Oil and Gas.)
  4. In addition, this sensitive source noted that Al-Arusi is also discussing the creation of a
  company specializing in mechanical construction related to the oil and gas industry. This firm would
  be based in Benghazi. The minister stated in private that he believes such a company can be
  developed to compete with international firms in this very complex field. He also believes that such a
  firm must be managed by experienced, scientifically-qualified Libyans, with reputations for honesty.
  He noted that until as such a cadre is developed it may be desirable to use experts from Egypt to fill
  the immediate needs of the firm. Al-Arusi believes this firm should have offices in all of the oil fields
  and loading facilities. The minister also plans to establish an office in Benghazi, similar to Tripoli's oil
  institute, a facility that will train students looking to pursue oil-related studies. In addition, al-Arusi is
  making plans to reopen the Higher Petroleum Institute in Tobruk, which was closed by Qaddafi at the
  beginning of the revolution. He told a sensitive source that he expects the Tobruk institute to produce
  thousands of skilled engineers to provide Libyan managers for the future operation of the oil sector.
  Once the final details are set the Zidan regime will submit the entire package for parliamentary
  approval and financing
  6. (Source Comment: Advisors to Magariaf state in confidence that, in their opinion this
  comprehensive plan for the oil industry will face opposition from individuals with links to foreign oil
  firms, primarily foreign trained engineers who hope to see greater privatization in the oil an oil
  services industries in the wake of the revolution. According to a particularly sensitive source, Zidan is
  particularly concerned about this possibility, noting that these individuals see this issue in strictly
  business terms, not considering the political issues, and the East — West situation, that are all part of
  the overall picture in Libya. At present al-Arusi believes that foreign oil firms remain concerned
  about the unsettled security situation throughout Libya, however; he is convinced that this new plan
  will help address this situation. At present, he noted that the large Italian oil firm ENT is stepping up
  its operations throughout Libya, and, with the support of the Italian Government, will continue to
  increase its investment in Libya in an effort to get ahead of the other foreign firms concerned in
  Libya.)
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739865
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045845



DocNumber: C05739866
MetadataSubject: H: LIBYA, INTEL, INTERNAL CONFLICT OVER MILITIAS. SID
MetadataTo: H
MetadataFrom: Sullivan, Jacob J
MetadataDateSent: 2012-02-22T05:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH1/DOC_0C05739866/C05739866.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739866
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
ExtractedBodyText:
  Will do.
  Sullivan, Jacob J <Sullivanii@state.gov›
  Wednesday, February 22, 2012 1215 AM
  Re: Fwd: H: Libya, intel, internal conflict over militias, Sid
  Prom: H [rnailto:HDR226clintonemailtom]
  Sent: Tuesday, February 21, 2012 11:14 PM
  To: Sullivan, Jacob
  Subject: Fwd: H: Libya, Intel, internal conflict over militias. Ski
  Pls review and forward as appropriate.
  Sent from my iPad
  Begin forwarded message:

RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739866
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  PART B6
  From:
  Sent:
  To:
  Subject:
  Will do.
  Sullivan, Jacob J <Sullivanii@state.gov›
  Wednesday, February 22, 2012 1215 AM
  Re: Fwd: H: Libya, intel, internal conflict over militias, Sid
  Prom: H [rnailto:HDR226clintonemailtom]
  Sent: Tuesday, February 21, 2012 11:14 PM
  To: Sullivan, Jacob
  Subject: Fwd: H: Libya, Intel, internal conflict over militias. Ski
  Pls review and forward as appropriate.
  Sent from my iPad
  Begin forwarded message:
  From:'
  Date: February 21, 2012 10:04:57 PM EST
  To H <HDR22Zclintotiemailscom>
  Subject H: Libya, intel, internal conflict over militias. Sid
  CONFIDENTIAL
  February 21, 2012
  For: Hillary
  From: Sid
  Re: Libya politics to control militias
  SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as
  well as the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and
  security services.
  1. On February 19, 2012, Libyan President Ylustafa Abdul Mil and Prime
  Minister Abdurrahim el-Keib instructed Minister of the Interior Minister Fawzi Abd Ali
  and Minister of Defense Osama al Juwali to move as forcefully as possible to deal with
  armed conflict between the various militias which carried the bulk of fighting during the
  20nrevolution against former dictator Muammar al Qaddafl. According to an
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739866
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045157
  B6

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739866
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  extremely sensitive source speaking in secret, el-Keib, acting in his role as the head of
  government, told the two ministers that, if they could not stop the fighting and disarm
  the militias he would be forced to find ministers who can carry out his orders. Ali and
  Juwali each stated privately that, while they would follow orders, they have little hope of
  succeeding in this matter until el-Keib and Jalil gain credibility as the rulers of the
  country. Ali added that, in his opinion, this situation will persist until a new
  government is chosen during the national elections planned for later in 2012.
  2. In the opinion of this individual, the Prime Minister is particularly concerned
  by the situation in the Southern portion of the country, where the area defined by the
  towns of Ghat, Sabha, and al Kufra, where fighting between rival tribal and regional
  militias has been exacerbated by the activities of Qaddafi loyalists, and their allies,
  Taureg tribal fighters. This individual added that el-Keib and Jalil agree that the
  uncertain security situation in this area represents a threat to Libya's future stability.
  They agreed that, at present, if faced with a concerted effort by either disaffected
  militiamen or pro-Qaddafi forces government security forces and the new national army
  would be unable to protect either Libyan citizens or Western businessmen and oil
  industry workers in the region.
  3.(Source Comment: In the opinion of this individual, el-Keib believes that any
  attack against oil field workers will frighten large Western firms and seriously damage
  Libya's efforts to recover from the revolution. This individual added that al Juwali is
  particularly upset with his deputy Minister and Chief of Staff of the Army, General
  Yousef Mangoush, who he believes has been unable to work with national army ground
  force commander General Khalifa Belqasim Haftar. A very sensitive source added that
  the Benghazi based units of the army, under Haftar's direct command, are currently
  deploying to the area southeast of al-Kufra, along the Sudanese border.)
  4. In the opinion of a sensitive source, Haftar and al Juwali believe that the
  Sudanese military is providing arms and supplies to the pro-Qaddafi forces, under direct
  orders from Sudanese President Omar al Bashir. El-Keib complained to al-Juwali that
  Haftar's forces passed through al-Kufra region during early and mid-February on their
  way to the Sudanese border, however; they did nothing to disarm the local revolutionary
  militias, or stop the fighting between competing tribal groups. In the opinion of this
  individual, Hafter felt that the threat from the pro-Qaddafi forces was greater than that
  posed by the regional and tribal fighting.
  5. At the same time, a source with excellent access to the leadership of the
  National Transitional Council (NTC) stated in secret that fighting continues between
  regional, tribal, and religious rivals throughout the Northern/Mediterranean portions of
  the country. This same source added that the ongoing struggle between the Misrata and
  Zintan militias for control of the area west of Tripoli is particularly violent and
  disruptive for the rest of the country. In the capital itself, fighting continues between
  regional groups, the national army, Islamist militias, and criminal street gangs, all of
  whom are very well armed. This individual reports that during mid-February 2012 el-
  Keib and Jalil agreed to address the problem of disaffected former militiamen and their
  families by providing payments of 2,000 Dinars (approximately $1,500) per month to
  the families of fighters who were wounded or killed in the revolution.
  6. In addition the President and Prime Minister instructed Minister of Finance
  Hassan Ziglam to develop an efficient system to provide assistance funds to unemployed
  former fighters. For his part, Ziglam privately expressed concern that previous efforts in
  this regard have met with a high level of fraud. According to the government's best
  estimates, the revolutionary army included approximately 25,000 combat troops, but it
  is difficult to identify those with legitimate claims, as no accurate service records were
  maintained. That said, he stated in private that the government must be seen to take
  some form of direct action, even if money is paid to fraudulent claimants. The fact is,
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739866
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045158

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739866
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  according to Ziglam, the NTC is losing control of the country and must give something
  to the veterans of the revolution to slow this process.
  7.(Source Comment: Speaking in strictest confidence, a knowledgeable
  individual stated that al-Juwali is concerned by the possibility that the country may
  deteriorate into a multi-sided civil war involving the regional militias, Islamist forces
  and the national army. At the same time, he acknowledges that the new army has lost
  control of large portions of the southern part of the country, with tribal fighting spilling
  over into Mali and Chad. According to this source, al-Juwali is also frustrated by the
  slow pace of military and police training promised to the various Libyan national
  security forces by the governments of France and Turkey. He added that, while Turkey
  has received some of the most seriously wound troops for treatment, the lack of
  adequate medical care for veterans inside of Libya remains a major source of conflict
  between the former rebel troops and the N'TC government)
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739866
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045159



DocNumber: C05739867
MetadataSubject: THANK YOU
MetadataTo: H
MetadataFrom: Reines, Philippe I
MetadataDateSent: 2012-12-24T05:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH3/DOC_0C05739867/C05739867.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: Fw: Thank You
ExtractedFrom: Reines, Philippe) <reinesp@state.gov>
ExtractedDateSent: Monday, December 24, 2012 8:39 AM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739867
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN FULL
RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739867
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  FULL
  From: Reines, Philippe) <reinesp@state.gov>
  Sent: Monday, December 24, 2012 8:39 AM
  To:
  Subject: Fw: Thank You
  From: Secretary Clinton [malito:SMSGS@state.gov]
  Sent: Friday, December 21, 2012 06:18 PM
  Subject: Thank You
  THE SECRETARY OF STATE
  WASHINGTON
  Dear Colleagues —
  I wanted to reach out to you directly after this challenging week, and express my gratitude for everything you
  do to advance our nation's interests and values. That is how we keep faith with those we serve and honor
  those we've lost. Even after four years, I continue to be amazed by your dedication, energy, and talent. It is a
  privilege to be part of your team.
  I also want to thank everyone who is working so hard to provide all our people and posts with the best
  possible leadership, security and support. As Deputy Secretaries Burns and Nides told Congress on Thursday,
  our colleagues in Diplomatic Security, Near Eastern Affairs, and in every bureau across the Department, at
  home and abroad, get it right countless times a day, for years on end, in some of the toughest circumstances
  imaginable. We need to learn from the tragedy in Benghazi, and make every possible improvement -- and we
  will. We also need to recognize the extraordinary service of our security professionals. They are courageous
  patriots and consummate professionals. And like you, I trust them with my life.
  I want to thank Ambassador Pickering, Admiral Mullen, and all the members of the Accountability Review
  Board. Their report takes a clear-eyed look at serious and systemic problems that we are already working to
  fix. I have accepted every one of the Board's recommendations. I asked the Deputy Secretary for
  Management and Resources to spearhead the effort to implement them, and to take those additional steps
  above and beyond those recommendations that make sense and make us stronger. To do this well, we need
  your help. All of us have to work together to take these reforms to heart and build on and improve the way
  we do business.
  I am determined to leave the State Department and USAID stronger, safer, and more secure than I found
  them. I owe that to each of you. And I am delighted that President Obama has chosen Senator John Kerry to
  continue that work. Earlier today, I spoke with John and congratulated him on his nomination to be the next
  Secretary of State. I have been privileged to know him for many years, and to call him a friend, colleague, and
  partner. He is the son of a career Foreign Service Officer, a decorated war hero, and an accomplished
  statesman. I know that he shares our deep commitment to diplomacy and development. You deserve the
  highest caliber leadership, and that is exactly what you'll get with Senator Kerry.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739867
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045846

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739867
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  It has been one of the great honors of my life to serve with you over the past four years. We have a lot more
  to do together in the coming days and weeks. So I hope you have a wonderful holiday and a joyous new year
  Sincerely,
  Hillary Rodham Clinton
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739867
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045847



DocNumber: C05739868
MetadataSubject: FROM HRC FRIEND
MetadataTo: H
MetadataFrom: Sullivan, Jacob J
MetadataDateSent: 2012-02-24T05:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH1/DOC_0C05739868/C05739868.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: Fvic From HRC friend
ExtractedFrom: Sullivan, Jacob I <Sullivanii@state.gov>
ExtractedDateSent: Friday, February 24, 2012 5:24 AM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739868
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN FULL
ExtractedBodyText: Latest from Gene.
RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739868
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  FULL
  From: Sullivan, Jacob I <Sullivanii@state.gov>
  Sent: Friday, February 24, 2012 5:24 AM
  To:
  Subject: Fvic From HRC friend
  Latest from Gene.
  Original Message ----
  From: Cretz, Gene A
  Sent: Friday, February 24, 2012 01:13 AM
  To Sullivan, Jacob 1; Feltrnan, Jeffrey D
  Subject: RE: From HRC friend
  am skeptical that Jalil and al-keeb are capable either by power or by character to deal with the shortcomings of their
  MinDef and Minint in this way. The latter 2 are both very powerful by virtue of their Ziritan and lvlisrata roots
  respectively, and any effort to remove them would have seriousblowback. MiniNt Fawzi who I saw the other day is
  clearly way ahead of his colleague in getting the thuwar into the process of registration, the first step hopefully toward
  DDR. I think everybody here is aware now how difficult the disarming of these militias, which have become de facto real
  institutions in and of themselves. It is naieve to think they can be dissolved by executive fiat Some positive movement-
  Jordanians preparing to accept first tranche of 1500 for police training.
  There is concern here that continuing rivalries among the militias remains dangerous from the perspective of the havoc
  they can wreak with their firepower and their continued control of select turf. At the end of the day, I think everybody is
  coming to the conclusion that the elections will take place in the context of militia control. We hope that a program can
  be devised to keep them acting responsibly toward the outcome of the election, especially viz the obligations they may
  well be asked to undertake to keep elections free, and fair and devoid of violence. Always danger of continuing
  skirmishes but Armageddon predictions a bit overstated.
  We are all worried about the situation in Kufra and the clashes between the Arab alZwai tribe and the African tribe's the
  Tebu. This is again a legacy of the Qadhafi era who played on these divisions to keep himself in control. The
  government believes that the Tebu are being aided from al_Qadhafi elements and perhaps government supporters in
  Sudan to undermine the TNC. There are some disturbing signs that in fact the TNC may be supporting the dispatch of
  select militias to deploy down there maybe rpt maybe to "resolve" this ethnic problem as the situation in Tewarga was
  resolved-i.e., "ethnic cleansing" --We are only at the very beginning stages of seeing whether there is credible evidence
  on this score--so please rpt please don't raise any flags about it. It would be explosive.1 will keep you informed about any
  info we develop.
  No surprise about Heftat-he is extremely angry he lost out on the COS spot so his efforts to undermine the new COS
  Mangoosh would be fully in line with his character to be big cheese.
  The war wounded is a national tragedy. The former group allowed everybody to go abroad and they did to the tune of
  800 million dollars. 50,000 Libyans abroad now 15 percent receiving medical treatment Who do you think the others
  are? Relatives, frauds, and those who snuck out to get botox and tummy tucks. Senator McCain will rail about our
  refusal to take thousands of them to the States but the process has been so bungled I think we did as much as we could
  considering.
  Original Message
  From: Sullivan, Jacob
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739868
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045160

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739868
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  Sent: Wednesday, February 22, 2012 9:11 AM
  To: Feltman, Jeffrey 0; Cretz, Gene A
  Subject: From HRC friend
  Here is the latest on Libya. As always, let me know your thoughts.
  SOURCE:
  Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of European
  Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.
  1.
  On February 19, 2012, Libyan President Mustafa Abdul Ali! and Prime Minister Abdurrahim el-Keib instructed Minister
  of the Interior Minister Fawzi Abd Ali and Minister of Defense Osama at Juwali to move as forcefully as possible to deal
  with armed conflict between the various militias which carried the bulk of fighting during the 2011revolution against
  former dictator Muammar al Qaddafi.
  According to an extremely sensitive source speaking in secret, el-Keib, acting in his role as the head of government, told
  the two ministers that if they could not stop the fighting and disarm the militias he would be forced to find ministers
  who can carry out his orders.
  Ali and Juwali each stated privately that, while they would follow orders, they have little hope of succeeding in this
  matter until el-Kelb and Jalil gain credibility as the rulers of the country.
  Ali added that, in his opinion, this situation will persist until a new government is chosen during the national elections
  planned for later in 2012.
  2.
  In the opinion of this individual, the Prime Minister is particularly concerned by the situation in the Southern portion of
  the country, where the area defined by the towns of Ghat, Sabha, and al Kufra, where fighting between rival tribal and
  regional militias has been exacerbated by the activities of
  Qaddafi loyalists, and their allies? Taureg tribal fighters.
  This individual added that el-Keib and Jaill agree that the uncertain security situation in this area represents a threat to
  Libya's future stability.
  They agreed that, at present, iffaced with a concerted effort by either disaffected militiamen or pro-Qaddafi forces
  government security forces and the new national army would be unable to protect either Libyan citizens or Western
  businessmen and oil industry workers in the region.
  3.(Source Comment:
  In the opinion of this individual, el-Keib believes that any attack against oil field workers will frighten large Western
  firms and seriously damage Libya's efforts to recover from the revolution.
  This individual added that al Juwali is particularly upset with his deputy Minister and Chief of Staff of the Army, General
  Yousef Mangoush, who he believes has been unable to work with national army ground force commander General
  Khalifa Belqasim Hefter.
  A very sensitive source added that the Benghazi based units of the army, under Haftar's direct command, are currently
  deploying to the area southeast of al-Kufra, along the Sudanese border.)
  4.
  In the opinion of a sensitive source, Haftar and at Aswan believe that the Sudanese military is providing arms and
  supplies to the pro-Qaddafi forces, under direct orders from Sudanese President Omar al Bashir.
  El-Keib complained to al-Juevall that Haftar's forces passed through al-Kufra region during early and mid-February on
  their way to the Sudanese border, however; they did nothing to disarm the local revolutionary militias, or stop the
  fighting between competing tribal groups.
  In the opinion of this individual, Hefter felt that the threat from the pro-Qaddafi forces was greater than that posed by
  the regional and tribal fighting.
  5.
  At the same time, a source with excellent access to the leadership of the National Transitional Council (NTC) stated in
  secret that fighting continues between regional, tribal, and religious rivals throughout the Northern/Mediterranean
  portions of the country.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739868
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045161

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739868
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  This same source added that the ongoing struggle between the Misrata and Zintan militias for control of the area west
  of Tripoli is particularly violent and disruptive for the rest of the country.
  In the capital itself, fighting continues between regional groups, the national army, Islamist militias, and criminal street
  gangs, all of whom are very well armed.
  This individual reports that during mid-February 2012 ei-Keib and Jatil agreed to address the problem of disaffected
  former militiamen and their families by providing payments of 2,000 Dinars (approximately $1,500) per month to the
  families of fighters who were wounded or killed in the revolution.
  6.
  In addition the President and Prime Minister instructed Minister of Finance Hassan Ziglam to develop an efficient
  system to provide assistance funds to unemployed former fighters.
  For his part, Ziglarri privately expressed concern that previous efforts in this regard have met with a high level of fraud.
  According to the government's best estimates, the revolutionary army included approximately 25,000 combat troops,
  but it is difficult to identify those with legitimate claims, as no accurate service records were maintained.
  That said, he stated in private that the government must be seen to take some form of direct action, even If money is
  paid to fraudulent claimants.
  The fact Is, according to Ziglam, the NTC Is losing control of the country and must give something to the veterans of the
  revolution to slow this process.
  7.(Source Comment: Speaking in strictest confidence, a knowledgeable individual stated that al-Juwali is
  concerned by the possibility that the country may deteriorate into a multi-sided civil war involving the regional militias,
  Islamist forces and the national army.
  At the same time, he acknowledges that the new army has lost control of large portions of the southern part of the
  country, with tribal fighting spilling over into Mali and Chad.
  According to this source, al-Juwali is also frustrated by the slow pace of military and police training promised to the
  various Libyan national security forces by the governments of France and Turkey.
  He added that, while Turkey has received some of the most seriously wound troops for treatment, the lack of
  adequate medical care for veterans inside of Libya remains a major source of conflict between the former rebel troops
  and the Nit government.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739868
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045162



DocNumber: C05739869
MetadataSubject: FROM HRC FRIEND
MetadataTo: Russorv@state.gov
MetadataFrom: H
MetadataDateSent: 2012-02-28T05:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH1/DOC_0C05739869/C05739869.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: Fw: From HRC friend
ExtractedTo: 'Russorv@state.gov'
ExtractedFrom: H <hrod17@clintonernail.com>
ExtractedDateSent: Tuesday, February 28, 2012 8:29 AM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739869
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN FULL
ExtractedBodyText:
  Pls print.
  --

RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739869
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE
  IN FULL
  From: H <hrod17@clintonernail.com>
  Sent: Tuesday, February 28, 2012 8:29 AM
  To: 'Russorv@state.gov'
  Subject Fw: From HRC friend
  Pls print.
  -- Original Message --
  From: Sullivan, Jacob I (mailto:Sullivardi@state.govi
  Sent: Friday, February 24, 2012 05:24 AM
  To: H
  Subject: Fw: From HRC friend
  Latest from Gene.
  --- Original Message ----
  From: Cretz, Gene A
  Sent Friday, February 24, 2012 01:13 AM
  To Sullivan, Jacob .1; Feltman, Jeffrey D
  Subject RE: From HRC friend
  I am skeptical that Jalii and al-keeb are capable either by power or by character to deal with the shortcomings of their
  MinDef and Minint in this way. The latter 2 are both very powerful by virtue of their Zintan and Misrata roots
  respectively, and any effort to remove them would have seriousblowback. MiniNt Fawzi who I saw the other day is
  dearly way ahead of his colleague in getting the thuwar into the process of registration, the first step hopefully toward
  DDR. I think everybody here is aware now how difficult the disarming of these militias, which have become de facto real
  institutions in and of themselves. It is naieve to think they can be dissolved by executive fiat. Some positive movement
  Jordanians preparing to accept first tranche of 1500 for police training.
  There is concern here that continuing rivalries among the militias remains dangerous from the perspective of the havoc
  they can wreak with their firepower and their continued control of select turf. At the end of the day, I think everybody is
  coming to the conclusion that the elections will take place in the context of militia control. We hope that a program can
  be devised to keep them acting responsibly toward the outcome of the election, especially viz the obligations they may
  well be asked to undertake to keep elections free, and fair and devoid of violence. Always danger of continuing
  skirmishes but Armageddon predictions a bit overstated.
  We are all worried about the situation in Kufra and the clashes between the Arab alZwai tribe and the African tribals the
  Tebu. This is again a legacy of the Qadhafi era who played on these divisions to keep himself in control. The
  government believes that the Tebu are being aided from al_Qadhafi elements and perhaps government supporters in
  Sudan to undermine the TNC. There are some disturbing signs that in fact the INC may be supporting the dispatch of
  select militias to deploy down there maybe rpt maybe to "resolve" this ethnic problem as the situation in Tewarga was
  resolved e, "ethnic cleansing" —We are only at the very beginning stages of seeing whether there is credible evidence
  on this score—so please rpt please don't raise any flags about it It would be explosive] will keep you informed about any
  info we develop.
  No surprise about Heftar-he is extremely angry he lost out on the COS spot so his efforts to undermine the new COS
  Marv:posh would be fully in line with his character to be big cheese.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739869
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045163

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739869
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  The war wounded is a national tragedy. The former group allowed everybody to go abroad and they did to the tune of
  800 million dollars. 50,000 Libyans abroad now-15 percent receiving medical treatment. Who do you think the others
  are? Relatives, frauds, and those who snuck out to get botox and tummy tucks. Senator McCain will rail about our
  refusal to take thousands of them to the States but the process has been so bungled I think we did as much as we could
  considering.
  ----Original Message---
  From: Sullivan, Jacob
  Sent: Wednesday, February 22, 2012 9:11 AM
  To: Feltman, Jeffrey D; Cretz, Gene A
  Subject: From HRC friend
  Here is the latest on Libya. As always, let me know your thoughts.
  SOURCE:
  Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of European
  Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.
  1.
  On February 19, 2012, Libyan President Mustafa Abdul JAI and Prime Minister Abdurrahim el-Keib instructed Minister
  of the Interior Minister Fawzi Abd All and Minister of Defense °same al Juwali to move as forcefully as possible to deal
  with armed conflict between the various militias which carried the bulk of fighting during the 2011revolution against
  former dictator Muammar at Qaddafi.
  According to an extremely sensitive source speaking in secret, el-Keib, acting in his role as the head of government, told
  the two ministers that, if they could not stop the fighting and disarm the militias he would be forced to find ministers
  who can carry out his orders.
  All and Aiwa each stated privately that, while they would follow orders, they have little hope of succeeding in this
  matter until el-Keib and ialil gain credibility as the rulers of the country.
  All added that, in his opinion, this situation will persist until a new government is chosen during the national elections
  planned for later in 2012.
  2.
  In the opinion of this individual, the Prime Minister is particularly concerned by the situation in the Southern portion of
  the country, where the area defined by the towns of Ghat, Sabha, and al Kufra, where fighting between rival tribal and
  regional militias has been exacerbated by the activities of
  Qaddafi loyalists, and their allies, Taureg tribal fighters.
  This individual added that el-Keib and Jalil agree that the uncertain security situation in this area represents a threat to
  Libya's future stability.
  They agreed that, at present, if faced with a concerted effort by either disaffected militiamen or pro-Qaddafi forces
  government security forces and the new national army would be unable to protect either Libyan citizens or Western
  businessmen and oil industry workers in the region.
  3.(Source Comment:
  In the opinion of this individual, el-Keib believes that any attack against oil field workers will frighten large Western
  firms and seriously damage Libya's efforts to recover from the revolution.
  This individual added that al Juwali is particularly upset with his deputy Minister and Chief of Staff of the Army, General
  Yousef Mangoush, who he believes has been unable to work with national army ground force commander General
  Khalifa Belqasim Hefter.
  A very sensitive source added that the Benghazi based units of the army, under Haftar's direct command, are currently
  deploying to the area southeast of al-Kufra, along the Sudanese border.)
  4.
  In the opinion of a sensitive source, Haftar and at Juwali believe that the Sudanese military is providing arms and
  supplies to the pro-Qaddafi forces, under direct orders from Sudanese President Omar al I3ashir.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739869
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045164

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739869
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  El-Keib complained to aleitiwali that Hefter's forces passed through al-Kufra region during early and mid-February on
  their way to the Sudanese border, however; they did nothing to disarm the local revolutionary militias, or stop the
  fighting between competing tribal groups.
  In the opinion of this individual, Hefter felt that the threat from the pro-Qaddafi forces was greater than that posed by
  the regional and tribal fighting.
  5.
  At the same time, a source with excellent access to the leadership of the National Transitional Council (NTC) stated in
  secret that fighting continues between regional, tribal, and religious rivals throughout the Northern/Mediterranean
  portions of the country.
  This same source added that the ongoing struggle between the Misrata and Zintan militias for control of the area west
  of Tripoli is particularly violent and disruptive for the rest of the country.
  in the capital itself, fighting continues between regional groups, the national army, Islamist militias, and criminal street
  gangs, all of whom are very well armed.
  This individual reports that during mid-February 2012 el-Keib and ialil agreed to address the problem of disaffected
  former militiamen and their families by providing payments of 2,000 Dinars (approximately $1,500) per month to the
  families of fighters who were wounded or killed in the revolution.
  6.
  In addition the President and Prime Minister instructed Minister of Finance Hassan Ziglarn to develop an efficient
  system to provide assistance funds to unemployed former fighters.
  For his part, Ziglam privately expressed concern that previous efforts in this regard have met with a high level of fraud.
  According to the government's best estimates, the revolutionary army included approximately 25,000 combat troops,
  but it is difficult to identify those with legitimate claims, as no accurate service records were maintained.
  That said, he stated in private that the government must be seen to take some form of direct action, even if money is
  paid to fraudulent claimants.
  The fact is, according to Ziglam, the NTC is losing control of the country and must give something to the veterans of the
  revolution to slow this process.
  7.(Source Comment; Speaking in strictest confidence, a knowledgeable individual stated that al-Juwali is
  concerned by the possibility that the country may deteriorate into a multi-sided civil war involving the regional militias,
  Islamist forces and the national army.
  At the same time, he acknowledges that the new army has lost control of large portions of the southern part of the
  country, with tribal fighting spilling over into Mali and Chad.
  According to this source, al-Juwali is also frustrated by the slow pace of military and police training promised to the
  various Libyan national security forces by the governments of France and Turkey.
  He added that, while Turkey has received some of the most seriously wound troops for treatment, the lack of
  adequate medical care for veterans inside of Libya remains a major source of conflict between the former rebel troops
  and the NTC government.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739869
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045165



DocNumber: C05739870
MetadataSubject: H: FRANCE & UK BEHIND LIBYA BREAKUP. SID
MetadataTo: sullivanjj@state.gov
MetadataFrom: H
MetadataDateSent: 2012-03-09T05:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH1/DOC_0C05739870/C05739870.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: H: France & UK behind Libya breakup. Sid
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739870
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
ExtractedBodyText:
  H <hrod17@clintonemailcom>
  Friday, March 9, 2012 7:40 AM
  'sullivanjj@state.gov'
  Fw: H: France 8t UK behind Libya breakup. Sid
  hrc libya breakup.france8tuk behind split 030812.docx
  This one strains credulity. What do you think?

RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739870
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  PART B6
  From:
  Sent:
  To:
  Subject
  Attachments:
  H <hrod17@clintonemailcom>
  Friday, March 9, 2012 7:40 AM
  'sullivanjj@state.gov'
  Fw: H: France 8t UK behind Libya breakup. Sid
  hrc libya breakup.france8tuk behind split 030812.docx
  This one strains credulity. What do you think?
  From:
  Sent: Thursday, March 08, 2012 06:50 PM
  To: H
  Subject: H: France & UK behind Libya breakup. Sid
  CONFIDENTIAL
  March 8, 2012
  For: Hillary
  From: Sid
  Re: France & UK behind Libya breakup
  SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of
  European Governments, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and Western Intelligence and security services
  1. During the period between mid-January 2012 to March 2012 officers of the a French General Directorate for
  External Security ( Direction Generale de la Securite Exterieure Dcsp, and the British Secret Intelligence Service
  (SIS—Ml-8) activated longstanding contacts with tribal and civic leaders in Eastern Libya, in an effort to encourage them
  to establish a semi-autonomous zone in the historic province of Cyrenaica (Barge in Arabic). According to extremely
  knowledgeable sources, this effort was initiated by advisors to French President Nicholas Sarkozy after complaints from
  concerned French business leaders that the new Libyan Government was not rewarding appropriately French firms for the
  leading role France played in supporting the 2011 revolution against former Dictator Muammar al Qaddafi. SIS joined in
  this effort at the instruction of the office of Prime Minister David Cameron. This highly confidential effort comes in
  response to the inability of the National Transitional Council (NTC) government in Tripoli to organize the country
  effectively and deal with Western business interests in an effective and efficient manner.
  2. The French and British business and intelligence officials believe that a semi-autonomous regime in the
  Eastern city of Benghazi will be able to organize business opportunities in that region. This in turn will allow these
  Western firms to initiate new business projects. These same officials believe that there is also reduced threat from
  Islamist militias in the East. According to a knowledgeable source, French officials believe that this situation is the natural
  result of el-Keib's failure to organize the country and disarm the ethnic and regional militias who did the majority of the
  fighting against Qaddafi's forces during the revolution.
  3. (Source Comment: In the opinion of a very sensitive source, the French Government and business leaders
  actually expected to receive thirty five (35) per cent of new economic development in Libya after the fall of Qaddafi. Like
  many Western businessmen, these French officials made informal agreements with former Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril
  and his advisors, only to see these agreements ignored or delayed when Abdurrahim el-Keib became head of government
  in October 2011. In their opinion, once el-Keib moved the government from the Eastern city of Benghazi to the national
  capital at Tripoli, the government became inefficient and inaccessible. These individuals also believe that the
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739870
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045166
  B6

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739870
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  appointment of Minister of Oil Abduirahman Ben Yezza, who was a long time official of the Italian oil Company (EN!), was
  a factor. According to these sources, the bulk of ENI's oil fields are in the Western part of Libya, and Ben Yezza focused
  his attentions on that region, while failing to effectively organize new business East of Benghazi. These same officials
  state that the influences of the Western militias, particularly those from the Zintan region, have weakened the influence of
  the Eastern Elders.)
  4. An extremely sensitive source stated that the DGSE and SIS intend to control the move toward a semi-
  autonomous state under a federal system, However, they have been surprised by el-Keites intention, expressed both in
  public and in secret meetings with Minister of Defense Ousama al JUWali, a native of Zintan, to use force to hold the
  country together. El-Keth is also committed to Ben Yezza, although he is frustrated by the chaotic situation in Tripoli. This
  atmosphere affects new business for the most part and has been extremely irritating for businessmen from France and
  other Western countries.
  5, (Source Comment: in the opinion of a well placed source with access to the former royal family (al Senussi),
  while these Western officials are focused on working around the chaotic business situation, they are risking a civil war,
  failing to reci !nized the longstanding and complicated relationship between the Eastern and Western parts of the country.
  Qaddafi, as an absolute dictator, suppressed these differences, which have reemerged with his defeat and death. In
  addition, el-Keib is talking to old acquaintances in the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, in an effort to apply their influence to
  the Eastern tribal Eiders, and help hold the country together.)
  A
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739870
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045167

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739870
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  CONFIDENTIAL
  March 8, 2012
  For: Hillary
  From: Sid
  Re: France & UK behind Libya breakup
  SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as
  the highest levels of European Governments, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and Western
  Intelligence and security services.
  1. During the period between mid-January 2012 to March 2012 officers of the a French
  General Directorate for External Security ( Direction Generale de la Securite Exterieure --
  DGSE), and the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS--MI-6) activated long standing contacts
  with tribal and civic leaders in Eastern Libya, in an effort to encourage them to establish a semi-
  autonomous zone in the historic province of Cyrenaica (Barqa in Arabic). According to
  extremely knowledgeable sources, this effort was initiated by advisors to French President
  Nicholas Sarkozy after complaints from concerned French business leaders that the new Libyan
  Government was not rewarding appropriately French firms for the leading role France played in
  supporting the 2011 revolution against former Dictator Muammar al Qaddafi. SIS joined in this
  effort at the instruction of the office of Prime Minister David Cameron. This highly confidential
  effort comes in response to the inability of the National Transitional Council (NTC) government
  in Tripoli to organize the country effectively and deal with Western business interests in an
  effective and efficient manner.
  2. The French and British business and intelligence officials believe that a semi-
  autonomous regime in the Eastern city of Benghazi will be able to organize business
  opportunities in that region. This in turn will allow these Western firms to initiate new business
  projects. These same officials believe that there is also reduced threat from Islamist militias in
  the East. According to a knowledgeable source, French officials believe that this situation is the
  natural result of el-Keib's failure to organize the country and disarm the ethnic and regional
  militias who did the majority of the fighting against Qaddafi's forces during the revolution.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739870
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045168

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739870
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  3. (Source Comment: In the opinion of a very sensitive source, the French Government
  and business leaders actually expected to receive thirty five (35) per cent of new economic
  development in Libya after the fall of Qaddafi. Like many Western businessmen, these French
  officials made informal agreements with former Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril and his
  advisors, only to see these agreements ignored or delayed when Abdurrahim el-Keib became
  head of government in October 2011. In their opinion, once el-Keib moved the government
  from the Eastern city of Benghazi to the national capital at Tripoli, the government became
  inefficient and inaccessible. These individuals also believe that the appointment of Minister of
  Oil Abdulrahman Ben Yezza, who was a long time official of the Italian Oil Company (END,
  was a factor. According to these sources, the bulk of ENI's oil fields are in the Western part of
  Libya, and Ben Yezza focused his attentions on that region, while failing to effectively organize
  new business East of Benghazi. These same officials state that the influences of the Western
  militias, particularly those from the Zintan region, have weakened the influence of the Eastern
  Elders.)
  4. An extremely sensitive source stated that the DGSE and SIS intend to control the
  move toward a semi-autonomous state under a federal system. However, they have been
  surprised by el-Keib's intention, expressed both in public and in secret meetings with Minister of
  Defense Ousama al Juwali, a native of Zintan, to use force to hold the country together. El-Keib
  is also committed to Ben Yezza, although he is frustrated by the chaotic situation in Tripoli. This
  atmosphere affects new business for the most part and has been extremely irritating for
  businessmen from France and other Western countries
  5. (Source Comment: In the opinion of a well placed source with access to the former
  royal family (al Senussi), while these Western officials are focused on working around the
  chaotic business situation, they are risking a civil war, failing to recognized the longstanding and
  complicated relationship between the Eastern and Western parts of the country. Qaddafi, as an
  absolute dictator, suppressed these differences, which have reemerged with his defeat and death.
  In addition, el-Keib is talking to old acquaintances in the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, in an
  effort to apply their influence to the Eastern tribal Elders, and help hold the country together.)
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739870
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045169



DocNumber: C05739872
MetadataSubject: H: FRANCE & UK BEHIND LIBYA BREAKUP. SID
MetadataTo: H
MetadataFrom: Sullivan, Jacob J
MetadataDateSent: 2012-03-09T05:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH1/DOC_0C05739872/C05739872.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: RE: H: France & UK behind Libya breakup. Sid
ExtractedFrom: Sullivan, JacobJ <Sullivann@state.gov>
ExtractedDateSent: Friday, March 9, 2012 9:21 AM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739872
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
ExtractedBodyText:
  Definitely. I can share around if you like, but it seems like a thin conspiracy theory.
  From H [malito:HDR220dintonemall.com]
  Sent: Friday, March 09, 2012 7:40 AM
  To: Sullivan, Jacob 3
  Subject Fw: H: France & UK behind Libya breakup. Sid
  This one strains credulity. What do you think?

RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739872
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  PART B6
  From: Sullivan, JacobJ <Sullivann@state.gov>
  Sent: Friday, March 9, 2012 9:21 AM
  To:
  Subject: RE: H: France & UK behind Libya breakup. Sid
  Definitely. I can share around if you like, but it seems like a thin conspiracy theory.
  From H [malito:HDR220dintonemall.com]
  Sent: Friday, March 09, 2012 7:40 AM
  To: Sullivan, Jacob 3
  Subject Fw: H: France & UK behind Libya breakup. Sid
  This one strains credulity. What do you think?
  From:
  Sent: Thursday, March 08, 2012 06:50 PM
  To: H
  Subject: H: France & UK behind Libya breakup. Sid
  CONFIDENTIAL
  March 8, 2012
  For: Hillary
  From: Sid
  Re. France & UK behind Libya breakup
  SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of
  European Governments, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and Western Intelligence and security services.
  1. During the period between mid-January 2012 to March 2012 officers of the a French General Directorate for
  External Security ( Direction Generale de la Securite Exterieure — DGSE), and the British Secret Intelligence Service
  (SIS—MI-6) activated long standing contacts with tribal and civic leaders in Eastern Libya, in an effort to encourage them
  to establish a semi-autonomous zone in the historic province of Cyrenaica (Barge in Arabic). According to extremely
  knowledgeable sources, this effort was initiated by advisors to French President Nicholas Sarkozy after complaints from
  concerned French business leaders that the new Libyan Government was not rewarding appropriately French firms for the
  leading role France played in supporting the 2011 revolution against former Dictator Muammar al Qaddafi. SIS joined in
  this effort at the instruction of the office of Prime Minister David Cameron. This highly confidential effort comes in
  response to the inability of the National Transitional Council (NTC) government in Tripoli to organize the country
  effectively and deal with Western business interests in an effective and efficient manner.
  2. The French and British business and intelligence officials believe that a semi autonomous regime in the
  Eastern city of Benghazi will be able to organize business opportunities in that region. This in turn will allow these
  Western firms to initiate new business projects. These same officials believe that there is also reduced threat from
  Islamist militias in the East. According to a knowledgeable source, French officials believe that this situation is the natural
  result of el-Keib's failure to organize the country and disarm the ethnic and regional militias who did the majority of the
  fighting against Qaddafi's forces during the revolution.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739872
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB00451 70
  B6

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739872
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  3. (Source Comment: In the opinion of a very sensitive source, the French Government and business leaders
  actually expected to receive thirty five (35) per cent of new economic development in Libya after the fall of Qaddafi. Like
  many Western businessmen, these French officials made informal agreements with former Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril
  and his advisors, only to see these agreements ignored or delayed when Abdurrahim el-Keib became head of government
  in October 2011. In their opinion, once el-Keib moved the government from the Eastern city of Benghazi to the national
  capital at Tripoli, the government became inefficient and inaccessible. These individuals also believe that the
  appointment of Minister of Oil Abdulrahman Ben Yezza, who was a long time official of the Italian Oil Company (EN!), was
  a factor. According to these sources, the bulk of ENI's oil fields are in the Western part of Libya, and Ben Yezza focused
  his attentions on that region, while failing to effectively organize new business East of Benghazi. These same officials
  state that the influences of the Western militias, particularly those from the Zintan region, have weakened the influence of
  the Eastern Elders.)
  4. An extremely sensitive source stated that the DGSE and SIS.intend to control the move toward a semi-
  autonomous state under a federal system. However, they have been surprised by el-Keib's intention, expressed both in
  public and in secret meetings with Minister of Defense OUSetrill al JuwaIi, a native of Zintan, to use force to hold the
  country together. El-Kelb is also committed to Ben Van, although he is frustrated by the chaotic situation in Tripoli. This
  atmosphere affects new business for the most port and has been extremely irritating for businessmen from France and
  other Western countries.
  5. (Source Comment: In the opinion of well placed source with access to the former royal family (al Senussi),
  while these Western officials are focused on working around the chaotic business situation, they are risking a civil war,
  failing to recognized the longstanding and complicated relationship between the Eastern and Western parts of the
  country. Cladeafi, as an absolute dictator, suppressed these differences, which have reemerged with his defeat and
  death. In addition, al-Keib is talking to old acquaintances in the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, in an effort to apply their
  influence tothe Eastern tribal Elders, and help hold the country together.)
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739872
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045171



DocNumber: C05739874
MetadataSubject: LATEST FROM HRC'S CONTACT
MetadataTo: H
MetadataFrom: Sullivan, Jacob J
MetadataDateSent: 2012-04-03T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH1/DOC_0C05739874/C05739874.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: FW: Latest from HRC's contact
ExtractedFrom: Sullivan, Jacob I <SullivanJJ@state.gov>
ExtractedCc: Feltrnan, Jeffrey 0; Cretz, Gene A
ExtractedDateSent: Tuesday, April 3, 2012 649 PM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739874
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
ExtractedBodyText: FYI
RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739874
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  PART B6
  From: Sullivan, Jacob I <SullivanJJ@state.gov>
  Sent: Tuesday, April 3, 2012 649 PM
  To:
  Subject: FW: Latest from HRC's contact
  FYI
  Original Message-----
  From: Stevens, John C
  Sent: Tuesday, April 03, 2012 6:33 PM
  To: Sullivan, Jacobi
  Cc: Feltrnan, Jeffrey 0; Cretz, Gene A
  Subject: RE: Latest from HRC's contact
  Very interesting report. By chance, Imet with our insightful in Benghazi yesterday and we discussed B6
  the LMB's electoral prospects. He didn't think they would have a large following b/c they don't have a strong
  organization and because most Libyans view the LMB as a branch of the Egyptian MB, and Libyans don't want to be
  ruled by Egypt. He did not mention the interesting point below about the LMB as a counterbalance to the eastern based
  Federalists. He did emphasize, though, that the Federalist movement has widespread support in the east and will
  continue to up the ante with Tripoli, including possibly making a move on the oil production in that part of the country
  (AGOCO, a large state-owned oil company, is based in Benghazi). -- Chris
  SBU
  This email is UNCLASSIFIED
  Original Message
  From: Sullivan, Jacobi
  Sent: Tuesday, April 03, 2012 12:44 PM
  To Feltman, Jeffrey D.
  ,Cretz, Gene A; Stevens, John C
  Subject: Latest from HRC's contact
  Below is the latest report from HRC's contact; would be interested in your reactions.
  SOURCE:
  Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of European
  Governments, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and Western Intelligence and security services.
  1.
  During the last week of March 2012, the leaders of the National Transitional Council (NTC) regime in Libya discussed
  the rising popularity and independence of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood (LMB) in preparation for the national
  parliamentary elections scheduled for July 2012.
  According to a source with direct access to these discussions, President Mustafa Abclel Jalil stated in very direct terms
  that he sees the emergence of the LMB as a major factor in the upcoming elections, which are already complicated by
  the Federalist movement for the semi autonomous status of the historic Eastern Libyan region of
  Cyrenaica (Barge in Arabic).
  Minister of Defense Ousarra al Juwali and Prime Minister Abdurrahirn el Keib both believe that the rise of the LMB,
  which was a relatively minor member of the NTC until November 2011, is, in fact, related to the Federalist movement fl
  Eastern Libya.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739874
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045172

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739874
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  According to al Juwali, a native of the Western Libyan region of Zintan, the LMB is drawing strength from people who
  fear that the Federalist movement in Barqa will result in that region dominating the country, gaining control of an
  inordinate share of the country's oil and mineral reserves.
  For his part, Jalil stated that he agrees with Oil Minister Abdulrahman Ben Yezza that if matters are not resolved by the
  July elections, the unsettled nature of the political process in Libya will damage the country's image as a business
  partner and confuse foreign banks and oil firms attempting to open new contacts with the new Libyan Government, or
  reactivate existing agreements.
  2.
  According to a sensitive source, while discussing this matter with Dr Abd al-Nasser Shamata, the head of the Crisis
  Management Unit in the NTC, Prime Minister el Keib stated that the most problematic aspect of the rise of the LMB is
  the leadership role taken by Islamist militia leader General Abdel Hakim Alamin Belhaj.
  In the opinion of this source, the NTC leadership sees Belhaj as one of the greatest threats to the long term success of
  their regime.
  Al Juwali also notes that Belhaj is the head of the founding committee for the LMB's Justice and Construction Party
  (JCP). As the Federalist movement took hold in early March 2012, al Juwali, under instruction from el Keib and Jalil, met
  with Belhaj and other Western militia leaders to arrange for their support In the event military force is needed to hold
  the country together.
  Belhaj represented the most effective of the Western militias.
  3.
  According to the Minister of Defense, this situation with the Federalist movement enhanced Belhaj's prestige at the
  time he was working to secure a leadership role in the LMB and the JCP.
  El Keib and Jalil are concerned that, despite the fact that the LMB has a limited base after years of suppression by the
  regime of former dictator Muammar al Qaddafi, they will appeal to those Libyans who believe that the NTC regime is
  under the influence of the United States and Western Europe.
  The activities of Belhaj in both the LMB and the JCP reinforce this view.
  Jalil finds this situation frustrating, particularly in the light of his regular assurances that Libya would operate under
  Islamic law, and while maintaining appropriate ties to the West, will remain hostile to Israel.
  4. (Source Comment:
  In a private conversation, Jalil stated that he is working to balance the internal political realities of Libya against the
  concerns of the international business community.
  The President is concerned that the appointment of BenYezza as Oil Minister in October 2011 provided the JCP with a
  tangible concern to use against NTC candidates during the July elections.
  After his long experience as a senior official of the Multinational Italian Oil Firm ENI, Ben Yezza is viewed by Belhaj and
  many members of the LMB as a symbol of the issue they will pursue in the national election, the idea that NTC, like the
  Qaddafi, regime is corrupt and involved in allowing foreign interests to control the nation's mineral wealth.
  That said, Jalil continues to agree with el Keib that Ben Yezza is an excellent administrator, and in the long run will play
  an important role in effectively managing the nation's mineral wealth.)
  5.
  According to an extremely sensitive source, Jalil and his advisors have been in contact with Supreme Guide Mohamed
  Badie, the leader of the much larger and more powerful Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (EMB).
  This contact is largely based on the President's need to address reports he has received that the LMB is reaching out to
  Badie and his advisors for support.
  This effort is particularly important given the belief among NTC leaders that the EMB and its Freedom and Justice Party
  (FJP) will control the Government of Egypt as that country moves to civilian rule later in 2012. In the opinion of this
  source, Badie is sympathetic to Jalil's position, especially since the Libyan President and el Keib were members of the
  EMB during their student days in Egypt.
  The Supreme Guide will, according to Jalil, work to influence the LMB to establish a cooperative effort with the NTC.
  Badie will point out the fact that his ability to cooperate with both the Supreme Council for the Armed Force (SCAF), as
  well as the Salafist al Nour party, helped establish the EMB as the dominant political force in Egypt, while avoiding high
  levels of violence.
  6.
  (Source Comment: An extremely sensitive source within the EMB agreed that Badie and Jalil have spoken in an effort to
  develop a plan to deal with the LMB.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739874
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045173

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739874
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  According to this source, Jalil told Badie that the LMB and the JCP are far more intolerant of foreign business and
  banking interests than the NTC, and a strong showing in the July elections will strengthen Belhaj and other conservative
  Islamists, adversely affecting the Libyan economy, which in turn will cause problems for Egypt as it recovers from its own
  revolution in 2011.
  Jalil emphasized that at this point the NTC has managed to avoid violent outbursts between competing groups, even in
  the face of the Federalist movement in the East, in a region that borders Egypt.
  He warned that an LMB/JCP victory might change this and lead to increased violence between rival militias that could
  wash over into Egypt.)
  7.
  According to a sensitive source, the LMB has a complex history and Jalil and el Keib believe this past may hold some
  points which can be used against the Brotherhood and the JCP in the July elections.
  The TNTC leaders know that after Qaddafi came to power in 1969, the LMB was repressed and many of its leaders were
  executed publicly. Eventually the Brotherhood, having reestablished itself in the United States and Europe, entered into
  a dialogue with the Qaddafi regime 1999, and in 2005 began a series of negotiations with SW al-Islam Qaddafi, whose
  goal was to co-opt and neutralize opposition groups, particularly Islamist ones.
  8.
  According to this individual, Belhaj and the other Islamist leaders mistrusted the LMB during the first months of the
  2011 revolution.
  However, Belhaj eventually established a working relationship with Fawzi Abu Kitef, the head of the Revolutionary
  Brigades Coalition in Eastern Libya and the former deputy defense minister in the NTC. Abu Kltef was a leading figure in
  the LMB who spent more than 18 years in prison, including the notorious facility at Abu SeIlm. Under Abu Kitef and
  leaders like Dr. Abdullah Shamia, who was in charge of the economic committee of the NTC, the Brotherhood
  established itself as a unique group within the Jai Keib regime; serving there until they began to plan for
  independent political activity in late 2011 and early 2012.
  9.
  In early 2012, as the relationship between the NTC and Belhaj and the other Islamists deteriorated in the face of
  regional and ethnic power struggles, the LMB leadership, in coordination with Belhaj began to look at an independent
  political effort in the parliamentary elections. During its first public conference in Benghazi during November 2011, the
  LMB elected a new leader, increased its consultative council membership from 11 to 30 leaders, and decided to form a
  political party; the JCP.
  Mohammed Swan, the former head of the Libyan LMB's Consultative Council, won a tight victory over longtime LMB
  leader Soliman Abd al-Qadr, to become the first leader of the JCP. Bashir al-Kubty was elected General Observer of the
  LMB.
  10.(Source comment: According to an individual with excellent access, the LMB leaders are sensitive to charges
  that the JCP is a party with a narrow religious agenda, and they encouraged Walid al-Sakran, non-member of the LMB, to
  compete as a candidate for JCP leadership.
  That said Belhaj and other Islamist leaders believe that the LMB is set to follow the electoral path of Islamist success
  seen in Egypt, Tunisia, and other Arab countries.
  Belhaj now believes that the country will move forward under sharia law, administered by the Islamist bloc, including
  the LMB/JCP
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739874
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045174



DocNumber: C05739875
MetadataSubject: LATEST FROM HRC'S CONTACT
MetadataTo: H
MetadataFrom: Sullivan, Jacob J
MetadataDateSent: 2012-04-03T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH1/DOC_0C05739875/C05739875.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: RE: Latest from HRC's contact
ExtractedFrom: Sullivan, Jacob J <SullivanJJ@state.gov>
ExtractedCc: Feltman, Jeffrey D; Cretz, Gene A
ExtractedDateSent: Tuesday, April 3, 2012 7:17 PM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739875
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
ExtractedBodyText: Can I call you in 30? Several items.
RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739875
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  PART B6
  From: Sullivan, Jacob J <SullivanJJ@state.gov>
  Sent: Tuesday, April 3, 2012 7:17 PM
  To:
  Subject: RE: Latest from HRC's contact
  Can I call you in 30? Several items.
  Original Message--
  From: H [mailto:HDR22@clintonemall.corn]
  Sent: Tuesday, April 03, 2012 7:11 PM
  To: Sullivan, Jacob
  Subject: Re: Latest from HRC's contact
  Anything to report? I can call now If you're free.
  ---- Original Message
  From: Sullivan, Jacob [mallto:SullIvanil@state.gov]
  Sent: Tuesday, April 03, 2012 06:48 PM
  To: H
  Subject: FW: Latest from HRC's contact
  FYI
  Original Message
  From: Stevens, John C
  Sent: Tuesday, April 03, 2012 6:33 PM
  To: Sullivan, Jacob J
  Cc: Feltman, Jeffrey D; Cretz, Gene A
  Subject: RE: Latest from HRC's contact
  Very interesting report. By chance, I met with our insightful n Benghazi yesterday and we discussed B6
  the LMB's electoral prospects. He didn't think they would have a large following bic they don't have a strong
  organization and because most Libyans view the LMB as a branch of the Egyptian MB, and Libyans don't want to be
  ruled by Egypt. He did not mention the interesting point below about the LMB as a counterbalance to the eastern-based
  Federalists. He did emphasize, though, that the Federalist movement has widespread support in the east and will
  continue to up the ante with Tripoli, including possibly making a move on the oil production in that part of the country
  (AGOCO, a large state-owned oil company, is based in Benghazi). -- Chris
  SBU
  This email is UNCLASSIFIED
  Original Message
  From: Sullivan, Jacob J
  Sent: Tuesday, April 03, 2012 12:44 PM
  To: Feltrnan, Jeffrey D; Cretz, Gene A; Stevens, John C
  Subject: Latest from HRC's contact
  Below is the latest report from HRC's contact; would be interested in your reactions.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739875
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045175

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739875
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  SOURCE:
  Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of European
  Governments, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and Western Intelligence and security services.
  1.
  During the last week of March 2012, the leaders of the National Transitional Council (NTC) regime in Libya discussed
  the rising popularity and independence of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood (LMB) in preparation for the national
  parliamentary elections scheduled for July 2012.
  According to a source with direct access to these discussions, President Mustafa Abdel Jalil stated in very direct terms
  that he sees the emergence of the LMB as a major factor in the upcoming elections, which are already complicated by
  the Federalist movement for the semi-autonomous status of the historic Eastern Libyan region of
  Cyrenalca (Barqa in Arabic).
  Minister of Defense Ousama at Juwali and Prime Minister Abdurrahim el Keib both believe that the rise of the LMB,
  which was a relatively minor member of the NTC until November 2011, is, in fact, related to the Federalist movement in
  Eastern Libya.
  According to al Juwali, a native of the Western Libyan region of Zintan, the LMB is drawing strength from people who
  fear that the Federalist movement in Barqa will result in that region dominating the country, gaining control of an
  inordinate share of the country's oil and mineral reserves.
  For his part, Jalil stated that he agrees with Oil Minister Abdulrahman Ben Yezza that if matters are not resolved by the
  July elections, the unsettled nature of the political process in Libya will damage the country's image as a business
  partner and confuse foreign banks and oil firms attempting to open new contacts with the new Libyan Government, or
  reactivate existing agreements.
  2.
  According to a sensitive source, while discussing this matter with Dr Abd al-Nasser Shamata, the head of the Crisis
  Management Unit in the NTC, Prime Minister el Keib stated that the most problematic aspect of the rise of the LMB is
  the leadership role taken by Islamist militia leader General Abdel Hakim Alamin Belhaj.
  In the opinion of this source, the NTC leadership sees Belhaj as one of the greatest threats to the long term success of
  their regime.
  Al Juwali also notes that Belhaj is the head of the founding committee for the LMB's Justice and Construction Party
  (JCP). As the Federalist movement took hold in early March 2012, al Juwali, under instruction from el Keib and Jalil, met
  with Belhaj and other Western militia leaders to arrange for their support in the event military force is needed to hold
  the country together.
  Belhaj represented the most effective of the Western militias.
  3.
  According to the Minister of Defense, this situation with the Federalist movement enhanced Belhaj's prestige at the
  time he was working to secure a leadership role in the LMB and the JCP.
  El Keib and Jalil are concerned that, despite the fact that the LMB has a limited base after years of suppression by the
  regime of former dictator Muammar al Qaddafi, they will appeal to those Libyans who believe that the NTC regime is
  under the influence of the United States and Western Europe.
  The activities of Belhaj in both the LMB and the JCP reinforce this view.
  Jalil finds this situation frustrating, particularly in the light of his regular assurances that Libya would operate under
  Islamic law, and while maintaining appropriate ties to the West, will remain hostile to Israel.
  4. (Source Comment:
  In a private conversation, Jalil stated that he is working to balance the internal political realities of Libya against the
  concerns of the international business community.
  The President is concerned that the appointment of BenYezza as Oil Minister in October 2011 provided the JCP with a
  tangible concern to use against NTC candidates during the July elections.
  After his long experience as a senior official of the Multinational Italian Oil Firm [NI, Ben Yezza is viewed by Belhaj and
  many members of the LMB as a symbol of the issue they will pursue in the national election, the idea that NTC, like the
  Qaddafi, regime is corrupt and involved in allowing foreign interests to control the nation's mineral wealth.
  That said, Jalil continues to agree with el Keib that Ben Yezza is an excellent administrator, and in the long run will play
  an important role in effectively managing the nation's mineral wealth.)
  5.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739875
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045176

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739875
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  According to an extremely sensitive source, Jalil and his advisors have been in contact with Supreme Guide Mohamed
  Badie, the leader of the much larger and more powerful Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (EMB).
  This contact is largely based on the President's need to address reports he has received that the LMB is reaching out to
  Badie and his advisors for support.
  This effort is particularly important given the belief among NTC leaders that the EMB and its Freedom and Justice Party
  (FJP) will control the Government of Egypt as that country moves to civilian rule later in 2012. In the opinion of this
  source, Badie is sympathetic to Jalil's position, especially since the Libyan President and el Keib were members of the
  EMB during their student days in Egypt.
  The Supreme Guide will, according to Jalil, work to influence the LMB to establish a cooperative effort with the NTC.
  Sadie will point out the fact that his ability to cooperate with both the Supreme Council for the Armed Force (SCAF), as
  well as the Salafist al Nour party, helped establish the EMB as the dominant political force in Egypt, while avoiding high
  levels of violence.
  6.
  (Source Comment: An extremely sensitive source within the EMB agreed that Badie and Jalil have spoken in an effort to
  develop a plan to deal with the LMB.
  According to this source, Jalil told Badie that the LMB and the JCP are far more intolerant of foreign business and
  banking interests than the NTC, and a strong showing in the July elections will strengthen Belhaj and other conservative
  Islamists, adversely affecting the Libyan economy, which in turn will cause problems for Egypt as it recovers from its own
  revolution in 2011.
  Jaill emphasized that at this point the NTC has managed to avoid violent outbursts between competing groups, even in
  the face of the Federalist movement in the East, in a region that borders Egypt.
  He warned that an LMB/JCP victory might change this and lead to increased violence between rival militias that could
  wash over into Egypt.)
  7.
  According to a sensitive source, the LMB has a complex history and Jalil and el Keib believe this past may hold some
  points which can be used against the Brotherhood and the JCP in the July elections.
  The TNTC leaders know that after Qaddafi came to power in 1969, the LMB was repressed and many of its leaders were
  executed publicly. Eventually the Brotherhood, having reestablished itself in the United States and Europe, entered into
  a dialogue with the Qaddafi regime 1999, and in 2005 began a series of negotiations with Saif al-Islam Qaddafi, whose
  goal was to co-opt and neutralize opposition groups, particularly Islamist ones.
  8.
  According to this individual, Belhaj and the other Islamist leaders mistrusted the LMB during the first months of the
  2011 revolution.
  However, Belhaj eventually established a working relationship with Fawzi Abu Kitef, the head of the Revolutionary
  Brigades Coalition in Eastern Libya and the former deputy defense minister in the NTC. Abu Kitef was a leading figure in
  the LMB who spent more than 18 years in prison, including the notorious facility at Abu Selim. Under Abu Kitef and
  leaders like Dr. Abdullah Shamia, who was in charge of the economic committee of the NTC, the Brotherhood
  established itself as a unique group within the Jalil/el Keib regime; serving there until they began to plan for
  independent political activity in late 2011 and early 2012.
  9.
  In early 2012, as the relationship between the NTC and Belhaj and the other Islamists deteriorated in the face of
  regional and ethnic power struggles, the LMB leadership, in coordination with Belhaj began to look at an independent
  political effort in the parliamentary elections. During its first public conference in Benghazi during November 2011, the
  LMB elected a new leader, increased its consultative council membership from 11 to 30 leaders, and decided to form a
  political party; the JCP.
  Mohammed Swan, the former head of the Libyan LMB's Consultative Council, won a tight victory over longtime LMB
  leader Solirnan Abd al-Qadr, to become the first leader of the JCP. Bashir al-Kubty was elected General Observer of the
  LMB.
  10.(Source comment: According to an individual with excellent access, the LMB leaders are sensitive to charges
  that the JCP is a party with a narrow religious agenda, and they encouraged Walid al-Sakran, non-member of the LMB, to
  compete as a candidate for JCP leadership.
  That said Belhaj and other Islamist leaders believe that the LMB is set to follow the electoral path of Islamist success
  seen in Egypt, Tunisia, and other Arab countries.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739875
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045177

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739875
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  Belhaj now believes that the country will move forward under sharia law, administered by the Islamist bloc, including
  the LMB/JCP
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739875
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045178



DocNumber: C05739876
MetadataSubject: LIBYA
MetadataTo: H
MetadataFrom: Sullivan, Jake
MetadataDateSent: 2012-04-04T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH1/DOC_0C05739876/C05739876.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: Libya
ExtractedFrom: Jake Sullivan _
ExtractedDateSent: Wednesday, April 4, 2012 7:35 AM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739876
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
ExtractedBodyText:
  Secretary Clinton's leadership on Libya
  HRC has been a critical voice on Libya in administration deliberations, at NATO, and in contact group meetings — as well
  as the public face of the U.S. effort in Libya. She was instrumental in securing the authorization, building the coalition,
  and tightening the noose around Qadhafi and his regime.
  February 25— HRC announces the suspension of operations of the Libyan embassy in Washington.
  February 26 — HRC directs efforts to evacuate all U.S. embassy personnel from Tripoli and orders the closing of the
  embassy.
  February 26 -- HRC made a series of calls to her counterparts to help secure passage of UNSC 1970, which imposes
  sanctions on Gaddafi and his family and refers Qadhafi and his cronies to the ICC
  February 28 — HRC travels to Geneva, Switzerland for consultations with European partners on Libya. She gives a major
  address in which she says: "Colonel Qadhafi and those around him must be held accountable for these acts, which
  violate international legal obligations and common decency. Through their actions, they have lost the legitimacy to
  govern. And the people of Libya have made themselves
  clear: It is time for Qadhafi to go — now, without further violence or delay." She also works to secure the suspension of
  Libya from membership in the Human Rights Council.
  Early March — HRC appoints Special Envoy Chris Stevens to be the U.S.
  representative to Benghazi
  March 14— HRC travels to Paris for the G8 foreign minister's meeting.
  She meets with INC representative Jibril and consults with her colleagues on further UN Security Council action. She
  notes that a no-fly zone will not be adequate.
  B6
  B5
  March 14-16 — HRC participates in a series of high-level video- and teleconferences
  She is a leading voice for strong UNSC action and a NATO civilian protection mission.
  March 17 —HRC secures Russian abstention and Portuguese and African support for UNSC 1973, ensuring that it passes.
  1973 authorizes a no-fly zone over Libya and "all necessary measures" - code for military action - to protect civilians
  against Gaddafi's army.
  March 19— HRC travels to Paris to meet with European and Arab leaders to prepare for military action to protect
  civilians. That night, the first U.S. air strikes halt the advance of Gaddafi's forces on Benghazi and target Libya's air
  defenses.
  March 24— HRC engages with allies and secures the transition of command and control of the civilian protection mission
  to NATO. She announces the transition in a statement.
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739876
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045179
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739876
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  March 18-30— HRC engages with UAE, Qatar, and Jordan to seek their participation in coalition operations. Over the
  course of several days, all three devote aircraft to the mission.
  March 29 — HRC travels to London for a conference on Libya, where she is a driving force behind the creation of a
  Contact Group comprising 20-plus countries to coordinate efforts to protect civilians and plan for a post-Qadhafi Libya.
  She is instrumental in setting up a rotating chair system to ensure regional buy-in.
  April 14 — HRC travels to Berlin for NATO meetings. She is the driving force behind NATO adopting a communiqué that
  calls for Qadhafi's departure as a political objective, and lays out three clear military objectives: end of attacks and
  threat of attacks on civilians; the removal of Qadhafi forces from cities they forcibly entered; and the unfettered
  provision of humanitarian access.
  May 5— HRC travels to Rome for a Contact Group meeting. The Contact Group establishes a coordination system and a
  temporary financial mechanism to funnel money to the TNC.
  June 8 — HRC travels to Abu Dhabi for another Contact Group meeting and holds a series of intense discussions with
  rebel leaders.
  June 12 — HRC travels to Addis for consultations and a speech before the African Union, pressing the case for a
  democratic transition in Libya.
  Late June — HRC meets with House Democrats and Senate Republicans to persuade them not to de-fund the Libya
  operation.
  July 15 — HRC travels to Istanbul and announces that the U.S.
  recognizes the TNC as the legitimate government of Libya. She also secures recognition from the other members of the
  Contact Group.
  July 16— HRC sends Feltman, Cretz, and Chollet to Tunis to meet with Qadhafi envoys "to deliver a clear and firm
  message that the only way to move forward, is for Qadhafi to step down".
  Early August — HRC works to construct a $1.5 billion assets package to be approved by the Security Council and sent to
  the TNC. That package is working through its last hurdles.
  Early August After military chief Abdel Fattah Younes is killed, S sends a personal message to TNC head Jalil to press for
  a responsible investigation and a careful and inclusive approach to creating a new executive council.
  Early August HRC secures written pledges from the TNC to an inclusive, pluralistic democratic transition. She
  continues to consult with European and Arab colleagues on the evolving situation.
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739876
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045180

RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739876
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  PART B5,B6
  From: Jake Sullivan _
  Sent: Wednesday, April 4, 2012 7:35 AM
  To:
  Subject: Libya
  Secretary Clinton's leadership on Libya
  HRC has been a critical voice on Libya in administration deliberations, at NATO, and in contact group meetings — as well
  as the public face of the U.S. effort in Libya. She was instrumental in securing the authorization, building the coalition,
  and tightening the noose around Qadhafi and his regime.
  February 25— HRC announces the suspension of operations of the Libyan embassy in Washington.
  February 26 — HRC directs efforts to evacuate all U.S. embassy personnel from Tripoli and orders the closing of the
  embassy.
  February 26 -- HRC made a series of calls to her counterparts to help secure passage of UNSC 1970, which imposes
  sanctions on Gaddafi and his family and refers Qadhafi and his cronies to the ICC
  February 28 — HRC travels to Geneva, Switzerland for consultations with European partners on Libya. She gives a major
  address in which she says: "Colonel Qadhafi and those around him must be held accountable for these acts, which
  violate international legal obligations and common decency. Through their actions, they have lost the legitimacy to
  govern. And the people of Libya have made themselves
  clear: It is time for Qadhafi to go — now, without further violence or delay." She also works to secure the suspension of
  Libya from membership in the Human Rights Council.
  Early March — HRC appoints Special Envoy Chris Stevens to be the U.S.
  representative to Benghazi
  March 14— HRC travels to Paris for the G8 foreign minister's meeting.
  She meets with INC representative Jibril and consults with her colleagues on further UN Security Council action. She
  notes that a no-fly zone will not be adequate.
  B6
  B5
  March 14-16 — HRC participates in a series of high-level video- and teleconferences
  She is a leading voice for strong UNSC action and a NATO civilian protection mission.
  March 17 —HRC secures Russian abstention and Portuguese and African support for UNSC 1973, ensuring that it passes.
  1973 authorizes a no-fly zone over Libya and "all necessary measures" - code for military action - to protect civilians
  against Gaddafi's army.
  March 19— HRC travels to Paris to meet with European and Arab leaders to prepare for military action to protect
  civilians. That night, the first U.S. air strikes halt the advance of Gaddafi's forces on Benghazi and target Libya's air
  defenses.
  March 24— HRC engages with allies and secures the transition of command and control of the civilian protection mission
  to NATO. She announces the transition in a statement.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739876
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
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  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739876
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  March 18-30— HRC engages with UAE, Qatar, and Jordan to seek their participation in coalition operations. Over the
  course of several days, all three devote aircraft to the mission.
  March 29 — HRC travels to London for a conference on Libya, where she is a driving force behind the creation of a
  Contact Group comprising 20-plus countries to coordinate efforts to protect civilians and plan for a post-Qadhafi Libya.
  She is instrumental in setting up a rotating chair system to ensure regional buy-in.
  April 14 — HRC travels to Berlin for NATO meetings. She is the driving force behind NATO adopting a communiqué that
  calls for Qadhafi's departure as a political objective, and lays out three clear military objectives: end of attacks and
  threat of attacks on civilians; the removal of Qadhafi forces from cities they forcibly entered; and the unfettered
  provision of humanitarian access.
  May 5— HRC travels to Rome for a Contact Group meeting. The Contact Group establishes a coordination system and a
  temporary financial mechanism to funnel money to the TNC.
  June 8 — HRC travels to Abu Dhabi for another Contact Group meeting and holds a series of intense discussions with
  rebel leaders.
  June 12 — HRC travels to Addis for consultations and a speech before the African Union, pressing the case for a
  democratic transition in Libya.
  Late June — HRC meets with House Democrats and Senate Republicans to persuade them not to de-fund the Libya
  operation.
  July 15 — HRC travels to Istanbul and announces that the U.S.
  recognizes the TNC as the legitimate government of Libya. She also secures recognition from the other members of the
  Contact Group.
  July 16— HRC sends Feltman, Cretz, and Chollet to Tunis to meet with Qadhafi envoys "to deliver a clear and firm
  message that the only way to move forward, is for Qadhafi to step down".
  Early August — HRC works to construct a $1.5 billion assets package to be approved by the Security Council and sent to
  the TNC. That package is working through its last hurdles.
  Early August After military chief Abdel Fattah Younes is killed, S sends a personal message to TNC head Jalil to press for
  a responsible investigation and a careful and inclusive approach to creating a new executive council.
  Early August HRC secures written pledges from the TNC to an inclusive, pluralistic democratic transition. She
  continues to consult with European and Arab colleagues on the evolving situation.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739876
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045180



DocNumber: C05739877
MetadataSubject: LATEST FROM HRC'S CONTACT
MetadataTo: H
MetadataFrom: Sullivan, Jacob J
MetadataDateSent: 2012-04-05T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH1/DOC_0C05739877/C05739877.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: FW: Latest from HRC's contact
ExtractedFrom: Sullivan, Jacob I <Sullivanli@state.gove
ExtractedCc: Feitman, Jeffrey D
ExtractedDateSent: Thursday, April 5, 2012 9:08 AM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739877
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
ExtractedBodyText:
  FYI
  ---

RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739877
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  PART B6
  From: Sullivan, Jacob I <Sullivanli@state.gove
  Sent: Thursday, April 5, 2012 9:08 AM
  To:
  Subject: FW: Latest from HRC's contact
  FYI
  ---Original Message-----
  From: Cretz, Gene A
  Sent: Thursday, April 05, 2012 7:50 AM
  To: Sullivan, Jacob J; Stevens, John C
  Cc: Feitman, Jeffrey D
  Subject: RE: Latest from HAC's contact
  Jake: I have been reading this over and over and it just seemed a bit odd to me. I finally figured out that I think the
  source has somehow confused two Bel-Hajs: One is our boy who accused us and the Brits of rendition-Abdul Hakim Bel-
  Haj and a second one is Larnin Bel Haj, an Islamist leader who I believe had previously I believe somehow been involved
  In Sudan but was now back in his native Ubya. The latter is the head of the JCP and MB. The former is of the former LIFG
  and now the Libyan Islamist Movement for Change and the premier Western Brigade commander whose group had
  control over Matega Airport for several months after October 23 and who tried to make himself the Supreme Military
  Council Commander of Tripoli before the TNC leadership stepped in several months ago. Let me try to untangle this and
  see if any of it jibes with the reality we are seeing.
  ----Original Message---
  From: Sullivan, Jacob 1
  Sent: Wednesday, April 04, 2012 12:49 AM
  To: Stevens, John C
  Cc: Feltman, Jeffrey D; Cretz, Gene A
  Subject: RE: Latest from NBC's contact
  Thanks -- I will share this with S.
  ----Original Message--
  From: Stevens, John C
  Sent: Tuesday, April 03, 2012 6:33 PM
  To: Sullivan, Jacobi
  Cc: Feitman, Jeffrey D; Cretz, Gene A
  Subject: RE: Latest from HRC's contact
  Very interesting report. By chance, I met with our insightful in Benghazi yesterday and we discussed B6
  the LIVIB's electoral prospects. He didn't think they would have a large following b/c they don't have a strong
  organization and because most Libyans view the LMB as a branch of the Egyptian MB, and Libyans don't want to be
  ruled by Egypt. He did not mention the interesting point below about the LMB as a counterbalance to the eastern based
  Federalists. He did emphasize, though, that the Federalist movement has widespread support in the east and will
  continue to up the ante with Tripoli, including possibly making a move on the oil production in that part of the country
  (AGOCO, a large state-owned oil company, is based in Benghazi). -- Chris
  SBU
  This email is UNCLASSIFIED
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739877
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045181

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739877
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  Original Message—
  From: Sullivan, Jacobi
  Sent: Tuesday, April 03, 2012 12:44 PM
  To: Feitman, Jeffrey D; Crete, Gene A; Stevens, John C
  Subject: Latest from HRC's contact
  Below is the latest report from NBC's contact; would be interested in your reactions.
  SOURCE:
  Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of European
  Governments, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and Western Intelligence and security services.
  1.
  During the last week of March 2012, the leaders of the National Transitional Council (NTC) regime in Libya discussed
  the rising popularity and independence of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood (LMB) in preparation for the national
  parliamentary elections scheduled for July 2012.
  According to a source with direct access to these discussions, President Mustafa Abdel Jalil stated in very direct terms
  that he sees the emergence of the LMB as a major factor in the upcoming elections, which are already complicated by
  the Federalist movement for the semi-autonomous status of the historic Eastern Libyan region of
  Cyrenaica (Berea in Arabic).
  Minister of Defense Ousama al Juwall and Prime Minister Abdurrahim el Keib both believe that the rise of the LMB,
  which was a relatively minor member of the NTC until November 2011, is, in fact, related to the Federalist movement in
  Eastern Libya.
  According to at Juwali, a native of the Western Libyan region of Zintan, the LMB is drawing strength from people who
  fear that the Federalist movement in Barge will result in that region dominating the country, gaining control of an
  inordinate share of the country's oil and mineral reserves.
  For his part, Jalil stated that he agrees with Oil Minister Abcluirahman Ben 'lima that if matters are not resolved by the
  July elections, the unsettled nature of the political process in Libya will damage the country's image as a business
  partner and confuse foreign banks and oil firms attempting to open new contacts with the new Libyan Government, or
  reactivate existing agreements.
  2.
  According to a sensitive source, while discussing this matter with Dr Abd al-Nasser Shamata, the head of the Crisis
  Management Unit in the NTC, Prime Minister el Keib stated that the most problematic aspect of the rise of the LMB is
  the leadership role taken by Islamist militia leader General Abdel Hakim Alamin Belhaj.
  In the opinion of this source, the NTC leadership sees Belhaj as one of the greatest threats to the long term success of
  their regime.
  Al Juwali also notes that Belhaj is the head of the founding committee for the LMB's Justice and Construction Party
  (JCP). As the Federalist movement took hold in early March 2012, al Juwali, under instruction from el Keib and Jalil, met
  with Belhaj and other Western militia leaders to arrange for their support in the event military force is needed to hold
  the country together.
  Beihaj represented the most effective of the Western militias.
  3.
  According to the Minister of Defense, this situation with the Federalist movement enhanced Belhaj's prestige at the
  time he was working to secure a leadership role in the LMB and the JCP.
  El Keib and Jalil are concerned that, despite the fact that the LMB has a limited base after years of suppression by the
  regime of former dictator Muammar al Qaddafi, they will appeal to those Libyans who believe that the NTC regime is
  under the influence of the United States and Western Europe.
  The activities of Belhaj in both the LMB and the JCP reinforce this view.
  Jalil finds this situation frustrating, particularly in the light of his regular assurances that Libya would operate under
  Islamic law, and while maintaining appropriate ties to the West, will remain hostile to Israel.
  4.(Source Comment:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739877
  Date: 05/13/2015
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  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739877
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  In a private conversation, Jalil stated that he is working to balance the internal political realities of Libya against the
  concerns of the international business community.
  The President is concerned that the appointment of BenYezza as Oil Minister in October 2011 provided the JCP with a
  tangible concern to use against NTC candidates during the July elections.
  After his long experience as a senior official of the Multinational Italian Oil Firm ENI, Ben Yezza is viewed by Belhaj and
  many members of the LMB as a symbol of the issue they will pursue in the national election, the idea that NTC, like the
  Qaddafi, regime is corrupt and involved in allowing foreign interests to control the nation's mineral wealth.
  That said, Jalil continues to agree with el Keib that Ben Yezza is an excellent administrator, and in the long run will play
  an important role in effectively managing the nation's mineral wealth.)
  5.
  According to an extremely sensitive source, Jalil and his advisors have been in contact with Supreme Guide Mohamed
  Badie, the leader of the much larger and more powerful Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (EMB).
  This contact is largely based on the President's need to address reports he has received that the LMB is reaching out to
  Badie and his advisors for support.
  This effort is particularly important given the belief among NTC leaders that the EMB and its Freedom and Justice Party
  (FJP) will control the Government of Egypt as that country moves to civilian rule later in 2012. In the opinion of this
  source, Badie is sympathetic to Jalirs position, especially since the Libyan President and el Keib were members of the
  EMB during their student days in Egypt.
  The Supreme Guide will, according to J3111, work to influence the LMB to establish a cooperative effort with the NTC.
  Sadie will point out the fact that his ability to cooperate with both the Supreme Council for the Armed Force (SCAF), as
  well as the Salafist al Nour party, helped establish the EMB as the dominant political force in Egypt, while avoiding high
  levels of violence.
  6.
  (Source Comment: An extremely sensitive source within the EMB agreed that Badie and Jalil have spoken in an effort to
  develop a plan to deal with the LMB.
  According to this source, Jalil told Badie that the LMB and the JCP are far more intolerant of foreign business and
  banking interests than the NTC, and a strong showing in the July elections will strengthen Belhaj and other conservative
  Islamists, adversely affecting the Libyan economy, which in turn will cause problems for Egypt as it recovers from its own
  revolution in 2011.
  Jalil emphasized that at this point the NTC has managed to avoid violent outbursts between competing groups, even in
  the face of the Federalist movement in the East, in a region that borders Egypt.
  He warned that an LMB/JCP victory might change this and lead to increased violence between rival militias that could
  wash over into Egypt.)
  7.
  According to a sensitive source, the LMB has a complex history and Jalil and el Keib believe this past may hold some
  points which can be used against the Brotherhood and the JCP in the July elections.
  The TNTC leaders know that after Qaddafi came to power in 1969, the LMB was repressed and many of its leaders were
  executed publicly. Eventually the Brotherhood, having reestablished itself in the United States and Europe, entered into
  a dialogue with the Qaddafi regime 1999, and in 2005 began a series of negotiations with Saif Qaddafi, whose
  goal was to co-opt and neutralize opposition groups, particularly Islamist ones.
  8.
  According to this individual, Belhaj and the other Islamist leaders mistrusted the LMB during the first months of the
  2011 revolution.
  However, Belhaj eventually established a working relationship with Fawzi Abu Kitef, the head of the Revolutionary
  Brigades Coalition in Eastern Libya and the former deputy defense minister in the NTC. Abu Kitef was a leading figure in
  the LMB who spent more than 18 years in prison, including the notorious facility at Abu Selim. Under Abu Kitef and
  leaders like Dr. Abdullah Shamia, who was in charge of the economic committee of the NTC, the Brotherhood
  established itself as a unique group within the Jain/el Keib regime; serving there until they began to plan for
  independent political activity in late 2011 and early 2012.
  9.
  In early 2012, as the relationship between the NTC and Belhaj and the other Islamists deteriorated in the face of
  regional and ethnic power struggles, the LMB leadership, in coordination with Belhaj began to look at an independent
  political effort in the parliamentary elections. During its first public conference in Benghazi during November 2011, the
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739877
  Date: 05/13/2015
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  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739877
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  LIMB elected a new leader, increased its consultative council membership from 11 to 30 leaders, and decided to form a
  political party; the JCP.
  Mohammed Swan, the former head of the Libyan LMB's Consultative Council, won a tight victory over longtime LMB
  leader SoOman Abd al-Qadr, to become the first leader of the JCP. Bashir al-Kubty was elected General Observer of the
  LMB.
  10. (Source comment: According to an individual with excellent access, the LMB leaders are sensitive to charges
  that the JCP is a party with a narrow religious agenda, and they encouraged Walid al-Sakran, non-member of the LMB, to
  compete as a candidate for JCP leadership.
  That said Belhaj and other Islamist leaders believe that the LMB is set to follow the electoral path of Islamist success
  seen in Egypt, Tunisia, and other Arab countries.
  Belhaj now believes that the country will move forward under sharia law, administered by the Islamist bloc including
  the LIVIB/JCP
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739877
  Date: 05/13/2015
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DocNumber: C05739878
MetadataSubject: LATEST FROM HRC'S FRIEND
MetadataTo: H
MetadataFrom: Sullivan, Jacob J
MetadataDateSent: 2012-04-23T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH1/DOC_0C05739878/C05739878.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: FW: Latest from HRC friend
ExtractedFrom: Sullivan, Jacob J <Sullivanll@state,gov›
ExtractedDateSent: Monday, April 23, 2012 8:40 PM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739878
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN FULL
ExtractedBodyText:
  FYI
  From Stevens, John C
  Sent; Monday, April 23, 2012 7:00 PM
  To; Sullivan, Jacob)
  Cc Cretz, Gene A; Fettman, Jeffrey
  Subject RE: Latest from HRC friend
  Jake- Interesting report. Gene is closer to the action and I defer to him on the latest Jail-ian thinking
  and machinations vis-a-vis the cabinet and INC. I hadn't heard about ENI-related corruption but
  wouldn't be surprised.
  On the federalism issue,. Jail is right to be concerned about eastern agitation for autonomy. A
  cabinet chance won't solve that problem, though. Nor will recruiting Belhaj and Islamist fighters to
  take on the Bardans. To the contrary, it would only lead to unwanted bloodshed - the large Obeid
  tribe still nurses a serious grudge against Belhaj and his ilk for the Islamists' presumed role in killing their
  beloved Gen. Yunis last July and would probably put up a fierce fight.
  The cabinet and INC need to have a serious discussion with the Bargans - if they aren't already
  doing so - about how power and resources are to be distributed in the new Libya. The Libyans held
  similarly heated debates on this very topic in the early1950s as they held their first parliamentary
  elections and drafted their constitution (there were actually violent skirmishes in connection with
  those elections, and Washington delayed the arrival of the first US ambassador until after things had
  calmed down). Hopefully the current leadership can negotiate these issues peaceably in the
  corning months. Of course, we and the UN and our other partners should encourage them to do so.
  - Chris
  SBU
  This email is UNCLASSIFIED,
  From; Sullivan, Jacob
  Sent: Monday, April 23, 2012 5:31 PM
  To: Stevens, John C; Cr, Gene A; Feltman, Jeffrey D
  Subject Latest from HRC friend
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739878
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045185
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739878
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  Let me know your thoughts:
  SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of
  European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.
  1.On April 17, 2012 Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC) President Mustafa Abdel Jalil stated to a close
  advisor that he is considering when, or even if, to hold a vote of no confidence in the NTC regarding support for the
  government of Prime Minister Abdel Rahman al-Keib. According to a source with access to the NTC leadership, Jalil
  realizes that a majority of the Council members no longer support el-Keib and his cabinet of Western educated technical
  experts. Jaili continues to believe that, for the moment, the most important issue facing the NTC is the federalist
  movement toward a semi-autonomous state in the Eastern region of Cyrenaica (Barge in Arabic). This situation continues
  to complicate the NTC efforts to stabilize the country. With this in mind, Jalil expressed concern that a dramatic vote of no
  confidence for el-Keib will weaken the entire NTC by association. Instead, according to this source, Jalil is considering
  delaying a CiOCISI011, possibly putting it off until an elected legislature is in place in the late summer or early fall of 2012.
  2. (Source Comment: In the opinion of this individual, the NTC has been able to reach a temporary
  understanding with the eastern federalists, allowing the separatists to administer their local regions, while deferring to the
  NTC for national and international issues. The complicating factor at this point lies in reaching a determination regarding
  who has authority over new contracts with oil companies and other international firms. As of the week of April 16, 2012,
  no decision has been reached on this point. The bulk of the NTC leadership is drawn from Barge, and Jalil now believes
  they can control the situation if they can establish an organized central government. In particular, Jalil, according to a
  sensitive source, is increasingly confident that the eastern roots of the NTC will allow him to balance the federalist
  movement against the need for a sense of national unity. In the opinion of this source, el-Keib's future depends on Jalil's
  opinion of his capacity to deal with this complex situation.)
  3. Minister of Defense Ousama al Juwali is viewed by Jalil as the most important western Libyan in el-Keib's
  cabinet, and the President and the leaders of the NTC had hoped that he would be able to deal with the confused security
  situation in Tripoli. However, while he did receive assurances from General Abdel Hakim Alamin Belhaj regarding
  possible assistance from his Islamist troops if fighting broke out between the National Army and the militia's loyal to the
  eastern federalists. Unfortunately, from Jalil's point of view, this effort seems to have emboldened Belhaj and heightened
  tension between the eastern and western portions of the country. According to this source, after reviewing the federalist
  problem, Dr Abd al-Nasser Shamata, the head of the Crisis Management for the NTC, believes that el-Keib, al Juwali, Oil
  Minister Abdulrahman Ben Yezza, and the bulk of the cabinet should be replaced by people drawn from within the NTC,
  individuals who are in touch with the concerns of the Libyan people of all tribes and political groups. In the opinion of this
  source Jalil is factoring this position into his decision on el-Keib.
  4. Regarding the existing relationships with international oil firms, Shamata told Jalil that for the most part the
  existing fields are continuing to produce and the owners have worked out security arrangements with local political and
  tribal leaders. However, since el-Keib and Ben Yezza have been unable to bring order to the national administration, it is
  difficult for firms to initiate new projects, since it is not clear who has the authority or the desire to sign such
  agreements. Shamata stated forcefully that the Prime Minister, whoever he is, must establish an orderly administration
  before full advantage can be gained from the oil fields. In the meantime, Shamata warns that his office has found
  evidence of corruption between local officials and international firms. In this regard, he stated that local representatives of
  the Italian national oil firm (ENI) have made problematic arrangements with local officials in the western part of the
  country, where their oil fields are located. He added that most of these ENI employees are Libyans, but he believes ENI
  management in Italy is aware of this situation. Shamata pointed out, without additional comment, that Ben Yezza is a
  long time senior official of ENI.
  5. In the opinion this source, Shamata and Jalil are not planning to publicize these charges regarding ENI, at least
  until they decide how best to move forward on el-Keib, whether to allow the Prime Minister more time to address his
  problems, proceed with the vote of no confidence or quietly ask him to step down on his own.
  6. (Source Comment: According to this source, el-Keib is under fire primarily as a result of his failure to bring
  order to the National Army, disarm independent militias, and establish security throughout the country. The leading
  opposition to el-Keib is based in the Political Issues committee of the NTC, and as many as 42 of the 73 active NTC
  members will vote against el-Keib if Jalil brings this matter to a vote. The source warns that these numbers are provided
  by members of this Political committee, who may have their own agenda. A two thirds majority is required for the no
  confidence vote, however; several senior members of the NTC are reluctant to take such a step until a constituent
  assembly has been elected. They do not want this to look like the decision of a small group of people.)
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739878
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045186

RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739878
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  FULL
  From: Sullivan, Jacob J <Sullivanll@state,gov›
  Sent: Monday, April 23, 2012 8:40 PM
  To:
  Subject: FW: Latest from HRC friend
  FYI
  From Stevens, John C
  Sent; Monday, April 23, 2012 7:00 PM
  To; Sullivan, Jacob)
  Cc Cretz, Gene A; Fettman, Jeffrey
  Subject RE: Latest from HRC friend
  Jake- Interesting report. Gene is closer to the action and I defer to him on the latest Jail-ian thinking
  and machinations vis-a-vis the cabinet and INC. I hadn't heard about ENI-related corruption but
  wouldn't be surprised.
  On the federalism issue,. Jail is right to be concerned about eastern agitation for autonomy. A
  cabinet chance won't solve that problem, though. Nor will recruiting Belhaj and Islamist fighters to
  take on the Bardans. To the contrary, it would only lead to unwanted bloodshed - the large Obeid
  tribe still nurses a serious grudge against Belhaj and his ilk for the Islamists' presumed role in killing their
  beloved Gen. Yunis last July and would probably put up a fierce fight.
  The cabinet and INC need to have a serious discussion with the Bargans - if they aren't already
  doing so - about how power and resources are to be distributed in the new Libya. The Libyans held
  similarly heated debates on this very topic in the early1950s as they held their first parliamentary
  elections and drafted their constitution (there were actually violent skirmishes in connection with
  those elections, and Washington delayed the arrival of the first US ambassador until after things had
  calmed down). Hopefully the current leadership can negotiate these issues peaceably in the
  corning months. Of course, we and the UN and our other partners should encourage them to do so.
  - Chris
  SBU
  This email is UNCLASSIFIED,
  From; Sullivan, Jacob
  Sent: Monday, April 23, 2012 5:31 PM
  To: Stevens, John C; Cr, Gene A; Feltman, Jeffrey D
  Subject Latest from HRC friend
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739878
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045185

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739878
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  Let me know your thoughts:
  SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of
  European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.
  1.On April 17, 2012 Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC) President Mustafa Abdel Jalil stated to a close
  advisor that he is considering when, or even if, to hold a vote of no confidence in the NTC regarding support for the
  government of Prime Minister Abdel Rahman al-Keib. According to a source with access to the NTC leadership, Jalil
  realizes that a majority of the Council members no longer support el-Keib and his cabinet of Western educated technical
  experts. Jaili continues to believe that, for the moment, the most important issue facing the NTC is the federalist
  movement toward a semi-autonomous state in the Eastern region of Cyrenaica (Barge in Arabic). This situation continues
  to complicate the NTC efforts to stabilize the country. With this in mind, Jalil expressed concern that a dramatic vote of no
  confidence for el-Keib will weaken the entire NTC by association. Instead, according to this source, Jalil is considering
  delaying a CiOCISI011, possibly putting it off until an elected legislature is in place in the late summer or early fall of 2012.
  2. (Source Comment: In the opinion of this individual, the NTC has been able to reach a temporary
  understanding with the eastern federalists, allowing the separatists to administer their local regions, while deferring to the
  NTC for national and international issues. The complicating factor at this point lies in reaching a determination regarding
  who has authority over new contracts with oil companies and other international firms. As of the week of April 16, 2012,
  no decision has been reached on this point. The bulk of the NTC leadership is drawn from Barge, and Jalil now believes
  they can control the situation if they can establish an organized central government. In particular, Jalil, according to a
  sensitive source, is increasingly confident that the eastern roots of the NTC will allow him to balance the federalist
  movement against the need for a sense of national unity. In the opinion of this source, el-Keib's future depends on Jalil's
  opinion of his capacity to deal with this complex situation.)
  3. Minister of Defense Ousama al Juwali is viewed by Jalil as the most important western Libyan in el-Keib's
  cabinet, and the President and the leaders of the NTC had hoped that he would be able to deal with the confused security
  situation in Tripoli. However, while he did receive assurances from General Abdel Hakim Alamin Belhaj regarding
  possible assistance from his Islamist troops if fighting broke out between the National Army and the militia's loyal to the
  eastern federalists. Unfortunately, from Jalil's point of view, this effort seems to have emboldened Belhaj and heightened
  tension between the eastern and western portions of the country. According to this source, after reviewing the federalist
  problem, Dr Abd al-Nasser Shamata, the head of the Crisis Management for the NTC, believes that el-Keib, al Juwali, Oil
  Minister Abdulrahman Ben Yezza, and the bulk of the cabinet should be replaced by people drawn from within the NTC,
  individuals who are in touch with the concerns of the Libyan people of all tribes and political groups. In the opinion of this
  source Jalil is factoring this position into his decision on el-Keib.
  4. Regarding the existing relationships with international oil firms, Shamata told Jalil that for the most part the
  existing fields are continuing to produce and the owners have worked out security arrangements with local political and
  tribal leaders. However, since el-Keib and Ben Yezza have been unable to bring order to the national administration, it is
  difficult for firms to initiate new projects, since it is not clear who has the authority or the desire to sign such
  agreements. Shamata stated forcefully that the Prime Minister, whoever he is, must establish an orderly administration
  before full advantage can be gained from the oil fields. In the meantime, Shamata warns that his office has found
  evidence of corruption between local officials and international firms. In this regard, he stated that local representatives of
  the Italian national oil firm (ENI) have made problematic arrangements with local officials in the western part of the
  country, where their oil fields are located. He added that most of these ENI employees are Libyans, but he believes ENI
  management in Italy is aware of this situation. Shamata pointed out, without additional comment, that Ben Yezza is a
  long time senior official of ENI.
  5. In the opinion this source, Shamata and Jalil are not planning to publicize these charges regarding ENI, at least
  until they decide how best to move forward on el-Keib, whether to allow the Prime Minister more time to address his
  problems, proceed with the vote of no confidence or quietly ask him to step down on his own.
  6. (Source Comment: According to this source, el-Keib is under fire primarily as a result of his failure to bring
  order to the National Army, disarm independent militias, and establish security throughout the country. The leading
  opposition to el-Keib is based in the Political Issues committee of the NTC, and as many as 42 of the 73 active NTC
  members will vote against el-Keib if Jalil brings this matter to a vote. The source warns that these numbers are provided
  by members of this Political committee, who may have their own agenda. A two thirds majority is required for the no
  confidence vote, however; several senior members of the NTC are reluctant to take such a step until a constituent
  assembly has been elected. They do not want this to look like the decision of a small group of people.)
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739878
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045186



DocNumber: C05739879
MetadataSubject: TALK WITH PM
MetadataTo: H
MetadataFrom: Sullivan, Jacob J
MetadataDateSent: 2012-04-27T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH1/DOC_0C05739879/C05739879.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedDateSent: Friday, April 27, 2012 6:23 AM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739879
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN FULL
ExtractedBodyText:
  FYI
  Sullivan, Jacob J <Sullivan.0@state.gov>
  Friday, April 27, 2012 11:16 AM
  FW: Talk with PM

ExtractedCc:
  Dibble, Elizabeth L; Maxwell, Raymond D; Sidereas, Evyenia; Stevens, John C; Roebuck, William V; SF-S-0; Sullivan,

RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739879
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  FULL
  From:
  Sent
  To:
  Subject:
  FYI
  Sullivan, Jacob J <Sullivan.0@state.gov>
  Friday, April 27, 2012 11:16 AM
  FW: Talk with PM
  From: Cretz, Gene A
  Sent: Friday, April 27, 2012 6:23 AM
  To: Felinen, Jeffrey D
  Cc: Dibble, Elizabeth L; Maxwell, Raymond D; Sidereas, Evyenia; Stevens, John C; Roebuck, William V; SF-S-0; Sullivan,
  Jacob 3; Burns, William J
  Subject: Talk with PM
  I called PM el-Keib this morning to get his take on what we were all hearing about TNC final decisions to dismiss the
  government, etc. I told him that after the British Ambassador and I had spoken to him and Jalil on Sunday, we had
  hoped that these public skirmishes would end and that the government could focus on security and the elections. The
  PM said that he had in fact met with Jalil on Monday and agreed to work together for the good of the nation. On
  Tuesday, the PM had met with several Council members and had brought along proposed changes in some of the
  ministerial portfolios. He sensed there was agreement from the Council members present and thought he had
  succeeded in quelling the public discontent. Unfortunately, he continued, more public threats, etc. were issued and by
  Wednesday evening he had had enough. That prompted his critical remarks in a press interview demanding that the TNC
  stop interfering in the government's business and let him and his government do the work they needed to do without all
  this negative background noise. He told me that we should not be concerned about last night's "rumors" and that he
  would continue to work to end these fratricidal disputes. For his own role, he said he would be just as happy to give up
  his post if matters came to that We will continue to try to reach out to other contacts today to see if in fact the Council
  does intend to act against the government. But while the PM is clearly frustrated, he also seemed to believe that the
  current strife will not result in any major shake-up, at least for the time being.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739879
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045187



DocNumber: C05739880
MetadataSubject: H: LIBYAN ELECTIONS INTEL. SID
MetadataTo: sullivanjj@state.gov
MetadataFrom: H
MetadataDateSent: 2012-07-04T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH1/DOC_0C05739880/C05739880.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: H: Ubyan elections Intel. Sid
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739880
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
ExtractedBodyText:
  H <hrod17@clintonemaiLcom>
  Wednesday, July 4, 2012 7:54 AM
  'sullivanjj@state.gov'
  Fw: H: Libyan elections intel. Sid
  hrc memo libyan elections intel 070312.docx
  More info.
  B6

RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739880
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  PART B6
  From:
  Sent:
  To:
  Subject
  Attachments:
  H <hrod17@clintonemaiLcom>
  Wednesday, July 4, 2012 7:54 AM
  'sullivanjj@state.gov'
  Fw: H: Libyan elections intel. Sid
  hrc memo libyan elections intel 070312.docx
  More info.
  B6
  From:
  Sent: Tuesday, July 03, 2012 07:08 PM
  To: 1-1
  Subject: H: Ubyan elections Intel. Sid
  CONFIDENTIAL
  July 3,2012
  For: Hillary
  From: Sid
  Re: Libyan election
  SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of
  European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.
  1. Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC) President Mustafa Abdel Jalil expected the final days leading to the
  July 7, 2012 national elections to be complicated and sometimes violent; however, according to a knowledgeable
  individual, he is particularly concerned by the level of control exerted by regional militia's and political groups on the
  electoral process. In the opinion of this individual, Jalil and his advisors believe that, given the level of suspicion and
  frustration felt in the various parts of the country, it will be difficult for the new 200 seat General National Congress (GNC)
  to establish its authority, draft a new constitution, and establish new national government. With this in mind, Jalil stated in
  extreme confidence that the NTC may have to remain in power until the situation becomes stable and a new government
  is firmly in place. That said he still plans to have interim Prime Minister Abdel Rahman el-Keib step down after the
  election results have been certified. The NTC will then work with the GNC as it takes shape to choose a new Prime
  Minister and Cabinet. Jalil would like to keep several ministers from the el-Keib government in the new regime,
  particularly Minister of Defense Ousama al-Juwali.
  2. According to this individual, Jalil wants to maintain a degree of security and stability in an effort to reassure
  foreign businesses and banks that Libya will not descend into civil war and chaos. At the same time, the NTC must deal
  with the regional issues that divide the country's three electoral regions: Tripolitania in the West, Cyrenaica (Barge) in the
  East, and Fezzan in the South. In the weeks leading up to the election the failure of the NTC to resolve these differences
  has strengthened the federalist movement in Barge while antagonizing the tribal leaders in the South. Both groups are
  calling on their followers to boycott the election while the Southerners are calling for the National Army to withdraw its
  forces from the area around the town of Kufra, where they are deployed to stop fighting between tribal militias. At the
  same time, on July 1 federalist supporters attacked electoral offices in Benghazi, protesting the influence of Tripoli and the
  Western region on the upcoming elections.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739880
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045188

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739880
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  3. (Source Comment: In the opinion of a knowledgeable individual, the division of the 200 seats in the GNC lies
  at the heart of this matter, with 120 seats allotted for the Tripolitania, 60 for Barqa, and 18 for the Fezzan area. At
  present, the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood (LMB) and its political arm, the Justice and Construction Party (JCP), are
  attempting to mount a national campaign, receiving discreet advice and technical support from the Egyptian Muslim
  Brotherhood (EMB). With this assistance, Jalil is convinced that the JCP is the party that operates most effectively
  throughout the country. Jalil has established ties to the EMB, from whom he has learned that JCP leader Mohamad
  Sowan and his associates are working with the leadership of the EMB.)
  4. According to his sources, Jalil believes that he can work with Sowan and the LMB/JCP; however, he is
  concerned that Mohammed Morsi, the newly elected EMB President of Egypt, and EMB Supreme Guide Mohammed
  Badie are focused on developing Egyptian influence in Libya. Jalil has been informed privately that these EMB leaders
  want to establish a strong position in Libya, particularly in the oil services sector as part of their effort to improve Egypt's
  economic situation. Libyan officials in Cairo and Jalil's own associates are warning him that the Egyptians may see the
  NTC as a potential barrier to their effort and are advising Sowan to press for an early withdrawal of Jalil and the NTC from
  Libyan politics. For his part, Jalil has attempted to avoided direct conflict with the LMB/JCP, focusing his attention, and
  that of the el-Keib interim government on trying to deal with the unrest in the period leading up to the national elections.
  5. According to a particularly sensitive source, Jalil believes that Sowan will need the assistance of the Libyan
  National Party (LNP), the Islamist group led by religious scholar Ali al-Salabi and former Islamist militant
  General Abdel Hakim Alamin Belhaj to gain enough seats to control the GNC. While there are significant personal
  conflicts between Sowan and Belhaj, Jalil believes that the two groups could work together to gain control of the
  government. In this case, Jalil believes the new regime would move quickly to oust the NTC, and establish a more
  conservative Islamist regime. At the same time, since the LNP is a Tripoli based movement, Jalil fears that the tribal
  federalists in Barqa might react violently to them gaining an important role in the new government. Since the Barqa
  leaders are urging their followers to boycott the election, a strong role for the LNP in coalition with the LMB/JCB could
  lead to calls for Barge to secede from the Libya. (Source Comment: The LNP is dominated by the former leaders of the
  Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (AI-Jamala al-Islamiyyah —LIFG), who, according to sensitive sources, maintained ties to al
  Qa'ida during their struggle with the forces of former dictator Muammar al Qaddafi.)
  6. Former interim Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril is leading the National Forces Alliance (NFA),
  an umbrella coalition of liberal parties that received Western support for efforts to overthrow the regime of Muammar al
  Qaddafi. While Jibril is not on the list of candidates, his presence in the NFA leadership is seen by Belhaj and other
  Islamists as an effort by the United States and Western Europe to manipulate the election. Jalil does not believe that the
  NFA can gain control of enough seats in parliament to play a significant role in the new government. According to this
  source, Jalil believes that former Oil and Finance Minister Ali Tarhouni also plays an important role in the NFA.
  7. At the same time, Jafil is watching the progress of a second moderate party, the National Front (NF), which is
  based on the work of a 1980s-era anti-Qaddafi exile organization. The party is led by Mohammed al-Magariaf, an exiled
  intellectual dissident leader from a prominent Eastern Libyan family. Jalil's sources advise that the NF is also backed by
  the al-Sennusi tribe, the former Libyan royal family, who may be looking to play a role in a semi-autonomous or
  independent Barqa. One particularly sensitive source noted that many of the NF leaders have ties to the United States,
  Italy and the United Kingdom, and at one point Jalil believed that the NF might be able to work with the NFA; however,
  personal differences between the leaders of the two parties made effective cooperation difficult.
  8. (Source Comment: In the end, a particularly sensitive source stated in confidence that Jalil believes the
  LMB/JCB will have a significant role in the new government, possibly supported by the LNP. However; he points out that
  since accurate polling is nonexistent it is impossible to predict a victor with any accuracy. Jaill also noted that it is quite
  possible that no group will win a clear victory, which, when added to the boycotts and pre-election violence may require
  the NTC maintain control of the country for some time to come. Accordingly, he has instructed al-Juwali to prepare to use
  the National Army to maintain order. For his part Al-Juwali has warned that this will be a difficult task since the best units
  of the Army, including many of its armored forces are deployed in the Kufra region of the Southeast, in an effort to control
  tribal conflicts, stem the flow of weapons into the country from South Sudan, and resist Qaddafi loyalists amongst the
  nomadic tribes of the region.)
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739880
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045189

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739880
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  CONFIDENTIAL
  July 3, 2012
  For: Hillary
  From. Sid
  Re: Libyan election
  SOURCE. Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as
  the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services
  1. Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC) President Mustafa Abdel mil expected
  the final days leading to the July 7, 2012 national elections to be complicated and sometimes
  violent however, according to a knowledgeable individual, he is particularly concerned by the
  level of control exerted by regional militia's and political groups on the electoral process. In the
  opinion of this individual, Jalil and his advisors believe that, given the level of suspicion and
  frustration felt in the various parts of the country, it will be difficult for the new 200 seat General
  National Congress (GNC) to establish its authority, draft a new constitution, and establish new
  national government. With this in mind, Jalil stated in extreme confidence that the NTC may
  have to remain in power until the situation becomes stable and a new government is firmly in
  place. That said he still plans to have interim.Prime Minister Abdel Rahman el-Keib step down
  after the election results have been certified The NTC will then work with the GNC as it takes
  shape to choose a new Prime Minister and Cabinet. Jalil would like to keep several ministers
  from the el-Keib government in the new regime, particularly Minister of Defense Ousama al-
  Juwali.
  2. According to this individual, Jalil wants to maintain a degree of security and stability
  in an effort to reassure foreign businesses and banks that Libya will not descend into civil war
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739880
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045190

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739880
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  and chaos. At the same time, the NTC must deal with the regional issues that divide the
  country's three electoral regions: Tripolitania in the West, Cyrenaica (Barqa) in the East, and
  Fezzan in the South. In the weeks leading up to the election the failure of the NTC to resolve
  these differences has strengthened the federalist movement in Barqa while antagonizing the tribal
  leaders in the South. Both groups are calling on their followers to boycott the election while the
  Southerners are calling for the National Army to withdraw its forces from the area around the
  town of Kufra, where they are deployed to stop fighting between tribal militias. At the same
  time, on July 1 federalist supporters attacked electoral offices in Benghazi, protesting the
  influence of Tripoli and the Western region on the upcoming elections.
  3. (Source Comment: In the opinion of a knowledgeable individual, the division of the
  200 seats in the GNC lies at the heart of this matter, with 120 seats allotted for the Tripolitania,
  60 for Barqa, and 18 for the Fezzan area. At present, the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood (LMB)
  and its political arm, the Justice and Construction Party (JCP), are attempting to mount a national
  campaign, receiving discreet advice and technical support from the Egyptian Muslim
  Brotherhood (EMB). With this assistance, Jalil is convinced that the JCP is the party that
  operates most effectively throughout the country. Jalil has established ties to the EMB, from
  whom he has learned that JCP leader Mohamad Sowan and his associates are working with the
  leadership of the EMB.)
  4. According to his sources, Jalil believes that he can work with Sowan and the
  LMB/JCP; however, he is concerned that Mohammed Morsi, the newly elected EMB President
  of Egypt, and EMB Supreme Guide Mohammed Badie are focused on developing Egyptian
  influence in Libya. Jalil has been informed privately that these EMB leaders want to establish a
  strong position in Libya, particularly in the oil services sector as part of their effort to improve
  Egypt's economic situation Libyan officials in Cairo and Jalil's own associates are warning him
  that the Egyptians may see the NTC as a potential barrier to their effort and are advising Sowan
  to press for an early withdrawal of Jalil and the NTC from Libyan politics. For his part, Jalil has
  attempted to avoided direct conflict with the LMB/JCP, focusing his attention, and that of the el-
  Keib interim government on trying to deal with the unrest in the period leading up to the national
  elections.
  5. According to a particularly sensitive source, Jalil believes that Sowan will need the
  assistance of the Libyan National Party (LNP), the Islamist group led by religious scholar
  All al-Salabi and former Islamist militant General Abdel Hakim Alamin Belhaj to gain enough
  seats to control the GNC. While there are significant personal conflicts between Sowan and
  Belhaj, Jalil believes that the two groups could work together to gain control of the government
  In this case, Jalil believes the new regime would move quickly to oust the NTC, and establish a
  more conservative Islamist regime. At the same time, since the LNP is a Tripoli based
  movement, Jalil fears that the tribal federalists in Barqa might react violently to them gaining an
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739880
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045191

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739880
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  important role in the new government. Since the Barqa leaders are urging their followers to
  boycott the election, a strong role for the LNP in coalition with the LMB/JCB could lead to calls
  for Barqa to secede from the Libya. (Source Comment: The LNP is dominated by the former
  leaders of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (Al-Jama'a al-Islamiyyah —LIFG), who, according
  to sensitive sources, maintained ties to al Qa'ida during their stru• e with the forces of former
  dictator Muammar al Qaddafi.)
  6. Former interim Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril is leading the National Forces
  Alliance (NFA), an umbrella coalition of liberal parties that received Western support for
  efforts to overthrow the regime of Muarnmar al Qaddafi. While Jibril is not on the list of
  candidates, his presence in the NFA leadership is seen by Belhaj and other Islamists as an effort
  by the United States and Western Europe to manipulate the election. Jalil does not believe that
  the NFA can gain control of enough seats in parliament to play a significant role in the new
  government. According to this source, Jalil believes that former Oil and Finance Minister Ali
  Tarhouni also plays an important role in the NFA.
  7. At the same time, Jalil is watching the progress of a second moderate party, the
  National Front (NF), which is based on the work of a 1980s-era anti-Qaddafi exile organization.
  The party is led by Mohammed al-Magariaf, an exiled intellectual dissident leader from a
  prominent Eastern Libyan family. Jahr s sources advise that the NF is also backed by the al-
  Sennusi tribe, the former Libyan royal family, who may be looking to play a role in a semi-
  autonomous or independent Barqa. One particularly sensitive source noted that many of the NF
  leaders have ties to the United States, Italy and the United Kingdom, and at one point Jalil
  believed that the NF might be able to work with the NFA; however, personal differences
  between the leaders of the two parties made effective cooperation difficult.
  8. (Source Comment: In the end, a particularly sensitive source stated in confidence that
  Jalil believes the LMB/JCB will have a significant role in the new government, possibly
  supported by the LNP. However; he points out that since accurate polling is nonexistent it is
  impossible to predict a victor with any accuracy. Jalil also noted that it is quite possible that no
  group will win a clear victory, which, when added to the boycotts and pre-election violence may
  require the NTC maintain control of the country for some time to come. Accordingly, he has
  instructed al-Juwali to prepare to use the National Army to maintain order. For his part Al-
  Juwali has warned that this will be a difficult task since the best units of the Army, including
  many of its armored forces are deployed in the Kufra region of the Southeast, in an effort to
  control tribal conflicts, stem the flow of weapons into the country from South Sudan, and resist
  Qaddafi loyalists amongst the nomadic tribes of the region.)
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739880
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045192



DocNumber: C05739882
MetadataSubject: FYI
MetadataTo: sullivanjj@state.gov
MetadataFrom: H
MetadataDateSent: 2012-07-07T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH1/DOC_0C05739882/C05739882.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedTo: `sullivanji@state.gov'
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739882
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN FULL
ExtractedBodyText:
  Another report--
  SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of
  European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.
  1. As of the morning of July 6, an individual with access to the information stated in confidence that Libyan National
  Transitional Council (NTC) President Mustafa Abdel Jalil remains committed to a transfer of power to a popularly elected
  government; however, he is prepared to ex-tend the life of the NTC as a guarantor of stability for the Libyan people
  following the July 7, 2012 election for seats in a 200-member General National Congress (GNC). Jaifi realizes that 2.7
  million Libyans have registered to vote and are generally anxious to replace the increasingly unpopular NTC. That said,
  JAI expects the voting to lead to a period of confusion and he will not abandon his authority until the results are fixed.
  2. Jalil is also frustrated by the fact that during its eight-month tenure of the administration of Prime Minister Abclel
  Rahman el-Keib - who was appointed by the NTC was unable to provide solutions for Libya's long list of needs: a
  functioning justice system, a reconciliation process for officials who served the old administration, the disarming of
  militia, building functional national security forces, rebuilding destroyed areas, and delivering basic services such as
  healthcare.
  3. At the same time, outside of the oil sector, much of Libya's economy is stagnant, and in the opinion of Western
  security officials, lacks the government's go-ahead to restart public sector infrastructure contracts. In addition,
  international advisers and foreign investors are reluctant to return to an environment where the government will not
  sign long term agreements and cannot guarantee security.
  4.(Source Comment: According to an extremely sensitive source, Jalil continues to believe that this chaotic situation
  should not be surprising. He regularly points out that eight months is not a sufficient amount of time to build functioning
  institutions from the remnants of the regime of former dictator Muammar al Qaddafi. The old regime featured a
  dysfunctional bureaucracy, idiosyncratic rule, and anti-institutionalism. Additionally, Jaill now re
  Ializes that due to
  pronounced incompetence and a lack of will to take unpopular decisions the el-Keib government also failed to make
  progress in the few areas where it could have achieved meaningful change. The towns of Sirte and Tawargha are
  representative of the situation in the countryside where people lost their homes in the conflict and have been living in
  temporary camps with limited ability to register and vote in their home district. Jalil has been urged by contacts in the
  French and Italian Governments to guarantee the rights of people across the country in particular, he has serious
  concerns as to whether or not supporters of former dictator Muammar al Qaddafi in his hometown of Sirte will be
  included in the future political processes of the new Libya; if they are not allowed to vote by local militiamen. At the
  same time, the fighting between Libyan Arabs and Tebta tribesmen in the Kufra area threatens to prevent any voting
  there. Jalil has been warned that the NTC regulations now state that members of the National Army are not allowed to
  vote or run for office, which is a disincentive for armed militia brigade members to become legitimate soldiers.)
  5.This well informed individual believes that despite these flaws, the new government created by the July 7 election will
  eventually have the mandate to take the difficult decisions that can create a reconciliation process. Jalil will work to
  maintain order in this transition period, and finally reach his goal of creating a situation where the government can
  rebuild homes and restore sufficient law and order; allowing those in Sirte, Tawargha, Kufra, and throughout the rest of
  the country to live in their hometowns, establishing a situation where a true civil society can develop.
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739882
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045193
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739882
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  6. Jail!, in conversations with the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), and separately with liberal leader Ali
  Tarhouni, has acknowledged that the central government's top priority must be security and that the NTC has been
  unable to provide it. That said, Jail! and Minister of Defense Ousarna alefuwali have pledged to provide 30,000 to 40,000
  security personnel for election day to prevent similar incidents to the July 1 attack on Benghazi's election headquarters.
  In that case eastern federalists entered the building, where ballot papers were burned and ballot boxes destroyed.
  Similarly, these federalist forces are suspected of the attack on July 5 that burned down Ajdabiya's main storage centre
  for election materials.
  7. In the opinion of this individual, although those responsible for the Benghazi attack were pro-federalist, it has not
  been proven that they were members of the self-appointed Cyrenaican National Council (MC), whose military arm set
  up a roadblock in Wadi al-Ahmar on Libya's major east-west highway to demand that Cyrenaica get as many seats in the
  GNC as Tripolitania. Thus far, neither the CNC nor any other group has publicly stated that they intend to use violence to
  disrupt the elections. (Note: Under the current system Tripolitania will have 120 seats in the GNC, Cyrenaica (Barge) 62,
  and Fezzan in the South 18.)
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739882
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045194

RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739882
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  FULL
  From H ehrod17@clintonemail.com
  Sent Saturday, July 7, 2012 8:20 AM
  To: `sullivanji@state.gov'
  Subject Fyi
  Another report--
  SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of
  European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.
  1. As of the morning of July 6, an individual with access to the information stated in confidence that Libyan National
  Transitional Council (NTC) President Mustafa Abdel Jalil remains committed to a transfer of power to a popularly elected
  government; however, he is prepared to ex-tend the life of the NTC as a guarantor of stability for the Libyan people
  following the July 7, 2012 election for seats in a 200-member General National Congress (GNC). Jaifi realizes that 2.7
  million Libyans have registered to vote and are generally anxious to replace the increasingly unpopular NTC. That said,
  JAI expects the voting to lead to a period of confusion and he will not abandon his authority until the results are fixed.
  2. Jalil is also frustrated by the fact that during its eight-month tenure of the administration of Prime Minister Abclel
  Rahman el-Keib - who was appointed by the NTC was unable to provide solutions for Libya's long list of needs: a
  functioning justice system, a reconciliation process for officials who served the old administration, the disarming of
  militia, building functional national security forces, rebuilding destroyed areas, and delivering basic services such as
  healthcare.
  3. At the same time, outside of the oil sector, much of Libya's economy is stagnant, and in the opinion of Western
  security officials, lacks the government's go-ahead to restart public sector infrastructure contracts. In addition,
  international advisers and foreign investors are reluctant to return to an environment where the government will not
  sign long term agreements and cannot guarantee security.
  4.(Source Comment: According to an extremely sensitive source, Jalil continues to believe that this chaotic situation
  should not be surprising. He regularly points out that eight months is not a sufficient amount of time to build functioning
  institutions from the remnants of the regime of former dictator Muammar al Qaddafi. The old regime featured a
  dysfunctional bureaucracy, idiosyncratic rule, and anti-institutionalism. Additionally, Jaill now re
  Ializes that due to
  pronounced incompetence and a lack of will to take unpopular decisions the el-Keib government also failed to make
  progress in the few areas where it could have achieved meaningful change. The towns of Sirte and Tawargha are
  representative of the situation in the countryside where people lost their homes in the conflict and have been living in
  temporary camps with limited ability to register and vote in their home district. Jalil has been urged by contacts in the
  French and Italian Governments to guarantee the rights of people across the country in particular, he has serious
  concerns as to whether or not supporters of former dictator Muammar al Qaddafi in his hometown of Sirte will be
  included in the future political processes of the new Libya; if they are not allowed to vote by local militiamen. At the
  same time, the fighting between Libyan Arabs and Tebta tribesmen in the Kufra area threatens to prevent any voting
  there. Jalil has been warned that the NTC regulations now state that members of the National Army are not allowed to
  vote or run for office, which is a disincentive for armed militia brigade members to become legitimate soldiers.)
  5.This well informed individual believes that despite these flaws, the new government created by the July 7 election will
  eventually have the mandate to take the difficult decisions that can create a reconciliation process. Jalil will work to
  maintain order in this transition period, and finally reach his goal of creating a situation where the government can
  rebuild homes and restore sufficient law and order; allowing those in Sirte, Tawargha, Kufra, and throughout the rest of
  the country to live in their hometowns, establishing a situation where a true civil society can develop.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739882
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045193

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739882
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  6. Jail!, in conversations with the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), and separately with liberal leader Ali
  Tarhouni, has acknowledged that the central government's top priority must be security and that the NTC has been
  unable to provide it. That said, Jail! and Minister of Defense Ousarna alefuwali have pledged to provide 30,000 to 40,000
  security personnel for election day to prevent similar incidents to the July 1 attack on Benghazi's election headquarters.
  In that case eastern federalists entered the building, where ballot papers were burned and ballot boxes destroyed.
  Similarly, these federalist forces are suspected of the attack on July 5 that burned down Ajdabiya's main storage centre
  for election materials.
  7. In the opinion of this individual, although those responsible for the Benghazi attack were pro-federalist, it has not
  been proven that they were members of the self-appointed Cyrenaican National Council (MC), whose military arm set
  up a roadblock in Wadi al-Ahmar on Libya's major east-west highway to demand that Cyrenaica get as many seats in the
  GNC as Tripolitania. Thus far, neither the CNC nor any other group has publicly stated that they intend to use violence to
  disrupt the elections. (Note: Under the current system Tripolitania will have 120 seats in the GNC, Cyrenaica (Barge) 62,
  and Fezzan in the South 18.)
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739882
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045194



DocNumber: C05739883
MetadataSubject: FYI
MetadataTo: H
MetadataFrom: Sullivan, Jacob J
MetadataDateSent: 2012-07-07T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH1/DOC_0C05739883/C05739883.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: Re: Fyi
ExtractedFrom: Sullivan, Jacob .1 <SulliyanJJ©state.gov>
ExtractedDateSent: Saturday, July 7, 2012 10:04 AM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739883
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN FULL
ExtractedBodyText:
  Will pass to Chris and Beth. To state the obvious, the ballot burning and helicopter shootdown are concerning.

RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739883
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  FULL
  From: Sullivan, Jacob .1 <SulliyanJJ©state.gov>
  Sent: Saturday, July 7, 2012 10:04 AM
  To:
  Subject: Re: Fyi
  Will pass to Chris and Beth. To state the obvious, the ballot burning and helicopter shootdown are concerning.
  Original Message ----
  From H [mailto:HDR22@clintonemail.corn]
  Sent: Saturday, July 07, 2012 08:20 AM
  To: Sullivan, Jacob
  Subject: Fyi
  Another report---
  SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of
  European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.
  1. As of the morning of July 6, an individual with access to the information stated in confidence that Libyan National
  Transitional Council (NTC) President Mustafa Abdel Jalil remains committed to a transfer of power to a popularly elected
  government; however, he is prepared to extend the life of the NTC as a guarantor of stability for the Libyan people
  following the July 7, 2012 election for seats in a 200-member General National Congress (GNC). Jalil realizes that 2.7
  million Libyans have registered to vote and are generally anxious to replace the increasingly unpopular NTC. That said,
  Jalil expects the voting to lead to a period of confusion and he will not abandon his authority until the results are fixed.
  2. Jalil is also frustrated by the fact that during its eight-month tenure of the administration of Prime Minister Abdel
  Rahman el-Keib - who was appointed by the NTC — was unable to provide solutions for Libya's long list of needs: a
  functioning justice system, a reconciliation process for officials who served the old administration, the disarming of
  militia, building functional national security forces, rebuilding destroyed areas, and delivering basic services such as
  healthcare.
  3. At the same time, outside of the oil sector, much of Libya's economy is stagnant, and in the opinion of Western
  security officials, lacks the government's go-ahead to restart public sector infrastructure contracts. In addition,
  international advisers and foreign investors are reluctant to return to an environment where the government will not
  sign long term agreements and cannot guarantee security.
  4. (Source Comment: According to an extremely sensitive source, Jalil continues to believe that this chaotic situation
  should not be surprising. He regularly points out that eight months is not a sufficient amount of time to build functioning
  institutions from the remnants of the regime of former dictator Muammar al Qaddafi. The old regime featured a
  dysfunctional bureaucracy, idiosyncratic rule, and anti-institutionalism. Additionally, Jalil now realizes that due to
  pronounced incompetence and a lack of will to take unpopular decisions the el-Keib government also failed to make
  progress in the few areas where it could have achieved meaningful change. The towns of Sirte and Tawargha are
  representative of the situation in the countryside where people lost their homes in the conflict and have been living in
  temporary camps with limited ability to register and vote in their home district. Jalil has been urged by contacts in the
  French and Italian Governments to guarantee the rights of people across the country. In particular, he has serious
  concerns as to whether or not supporters of former dictator fv1uammar al Qaddafi in his hometown of Sirte will be
  included in the future political processes of the new Libya; if they are not allowed to vote by local militiamen. At the
  same time the fighting between Libyan Arabs and Tebu tribesmen in the Kufra area threatens to prevent any voting
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739883
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045195

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739883
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  there. Jalil has been warned that the NTC regulations now state that members of the National Army are not allowed to
  vote or run for office, which is a disincentive for armed militia brigade members to become legitimate soldiers.)
  5.This well informed individual believes that despite these flaws, the new government created by the July 7 election will
  eventually have the mandate to take the difficult decisions that can create a reconciliation process. Jalil will work to
  maintain order in this transition period, and finally reach his goal of creating a situation where the government can
  rebuild homes and restore sufficient law and order; allowing those in Sirte, Tawargha, Kufra, and throughout the rest of
  the country to live in their hometowns, establishing a situation where a true civil society can develop.
  6. Jalil, in conversations with the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), and separately with liberal leader All
  Tarhouni, has acknowledged that the central government's top priority must be security and that the NTC has been
  unable to provide it. That said, Jalil and Minister of Defense Ousarna al-Juwali have pledged to provide 30,000 to 40,000
  security personnel for election day to 'prevent similar incidents to the July 1 attack on Benghazi's election headquarters.
  In that case eastern federalists entered the building, where ballot papers were burned and ballot boxes destroyed.
  Similarly, these federalist forces are suspected of the attack on July 5 that burned down Ajdabiyals main storage centre
  for election materials.
  7. In the opinion of this individual, although those responsible for the Benghazi attack were pro-federalist, it has not
  been proven that they were members of the self-appointed Cyrenaican National Council (CNC), whose military arm set
  up a roadblock in Wadi al-Ahmar on Libya's major east-west highway to demand that Cyrenaica get as many seats in the
  GNC as Tripolitania. Thus far, neither the CNC nor any other group has publicly stated that they intend to use violence to
  disrupt the elections. (Note: Under the current system Tripolitania will have 120 seats in the GNC, Cyrenaica (Barqa) 62,
  and Fezzan in the South 18.)
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739883
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045196



DocNumber: C05739884
MetadataSubject: LIBYA INTEL FROM S
MetadataTo: H
MetadataFrom: Sullivan, Jacob J
MetadataDateSent: 2012-07-07T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH1/DOC_0C05739884/C05739884.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: RE: Libya intel from S
ExtractedFrom: Stevens, John C
ExtractedCc: Jones, Beth E
ExtractedDateSent: Saturday, July 7,2012 12:31 PM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739884
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN FULL
ExtractedBodyText: Fyi
RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739884
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  FULL
  From; Sullivan, Jacobi <Sullivanii@state.gove
  Sent: Saturday, July 7,2012 12:31 PM
  To:
  Subject Fw: Libya intel from S
  Fyi
  Original Message ---
  From: Stevens, John C
  Sent: Saturday, July 07, 2012 12:13 PM
  To: Sullivan, Jacob
  Cc: Jones, Beth E
  Subject: RE: Libya intel from S
  Jake - Thanks for this. Tracks with what we are hearing about elections and the weakness of the interim govt. Elections
  are going smoothly throughout most of Libya (Ajdabiya being the exception, where some ballots were sabotaged
  requiring voting in some centers to be postponed for a few hours). Factoring in time to tally votes and process appeals,
  the UN and the Libyan elections commission are anticipating announcing final results by late July. The expectation is
  that the TNC will remain in power until the new congress is seated.
  Sett McCain and I toured the new parliament this afternoon, where we encountered a TNC member, an engineer and a
  couple of UN experts reviewing progress on the interior decor of the main chamber. They are racing to get the chamber
  finished in time for the first session. The UN is offering technical assistance to the secretariat of the new congress,
  ranging from parliamentary procedure to legislative drafting. They're even helping to plot out the choreography of the
  first sessions.
  The atmosphere in Tripoli is very festive. The gov't declared today a holiday and people are driving around honking and
  waving flags and making peace sign gestures. We visited several polling stations where we found people patiently
  waiting in lines (gender segregated) lvlcCain was applauded and thanked for his support wherever we went.
  -- Chris
  -----Original Message
  From: Sullivan, Jacob
  Sent: Saturday, July 07, 2012 10:07 AM
  To: Jones, Beth E; Stevens, John C
  Subject: Libya intel from S
  Further info from friend of 5:
  SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of
  European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.
  1. As of the morning of July 6, an individual with access to the information stated in confidence that Libyan National
  Transitional Council (NTC) President Mustafa Abdel ialil remains committed to a transfer of power to a popularly elected
  government; however, he is prepared to extend the life of the NTC as a guarantor of stability for the Libyan people
  following the July 7, 2012 election for seats in a 200 member General National Congress (6 NC) Jail) realizes that 2.7
  million Libyans have registered to vote and are generally anxious to replace the increasingly unpopular NTC. That said,
  Jaill expects the voting to lead to a period of confusion and he will not abandon his authority until the results are fixed.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739884
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045197

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739884
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  2. Jalil is also frustrated by the fact that during its eight-month tenure of the administration of Prime Minister Made!
  Rahrnan el-Keib - who was appointed by the NTC — was unable to provide solutions for Libya's long list of needs: a
  functioning justice system, a reconciliation process for officials who served the old administration, the disarming of
  militia, building functional national security forces, rebuilding destroyed areas, and delivering basic services such as
  healthcare.
  3. At the same time, outside of the oil sector, much of Libya's economy is stagnant, and in the opinion of Western
  security officials, lacks the government's go-ahead to restart public sector infrastructure contracts. In addition,
  international advisers and foreign investors are reluctant to return to an environment where the government will not
  sign long term agreements and cannot guarantee security.
  4.(Source Comment: According to an extremely sensitive source, Jai continues to believe that this chaotic situation
  should not be surprising. He regularly points out that eight months is not a sufficient amount of time to build functioning
  institutions from the remnants of the regime of former dictator Muammar al Qaddafi. The old regime featured a
  dysfunctional bureaucracy, idiosyncratic rule, and anti-institutionalism. Additionally, Jalil now realizes that due to
  pronounced incompetence and a lack of will to take unpopular decisions the el-Keib government also failed to make
  progress in the few areas where it could have achieved meaningful change. The towns of Sirte and Tawargha are
  representative of the situation in the countryside where people lost their homes in the conflict and have been living in
  temporary camps with limited ability to register and vote in their home district. Jail' has been urged by contacts in the
  French and Italian Governments to guarantee the rights of people across the country. In particular, he has serious
  concerns as to whether or not supporters of former dictator Muammar al Qaddafi in his hometown of Sirte will be
  included in the future political processes of the new Libya; if they are not allowed to vote by local militiamen. At the
  same time, the fighting between Libyan Arabs and Tebu tribesmen in the Kufra area threatens to prevent any voting
  there. Jalil has been warned that the NTC regulations now state that members of the National Army are not allowed to
  vote or run for office, which is a disincentive for armed militia brigade members to become legitimate soldiers.)
  5.This well informed individual believes that despite these flaws, the new government created by the July 7 election will
  eventually have the mandate to take the difficult decisions that can create a reconciliation process. Jalil will work to
  maintain order in this transition period, and finally reach his goal of creating a situation where the government can
  rebuild homes and restore sufficient law and order; allowing those in Sine, Tawargha, Kufra, and throughout the rest of
  the country to live in their hometowns, establishing a situation where a true civil society can develop.
  6. Jail!, in conversations with the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), and separately with liberal leader Ali
  Tarhouni, has acknowledged that the central government's top priority must be security and that the NTC has been
  unable to provide it. That said, JAI and Minister of Defense Ousama al-Juwali have pledged to provide 30,000 to 40,000
  security personnel for election day to prevent similar incidents to the July 1 attack on Benghazi's election headquarters.
  In that case eastern federalists entered the building, where ballot papers were burned and ballot boxes destroyed.
  Similarly, these federalist forces are suspected of the attack on July 5 that burned down Ajdabiya's main storage centre
  for election materials.
  7. In the opinion of this individual, although those responsible for the Benghazi attack were pro-federalist, it has not
  been proven that they were members of the self-appointed Cyrenaican National Council (CNC), whose military arm set
  up a roadblock in Wadi al-Ahmar on Libya's major east-west highway to demand that Cyrenaica get as many seats in the
  GNC as Tripolitania. Thus far, neither the CNC nor any other group has publicly stated that they intend to use violence to
  disrupt the elections. (Note: Under the current system Tripolitania will have 120 seats in the GNC, Cyrenaica (Barge) 62,
  and Fezzan in the South 18.)
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739884
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045198



DocNumber: C05739885
MetadataSubject: H: LIBYAN ELECTIONS INTEL. SID
MetadataTo: Russorv@state.gov
MetadataFrom: H
MetadataDateSent: 2012-07-17T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH1/DOC_0C05739885/C05739885.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: H: Libyan elections Intel. Sid
ExtractedTo: H
ExtractedDateSent: Tuesday, July 03, 2012 07:08 PM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739885
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
ExtractedBodyText:
  B6
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739885
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  PART B6

RawText:
  From:
  Sent: Tuesday, July 03, 2012 07:08 PM
  To: H
  Subject: H: Libyan elections Intel. Sid
  B6
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739885
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  PART B6
  From:
  Sent
  To:
  Subject
  Attachments:
  H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>
  Tuesday, July 17, 2012 7:16 AM
  'Russorv@state.gov.
  Fw: H: Libyan elections intel. Sid
  hrc memo libyan elections intel 070312.docx
  Pls print.
  CONFIDENTIAL
  July 3, 2012
  For Hillary
  From: Sid
  Re: Libyan election
  SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of
  European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.
  1. Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC) President Mustafa Abdel Jalil expected the final days leading to the
  July 7, 2012 national elections to be complicated and sometimes violent; however, according to a knowledgeable
  individual, he is particularly concerned by the level of control exerted by regional militia's and political groups on the
  electoral process. In the opinion of this individual, Jalil and his advisors believe that, given the level of suspicion and
  frustration felt in the various parts of the country, it will be difficult for the new 200 seat General National Congress (GNC)
  to establish its authority, draft a new constitution, and establish new national government. With this in mind, Jalil stated in
  extreme confidence that the NTC may have to remain in power until the situation becomes stable and a new government
  is firmly in place. That said he still plans to have interim Prime Minister Abdel Rahman el-Keib step down after the
  election results have been certified. The NTC will then work with the GNC as it takes shape to choose a new Prime
  Minister and Cabinet. Jalil would like to keep several ministers from the el-Keib government in the new regime,
  particularly Minister of Defense Ousama al-Juwali.
  2. According to this individual, Jalil wants to maintain a degree of security and stability in an effort to reassure
  foreign businesses and banks that Libya will not descend into civil war and chaos. At the same time, the NTC must deal
  with the regional issues that divide the country's three electoral regions: Tripolitania in the West, Cyrenaica (Barqa) in the
  East, and Fezzan in the South. In the weeks leading up to the election the failure of the NTC to resolve these differences
  has strengthened the federalist movement in Barqa while antagonizing the tribal leaders in the South. Both groups are
  calling on their followers to boycott the election while the Southerners are calling for the National Army to withdraw its
  forces from the area around the town of Kufra, where they are deployed to stop fighting between tribal militias. At the
  same time, on July 1 federalist supporters attacked electoral offices in Benghazi, protesting the influence of Tripoli and the
  Western region on the upcoming elections.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739885
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045199

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739885
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  3. (Source Comment In the opinion of a knowledgeable individual, the division of the 200 seats in the GNC lies
  at the heart of this matter, with 120 seats allotted for the Tripolitania, 60 for Banta, and 18 for the Fezzan area. At
  present, the Libyan MUSlifIl Brotherhood (LMB) and its political arm, the Justice and Construction Party (JCP), are
  attempting to mount a national campaign, receiving discreet advice and technic.al support from the Egyptian Muslim
  Brotherhood (EMB). Withthis assistance, Jalil is convinced that the JCP is the party that operates most effectively
  throughout the country. JO has established ties to the EMB, from whom he has learned that JCP leader Mohamed
  Sowan and his associates are working with the leadership of the EMB.)
  4, According to his sources, Jai believes that he can work with Sowan and the LMB/JCP; however, he is
  concerned that Mohammed Morsi, the newly elected EMB President of Egypt and EMB Supreme Guide Mohammed
  Bathe are focused on developing Egyptian influence in Libya. Jalil has been informed privately that these EMS leaders
  want to establish a strong position in Libya, particularly in the oil services sector as part of their effort to improve Egypt's
  economic situation. Libyan officials in Cairo and Jallfs own associates are warning him that the Egyptians may see the
  NTC as a potential barrier to their effort and are advising Sowan to press for an early withdrawal of Jalil and the NTC from
  Libyan politics. For his part, Jalil has attempted to avoided direct conflict with the LMB/JCP, focusing his attention, and
  that of the el-keib interim government on trying to deal with the unrest in the period leading up to the national elections.
  5. According to a particularly sensitive source, Jalil believes that Sowan will need the assistance of the Libyan
  National Party (LNP), the Islamist group led by religious scholar All al-Salabi and former Islarnist militant
  General Abdel Hakim Alamin Belhaj to gain enough seats to control the GNC. While there are significant personal
  conflicts between Sowan and Bethel Jalii believes that the two groups could work together to gain control of the
  government. In this case, Jalil believes the new regime would move quickly to oust the RITC, and establish a more
  conservative Islamist regime. At the same time since the LNP is a Tn'poli based movement, Jalil fears that the tribal
  federalists in Barge might react violently to them gaining an important role in the new government. Since the Barge
  leaders are urging their followers to boycott the election, a strong role for the LNP in coalition with the LMB/JCB could
  lead to calls for Barge to secede from the Libya. (Source Comment: The LNP is dominated by the former leaders of the
  Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (AI-Jama'a al-Islamiyyah —LIFG), who according to sensitive sources, maintained ties to at
  Oalcia during their struggle with the forces of former dictator !Muenster at Qaddafi.)
  6. Former interim Prime Minister Mahmotel Jibril is leading the National Forces Alliance (NFA),
  an umbrella coalition of liberal parties that received Western support for efforts to overthrow the regime of Nluammar at
  Qaddafi. VVhile Jibril is not on the list of candidates, his presence in the NFA leadership is seen by Belhaj and other
  Islamists as an effort by the United States and Western Europe to manipulate the election. Jalil does not believe that the
  NFA can gain control of enough seats in parliament to play a significant role in the new government. According to this
  source, Jalil believes that former Oil and Finance Minister Ali Tanhouni also plays an important role in the NFA.
  7, At the same time Jalil is watching the progress of a second moderate party, the National Front (NF), which is
  based on the work of a 1980s-era anti-Qaddafi exile organization. The party is led by Mohammed al-Magariaf, an exiled
  intellectual dissident leader from a prominent Eastern Libyan family, Jai's sources advise that the NF is also backed by
  the al-Sennusi tribe, the former Libyan royal family, who may be looking to play a role in a semi-autonomous or
  independent Barga. One particularly sensitive source noted that many of the NF leaders have ties to the United States,
  Italy and the United Kingdom, and at one point Jalil believed that the NF might be able to work with the NFA; however,
  personal differences between the leaders of the two parties made effective cooperation difficult.
  8. (Source Comment: In the end, a particularly sensitive source stated in confidence that Jalil believes the
  LNIBIJCB will have a significant role in the new government possibly supported by the LNP. However; he points out that
  since accurate polling is nonexistent it is impossible to predict a victor with any accuracy. Jaill also noted that it is quite
  possible that no group will win a clear victory, which, when added to the boycotts and pre-election violence may require
  the NTC maintain control of the country for some time to come. Accordingly, he has instructed ahArwalii to prepare to use
  the National Army to maintain order. For his part Al-Juwali has warned that this will be a difficult task since the best units
  of the Army, including many of its armored forces are deployed in the kutra region of the Southeast, in an effort to control
  tribal conflicts, stem the flow of weapons into the country from South Sudan, and resist Qaddati loyalists amongst the
  nomadic tribes of the region.)
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739885
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045200

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739885
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  CONFIDENTIAL
  July 3,2012
  For: Hilary
  From. Sid
  Re Libyan election
  SOURCE: Sources.vvith direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as
  the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security ser‘ices.
  1, Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC) President Mustafa Abdel Jail expected
  the final days leading to the July 7, 2012 national elections to be complicated and sometimes
  violent however, according to a knowledgeable individual, he is particularly concerned by the
  level of control exerted by regional militia's and political groups on the electoral process. In the
  opinion of this individual, Jahl and his advisors believe that, given the level of suspicion and
  frustration felt in the various parts of the country, it will be difficult for the new 200 seat General
  National Congress (GNC) to establish its authority, draft a new constitution, and establish new
  national government. With this in mind, Jalil stated in extreme confidence that the NTC may
  have to remain in power until the situation becomes stable and a new government is firmly in
  place. That said he still plans to have interim Prime Minister Abdel Rahman el-Keib step down
  after the election results have been certified. The NTC will then work with the GNC as it takes
  shape to choose a new Prime Minister and Cabinet. Jail would like to keep several ministers
  from the el-Keib government in the new regime, particularly Minister of Defense Ousama al-
  Juwal i
  2 According to this individual, Jalil wants to maintain a degree of security and stability
  in an effort to reassure foreign businesses and banks that Libya will not descend into civil war
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739885
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045201

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739885
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  and chaos. At the same time, the NTC must deal with the regional issues that divide the
  country's three electoral regions: Tripolitania in the West, Cyrenaica (Barqa) in the East, and
  Fezzan in the South. In the weeks leading up to the election the failure of the NTC to resolve
  these differences has strengthened the federalist movement in Barqa while antagonizing the tribal
  leaders in the South. Both groups are calling on their followers to boycott the election while the
  Southerners are calling for the National Army to withdraw its forces from the area around the
  town of Kufra, where they are deployed to stop fighting between tribal militias. At the same
  time, on July 1 federalist supporters attacked electoral offices in Benghazi, protesting the
  influence of Tripoli and the Western region on the upcoming elections.
  3. (Source Comment: In the opinion of a knowledgeable individual, the division of the
  200 seats in the GNC lies at the heart of this matter, with 120 seats allotted for the Tripolitania,
  60 for Barqa, and 18 for the Fezzan area. At present, the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood (LMB)
  and its political arm, the Justice and Construction Party (JCP), are attempting to mount a national
  campaign, receiving discreet advice and technical support from the Egyptian Muslim
  Brotherhood (EMB). With this assistance, Jalil is convinced that the JCP is the party that
  operates most effectively throughout the country. Jalil has established ties to the EMB, from
  whom he has learned that JCP leader Mohamad Sowan and his associates are working with the
  leadership of the EMB.)
  4.According to his sources, Jalil believes that he can work with Sowan and the
  LMB/JCP; however, he is concerned that Mohammed Morsi, the newly elected EMB President
  of Egypt, and EMB Supreme Guide Mohammed Badie are focused on developing Egyptian
  influence in Libya. Jalil has been informed privately that these EMB leaders want to establish a
  strong position in Libya, particularly in the oil services sector as part of their effort to improve
  Egypt's economic situation. Libyan officials in Cairo and Jalil's own associates are warning him
  that the Egyptians may see the NTC as a potential barrier to their effort and are advising Sowan
  to press for an early withdrawal of Jalil and the NTC from Libyan politics. For his part, Jalil has
  attempted to avoided direct conflict with the LMB/JCP, focusing his attention, and that of the el-
  Keib interim government on trying to deal with the unrest in the period leading up to the national
  elections.
  5. According to a particularly sensitive source, Jalil believes that Sowan will need the
  assistance of the Libyan National Party (LNP), the Islamist group led by religious scholar
  Ali al-Salabi and former Islamist militant General Abdel Hakim Alamin Belhaj to gain enough
  seats to control the GNC. While there are significant personal conflicts between Sowan and
  Belhaj, Jalil believes that the two groups could work together to gain control of the government.
  In this case, Jalil believes the new regime would move quickly to oust the NTC, and establish a
  more conservative Islamist regime. At the same time, since the LNP is a Tripoli based
  movement, Nil fears that the tribal federalists in Barqa might react violently to them gaining an
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739885
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045202

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739885
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  important role in the new government. Since the Barqa leaders are urging their followers to
  boycott the election, a strong role for the LNP in coalition with the LMB/JCB could lead to calls
  for Barqa to secede from the Libya. (Source Comment: The LNP is dominated by the former
  leaders of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (AI-Jamala al-Islamiyyah —LIFO), who, according
  to sensitive sources, maintained ties to al Qa'ida during their struggle with the forces of former
  dictator Muammar al Qaddafi )
  6. Former interim Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril is leading the National Forces
  Alliance (NFA), an umbrella coalition of liberal parties that received Western support for
  efforts to overthrow the regime of Muammar al Qaddafi. While fibril is not on the list of
  candidates, his presence in the NFA leadership is seen by Belhaj and other Islamists as an effort
  by the United States and Western Europe to manipulate the election. Jalil does not believe that
  the NFA can gain control of enough seats in parliament to play a significant role in the new
  government. According to this source, Jalil believes that former Oil and Finance Minister Mi
  Tarhouni also plays an important role in the NFA.
  7. At the same time, Jalil is watching the progress of a second moderate party, the
  National Front (NF), which is based on the work of a 1980s-era anti-Qaddafi exile organization.
  The party is led by Mohammed al-Magariaf, an exiled intellectual dissident leader from a
  prominent Eastern Libyan family. Jalil 's sources advise that the NF is also backed by the al-
  Sennusi tribe, the former Libyan royal family, who may be looking to play a role in a semi-
  autonomous or independent Barqa. One particularly sensitive source noted that many of the NF
  leaders have ties to the United States, Italy and the United Kingdom, and at one point Jalil
  believed that the NF might be able to work with the NFA; however, personal differences
  between the leaders of the two parties made effective cooperation difficult.
  8. (Source Comment: In the end, a particularly sensitive source stated in confidence that
  Jalil believes the LMB/JCB will have a significant role in the new government, possibly
  supported by the LNP. However; he points out that since accurate polling is nonexistent it is
  impossible to predict a victor with any accuracy. Jalil also noted that it is quite possible that no
  group will win a clear victory, which, when added to the boycotts and pre-election violence may
  require the NTC maintain control of the country for some time to come Accordingly, he has
  instructed al-Juwali to prepare to use the National Army to maintain order. For his part Al-
  Juwali has warned that this will be a difficult task since the best units of the Army, including
  many of its armored forces are deployed in the Kufra region of the Southeast, in an effort to
  control tribal conflicts, stem the flow of weapons into the country from South Sudan, and resist
  Qaddafi loyalists amongst the nomadic tribes of the region )
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739885
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045203



DocNumber: C05739887
MetadataSubject: H: INTEL ON NEW LIBYAN PRESIDENT. SID
MetadataTo: H
MetadataFrom: Blumenthal, Sidney
MetadataDateSent: 2012-08-23T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH1/DOC_0C05739887/C05739887.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: H: Intel on new Libya president, Sid
ExtractedFrom: Sidney Blumenthal
ExtractedDateSent: Thursday, August 23, 2012 11:34 PM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739887
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
ExtractedBodyText:
  August 23, 2012
  For: Hillary

RawText:
  B6
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739887
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  PART B6
  From: Sidney Blumenthal
  Sent: Thursday, August 23, 2012 11:34 PM
  To:
  Subject: H: Intel on new Libya president, Sid
  Attachments: hrc memo libya new president 082312.docx
  CONFIDENTIAL
  August 23, 2012
  For: Hillary
  From: Sid
  Re: New president of Libya
  SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council,as well as the highest levels
  of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.
  I. During early August, 2012, Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC) President Mustafa Abdel
  Jalil held discreet meetings with Mohammed Yussef Magariaf, the then leader of the newly elected General
  National Congress (GNC), who Jalil learned was to be named interim President of Libya when the NTC stepped
  down. During these sessions the two leaders worked out the transition to a new, elected interim Government for
  Libya; focusing on the need to restore stability and security by disarming the militia units which fought in the
  2011 revolution against former dictator Muammar al Qaddafi. According to a source with excellent access to
  both parties, Jalil came away from the meeting convinced that Magariaf is intent on becoming Libya's first
  elected president following the overthrow of Qaddafi. Jalil was pleased to learn that Magariaf strongly supports
  the three-party Cairo Declaration negotiated between the NTC and the Governments of Tunisia and Egypt in
  late July allowing for increased trade and a relaxation of existing travel restrictions.
  2. According to this individual, Jalil and Magariaf agree that Tunisia and Egypt hold the key to Libya's
  future economic success, with Libya providing the funding for new projects, while Egypt and Tunisia provide
  technical expertise. Magariaf stated privately that this relationship marks a departure from the Qaddafi years
  when Libya's natural resources fell under the control of foreign firms and governments. Jalil added that
  Magariaf will welcome investment and cooperation from American and Western European banks and
  corporations, but believes Libya, supported by the new governments rising out of the Arab Spring, must
  maintain control over all aspects of the industries involved in exploiting its natural resources. In this regard,
  with the support of both Jalil and Magariaf, the Libyan Ministry of Finance is increasing the level of Libyan
  investment in the Cairo stock exchange. In turn, Magariaf and Egyptian President Mohamad Morsi discussed
  increased Tunisian and Egyptian investment in the Benghazi stock exchange as the economic situation in Libya
  becomes more orderly.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739887
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045204

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739887
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  3. In commenting on the new Interim President, Jalil added that Magariaf s current position is bolstered
  by the fact that he is not tied to any particular faction. At the same time he has maintained the respect that is
  attached to his role as the first Libyan leader to direct an armed revolt against Qaddafi. This fighting was
  carried out by the rebel Libyan National Army in 1981. Magariaf is an academic and diplomat with well
  established Islamist credentials and good relationships with business and government leaders in the United
  States and Western Europe. A separate sensitive source noted that one interesting issue to watch is Magariaf s
  relationship with General Khalifa Belqasim Haftar, the commander of one sections of the new Libyan Army.
  Haftar has been at odds with many of the militia commanders and is currently leading Libyan forces in the
  Kufra region, attempting to end local tribal fighting and block the smuggling of arms and supplies to pro-
  Qaddafi militias by supporters based in South Sudan. In the years between 1981 and 1990 Haftar (then Colonel
  Haftar) commanded the rebel Libyan National Army, under Magariaf s National Front for the Salvation of
  Libya (NFSL). One source notes that Magariaf s opposition to Qaddafi was based on the dictator's betrayal of
  Islamic principles, a position that, at that time, was supported by the Western Allies.
  4. According to this individual, Jalil also spoke with former Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril, who
  indicated that he and Magariaf agree on many issues, including the belief that they can build an Islamic state in
  Libya that can function in the world economy and the international diplomatic community. He did note that he
  believes Magariaf s view of the role of Islam in the day to day function of the government is more conservative
  than his, but these are differences that can be sorted out in the GNC. In the opinion of this individual Jabril is
  well aware of the fact that, while his National Force Alliance (NFA) controls a solid bloc of thirty nine (39)
  seats in the GNC and Magariaf's National Front Party (NFP) holds no seats in its own right, the interim
  President has established good working relationships with at least 100 of the 120 independent members of the
  GNC. Magariaf received 113 votes in his election as Interim President. Again these independent deputies
  respect Magariaf s role in fighting the Qaddafi regime.
  5.(Source Comment: This particularly sensitive individual stated in strict confidence that Magariaf sees
  his role as establishing an efficient interim government, while overseeing the drafting of a new constitution and
  election law. This individual believes that Magariaf is very interested in winning the presidency under this new
  law. Besides meeting with Jalil and Jibril, Magariaf is talking to liberal politicians including former Oil and
  Finance Minister Ali Tarhouni, and the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood's (MB) Justice and Construction
  Party (JCP), including Mohamad Sowan.)
  6. This individual adds that Jalil believes Magariaf will face a very difficult period as he addresses the
  many issues left unresolved by the NTC and the interim regime of Prime Minister .kbdel Rahman el-Keib. Jalil
  has been highly frustrated by el-Keib's inability to disarm the many militia units left over from the 2011
  revolution against Qaddafi. At the same time he has advised Magariaf to move quickly in replacing el-Keib's
  cabinet while deciding which ministers to retain. The new interim government is facing a problem of
  lawlessness and attacks against foreigners, including representatives of the Egyptian Government; this at a time
  when the new Muslim Brotherhood government of Egypt is reaching out to increase business and diplomatic
  contacts between the two countries. According to a sensitive source, Libyan military intelligence officers
  believe these attacks are the work of Qaddafi loyalists, while former NTC officials fear that they may be carried
  out by dissident Islamist groups, frustrated with the results of the national elections, which many of them
  boycotted.
  7. (Source Comment: An extremely sensitive source stated in confidence that Libyan Military
  Intelligence officers reported to Jalil and later Magariaf that a series of bombings in Tripoli and Benghazi
  appear to be the work of Qaddafi loyalists looking to create tension between the Libyan and Egyptian
  Governments. These attacks included the car of an Egyptian diplomat, which was blown up near his home in
  Benghazi, a day after several deadly bomb attacks in the capital Tripoli. At the same time, a homemade bomb
  exploded under the vehicle of the Egyptian consulate's first secretary Abdelhamid Rifai in one of the Tripoli's
  most affluent neighborhoods. No one was hurt during this attack. Earlier in August, three car bombs exploded
  near the Ministry of Interior in Tripoli, killing two people and wounding three others. This sensitive source
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739887
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045205

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739887
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  added that security officers arrested 32 members of what they describe as an organized network of Gaddafi
  loyalists linked to the attacks. During this period, the Red Cross suspended its activities in Benghazi and
  Misrata after one of its compounds in Misrata was attacked with grenades and rockets. In late July seven
  Iranian relief workers associated with the Libyan Red Crescent were kidnapped by tribal troops still loyal to the
  Qaddafi family. Security officials have no word on the whereabouts of these relief workers.)
  8. According to this source, while the Cairo Declaration received a positive reception among Libyan
  political and business leaders, it also created a drastic increase in the number of Libyan's applying for Egyptian
  visas under the new, simplified process. This workload has created a backlog of applications, and in mid-
  August, a group of Libyan nationals frustrated with the Egyptian visa process attacked the interior of the
  Egyptian consulate in Tripoli. These Libyan applicants were angry about the time it was taking to receive visas
  to enter Egypt and were demanding that the staff work past their stated hours of operation. A sensitive source
  noted that a number of Libyans destroyed the furniture in the main waiting room and attacked the consulate.
  The Magariaf Government has assured the Egyptian ambassador that additional security personnel will be
  assigned to guard the Embassy, at least until the visa backlog is reduced.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739887
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045206

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739887
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  CONFIDENTIAL
  August 23, 2012
  For: Hillary
  From: Sid
  Re: New president of Libya
  SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as
  the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.
  1. During early August, 2012, Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC) President
  Mustafa Abdel Jalil held discreet meetings with Mohammed Yussef Magariaf, the then leader of
  the newly elected General National Congress (GNC), who Jalil learned was to be named interim
  President of Libya when the NTC stepped down. During these sessions the two leaders worked
  out the transition to a new, elected interim Government for Libya; focusing on the need to restore
  stability and security by disarming the militia units which fought in the 2011 revolution against
  former dictator Muammar al Qaddafi. According to a source with excellent access to both
  parties, Jalil came away from the meeting convinced that Magariaf is intent on becoming Libya's
  first elected president following the overthrow of Qaddafi. Jalil was pleased to learn that
  Magariaf strongly supports the three-party Cairo Declaration negotiated between the NTC and
  the Governments of Tunisia and Egypt in late July allowing for increased trade and a relaxation
  of existing travel restrictions.
  2. According to this individual, Jalil and Magariaf agree that Tunisia and Egypt hold the
  key to Libya's future economic success, with Libya providing the funding for new projects,
  while Egypt and Tunisia provide technical expertise. Magariaf stated privately that this
  relationship marks a departure from the Qaddafi years when Libya's natural resources fell under
  the control of foreign firms and governments. Jalil added that Magariaf will welcome
  investment and cooperation from American and Western European banks and corporations, but
  believes Libya, supported by the new governments rising out of the Arab Spring, must maintain
  control over all aspects of the industries involved in exploiting its natural resources. In this
  regard, with the support of both Jalil and Magariaf, the Libyan Ministry of Finance is increasing
  the level of Libyan investment in the Cairo stock exchange. In turn, Magariaf and Egyptian
  President Mohamad Morsi discussed increased Tunisian and Egyptian investment in the
  Benghazi stock exchange as the economic situation in Libya becomes more orderly.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739887
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045207

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739887
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  officers believe these attacks are the work of Qaddafi loyalists, while former NTC officials fear
  that they may be carried out by dissident Islamist groups, frustrated with the results of the
  national elections, which many of them boycotted.
  7. (Source Comment: An extremely sensitive source stated in confidence that Libyan
  Military Intelligence officers reported to Jalil and later Magariaf that a series of bombings in
  Tripoli and Benghazi appear to be the work of Qaddafi loyalists looking to create tension
  between the Libyan and Egyptian Governments. These attacks included the car of an Egyptian
  diplomat, which was blown up near his home in Benghazi, a day after several deadly bomb
  attacks in the capital Tripoli. At the same time, a homemade bomb exploded under the vehicle
  of the Egyptian consulate's first secretary Abdelhamid Rifai in one of the Tripoli's most affluent
  neighborhoods. No one was hurt during this attack. Earlier in August, three car bombs exploded
  near the Ministry of Interior in Tripoli, killing two people and wounding three others. This
  sensitive source added that security officers arrested 32 members of what they describe as an
  organized network of Gaddafi loyalists linked to the attacks. During this period, the Red Cross
  suspended its activities in Benghazi and Misrata after one of its compounds in Misrata was
  attacked with grenades and rockets. In late July seven Iranian relief workers associated with the
  Libyan Red Crescent were kidnapped by tribal troops still loyal to the Qaddafi family. Security
  officials have no word on the whereabouts of these relief workers.)
  8. According to this source, while the Cairo Declaration received a positive reception
  among Libyan political and business leaders, it also created a drastic increase in the number of
  Libyan's applying for Egyptian visas under the new, simplified process. This workload has
  created a backlog of applications, and in mid-August, a group of Libyan nationals frustrated with
  the Egyptian visa process attacked the interior of the Egyptian consulate in Tripoli. These
  Libyan applicants were angry about the time it was taking to receive visas to enter Egypt and
  were demanding that the staff work past their stated hours of operation. A sensitive source noted
  that a number of Libyans destroyed the furniture in the main waiting room and attacked the
  consulate. The Magariaf Government has assured the Egyptian ambassador that additional
  security personnel will be assigned to guard the Embassy, at least until the visa backlog is
  reduced.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739887
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045208



DocNumber: C05739888
MetadataSubject: H: INTEL ON NEW LIBYA PRESIDENT. SID
MetadataTo: sullivanjj@state.gov
MetadataFrom: H
MetadataDateSent: 2012-08-24T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH1/DOC_0C05739888/C05739888.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: Fw: H: Intel on new Libya president. Sid
ExtractedTo: 'sullivanjj@state.golt
ExtractedFrom: H <hrod17@clintonemailcom>
ExtractedDateSent: Friday, August 24, 2012 7:44 AM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739888
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
ExtractedBodyText: Very interesting.
RawText:
  B6
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739888
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  PART B6
  From: H <hrod17@clintonemailcom>
  Sent: Friday, August 24, 2012 7:44 AM
  To: 'sullivanjj@state.golt
  Subject: Fw: H: Intel on new Libya president. Sid
  Attachments: hrc memo libya new president 082312.docx
  Very interesting.
  From: Sidney Blumenthal [mailto
  Sent: Thursday, August 23, 2012 11:33 PM
  To: H
  Subject: H: Intel on new Libya president. Sid
  CONFIDENTIAL
  August 23, 2012
  For: Hillary
  From: Sid
  Re: New president of Libya
  SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels
  of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.
  1. During early August, 2012, Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC) President Mustafa Abdel
  Jalil held discreet meetings with Mohammed Yussef Magariaf, the then leader of the newly elected General
  National Congress (GNC), who Jalil learned was to be named interim President of Libya when the NTC stepped
  down. During these sessions the two leaders worked out the transition to a new, elected interim Government for
  Libya; focusing on the need to restore stability and security by disarming the militia units which fought in the
  2011 revolution against former dictator Muammar al Qaddafi. According to a source with excellent access to
  both parties, _Tani came away from the meeting convinced that Magariaf is intent on becoming Libya's first
  elected president following the overthrow of Qaddafi. Jalil was pleased to learn that Magariaf strongly supports
  the three-party Cairo Declaration negotiated between the NTC and the Governments of Tunisia and Egypt in
  late July allowing for increased trade and a relaxation of existing travel restrictions.
  2. According to this individual, Jalil and Magariaf agree that Tunisia and Egypt hold the key to Libya's
  future economic success, with Libya providing the funding for new projects, while Egypt and Tunisia provide
  technical expertise. Magariaf stated privately that this relationship marks a departure from the Qaddafi years
  when Libya's natural resources fell under the control of foreign firms and governments. Jalil added that
  Magariaf will welcome investment and cooperation from American and Western European banks and
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739888
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045209

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739888
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  corporations, but believes Libya, supported by the new governments rising out of the Arab Spring, must
  maintain control over all aspects of the industries involved in exploiting its natural resources. In this regard,
  with the support of both Jalil and Magariaf, the Libyan Ministry of Finance is increasing the level of Libyan
  investment in the Cairo stock exchange. In turn, Magariaf and Egyptian President Mohamad Morsi discussed
  increased Tunisian and Egyptian investment in the Benghazi stock exchange as the economic situation in Libya
  becomes more orderly.
  1 In commenting on the new Interim President, Jalil added that Magariaf s current position is bolstered
  by the fact that he is not tied to any particular faction. At the same time he has maintained the respect that is
  attached to his role as the first Libyan leader to direct an armed revolt against Qaddafi. This fighting was
  carried out by the rebel Libyan National Army in 1981. Magariaf is an academic and diplomat with well
  established Islamist credentials and good relationships with business and government leaders in the United
  States and Western Europe. A separate sensitive source noted that one interesting issue to watch is Magariaf s
  relationship with General Khalifa Belqasim Haftar, the commander of one sections of the new Libyan Army.
  Haftar has been at odds with many of the militia commanders and is currently leading Libyan forces in the
  Kufra region, attempting to end local tribal fighting and block the smuggling of arms and supplies to pro-
  Qaddafi militias by supporters based in South Sudan. In the years between 1981 and 1990 Haftar (then Colonel
  Haftar) commanded the rebel Libyan National Army, under Magariaf s National Front for the Salvation of
  Libya (NFSL). One source notes that Magariaf s opposition to Qaddafi was based on the dictator's betrayal of
  Islamic principles, a position that, at that time, was supported by the Western Allies.
  4. According to this individual, Jalil also spoke with former Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril, who
  indicated that he and Magariaf agree on many issues, including the belief that they can build an Islamic state in
  Libya that can function in the world economy and the international diplomatic community. He did note that he
  believes Magariaf s view of the role of Islam in the day to day function of the government is more conservative
  than his, but these are differences that can be sorted out in the GNC. In the opinion of this individual Jabril is
  well aware of the fact that, while his National Force Alliance (NFA) controls a solid bloc of thirty nine (39)
  seats in the GNC and Magariaf s National Front Party (NFP) holds no seats in its own right, the interim
  President has established good working relationships with at least 100 of the 120 independent members of the
  GNC. Magariaf received 113 votes in his election as Interim President. Again these independent deputies
  respect Magariaf s role in fighting the Qaddafi regime.
  5.(Source Comment: This particularly sensitive individual stated in strict confidence that Magariaf sees
  his role as establishing an efficient interim government, while overseeing the drafting of a new constitution and
  election law. This individual believes that Magariaf is very interested in winning the presidency under this new
  law. Besides meeting with Jalil and Jibril, Magariaf is talking to liberal politicians including former Oil and
  Finance Minister Ali Tarhouni, and the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood's (MB) Justice and Construction
  Party (JCP), including Mohamad Sowan.)
  6. This individual adds that Jalil believes Magariaf will face a very difficult period as he addresses the
  many issues left unresolved by the NTC and the interim regime of Prime Minister Abdel Rahman el-Keib. Jalil
  has been highly frustrated by el-Keib's inability to disarm the many militia units left over from the 2011
  revolution against Qaddafi. At the same time he has advised Magariaf to move quickly in replacing el-Keib's
  cabinet while deciding which ministers to retain. The new interim government is facing a problem of
  lawlessness and attacks against foreigners, including representatives of the Egyptian Government; this at a time
  when the new Muslim Brotherhood government of Egypt is reaching out to increase business and diplomatic
  contacts between the two countries. According to a sensitive source, Libyan military intelligence officers
  believe these attacks are the work of Qaddafi loyalists, while former NTC officials fear that they may be carried
  out by dissident Islamist groups, frustrated with the results of the national elections, which many of them
  boycotted.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739888
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045210

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739888
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  7. (Source Comment: An extremely sensitive source stated in confidence that Libyan Military
  Intelligence officers reported to Jalil and later Magariaf that a series of bombings in Tripoli and Benghazi
  appear to be the work of Qaddafi loyalists looking to create tension between the Libyan and Egyptian
  Governments. These attacks included the ear of an Egyptian diplomat, which was blown up near his home in
  Benghazi, a day after several deadly bomb attacks in the capital Tripoli. At the same time, a homemade bomb
  exploded under the vehicle of the Egyptian consulate's first secretary Abdelhatniti Rifai in one of the Tripoli's
  most affluent neighborhoods. No one was hurt during this attack. Earlier in August, three car bombs exploded
  near the Ministry of Interior in Tripoli, killing two people and wounding three others. This sensitive source
  added that security officers arrested 32 members of what they describe as an organized network of Gaddafi
  loyalists linked to the attacks. During this period, the Red Cross suspended its activities in Benghazi and
  Misrata after one of its compounds in Misrata was attacked with grenades and rockets. In late July seven
  Iranian relief workers associated with the Libyan Red Crescent were kidnapped by tribal troops still loyal to the
  Qaddafi family. Security officials have no word on the whereabouts of these relief workers.)
  8. According to this source, while the Cairo Declaration received a positive reception among Libyan
  political and business leaders, it also created a drastic increase in the number of Libyan's applying for Egyptian
  visas under the new, simplified process. This workload has created a backlog of applications, and in mid
  August, a group of Libyan nationals frustrated with the Egyptian visa process attacked the interior of the
  Egyptian consulate in Tripoli. These Libyan applicants were angry about the time it was taking to receive visas
  to enter Egypt and were demanding that the staff work past their stated hours of operation. A sensitive source
  noted that a number of Libyans destroyed the furniture in the main waiting room and attacked the consulate.
  The Magariaf Government has assured the Egyptian ambassador that additional security personnel will be
  assigned to guard the Embassy, at least until the visa backlog is reduced.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739888
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045211



DocNumber: C05739889
MetadataSubject: H: INTEL ON NEW LIBYA PRESIDENT. SID
MetadataTo: H
MetadataFrom: Sullivan, Jacob J
MetadataDateSent: 2012-08-24T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH1/DOC_0C05739889/C05739889.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: Re: H: Intel on new Libya president. Sid
ExtractedFrom: Sullivan, JacobJ <Sullivann@state.gov>
ExtractedDateSent: Friday, August 24, 2012 9:19 AM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739889
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
ExtractedBodyText: Yes. Some warning signs.
RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739889
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  PART B6
  From: Sullivan, JacobJ <Sullivann@state.gov>
  Sent: Friday, August 24, 2012 9:19 AM
  To:
  Subject: Re: H: Intel on new Libya president. Sid
  Yes. Some warning signs.
  From: H [mailto:HDR22@clintonemail.com]
  Sent: Friday, August 24, 2012 07:43 AM
  To: Sullivan, Jacob J
  Subject: Fw: H: Intel on new Libya president. Sid
  Very interesting.
  From: Sidney Blumenthal [mailto:
  Sent: Thursday, August 23, 2012 11:33 PM
  To: H
  Subject: H: Intel on new Libya president. Sid
  CONFIDENTIAL
  August 23, 2012
  For: Hillary
  From: Sid
  Re: New president of Libya
  SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels
  of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.
  1. During early August, 2012, Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC) President Mustafa Abdel
  Jalil held discreet meetings with Mohammed Yussef Magariaf, the then leader of the newly elected General
  National Congress (GNC), who Jalil learned was to be named interim President of Libya when the NTC stepped
  down. During these sessions the two leaders worked out the transition to a new, elected interim Government for
  Libya; focusing on the need to restore stability and security by disarming the militia units which fought in the
  2011 revolution against former dictator Muammar al Qaddafi. According to a source with excellent access to
  both parties, Jalil came away from the meeting convinced that Magariaf is intent on becoming Libya's first
  elected president following the overthrow of Qaddafi. Jalil was pleased to learn that Magariaf strongly supports
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739889
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045212
  B6

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739889
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  the three-party Cairo Declaration negotiated between the NTC and the Governments of Tunisia and Egypt in
  late July allowing for increased trade and a relaxation of existing travel restrictions.
  2. According to this individual, Jalil and Magariaf agree that Tunisia and Egypt hold the key to Libya's
  future economic success, with Libya providing the funding for new projects, while Egypt and Tunisia provide
  technical expertise. Magariaf stated privately that this relationship marks a departure from the Qaddafi years
  when Libya's natural resources fell under the control of foreign firms and governments. Jalil added that
  Magariaf will welcome investment and cooperation from American and Western European banks and
  corporations, but believes Libya, supported by the new governments rising out of the Arab Spring, must
  maintain control over all aspects of the industries involved in exploiting its natural resources. In this regard,
  with the support of both Jalil and Magariaf, the Libyan Ministry of Finance is increasing the level of Libyan
  investment in the Cairo stock exchange. In turn, Magariaf and Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi discussed
  increased Tunisian and Egyptian investment in the Benghazi stock exchange as the economic situation in Libya
  becomes more orderly.
  3. In commenting on the new Interim President, Jalil added that Magariaf s current position is bolstered
  by the fact that he is not tied to any particular faction. At the same time he has maintained the respect that is
  attached to his role as the first Libyan leader to direct an armed revolt against Qaddafi. This fighting was
  carried out by the rebel Libyan National Army in 1981. Magariaf is an academic and diplomat with well
  established Islamist credentials and good relationships with business and government leaders in the United
  States and Western Europe. A separate sensitive source noted that one interesting issue to watch is Magariaf s
  relationship with General Khalifa Belgasim Hefter, the commander of one sections of the new Libyan Army.
  Halter has been at odds with many of the militia commanders and is currently leading Libyan forces in the
  Kufra region, attempting to end local tribal fighting and block the smuggling of arms and supplies to pro-
  Qaddafi militias by supporters based in South Sudan. In the years between 1981 and 1990 Hefter (then Colonel
  Halter) commanded the rebel Libyan National Army, under 'vineries National Front for the Salvation of
  Libya (1\IFSL). One source notes that Magariafs opposition to Qaddafi was based on the dictator's betrayal of
  Islamic principles, a position that, at that time, was supported by the Western Allies.
  4. According to this individual, Jail also spoke with former Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril, who
  indicated that he and Magariaf agree on many issues, including the belief that they can build an Islamic state in
  Libya that can function in the world economy and the international diplomatic community. He did note that he
  believes Magariaf s view of the role of Islam in the day to day function of the government is more conservative
  than his, but these are differences that can be sorted out in the GNC. In the opinion of this individual Jabril is
  well aware of the fact that, while his National Force Alliance (NFA) controls a solid bloc of thirty nine (39)
  seats in the GNC and Magariaf s National Front Party (NFP) holds no seats in its own right, the interim
  President has established good working relationships with at least 100 of the 120 independent members of the
  GNC. Magariaf received 113 votes in his election as Interim President. Again these independent deputies
  respect Magariaf s role in fighting the Qaddafi regime.
  S. (Source Comment: This particularly sensitive individual stated in strict confidence that Magariaf sees
  his role as establishing an efficient interim government, while overseeing the drafting of a new constitution and
  election law. This individual believes that Magariaf is very interested in winning the presidency under this new
  law. Besides meeting with Jail and Jibril, Magariaf is talking to liberal politicians including former Oil and
  Finance Minister Ali Tarhouni, and the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood's (MB) Justice and Construction
  Party (ICP), including Mohamed &swan.)
  6. This individual adds that Jalil believes Magariaf will face a very difficult period as he addresses the
  many issues left unresolved by the NTC and the interim regime of Prime Minister Abdel Rahman el-Keib. Jail
  has been highly frustrated by el-Keib's inability to disarm the many militia units left over from the 2011
  revolution against Qaddafi. At the same time he has advised Magariaf to move quickly in replacing el-Keib's
  cabinet while deciding which ministers to retain. The new interim government is facing a problem of
  lawlessness and attacks against foreigners, including representatives of the Egyptian Government; this at a time
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739889
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045213

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739889
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  when the new Muslim Brotherhood government of Egypt is reaching out to increase business and diplomatic
  contacts between the two countries. According to a sensitive source, Libyan military intelligence officers
  believe these attacks are the work of Qaddafi loyalists, while former NTC officials fear that they may be carried
  out by dissident Islamist groups, frustrated with the results of the national elections, which many of them
  boycotted.
  7. (Source Comment: An extremely sensitive source stated in confidence that Libyan Military
  Intelligence officers reported to Jalil and later Magariaf that a series of bombings in Tripoli and Benghazi
  appear to be the work of Qaddafi loyalists looking to create tension between the Libyan and Egyptian
  Governments. These attacks included the car of an Egyptian diplomat, which was blown up near his home in
  Benghazi, a day after several deadly bomb attacks in the capital Tripoli. At the same time, a homemade bomb
  exploded under the vehicle of the Egyptian consulate's first secretary Abdelhamid Rifai in one of the Tripoli's
  most affluent neighborhoods. No one was hurt during this attack. Earlier in August, three car bombs exploded
  near the Ministry of Interior in Tripoli, killing two people and wounding three others. This sensitive source
  added that security officers arrested 32 members of what they describe as an organized network of Gaddafi
  loyalists linked to the attacks. During this period, the Red Cross suspended its activities in Benghazi and
  Misrata after one of its compounds in Misrata was attacked with grenades and rockets. In late July seven
  Iranian relief workers associated with the Libyan Red Crescent were kidnapped by tribal troops still loyal to the
  Qaddafi family. Security officials have no word on the whereabouts of these relief workers.)
  8. According to this source, while the Cairo Declaration received a positive reception among Libyan
  political and business leaders, it also created a drastic increase in the number of Libyan's applying for Egyptian
  visas under the new, simplified process. This workload has created a backlog of applications, and in mid-
  August, a group of Libyan nationals frustrated with the Egyptian visa process attacked the interior of the
  Egyptian consulate in Tripoli. These Libyan applicants were angry about the time it was taking to receive visas
  to enter Egypt and were demanding that the staff work past their stated hours of operation. A sensitive source
  noted that a number of Libyans destroyed the furniture in the main waiting room and attacked the consulate.
  The Magariaf Government has assured the Egyptian ambassador that additional security personnel will be
  assigned to guard the Embassy, at least until the visa backlog is reduced.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739889
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045214



DocNumber: C05739890
MetadataSubject: H: INTEL, LIBYAN PRESIDENT. SID
MetadataTo: H
MetadataFrom: Blumenthal, Sidney
MetadataDateSent: 2012-08-27T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH1/DOC_0C05739890/C05739890.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedFrom: Sidney Blumenthal
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739890
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
ExtractedBodyText:
  August 27, 2012
  For: Hillary

RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739890
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  PART B6
  From: Sidney Blumenthal
  Sent Monday, August 27, 2012 6:36 PM
  To:
  Subject H: Intel, Libyan President, Sid
  Attachments: lirc memo Libya President 082711.dorx
  CONFIDENTIAL
  August 27, 2012
  For: Hillary
  From: Ski
  Re: New President of Libya
  SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the
  highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.
  1.(Source Comment: As the new interim President of Libya Mohammed Yussef el Magariaf is
  determined to establish a democratic state based on Islamic principles. In the opinion of an
  extremely sensitive source, Magariaf sees this moment as the climax his entire life's work. Having
  first served deposed dictator Muammar al Qaddafi as a policy advisor and diplomat, in 1979 Magariaf
  became disenchanted with what he saw as the cult of personality that Qaddafi was building for
  himself while turning against the basic beliefs of the Islamist movement. Magariaf was member of the
  Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in his student days and remains a devout Islamist intellectual, albeit
  one who believes that Islam can coexist and even work with the non-Muslim world, particularly the
  United States and Western Europe. This source also believes that Magariaf is convinced that Libya,
  with its great natural wealth, can become a leading player in North Africa, as well as the rest of the
  Islamic world. Magariaf is particularly well disposed toward the governments of the United States
  and France, based on past experiences with each during his struggle with Qaddafi. This source also
  believes that he remains hostile to the government of Omar al Bashir in Sudan. In 1989 Bashir
  overthrew Magariafs ally, then Sudanese Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi and expelled Magariaf and
  his followers from Khartoum.)
  2. According to the same sensitive source, Magariaf will also seek a discreet relationship with
  Israel. Political realities in Libya at present will dictate that this relationship be handled in a low key
  manner, but the new President of Libya shares many common friends and associates with the leaders
  of Israel and intends to take advantage of this situation to improve the lot of the Libyan people.
  Magariaf may, at times, be forced to make statements critical of Israel for his own political purposes,
  but believes he and his associates have the experience and sophistication to manage this issue. At the
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739890
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045215
  B6

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739890
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  same time Magariaf intends to pursue aggressively the regional political initiatives begun by National
  Transitional Council (NTC) President Mustafa Abdel Jalil. Magariaf will pursue the economic and
  security cooperation set out in the Cairo Declaration of July 29, 2012 establishing a regional bond
  between the new revolutionary governments of Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. This same individual notes
  that Magariaf is aware of the fact that Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi sees Libya as a key factor
  in Egypt's economic development; and the Libyan leader believes he can manipulate this situation to
  the advantage of the Libyan people.
  3. A separate sensitive source stated on condition of strict secrecy that Magariaf intends to
  work with his security advisors to develop a plan for disarming the Islamist militias who fought
  against Qaddafi, without arousing their suspicion. He believes that the most important step in this
  matter will be providing the medical and economic services demanded by these militias in return for
  disarming. Magariaf also believes that he can manage the political ambitions of Islamist leaders like
  General Abdelhakim Belhaj, while preventing the growth of radical groups who might see Libya as a
  base of operations and support. Magariaf and his supporters believe that his Islamist/anti-Qaddafi
  credentials will allow him to manage these challenges, and if he can do so he will be able to win the
  presidency outright in the first full scale national presidential election in the spring of 2013.
  4. This source adds that, while avoiding direct involvement in the Syrian crisis, the Magariaf
  government will support Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the rest of the nations calling for the end of
  the regime of Basher al Assad. Magariaf harbors a particular sense of hostility toward Assad, who was
  a longtime ally of Qaddafi, supporting him with equipment, intelligence, and advisors throughout the
  revolution of 2011. Magariaf realizes that this stance will also bring him into conflict with Syria's ally
  Iran, but does not believe Iran has a role to play in Libya, or the rest of North Africa.
  5. According to an extremely sensitive source, in 1979 Magariaf, having become increasingly
  disenchanted with Qaddafi, fled Libya for Khartoum in Sudan, where in 1981, with the help of the
  government of Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi, Chadian leader Hissene Habre, Iraqi President
  Sadaam Hussein, and several Western states, he established The National Front for the Salvation of
  Libya (NFSL), dedicated to overthrowing Qaddafi and establishing an Islamic democracy in Libya.
  Under the auspices of the NFSL, Magariaf also organized the Libyan National Army (LNA), based in
  Ndjamena, Chad. The LNA was commanded by the Colonel Khalifa Belqasim Haftar, who is now one
  of the commanding generals of the new Libyan Army. Under Magariaf s authority the Haftar force,
  which numbered between 2,500 and 3,000 troops, fought several battles with Qaddafi's troops, with
  mixed results. These attacks included a raid on Qaddafi's compound at Bab al-Aziza in 1986. The
  LNA also maintained a 50,000 watt radio station in Ndjamena, broadcasting anti-Qaddafi material
  into Libya. This radio station was supported by Western governments and Iraqi Military Intelligence.
  6. The LNA's greatest success came in support of the Chadian Army under General Idriss
  Deby, in their overwhelming victory over Libyan troops at the battle Ouadi Doum in 1987. This
  victory forced the Libyan Army and Air Force out of Chad, and was supported by the French Air Force
  and other Western personnel. Following the battle Deby became a national hero in Chad. In 1990,
  with the support of Libyan intelligence officers, Deby, who had undergone military training in Libya
  and France, rebelled against and overthrew the Habre Government. At that time Deby, under
  Qaddafi's influence, forced the LNA to abandon Chad for Zaire, and eventually the United States.
  Magariaf and Haftar both settled in the United States, and while the LNA no longer existed as an
  effective force, Magariaf continued to maintain the NFSL as a political organization. In 2004
  Magariaf and the NFSL joined the National Conference for the Libyan Opposition (NCLO), eventually
  returning to support the 2011 revolution.
  7. (Source Comment: In the opinion of an extremely sensitive source speaking on condition of
  strict secrecy, Magariaf views himself as an Islamist politician who can work with both Islamic and
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739890
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045216

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739890
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  non-Islamic states, including Israel, if the relationships are properly managed. The Libyan President
  also sees the current situation as vindication for all of the problematic experiences he encountered in
  his long struggle against the Qaddafi regime. This individual believes that TvIagariaf intends to use his
  reputation for integrity, commitment to Islam, and his ability to work with divergent groups to
  establish himself as an effective interim President, and eventually the first elected Libyan Head of
  State in mid-2013. Ma gariaf plans to draw on all political, religious, and ethnic groups to form his
  cabinet, using his stature to form a representative government under the General National Council.)
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739890
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045217

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739890
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  CONFIDENTIAL
  August 27, 2012
  For: 1-fillary
  From: Sid
  Re: New President of Libya
  SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as
  the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.
  1. (Source Comment: As the new interim President of Libya Mohammed Yussef el
  Magariaf is determined to establish a democratic state based on Islamic principles. In the
  opinion of an extremely sensitive source, Magariaf sees this moment as the climax his entire
  life's work. Having first served deposed dictator Muammar al Qaddafi as a policy advisor and
  diplomat, in 1979 Magariaf became disenchanted with what he saw as the cult of personality that
  Qaddafi was building for himself while turning against the basic beliefs of the Islamist
  movement. Magariaf was member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in his student days and
  remains a devout Islamist intellectual, albeit one who believes that Islam can coexist and even
  work with the non-Muslim world, particularly the United States and Western Europe. This
  source also believes that Magariaf is convinced that Libya, with its great natural wealth, can
  become a leading player in North Africa, as well as the rest of the Islamic world. Magariaf is
  particularly well disposed toward the governments of the United States and France, based on past
  experiences with each during his struggle with Qaddafi. This source also believes that he
  remains hostile to the government of Omar al Bashir in Sudan. In 1989 Bashir overthrew
  Magariar s ally, then Sudanese Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi and expelled Magariaf and his
  followers from Khartoum.)
  2. According to the same sensitive source, Magariaf will also seek a discreet relationship
  with Israel. Political realities in Libya at present will dictate that this relationship be handled in a
  low key manner, but the new President of Libya shares many common friends and associates
  with the leaders of Israel and intends to take advantage of this situation to improve the lot of the
  Libyan people. Magariaf may, at times, be forced to make statements critical of Israel for his
  own political purposes, but believes he and his associates have the experience and sophistication
  to manage this issue. At the same time Magariaf intends to pursue aggressively the regional
  political initiatives begun by National Transitional Council (NTC) President Mustafa Abdel Jalil.
  Magariaf will pursue the economic and security cooperation set out in the Cairo Declaration of
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739890
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045218

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739890
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  July 29, 2012 establishing a regional bond between the new revolutionary governments of
  Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. This same individual notes that Magariaf is aware of the fact that
  Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi sees Libya as a key factor in Egypt's economic
  development; and the Libyan leader believes he can manipulate this situation to the advantage of
  the Libyan people.
  3. A separate sensitive source stated on condition of strict secrecy that Magariaf intends
  to work with his security advisors to develop a plan for disarming the Islamist militias who
  fought against Qaddafi, without arousing their suspicion. He believes that the most important
  step in this matter will be providing the medical and economic services demanded by these
  militias in return for disarming. Magariaf also believes that he can manage the political
  ambitions of Islamist leaders like General Abdelhakim Belhaj, while preventing the growth of
  radical groups who might see Libya as a base of operations and support. Magariaf and his
  supporters believe that his Islamistianti-Qaddafi credentials will allow him to manage these
  challenges, and if he can do so he will be able to win the presidency outright in the first full sca'e
  national presidential election in the spring of 2013.
  4. This source adds that, while avoiding direct involvement in the Syrian crisis, the
  Magariaf government will support Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the rest of the nations
  calling for the end of the regime of Basher al Assad. Magariaf harbors a particular sense of
  hostility toward Assad, who was a longtime ally of Qaddafi, supporting him with equipment,
  intelligence, and advisors throughout the revolution of 2011, Magariaf realizes that this stance
  will also bring him into conflict with Syria's ally Iran, but does not believe Iran has a role to play
  in Libya, or the rest of North Africa.
  5. According to an extremely sensitive source, in 1979 Magariaf, having become
  increasingly disenchanted with Qaddafi, fled Libya for Khartoum in Sudan, where in 1981, with
  the help of the government of Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi, Chadian leader Hissene Habre,
  Iraqi President Sadaam Hussein, and several Western states, he established The National Front
  for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL), dedicated to overthrowing Qaddafi and establishing an
  Islamic democracy in Libya. Under the auspices of the NFSL, Magariaf also organized the
  Libyan National Army (LNA), based in Ndjamena, Chad. The LNA was commanded by the
  Colonel Khalifa Belqasim Haftar, who is now one of the commanding generals of the new
  Libyan Army. Under Magariars authority the Haftar force, which numbered between 2,500 and
  3,000 troops, fought several battles with Qaddafi's troops, with mixed results. These attacks
  included a raid on Qaddafi's compound at Bab al-Aziza in 1986. The LNA also maintained a
  50,000 watt radio station in Ndjamena, broadcasting anti-Qaddafi material into Libya. This radio
  station was supported by Western governments and Iraqi Military Intelligence.
  6. The LNA's greatest success came in support of the Chadian Army under General
  Idriss Deby, in their overwhelming victory over Libyan troops at the battle Ouadi Doum in 1987.
  This victory forced the Libyan Army and Air Force out of' Chad, and was supported by the
  French Air Force and other Western personnel. Following the battle Deby became a national
  hero in Chad. In 1990, with the support of Libyan intelligence officers, Deby, who had
  undergone military training in Libya and France, rebelled against and overthrew the Habre
  Government A.t that time Deby, under Qaddafi's influence, forced the LNA to abandon Chad.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739890
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045219

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739890
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  for Zaire, and eventually the United States. Magariaf and Haftar both settled in the United
  States, and while the LNA no longer existed as an effective force, Magariaf continued to
  maintain the NFSL as a political organization. In 2004 Magariaf and the NFSL joined the
  National Conference for the Libyan Opposition (NCLO), eventually returning to support the
  2011 revolution.
  7. (Source Comment: In the opinion of an extremely sensitive source speaking on
  condition of strict secrecy, Magariaf views himself as an Islamist politician who can work with
  both Islamic and non-Islamic states, including Israel, if the relationships are properly managed.
  The Libyan President also sees the current situation as vindication for all of the problematic
  experiences he encountered in his long struggle against the Qaddafi regime. This individual
  believes that Magariaf intends to use his reputation for integrity, commitment to Islam, and his
  ability to work with divergent groups to establish himself as an effective interim President, and
  eventually the first elected Libyan Head of State in mid-2013. Magariaf plans to draw on all
  political, religious, and ethnic groups to form his cabinet, using his stature to form a
  representative goverment under the General National Council.)
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739890
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045220



DocNumber: C05739891
MetadataSubject: H: INTEL, LIBYAN PRESIDENT. SID
MetadataTo: Flores, Oscar
MetadataFrom: H
MetadataDateSent: 2012-08-28T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH1/DOC_0C05739891/C05739891.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: Fw: H: Intel, Libyan President, Sid
ExtractedTo: Oscar Flores
ExtractedFrom: H <hrod17@clintonernail.com>
ExtractedDateSent: Tuesday, August 28, 2012 10:33 AM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739891
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
ExtractedBodyText: Pls print.
RawText:
  B6
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739891
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  PART B6
  From: H <hrod17@clintonernail.com>
  Sent: Tuesday, August 28, 2012 10:33 AM
  To: Oscar Flores
  Subject: Fw: H: Intel, Libyan President, Sid
  Attachments: hrc memo Libya President 082712.docx
  Pls print.
  From: Sidney Blumenthal [mailto:
  Sent: Monday, August 27, 2012 06:35 PM
  To: H
  Subject: H: Intel, Libyan President. Sid
  CONFIDENTIAL
  August 27, 2012
  For: Hillary
  From: Sid
  Re: New President of Libya
  SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the
  highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.
  1. (Source Comment: As the new interim President of Libya Mohammed Yussef el Magariaf is
  determined to establish a democratic state based on Islamic principles. In the opinion of an
  extremely sensitive source, Magariaf sees this moment as the climax his entire life's work. Having
  first served deposed dictator Muammar al Qaddafi as a policy advisor and diplomat, in 1979 Magariaf
  became disenchanted with what he saw as the cult of personality that Qaddafi was building for
  himself while turning against the basic beliefs of the Islamist movement. Magariaf was member of the
  Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in his student days and remains a devout Islamist intellectual, albeit
  one who believes that Islam can coexist and even work with the non-Muslim world, particularly the
  United States and Western Europe. This source also believes that Magariaf is convinced that Libya,
  with its great natural wealth, can become a leading player in North Africa, as well as the rest of the
  Islamic world. Magariaf is particularly well disposed toward the governments of the United States
  and France, based on past experiences with each during his struggle with Qaddafi. This source also
  believes that he remains hostile to the government of Omar al Bashir in Sudan. In 1989 Bashir
  overthrew Magariafs ally, then Sudanese Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi and expelled Magariaf and
  his followers from Khartoum.)
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739891
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045221

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739891
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  2. According to the same sensitive source, MagariafwiU also seek a discreet relationship with
  Israel. Political realities in Libya at present will dictate that this relationship be handled in a low key
  manner, but the new President of Libya shares many common friends and associates with the leaders
  of Israel and intends to take advantage of this situation to improve the lot of the Libyan people.
  Magariaf may, at times, be forced to make statements critical of Israel for his own political purposes,
  but believes he and his associates have the experience and sophistication to manage this issue. At the
  same time Magariaf intends to pursue aggressively the regional political initiatives begun by National
  Transitional Council (NTC) President Mustafa Abdel Jalil. Magariaf will pursue the economic and
  security cooperation set out in the Cairo Declaration of July 29, 2012 establishing a regional bond
  between the new revolutionary governments of Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. This same individual notes
  that Magariaf is aware of the fact that Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi sees Libya as a key factor
  in Egypt's economic development; and the Libyan leader believes he can manipulate this situation to
  the advantage of the Libyan people.
  3. A separate sensitive source stated on condition of strict secrecy that Magariaf intends to
  work with his security advisors to develop a plan for disarming the Islamist militias who fought
  against Qaddafi, without arousing their suspicion. He believes that the most important step in this
  matter will be providing the medical and economic services demanded by these militias in return for
  disarming. Magariaf also believes that he can manage the political ambitions of Islamist leaders like
  General Abdelhakim Belhaj, while preventing the growth of radical groups who might see Libya as a
  base of operations and support. Magariaf and his supporters believe that his Islamist/anti-Qaddafi
  credentials will allow him to manage these challenges, and if he can do so he will be able to win the
  presidency outright in the first full scale national presidential election in the spring of 2013.
  4. This source adds that, while avoiding direct involvement in the Syrian crisis, the Magariaf
  government will support Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the rest of the nations calling for the end of
  the regime of Basher al Assad. Magariaf harbors a particular sense of hostility toward Assad, who was
  a longtime ally of Qaddafi, supporting him with equipment, intelligence, and advisors throughout the
  revolution of 2011. Magariaf realizes that this stance will also bring him into conflict with Syria's ally
  Iran, but does not believe Iran has a role to play in Libya, or the rest of North Africa.
  5. According to an extremely sensitive source, in 1979 Magariaf, having become increasingly
  disenchanted with Qaddafi, fled Libya for Khartoum in Sudan, where in 1981, with the help of the
  government of Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi, Chadian leader Hissene Habre, Iraqi President
  Sadaam Hussein, and several Western states, he established The National Front for the Salvation of
  Libya (NFSL), dedicated to overthrowing Qaddafi and establishing an Islamic democracy in Libya.
  Under the auspices of the NFSL, Magariaf also organized the Libyan National Army (LNA), based in
  Ndjamena, Chad. The LNA was commanded by the Colonel Khalifa Belqasim Haftar, who is now one
  of the commanding generals of the new Libyan Army. Under Magariaf s authority the Haftar force,
  which numbered between 2,500 and 3,000 troops, fought several battles with Qaddafi's troops, with
  mixed results. These attacks included a raid on Qaddafi's compound at Bab al-Aziza in 1986. The
  LNA also maintained a 50,000 watt radio station in Ndjamena, broadcasting anti-Qaddafi material
  into Libya. This radio station was supported by Western governments and Iraqi Military Intelligence.
  6. The LNA's greatest success came in support of the Chadian Army under General Idriss
  Deby, in their overwhelming victory over Libyan troops at the battle Quadi Doum in 1987. This
  victory forced the Libyan Army and Air Force out of Chad, and was supported by the French Air Force
  and other Western personnel. Following the battle Deby became a national hero in Chad. In 1990,
  with the support of Libyan intelligence officers, Deby, who had undergone military training in Libya
  and France, rebelled against and overthrew the Habre Government. At that time Deby, under
  Qaddafi's influence, forced the LNA to abandon Chad for Zaire, and eventually the United States.
  Magariaf and Haftar both settled in the United States, and while the LNA no longer existed as an
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739891
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045222

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739891
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  effective force, Magariaf continued to maintain the NFSL as a political organization. In 2004
  Magariaf and the NFSL joined the National Conference for the Libyan Opposition (NCLO), eventually
  returning to support the 2011revolution.
  7. (Source Comment: In the opinion of an extremely sensitive source speaking on condition of
  strict secrecy, Magariaf views himself as an Islamist politician who can work with both Islamic and
  non-Islamic states, including Israel, if the relationships are properly managed. The Libyan President
  also sees the current situation as vindication for all of the problematic experiences he encountered in
  his long struggle against the Qaddafi regime. This individual believes that Magariaf intends to use his
  reputation for integrity, commitment to Islam, and his ability to work with divergent groups to
  establish himself as an effective interim President, and eventually the first elected Libyan Head of
  State in mid-2013. Magariaf plans to draw on all political, religious, and ethnic groups to form his
  cabinet, using his stature to form a representative government under the General National Council.)
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739891
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045223



DocNumber: C05739892
MetadataSubject: H: INTEL, LIBYAN PRESIDENT. SID
MetadataTo: sullivanjj@state.gov
MetadataFrom: H
MetadataDateSent: 2012-08-28T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH1/DOC_0C05739892/C05739892.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: Fw: H: Intel, Libyan President. Sid
ExtractedTo: 'sullivanjj@state.gov'
ExtractedFrom: H <hrod17©clintonemail.com›
ExtractedDateSent: Tuesday, August 28, 2012 10:33 AM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739892
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
ExtractedBodyText: If true, this is encouraging. Should consider passing to Israelis.
RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739892
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  PART B6
  From: H <hrod17©clintonemail.com›
  Sent: Tuesday, August 28, 2012 10:33 AM
  To: 'sullivanjj@state.gov'
  Subject: Fw: H: Intel, Libyan President. Sid
  Attachments: hrc memo Libya President 082712.docx
  If true, this is encouraging. Should consider passing to Israelis.
  From: Sidney Blumenthal [mailto[
  Sent: Monday, August 27, 2012 06:35 PM
  To: H
  Subject: H: Intel, Libyan President. Sid
  CONFIDENTIAL
  August 27, 2012
  For: Hilary
  From: Sid
  Re: New President of Libya
  SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the
  highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.
  1. (Source Comment: As the new interim President of Libya Mohammed Yussef el Magariaf is
  determined to establish a democratic state based on Islamic principles. In the opinion of an
  extremely sensitive source, Magariaf sees this moment as the climax his entire life's work. Having
  first served deposed dictator Muammar al Qaddafi as a policy advisor and diplomat, in 1979 Magariaf
  became disenchanted with what he saw as the cult of personality that Qaddafi was building for
  himself while turning against the basic beliefs of the Islamist movement. Magariaf was member of the
  Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in his student days and remains a devout Islamist intellectual, albeit
  one who believes that Islam can coexist and even work with the non-Muslim world, particularly the
  United States and Western Europe. This source also believes that Magariaf is convinced that Libya,
  with its great natural wealth, can become a leading player in North Africa, as well as the rest of the
  Islamic world. Magariaf is particularly well disposed toward the governments of the United States
  and France, based on past experiences with each during his struggle with Qaddafi. This source also
  believes that he remains hostile to the government of Omar al Bashir in Sudan. In 1989 Bashir
  overthrew Magariafs ally, then Sudanese Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi and expelled Magariaf and
  his followers from Khartoum.)
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739892
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045224
  B6

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739892
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  2. According to the same sensitive source, Magariaf will also seek a discreet relationship with
  Israel. Political realities in Libya at present will dictate that this relationship be handled in a low key
  manner, but the new President of Libya shares many common friends and associates with the leaders
  of Israel and intends to take advantage of this situation to improve the lot of the Libyan people.
  Magariaf may, at times, be forced to make statements critical of Israel for his own political purposes,
  but believes he and his associates have the experience and sophistication to manage this issue. At the
  same time Magariaf intends to pursue aggressively the regional political initiatives begun by National
  Transitional Council (NTC) President Mustafa Abdel Jail. Magariaf will pursue the economic and
  security cooperation set out in the Cairo Declaration of July 29, 2012 establishing a regional bond
  between the new revolutionary governments of Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. This same individual notes
  that Magariaf is aware of the fact that Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi sees Libya as a key factor
  in Egypt's economic development; and the Libyan leader believes he can manipulate this situation to
  the advantage of the Libyan people.
  3. A separate sensitive source stated on condition of strict secrecy that Magariaf intends to
  work with his security advisors to develop a plan for disarming the Islamist militias who fought
  against Qaddafi, without arousing their suspicion. He believes that the most important step in this
  matter will be providing the medical and economic services demanded by these militias in return for
  disarming. Magariaf also believes that he can manage the political ambitions of Islamist leaders like
  General Abdelhakim Belhaj, while preventing the growth of radical groups who might see Libya as a
  base of operations and support. Magariaf and his supporters believe that his Islamist/anti-Qaddafi
  credentials will allow him to manage these challenges, and if he can do so he will be able to win the
  presidency outright in the first full scale national presidential election in the spring of 2013.
  4. This source adds that, while avoiding direct involvement in the Syrian crisis, the Magariaf
  government will support Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the rest of the nations calling for the end of
  the regime of Basher al Assad. Magariaf harbors a particular sense of hostility toward Assad, who was
  a longtime ally of Qaddafi, supporting him with equipment, intelligence, and advisors throughout the
  revolution of 2011. Magariaf realizes that this stance will also bring him into conflict with Syria's ally
  Iran, but does not believe Iran has a role to play in Libya, or the rest of North Africa,
  5. According to an extremely sensitive source, in 1979 Magariaf, having become increasingly
  disenchanted with Qaddafi, fled Libya for Khartoum in Sudan, where in 1981, with the help of the
  government of Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi, Chadian leader Hissene Habre, Iraqi President
  Sadaam Hussein, and several Western states, he established The National Front for the Salvation of
  Libya (NFSL), dedicated to overthrowing Qaddafi and establishing an Islamic democracy in Libya.
  Under the auspices of the NFSL, Magariaf also organized the Libyan National Army (LNA), based in
  Ndjarnena, Chad. The LNA was commanded by the Colonel Khalifa Belqasim Haftar, who is now one
  of the commanding generals of the new Libyan Army. Under Magariaf s authority the Haftar force,
  which numbered between 2,500 and 3,000 troops, fought several battles with Qaddafi's troops, with
  mixed results. These attacks included a raid on Qaddafi's compound at Bab al-Aziza in 1986. The
  LNA also maintained a 50,000 watt radio station in Ndjamena, broadcasting anti-Qaddafi material
  into Libya. This radio station was supported by Western governments and Iraqi Military Intelligence.
  6. The LNA's greatest success came in support of the Chadian Army under General Idriss
  Deby, in their overwhelming victory over Libyan troops at the battle Ouadi Doum in 1987. This
  victory forced the Libyan Army and Air Force out of Chad, and was supported by the French Air Force
  and other Western personnel. Following the battle Deby became a national hero in Chad. In 1990,
  with the support of Libyan intelligence officers, Deby, who had undergone military training in Libya
  and France, rebelled against and overthrew the Habre Government. At that time Deby, under
  Qaddafi's influence, forced the LNA to abandon Chad for Zaire, and eventually the United States.
  Magariaf and Haftar both settled in the United States, and while the LNA no longer existed as an
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739892
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045225

  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739892
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  effective force, Magariaf continued to maintain the NFSL as a political organization. In 2004
  Magariaf and the NFSL joined the National Conference for the Libyan Opposition (NCLO), eventually
  returning to support the 2011 revolution.
  7. (Source Comment: In the opinion of an extremely sensitive source speaking on condition of
  strict secrecy, Magariaf views himself as an Islamist politician who can work with both Islamic and
  non-Islamic states, including Israel, if the relationships are properly managed. The Libyan President
  also sees the current situation as vindication for all of the problematic experiences he encountered in
  his long struggle against the Qaddafi regime, This individual believes that Magariaf intends to use his
  reputation for integrity, commitment to Islam, and his ability to work with divergent groups to
  establish himself as an effective interim President, and eventually the first elected Libyan Head of
  State in mid-2013. Magariaf plans to draw on all political, religious, and ethnic groups to form his
  cabinet, using his stature to form a representative government under the General National Council.)
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739892
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045226



DocNumber: C05739894
MetadataSubject: REQUEST
MetadataFrom: H
MetadataDateSent: 2012-09-11T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH1/DOC_0C05739894/C05739894.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739894
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN PART
ExtractedBodyText:
  H <hrod17@clintonernail.com>
  Tuesday, September 11, 2012 5:50 AM
  Huma Aleedin B6
  Request
  Can you get us a copy of Bernard Henri-Levi's film about Libya? I think Harvey made it and showed it at Cannes last
  spring.
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739894
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045227

RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739894
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  PART B6
  From:
  Sent:
  To:
  Subject:
  H <hrod17@clintonernail.com>
  Tuesday, September 11, 2012 5:50 AM
  Huma Aleedin B6
  Request
  Can you get us a copy of Bernard Henri-Levi's film about Libya? I think Harvey made it and showed it at Cannes last
  spring.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739894
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045227



DocNumber: C05739895
MetadataSubject: TOM DONILON
MetadataTo: H
MetadataFrom: Hanley, Monica R
MetadataDateSent: 2012-09-11T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH1/DOC_0C05739895/C05739895.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: Charge Nolan
ExtractedFrom: Hanley, Monica R <HanleyMROstate.gov>
ExtractedCc: Mills, Cheryl D; Sullivan, Jacob J
ExtractedDateSent: Tuesday, September 11, 2012 10:37 PM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739895
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN FULL
ExtractedBodyText:
  Its Tom DoniIon who wants to speak with you secure. Ops was mistaken. He would like to speak with you asap as he is
  leaving shortly.
  ------

RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739895
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  FULL
  From: Hanley, Monica R <HanleyMROstate.gov>
  Sent Tuesday, September 11, 2012 10:41 PM
  To:
  Cc: Mills, Cheryl D; Sullivan, Jacob J
  Subject Tom Dorilion
  Its Tom DoniIon who wants to speak with you secure. Ops was mistaken. He would like to speak with you asap as he is
  leaving shortly.
  ------ Original Message ---
  From: Hanley, Monica R
  Sent: Tuesday, September 11, 2012 10:37 PM
  To: 'HDR22@clintorierriail.corn‘ <HDR22@clintonemail.com>
  Cc: Mills, Cheryl 0; Sullivan, Jacob J
  Subject: Charge Nolan
  Would like to speak with you secure. We are waiting to hear back on his availability.
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739895
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045228



DocNumber: C05739897
MetadataSubject: CHRIS SMITH
MetadataTo: sullivanjj@state.gov
MetadataFrom: H
MetadataDateSent: 2012-09-11T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH1/DOC_0C05739897/C05739897.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: Chris Smith
ExtractedTo: 'sulliyanij@state.goy'; 'millscd@state.goy'; 'nulandyj@state.goy'
ExtractedFrom: H <hrod17@clintoneniail.com>
ExtractedDateSent: Tuesday, September 11, 2012 11:38 PM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739897
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN FULL
ExtractedBodyText:
  Cheryl told me the Libyans confirmed his death. Should we announce tonight or wait until morning?
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739897
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045229

RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739897
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  FULL
  From: H <hrod17@clintoneniail.com>
  Sent: Tuesday, September 11, 2012 11:38 PM
  To: 'sulliyanij@state.goy'; 'millscd@state.goy'; 'nulandyj@state.goy'
  Subject: Chris Smith
  Cheryl told me the Libyans confirmed his death. Should we announce tonight or wait until morning?
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739897
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045229



DocNumber: C05739898
MetadataSubject: CHRIS SMITH
MetadataTo: H
MetadataFrom: Mills, Cheryl D
MetadataDateSent: 2012-09-11T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH1/DOC_0C05739898/C05739898.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: RE: Chris Smith
ExtractedTo: H; Sullivan, Jacob 1; Nuland, Victoria J
ExtractedFrom: Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.gov>
ExtractedDateSent: Tuesday, September 11, 2012 11:38 PM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739898
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN FULL
ExtractedBodyText: We are awaiting formal confirmation from our team. We are drafting a statement while we wait.
RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739898
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  FULL
  From: Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.gov>
  Sent Tuesday, September 11, 2012 11:39 PM
  To: H; Sullivan, Jacob 1; Nuland, Victoria J
  Subject: RE: Chris Smith
  We are awaiting formal confirmation from our team. We are drafting a statement while we wait.
  Original Message
  From: H [mailto:HDR22@clintonemail.com]
  Sent: Tuesday, September 11, 2012 11:38 PM
  To Sullivan, Jacob J; Mills, Cheryl D; Nuland, Victoria J
  Subject: Chris Smith
  Cheryl told me the Libyans confirmed his death. Should we announce tonight or wait until morning?
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739898
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045230



DocNumber: C05739899
MetadataSubject: CHRIS SMITH
MetadataTo: millscd@state.gov
MetadataFrom: H
MetadataDateSent: 2012-09-11T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataDateReleased: 2015-05-22T04:00:00+00:00
MetadataPdfLink: DOCUMENTS/HRC_Email_1_296/HRCH1/DOC_0C05739899/C05739899.pdf
MetadataCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
MetadataDocumentClass: HRC_Email_296
ExtractedSubject: Re: Chris Smith
ExtractedTo: 'rnillscd@state.gov's
ExtractedFrom: H <hrod17@clintonemailcom>
ExtractedDateSent: Tuesday, September 11, 2012 11:40 PM
ExtractedCaseNumber: F-2015-04841
ExtractedDocNumber: C05739899
ExtractedDateReleased: 05/13/2015
ExtractedReleaseInPartOrFull: RELEASE IN FULL
ExtractedBodyText: Ok.
RawText:
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739899
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
  RELEASE IN
  FULL
  From: H <hrod17@clintonemailcom>
  Sent: Tuesday, September 11, 2012 11:40 PM
  To: 'rnillscd@state.gov's
  , sullivanijastate.goV; nulandvj@state.gost
  Subject: Re: Chris Smith
  Ok.
  Original Message --
  From Mills, Cheryl D imailto:iViillsCD@state.govi
  Sent: Tuesday, September 11, 2012 11:38 PM
  To H; Sullivan, Jacobi <Sullivanil@state.gov>; Nuland, Victoria J <nulandvj@state.gova
  Subject: RE: Chris Smith
  We are awaiting formal confirmation from our team. We are drafting a statement while we wait.
  Original Message
  From: H Imailto:HDR22@clintonernail.comj
  Sent: Tuesday, September 11, 2012 11:38 PM
  To: Sullivan, Jacobi; Mills, Cheryl 0; Nuland, Victoria I
  Subject: Chris Smith
  Cheryl told me the Libyans confirmed his death. Should we announce tonight or wait until morning?
  UNCLASSIFIED
  U.S. Department of State
  Case No. F-2015-04841
  Doc No. C05739899
  Date: 05/13/2015
  STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
  SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045231



